Showing posts with label Drones. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Drones. Show all posts

Thursday, July 23, 2015

Special Operators and Intelligence Analysts: the 21st Century’s Lead Warriors

1 hour panel at the link below.

Special Operators and Intelligence Analysts: the 21st Century’s Lead Warriors


Streamed live on Jul 23, 2015
Huge ground invasions and indefinite occupation forces are so last decade. Today’s wars, big and little, are being fought largely by the strategic deployment of limited Special Operators on the ground and intelligence analysts back stateside who dispatch them and drones to the world’s hot spots for quick “in and out” operations. Experts in this kind of 21st century warfare discuss the strengths and weaknesses of this approach to global crises.

Kathleen Hicks, Senior Vice President, Henry A. Kissinger Chair, and Director, International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Eric Olson, former Commander of US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and a member of the Aspen Institute Homeland Security Group

Michael Vickers, Former Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

Moderator: Kim Dozier, Contributing Writer, The Daily Beast; Global Analyst, CNN

Monday, April 7, 2014

S. Korean military vows to step up anti-drone measures

I hope people will think this through.  These small UAS/RPVs (or drones) are difficult to detect by anyone.  I remember the difficulties we had for year detecting the AN-2 Colts (canvas covered bi-plane that is a main nKPA SOF infiltration platform).

I think the most important thing the north might have done was to fly over the ROK and observe the action of the ROK military in response to the recent provocations.  But based on the photos that have been released it looks like all they are taking are rudimentary low quality still photos.  I do not think they were capable of streaming real time video.

The alleged photos of the Blue House were also of poor quality.  I compared them with Google Earth and Google Earth had much better resolution.  I wonder if the nKPA UAS/RPV operators are substituting Google Earth images for their images when they show them to Kim Jong-un.  I wonder if these overflights are for internal north Korean propaganda or perhaps the result of Kim Jong-un saying he wanted the "advanced capability" like modern nations have.  (Maybe they will halt their long range missile and nuclear weapons programs and shift to UAS/RPVs so they can move from these airplane toy systems to something more sophisticated).

On the other hand this could very well be psychological operations directed against the ROK.  It is easy to see the effects they might want to achieve - political problems for the President, undermining of confidence in the ROK military capabilities, a rapid shift of resources to develop the capabilities try to detect and defend against these systems.  

I think we should spend some time trying to understand the north Korean strategy (and in particular the psychological operations strategy) before we go overboard chasing these toy systems around.  And yes I know people fear that these will be loaded with explosives to attack target but they could probably carry perhaps a kilo of C4 and while that would do some damage it would be relatively minor and certainly have little military effect (so we again have to consider the psychological operations strategy of the north).

But the best immediate reaction to this is to prevent overreaction (which I know is difficult to prevent among ROK politicians and of course any politicians for that matter).

(2nd LD) S. Korean military vows to step up anti-drone measures


2014/04/07 17:30
By Kim Eun-jung
SEOUL, April 7 (Yonhap) - South Korea's defense minister ordered tighter vigilance against new threats of small unmanned aerial vehicles on Monday as a recent discovery of suspected North Korean drones has sparked concern over the nation's air defense system.
Kim Kwan-jin issued the order at a meeting of top military commanders convened to discuss anti-drone measures after South Korea collected three drones in less than a month near the western and eastern front and on a border island.
One was found in late March in Paju, just south of the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas, and the other was retrieved from the front-line island of Baengnyeong during the North's live-fire drills near the western maritime border last week.
Most recently, the military on Sunday revealed a third drone similar to the other two drones, which a local resident found in a mountain on the east coast in early October.
"If (North Korea) developed the small unmanned aerial aircraft for reconnaissance purposes to enhance its relatively weak surveillance capability, it is expected to develop drones for secret infiltration and terrorism purposes in the future," Kim said during the video conference held at the Joint Chiefs of Staff headquarters in Seoul.
South Korean Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin convenes a meeting of top commanders to discuss anti-drone measures at the Joint Chiefs of Staff headquarters on April 7, 2014. (Yonhap)

South Korean Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin convenes a meeting of top commanders to discuss anti-drone measures at the Joint Chiefs of Staff headquarters on April 7, 2014. (Yonhap)

"We should strengthen our military readiness to be able to monitor, detect, identify and strike (the drones) with existing military assets along the border."

   The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Choi Yun-hee, talked with the commander of U.S. Forces Korea, Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, via the video conference system to discuss ways to cooperate in dealing with North Korean drones, as well as threats posed by its missile and nuclear weapons, his office said. Scaparrotti is now in the U.S. to attend a congressional panel meeting on security situations on the Korean Peninsula.
Rudimentary drones have existed for almost as long as aircraft themselves for reconnaissance and surveillance missions have, but the drone incursions have raised concerns over more sophisticated, armed UAVs that can launch attacks on military assets and major facilities.
Seoul officials have discussed anti-UAV measures in the past years, but so far, defenses against drones mostly consist of signal jamming, radar detection and conventional counterattack used against other types of aircraft.
In light of the drone incursions, Seoul's defense ministry said it is considering purchasing advanced low-altitude surveillance radars and anti-aircraft guns to better guard against infiltration by small aircraft.
With an in-depth analysis current underway, the three sky blue drones equipped with cameras, which crashed either due to engine failure or lack of fuels, showed Pyongyang's UAV technology to be at a rudimentary level.
In light of the drone discovery made by reports from local residents, military units across the country began searching for other drones that may have crashed in South Korea.
During the meeting, the defense chief also pledged to cooperate with related government agencies and civilians to better spot the small aircraft, which are hard to detect with the existing radars.
As part of the measures, the military is considering giving a monetary reward to any informant who reports the existence of a drone, according to officials.
The latest details from the investigation showed that the drones found in Paju and Samcheok may have extended their flight range by having had their glow engines modified to run on a more effective gasoline fuel, said a military official with knowledge of the ongoing investigation. The glow engine is a small internal combustion engine typically used in model aircraft.
While the triangle-shaped drones with an average speed of 100-120 km per hour are believed to have flown as far as 200 km, the Samcheok drone was discovered 130 km south of the military demarcation line. It is a strong indication that the engine may have used more cost effective gasoline fuel as it is designed to fly a round trip covering a distance of over 260 km, the official said.
"The joint investigation team has assembled the drones to look into engines to figure out whether they were modified to gasoline engines to extend their flight range," the official said. "An in-depth analysis of the engine structure would provide (knowledge about the North's) technology to make drones that can fly according to prearranged coordinates unaffected by wind."

   If the North successfully modified the glow engine to run on gasoline mix, it could conduct spy missions farther south, he added.
Experts say North Korea is believed to have deployed about 100 attack drones it unveiled last March during military drills, which was lauded by leader Kim Jong-un.
The range of the drones is estimated at up to 800 kilometers, sufficient to strike major South Korean and U.S. military targets in South Korea.
The North on Saturday derided the discovery of the drones that flew undetected over key areas in Seoul that tarnished the image of the South Korean forces, but made no mention of its involvement.
If the ongoing probe confirms that the drones were sent by the North, the spokesman for Seoul's defense ministry said it would constitute a violation of the Armistice Agreement of the 1950-53 Korean War and international regulations, and vowed to take "relevant actions" without elaborating on the details of potential measures.
The JCS said Sunday it will take necessary "military and legal actions" over the North's violation of its airspace if the drones are found to have come from the country.

Saturday, January 25, 2014

SecDef Should Crack Whip On Cyber, Drones, & Training Foreigners

Sydney analyzes the just released CNAS report on roles and missions by the their active duty military fellows.  I think it is worth reading and debating.  I have one comment to offer on Sydney's analysis and "competition" (Sydney's word) between the Army, Marine Corps, and SOF in Phase Zero operations.  Excerpt:

So-called Phase Zero Operations, in which US troops train foreign forces, conduct exercises with them, and even quietly help them secure their countries. Historically, Special Operations Forces did the small-scale, low-profile, long-term work in the shadows, while the four services occasionally showed up for big high-profile exercises. But after 9/11, the “Big Army” andMarine Corps both had to build up Afghan and Iraqi forces, expertise they don’t want to lose. Now now they are to some extent competing (my word, not the authors’) with each other and with SOCOM for Phase 0 business around the world, especially in the high-profile Pacific“The Department of Defense needs to provide the services guidance on their primary mission responsibilities in Phase 0 operations,” the four officer write, “instead of letting the services make their own decision about the force size and mix required.”

What is really required is simply to use the right forces for the right missions.  The Army, Marine Corps, and SOF are different forces with different capabilities (and as an old boss used to say "jointness does not equal sameness" - our joint force is better by having the right mix of different capabilities rather than trying to make the organizations that make up the joint force the same or do the same things, but I digress).  While DOD does need to provide service guidance what is really necessary to prevent "competition" (which of course is not always bad but in this case might lead to redundancy vice efficiency among capabilities) is a comprehensive strategy with supporting campaign plans that will determine the right mix of capabilities and forces to support the strategy.  i think the DOD guidance will end up being focused on force structure and budget with "competition" to employ their capabilities in support of the geographic combatant commands in order to justify their force structure and share of the resource pie.  In effect there is a lot of push, but is there a real pull from the combatant commands and the chiefs of mission for these capabilities?  Again more fundamentally, are we developing a comprehensive national strategy and regional campaign plans and country team mission strategic plans that will call for and then orchestrate the right service capabilities to accomplish the required ends of the strategy?
V/R
Dave


A Croatian soldier and a Minnesota National Guardsman train together for Afghanistan.
A Croatian soldier and a Minnesota National Guardsman train together for Afghanistan.
Yesterday, four mid-grade military officers — one from each armed service – made a remarkable public recommendation to their boss, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel: It’s time to force the four services back into clearly demarcated “lanes” and reduce overlap between them as budgets shrink and competition escalates. They focused on three high-priority areas:
  1. Cybersecurity, the one area of the budget that’s actually growing. As a result, all four services are training “cyber warriors” and creating “cyber” units — but with no clear guidance from the Defense Department on which service should specialize in what, so everyone is doing a bit of everything. “The services risk building similar capabilities in different ways to conduct the same mission,” the co-authors write, “[with] significant duplication and overlap.” Their (tentative) solution: take away some of the services’ authority to “train, equip, and organize” cybersecurity personnel and give it to the interservice Cyber Command. That step would raise CYBERCOM to a status currently enjoyed only by Special Operations Command (SOCOM), halfway to being a full-scale independent service.
  2. Drones, aka “unmanned aircraft systems” (UAS). “Currently,” they write, “the four services are developing 15 separate UAS platforms of varying weights, speeds and altitudes” (see exhibits 123, and 4), as well as “42 separate UAS payload development programs… [and] 13 ground control stations.” While they stop short of a specific recommendation here, the co-authors do note regretfully  that the current UAS Task Force lacks “authority over the services for programmatic consolidation or termination.” (Hint, hint?) They also speak approvingly of the much-derided 1947 Key West agreement, which among other things defined what kind of (manned) aircraft each service could fly.
(Continued at the link below)

Monday, May 27, 2013

US intelligence embraces debate in security issues

Excerpt:

Clapper, who has been working on intelligence issues for a half-century, is well aware of how jittery many Americans feel about the spy community. The internal debates, he believes, should bolster their confidence that intelligence officials have thoroughly weighed all aspects of some of the world's most difficult security issues before deciding how high a threat they pose. 
"I think it'd be very unhealthy - and I get a lot of pushback from people - if I tried to insist that you will have one uniform view and this is what I think, and that's what goes. That just wouldn't work," he said. "There is the fundamental tenet of truth to power, presenting inconvenient truths at inconvenient times. That's part of our system."
Much of the focus of this article is on man hunting and intelligence to support drone strikes or in the case of north Korea, enemy capabilities.  While that is hard and important work, what is the real challenge is intelligence analysis anticipating actions and most importantly to be able to assess the intent of others whether they be hostile state or non-state actors.

But I absolutely agree with the thrust of the article in that dissension and disagreement within the intelligence community is not a bad thing.  It illustrates that there are people thinking critically out there and that intelligence is not subject to politicalization (at least among the analysts – but the politicalization can still occur after the assessments and analysis are provided to policy and decision makers).
V/R
Dave

US intelligence embraces debate in security issues


LARA JAKES
Published: Today


FILE - In this May 1, 2011, image released by the White House and digitally altered by the source to obscure the details of a document in front of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, right with hand covering mouth, President Barack Obama, second from left, Vice President Joe Biden, left, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, right, and members of the national security team watch an update of the mission against Osama bin Laden in the White House Situation Room in Washington. As the world now knows well Obama ultimately decided to launch the raid on the Abbottabad compound that killed bin Laden, though faced with a level of widespread skepticism from a veteran intelligence analyst, shared with other top-level officials, which nearly scuttled the raid. That process reflected a sea change within the U.S. spy community, one that embraces debate to avoid “slam-dunk” intelligence in tough national security decisions. (AP Photo/The White House, Pete Souza, File)

WASHINGTON (AP) - In the months leading up to the killing of Osama bin Laden, veteran intelligence analyst Robert Cardillo was given the nickname "Debbie Downer." With each new tidbit of information that tracked bin Laden to a high-walled compound in northern Pakistan - phone records, satellite imaging, clues from other suspects - Cardillo cast doubt that the terror network leader and mastermind was actually there.

As the world now knows well, President Barack Obama ultimately decided to launch a May 2011 raid on the Abbottabad compound that killed bin Laden. But the level of widespread skepticism that Cardillo shared with other top-level officials - which nearly scuttled the raid - reflected a sea change within the U.S. spy community, one that embraces debate to avoid "slam-dunk" intelligence in tough national security decisions.

The same sort of high-stakes dissent was on public display recently as intelligence officials grappled with conflicting opinions about threats in North Korea and Syria. And it is a vital part of ongoing discussions over whether to send deadly drone strikes against terror suspects abroad - including U.S. citizens.

The three cases provide a rare look inside the secretive 16 intelligence agencies as they try to piece together security threats from bits of vague information from around the world. But they also raise concerns about whether officials who make decisions based on their assessments can get clear guidance from a divided intelligence community.

At the helm of what he calls a healthy discord is Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, who has spent more than two-thirds of his 72 years collecting, analyzing and reviewing spy data from war zones and rogue nations. Clapper, the nation's fourth top intelligence chief, says disputes are uncommon but absolutely necessary to get as much input as possible in far-flung places where it's hard for the U.S. to extract - or fully understand - ground-level realities.

"What's bad about dissension? Is it a good thing to have uniformity of view where everyone agrees all the time? I don't think so," Clapper told The Associated Press in an interview Friday. "...People lust for uniform clairvoyance. We're not going to do that."

"We are never dealing with a perfect set of facts," Clapper said. "You know the old saw about the difference between mysteries and secrets? Of course, we're held equally responsible for divining both. And so those imponderables like that just have to be factored."

Looking in from the outside, the dissension can seem awkward, if not uneasy - especially when the risks are so high.

At a congressional hearing last month, Rep. Doug Lamborn, R-Colo., read from a Defense Intelligence Agency report suggesting North Korea is able to arm long-range missiles with nuclear warheads. The April 11 disclosure, which had been mistakenly declassified, came at the height of Kim Jong Un's sabre-rattling rhetoric and raised fears that U.S. territory or Asian nations could be targeted for an attack.

Within hours, Clapper announced that the DIA report did not reflect the opinions of the rest of the intelligence community, and that North Korea was not yet fully capable of launching a nuclear-armed missile.

Two weeks later, the White House announced that U.S. intelligence concluded that Syrian President Bashar Assad has probably used deadly chemical weapons at least twice in his country's fierce civil war. But White House officials said the intelligence wasn't strong enough to justify sending significant U.S. military support to Syrian rebels who are fighting Assad's regime.

Because the U.S. has few sources to provide first-hand information in Syria, the intelligence agencies split on how confident they were that Assad had deployed chemical weapons. The best they could do was conclude that the Syrian regime, at least, probably had undertaken such an effort. This put Obama in the awkward political position of having said the use of chemical weapons would cross a "red line" and have "enormous consequences," but not moving on the news of chemical weapons use, when the occasion arose, because the intelligence was murky.

Lamborn said he welcomes an internal intelligence community debate but is concerned that the North Korean threat was cavalierly brushed aside.

"If they want to argue among themselves, that's fine," said Lamborn, a member of the House Armed Services Committee. However, he also said, "We should be cautious when evaluating different opinions, and certainly give credence to the more sobering possibilities. ... When it comes to national security, I don't think we want to have rose-colored glasses on, and sweep threats under the rug."
Clapper said that, in fact, U.S. intelligence officials today are more accustomed to predicting gloom and doom. "We rain on parades a lot," he said.

Current and former U.S. intelligence officials say the vigorous internal debate was spawn from a single mistake about a threat - and an overly aggressive response.


Congress demanded widespread intelligence reform after the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks, to fix a system where agencies hoarded threat information instead of routinely sharing it. Turf wars between the CIA and the FBI, in particular, were common. The CIA generally was considered the nation's top intelligence agency, and its director was the president's principal intelligence adviser.
(Continued at the link below)


Wednesday, March 6, 2013

Drones, Covert Action, and Counterterrorism: Why UAV Strikes should be Exclusively Military


This should stir up some discussion.  I do not know how much experience Mr. Segalini has in the National Clandestine Service and whether he is qualified to make this analysis but it should provoke some debate and discussion.  But these two paragraphs are interesting:
None of this is to say that any particular program of direct strikes caused the CIA to miss catching the Arab Spring.  It these sorts of programs, however, that form a larger trend of the Agency adopting “traditional military actions and operations” to an unprecedented degree, and it has been to the detriment of the Agency’s unique function and competence.  The Agency’s agility may have critical in bringing military assets rapidly to bear in the dynamic days immediately after September 11, 2001.  Long term, however, these programs are largely unnecessary.  The military is perfectly capable of operating these programs effectively while maintaining their security.  It has been reported extensively that JSOC maintains its own capabilities to conduct such actions and maintain OPSEC.  Indeed, according to Col. Charles Beckwith in his book about the founding of Delta Force, the constituent units within JSOC were originally stood up to conduct precisely these kinds of operations, such as the direct action raid in Abbottobad now so famous, and they were always understood to be operating under military authorities.  It is somewhat puzzling that after 30 years, it appears that someone only recently realized many central JSOC activities apparently need to “borrow” authorities from CIA. 
Regardless of whether it is JSOC military activity under CIA authorities, or CIA seconding the military’s capabilities to conduct an operation, undoubtedly these practices have fueled the critics of the Agency who see it as becoming “too militarized”.  This is too clumsy a phrase to serve as effective critique.  The problem is really somewhat different. The war on terror has reportedly seen the CIA adopt a “plug and play” approach to its paramilitary operations, hiring large numbers of former military personnel of all stripes to do their job just as if they were still in uniform.  
But this statement illustrates an age old debate and the tension between unconventional warfare and direct action or special warfare and surgical strike. In the context of philosophy this should not be an either/or construct but rather a both/and relationship.  Instead of arguing one is better than the other we need a strategy that employs the right ways and means to accomplish our ends - rarely are the ways exclusive but instead should provide the right mix to be most effective. It could be a combination of both below and of course the right strategy may employ neither as well. The key is balance and coherency among ends, ways, and means to support our national policy and protect our interests.
Subversion, sabotage, psychological operations, the manipulation of our enemy’s perception of his world and even of his own organization, have all taken a back seat to kinetic strikes.  The results have been less than impressive, and the value added, arguably, has been nil.
V/R
Dave

Drones, Covert Action, and Counterterrorism: Why UAV Strikes should be Exclusively Military

Journal Article | March 6, 2013 - 3:30am

The recent confirmation hearings for John Brennan’s nomination as CIA director occasioned an extended discussion--and unusually a rather public one at that--on the role and organizational identity of the CIA.  Brennan’s predecessor General Petraeus was a military man, perhaps the consummate military man of the age in terms of bearing, demeanor and vision; but he was sent to run a place which has always held itself apart from the military in its conventions and mission.  Yet the tension between the proximity of the CIA to military matters, and its inherent “otherness” has given rise to a debate amongst practitioners and observers alike, and has adopted as shorthand for the CIA’s various roles the idea that paramilitary operations and covert action are the central matter in dispute.  The most visible manifestation of these activities are the activities surrounding counterterrorism, and the most visible example of those are a supposed program run by CIA to conduct UAV strikes against terrorist targets outside of active combat zones. 

So much more the case recently, as memoranda from the Department of Justice have reached media outlets, laying down the rationale behind the use of UAV strikes even against U.S. citizens, presumably in operations conducted by the Department of Defense, whose program is acknowledged.  But more than that has been the confirmation hearing for Brennan, a former CIA officer whom President Obama nominated to become the Agency’s 21st Director.  During the Senate confirmation hearings, many questions from the Senators had to do with the practice of targeted killings and other CIA activities that are essentially military in nature.  Mr. Brennan was very careful not to confirm or deny any supposed covert action operations, but the questions from the Senators on the Senate’s Select Intelligence Committee made it seem to the even the casual observer that they were talking about the alleged Drone program, and some of the very serious issues surrounding it.

One of the more interesting dimensions to this issue has been reported by both the Washington Post, several weeks ago, and more recently by Michael Hirsh of the National Journal on February 7, which is the notion that Brennan feels “the [drone] program has run its course as a CIA operation” and that moving such a program to the Defense Department is the way forward in the future.  If true, this would be an important idea worth exploring, not least because it comes to us from a career CIA man.  Such men are not known for being eager to give away programs to the Defense Department.  It is also worth exploring because when the whole matter is considered, Brennan’s position would absolutely be the right one.  Any program of UAV strikes against high value targets being run from CIA is bad for covert action, bad for the CIA, bad for counterterrorism operations, and none too good either for war policy or the Law.

It is important to acknowledge from the outset that some very relevant practical questions are involved.  Recent articles in the Washington Post and in syndicated wires reported that the CIA’s supposed use of UAV strikes is meant to be exempted for two years from new restrictions and procedures in the “Counterterrorism Playbook”. For the time being at least, it appears that policymakers are not willing to transfer the program.  The reasoning goes that such supposed operations are too expedient to be stopped now or transferred immediately to a more structured program with greater oversight.  It is an argument with powerful momentum.  It will be difficult to overcome.  It may also be the case that Brennan’s priorities upon assuming the Directorship of the CIA will not at first include laying the groundwork for such a transfer.  Directors who arrive at Langley with major shifts in mind about how the Agency does its business tend not to last very long.  Even those who do, often run up against great amounts of bureaucratic inertia in trying to accomplish their goals.  All that aside, however, Brennan did remark at his hearing that “The CIA should not be doing traditional military activities and operations”, so at least he appears to have the right intentions, and the goal of placing a UAV strike program entirely within Defense is entirely right and worth pursuing. 

Why such a program is bad Covert Action--Many writers have either defended or attacked the the idea of CIA UAV strikes based on their support (or not) for a “paramilitary CIA”, a “wartime Agency” or a “militarized CIA”, as if the CIA’s authorities to conduct covert action mean precisely UAV strikes.  In reality, equating Drone strikes with paramilitary operations or covert action (CA) is a fallacy.  Most people, a surprising number of whom work in intelligence and special operations, don’t know what covert action is, and no doubt this contributes to the poor reasoning.  Yet any examination of the history of covert action, or even of what the term means, would clearly show that a drone strike program would be so far removed from the law, spirit and tradition of covert action that it strains the idea to the very limit. 

Covert Action (CA) is defined in Executive Order 12333, the latest version of which was amended in 2008.  It is available in full online and I encourage anyone wishing to learn more about CA to read it.  The definition of covert action is as follows:
(B)Covert action  means an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include:
(1) Activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence, traditional counterintelligence activities, traditional activities to improve or maintain the operational security of United States Government programs, or administrative activities;
(2) Traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support to such activities;...
The definition goes on to list other exceptions, but what primarily concerns us are the main definition and the first two exemptions.  It is also noteworthy that only the CIA, unless during a time of declared war, or under jurisdiction The War Powers Act, can perform covert action. 
(Continued at the link below)
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/drones-covert-action-and-counterterrorism-why-uav-strikes-should-be-exclusively-military

Tuesday, February 5, 2013

Exclusive: Justice Department memo reveals legal case for drone strikes on Americans


The  4.8MB, 16 page memo is at this link.  Note it is titled a "White Paper" and there is no attribution and no office symbol.  Too bad NBC News had to plaster its watermark all over it as it makes it a little hard to read. 
V/R
Dave

Exclusive: Justice Department memo reveals legal case for drone strikes on Americans
Michael Isikoff
9:30 PM on 02/04/2013

A confidential Justice Department memo concludes that the U.S. government can order the killing of American citizens if they are believed to be “senior operational leaders” of al-Qaida or “an associated force” — even if there is no intelligence indicating they are engaged in an active plot to attack the U.S.
The 16-page memo, a copy of which was obtained by NBC News, provides new details about the legal reasoning behind one of the Obama administration’s most secretive and controversial polices: its dramatically increased use of drone strikes against al-Qaida suspects, including those aimed at American citizens, such as the  September 2011 strike in Yemen that killed alleged al-Qaida operatives Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan. Both were U.S. citizens who had never been indicted by the U.S. government nor charged with any crimes.

The secrecy surrounding such strikes is fast emerging as a central issue in this week’s hearing of White House counterterrorism adviser John Brennan, a key architect of the drone campaign, to be CIA director.  Brennan was the first administration official to publicly acknowledge drone strikes in a speech last year, calling them “consistent with the inherent right of self-defense.” In a separate talk at the Northwestern University Law School in March, Attorney General Eric Holder specifically endorsed the constitutionality of targeted killings of Americans, saying they could be justified if government officials determine the target poses  “an imminent threat of violent attack.”

But the confidential Justice Department “white paper” introduces a more expansive definition of self-defense or imminent attack than described  by Brennan or Holder in their public speeches.  It refers, for example, to what it calls a “broader concept of imminence” than actual intelligence about any ongoing plot against the U.S. homeland.

“The condition that an operational  leader present an ‘imminent’ threat of violent attack against the United States does not require the United States to have clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take place in the immediate future,” the memo states.


Instead, it says,  an “informed, high-level” official of the U.S. government may determine that the targeted American  has been “recently” involved in “activities” posing a threat of a violent attack and “there is  no evidence suggesting that he has renounced or abandoned such activities.” The memo does not define “recently” or “activities.”
(Continued at the link below)

Tuesday, January 8, 2013

Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies


The report can be downloaded at the link below.  Worth a look for those interested in Drone Policy.
V/R
Dave
Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies
Author: Micah Zenko, Douglas Dillon Fellow

Download Now
Publisher
Council on Foreign Relations Press
Release Date
January 2013
51 pages
ISBN 978-0-87609-544-7
Council Special Report No. 65

Overview
Over the last ten years, drones have become a critical tool in the war against terrorist and militant organizations worldwide. Their advantages over other weapons and intelligence systems are well known. They can silently observe an individual, group, or location for hours on end, but take immediate action should a strike opportunity become available—all without putting a pilot at risk. This combination of capabilities is unique and has allowed the United States to decimate the leadership of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and disrupt the activities of many other militant groups.

Yet, as Micah Zenko writes in this Council Special Report, drones are not without their drawbacks, especially with regard to targeted killings. Like any tool, drones are only as useful as the information guiding them, and for this they are heavily reliant on local military and intelligence cooperation. More important, significant questions exist about who constitutes a legitimate target and under what circumstances it is acceptable to strike. There is also the question of net utility: To what extent are the specific benefits derived from drone strikes offset by the reality that the strikes often alienate the local government and population? And there is the reality that drones are proliferating but, as is often the case with new technologies, the international legal and regulatory framework is lagging behind.
Continued at the link below and the report may be downloaded there as well)

Thursday, December 20, 2012

Robot Wars: The Brave New World

Two Security Studies Program professors quoted in this article: Dan Byman and Christopher Swift.
V/R
Dave


Robot Wars: The Brave New World
December 17, 2012 6:57 AM

In future wars, will human soldiers be replaced by weapons that think for themselves? Lots of remote control systems are already on the battlefield. Chas Henry, All News 99.1′s national security correspondent, met with warfighters, scientists, critical analysts and the nation’s top military officer to explore the world of …ROBOT WARS.
WASHINGTON – When we humans go to war, our least favorite way is hand-to-hand, face-to-face.

“It speaks to human nature,” says MIT Professor Missy Cummings, a former Navy fighter pilot. “We don’t really like to kill, and if we are going to kill, we like to do it from far away.”

Over centuries, that’s led to creation of weapons that allow us to separate ourselves from our adversaries — first by yards, then miles. Now, technology allows attacks half a world away.
Until a decade ago, most of the remote engagement capability was owned by the U.S. or Israel. Not anymore.

Unmanned platforms –- in the air, on the ground, and on or under the water — are becoming less and less expensive. So are the sensors that help guide them. And nanotechnology is making them smaller.
Today, U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan launch throw-bots into the air by hand, and mini-helicopters deliver frontline supplies by remote control. Adding artificial intelligence to the mix, we’re now seeing some platforms operating without even remote human control. An unmanned aircraft flown by an internal computer recently refueled another unmanned plane – in the air – as it, too, flew completely on its own.

These tools of remote engagement (the people operating them don’t like to call them ‘drones’) are already changing modern battlefields. And some people worry we may not be giving enough thought to how much they’re going to change things.

Simon Ramo has been thinking about this for a long time. At 99 years old, he knows something about national security. Remember the defense firm TRW? He’s the ‘R.’
(Continued at the link below)

Sunday, December 9, 2012

May the robot shoot back at the human?


Mark addresses an issue I certainly had not thought of.  I do not think I have seen anything else written along these lines from this perspective.  The attack has not made much of a blip on the news media's radar.
V/R
Dave

May the robot shoot back at the human?

By Mark Hagerott
The Virginian-Pilot
© December 9, 2012

Something profound happened in early November 2012, and it was not Gen. David Petraeus' resignation. Rather, history was made when two manned Iranian SU-25s attacked an unmanned American aircraft in international airspace above the waters of the Persian Gulf, an area near and dear to many a Hampton Roads sailor and pilot.

The attack was unprecedented in peacetime. The American decision not to respond in a manner similar to past responses when manned aircraft have been attacked may well establish a new precedent for one of the most fundamental questions going forward into the 21st century: the relationship between humans and robots on the battlefield.

As a Norfolk-based sailor for almost 10 years, I have made multiple deployments into war zones. When going into harm's way, the Rules of Engagement were always clear: When in international waters or air space, if U.S. Navy ships or aircraft came under attack, we had the right to self defense and were authorized in all cases to take immediate defensive action (ie., shoot back).

Historically, an attack in international waters or air space is a matter of the highest import. Tensions rise, and in some cases nations are brought to the brink of war. When in 1968 North Korea attacked the USS Pueblo, an unarmed intelligence ship in international waters, the American military went on high alert, and war was not out of the question. When Libya threatened freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Sidra and fired at Navy aircraft in 1981, U.S. forces shot down the Libyan attackers.

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