Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy

This long chronology below may be of interest to those who want to follow along on what north Korea is doing.

Today's report that there was no "smoking gun" regarding the north's recent nuclear test made me recall the hole in the ground that north Korea dug in the late 1990's (see excerpt from the chronology below) that went undetected for a long while and then when we discovered it we ended up negotiating (e.g. paying extortion money) to inspect it and it turned out to be a big hole in the ground with nothing in it and no one observed where they put all the dirt.  The regime is masterful at deception as well as getting us to pay for something they do not have or do not intend to use (or test). 

I defer to the intel community for the accurate assessment of what actually occurred (was it live or was it memorex?  dating myself with reference to old TV commercials I know :-)) but we should keep in mind that the north truly believes that all warfare is based on deception.

Excerpt:

December 4-11, 1998: The United States and North Korea hold talks to address U.S. concerns about a suspected underground nuclear facility at Kumchang-ni. Pyongyang reportedly accepts in principle the idea of a U.S. inspection of the site but is unable to agree with U.S. proposals for “appropriate compensation.” 

May 20-24, 1999: A U.S. inspection team visits the North Korean suspected nuclear site in Kumchang-ni. According to the State Department, the team finds no evidence of nuclear activity or violation of the Agreed Framework. 

May 25-28, 1999: Traveling to Pyongyang as a presidential envoy, Perry meets with senior North Korean political, diplomatic, and military officials to discuss a major expansion in bilateral relations if Pyongyang is willing to address U.S. security concerns. Perry delivers a letter from President Clinton to North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, but the two do not meet. Perry reportedly calls on North Korea to satisfy U.S. concerns about ongoing nuclear weapons-related activities that are beyond the scope of the Agreed Framework and about ballistic missile development and proliferation in exchange for the lifting of U.S. sanctions, normalization of diplomatic relations, and potentially some form of security guarantee.

Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy

http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron

Latest ACA Resources

North Korea

• Prelude to an ICBM? Putting North Korea’s Unha-3 Launch Into Context
  (March 2013)
• Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: North Korea
  (February 12, 2013)

Press Contact: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107; Kelsey Davenport, Nonproliferation Analyst, (202) 463-8270 x102

Updated: February 2013

For years, the United States and the international community have tried to negotiate an end to North Korea’s nuclear and missile development and its export of ballistic missile technology. Those efforts have been replete with periods of crisis, stalemate, and tentative progress towards denuclearization, and North Korea has long been a key challenge for the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.

The United States has pursued a variety of policy responses to the proliferation challenges posed by North Korea, including military cooperation with U.S. allies in the region, wide-ranging sanctions, and non-proliferation mechanisms such as export controls. The United States also engaged in two major diplomatic initiatives in which North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons efforts in return for aid.

In 1994, faced with North Korea’s announced intent to withdraw from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which requires non-nuclear weapon states to forswear the development and acquisition of nuclear weapons, the United States and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework. Under this agreement, Pyongyang committed to freezing its illicit plutonium weapons program in exchange for aid.

Following the collapse of this agreement in 2002, North Korea claimed that it had withdrawn from the NPT in January 2003 and once again began operating its nuclear facilities.

The second major diplomatic effort were the Six-Party Talks initiated in August of 2003 which involved China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States. In between periods of stalemate and crisis, those talks arrived at critical breakthroughs in 2005, when North Korea pledged to abandon “all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs” and return to the NPT, and in 2007, when the parties agreed on a series of steps to implement that 2005 agreement.

Those talks, however, broke down in 2009 following disagreements over verification and an internationally condemned North Korea rocket launch. Pyongyang has since stated that it would never return to the talks and is no longer bound by their agreements. The other five parties state that they remain committed to the talks, and have called for Pyongyang to recommit to its 2005 denuclearization pledge.

The following chronology summarizes in greater detail developments in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, and the efforts to end them, since 1985.

Skip to: 1985, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004,2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013

1985

December 12, 1985: North Korea accedes to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) but does not complete a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Under Article III of the NPT, North Korea has 18 months to conclude such an arrangement. In coming years, North Korea links adherence to this provision of the treaty to the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea.

1991

September 27, 1991: President George Bush announces the unilateral withdrawal of all naval and land-based tactical nuclear weapons deployed abroad. Approximately 100 U.S. nuclear weapons had been based in South Korea. Eight days later, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev reciprocates.

November 8, 1991: In response to President Bush’s unilateral move, President Roh Tae Woo of South Korea announces the Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, under which South Korea promises not to produce, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons. In addition, the declaration unilaterally prohibits South Korea from possessing nuclear reprocessing or uranium enrichment facilities. These promises, if enacted, would satisfy all of North Korea’s conditions for allowing IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities.

December 31, 1991: The two Koreas sign the South-North Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Under the declaration, both countries agree not to “test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons” or to “possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.” They also agree to mutual inspections for verification.

1992

January 30, 1992: More than six years after signing the NPT, North Korea concludes a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

March 6, 1992: The United States imposes sanctions on North Korea’s Lyongaksan Machineries and Equipment Export Corporation and Changgwang Sinyong Corporation for missile proliferation activities.*

April 9, 1992: North Korea ratifies the safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

May 4, 1992: North Korea submits its nuclear material declarations to the IAEA, declaring seven sites and some 90 grams of plutonium that could be subject to IAEA inspection. Pyongyang claims that the nuclear material was the result of reprocessing 89 defective fuel rods in 1989. The IAEA conducted inspections to verify the completeness of this declaration from mid-1992 to early 1993.

June 23, 1992: The United States imposes “missile sanctions” on the North Korean entities sanctioned in March.*

September 1992: IAEA inspectors discover discrepancies in North Korea’s “initial report” on its nuclear program and ask for clarification on several issues, including the amount of reprocessed plutonium in North Korea.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron

The North Korea Problem

This except from the conclusion sums up both the policy and strategic dilemma we face and is an illustration of the "tyranny of proximity" (the advantage the north has with its capability to fire on Seoul):

But this policy of patiently waiting for verifiable changes in DPRK policies possesses several risks. First, it provides North Koreans with additional time to refine their nuclear and missile programs. Second, the current stalemate is inherently unstable. The DPRK could at any time resume testing its nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, likely to confirm and support its quest for a reliable nuclear deterrent but also possibly out of simple frustration about being ignored. The strategy also risks allowing a minor incident to escalate through the ROK’s “proactive deterrence” policy, which calls for responding immediately and disproportionately to any DPRK military provocations to deter further aggression. 

The worst scenario would see the DPRK leadership, thinking that their nuclear and missile arsenals would protect them by deterring potential counterattacks, launching another provocation only to trigger the massive and prompt response posited in the new ROK strategy. The DPRK might respond by detonating a nuclear device in order to shock the ROK and its foreign allies into de-escalating the crisis. Or it might simply bombard Seoul and its environs with the enormous number of artillery systems that the DPRK has amassed in the border region.

But regardless of the above scenario, if the north conducts another provocation along the lines of P-Y Do it is imperative for the ROK respond immediately at the "point of provocation" with decisive tactical military force.  By "winning" the tactical engagement with a decisive response the ROK can actually prevent escalation.  A slow decision making process leading to a slow response or a decision to strike deeper targets or those not directly tied to the actual provocation is what risks potential escalation.  Tactical readiness of ROK forces that can provide an immediate and decisive response is the key to preventing escalation.

V/R

Dave

The North Korea Problem

December 16, 2012

By Richard Weitz

Pyongyang has successfully tested a long-range rocket. What may happen next -- including missiles someday armed with nuclear warheads -- could make matters worse.

After announcing that its rocket was facing technical difficultiesthat might delay its impending test, North Korea surprised the international community by abruptly launching a three-stage rocket on Wednesday morning local time. Even more surprising than the timing was that the “Unha” (the Korean word for “galaxy”) rocket appears to have successfully placed the Kwangmyongsong-3 (“Shining Star-3”) satellite into orbit, albeit there are reports that it is encountering difficulties.

But space enthusiasts have nothing to cheer. Under the guise of developing a space launch vehicle, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is pursuing an intercontinental-range missile (ICBM) capability that would allow it reach targets as far away as California and Alaska.  Long-range rockets designed as space delivery vehicles and long-range ballistic missiles intended to carry warheads use similar engines, boosters, and other technologies, though a satellite can be made lighter than a nuclear warhead, which needs a dense heat shield to withstand the high temperatures encountered in reentering the earth’s atmosphere. The Kwangmyongsong-3 weighs an estimated 100 kilograms, whereas a typical nuclear warhead weighs ten times more, though a good designer can make them far smaller and therefore lighter.  

(Continued at the link below)

http://thediplomat.com/2012/12/16/the-north-korea-problem-from-bad-to-worse/?all=true

The prospect of a North Korean ICBM

I think the regime's intentions have always been clear on wanting this capability but I am glad that it is not longer in question for some. That is one very positive thing that come from last week's launch – there should be no questions as the regime's priorities and intent.

Hugh White is right to question the impact on the concept of extended deterrence now.  However, I think he is wrong in his assessment that an ICBM is a bad investment for Pyongyang.  He is correct from a Western viewpoint but from the regime's viewpoint it provides multiple opportunities for a return on investment from its belief that it provides a deterrence and defense capability, that it is instrumental in multiple ways to support its blackmail diplomacy based on provocations to gain political and economic concessions, it supports domestic propaganda, it enhances credibility with the regime elite, and proliferation brings hard currency.  From the regime's calculus it is a damn good investment.

V/R

Dave

The prospect of a North Korean ICBM

By Hugh White - 17 December 2012 11:39AM

As usual, most commentary on North Korea's rocket launch last week focuses on the politics and diplomacy of Pyongyang's delinquency. But it is worth exploring the strategic implications more specifically. These are significant, but not straightforward.

The apparently successful launch of a three-stage rocket makes it rather clearer than before that North Korea has both the capacity and the intention to build an intercontinental-range ballistic missile (ICBM). It is now prudent to expect that in perhaps as little as a decade, if North Korea survives in its present form, it may well have an operational ICBM capability. This would give Pyongyang the capacity to deliver a small number of probably relatively low-yield nuclear warheads onto American cities. 

The key question, therefore, is what this would mean for strategic affairs in Northeast Asia over coming decades.

The first thing to say is what it doesn't mean. It does not mean North Korea has any rational options to initiate an unprovoked nuclear attack on the US, because that would certainly produce a totally devastating US response. Nor does it make much if any difference to Pyongyang's capacity to deter a nuclear, or regime-threatening conventional, attack on North Korea. Its existing medium-range nuclear delivery options bring plenty of high-value targets within range of its nuclear forces today, so Pyongyang already has the capacity to deter military action which potential attackers would fear might cross Pyongyang's red lines.

But an ICBM capability would undermine the deterrent umbrella extended by the US to its Asian allies.

Extended deterrence depends on the credibility (to both the adversary and the ally) of US threats to respond to any nuclear attack on the ally with a US nuclear attack on the adversary. Such credibility depends a great deal on whether the adversary has the capacity to hit back at the US. As long as North Korea has no credible capacity to target America itself, a US retaliatory strike on the North carries relatively low risks for the US itself. 

But if the North can hit back, the costs for the US go up dramatically, and the credibility of the US threat goes down. In a crisis, everyone will be asking whether stopping North Korea doing whatever it wants to do is important enough to America to risk a nuclear attack on Honolulu or LA.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2012/12/17/The-prospect-of-a-North-Korean-ICBM.aspx

A North Korean message to the world?

Excerpt: 

So, what message is Kim trying to send almost a year after his father's death? And how should the world respond?

As I have mentioned whatever message the Kim Family Regime is trying to send the world, the message we should receive is that the north cannot and will not change and it is incapable of functioning as a responsible member of the international community. It will continue to proliferate WMD and missile technology and conduct blackmail diplomacy in pursuit of political and economic concessions. The institutional structure that has been built in the north is one that is solely focused on perpetuating the existence of the Kim Family Regime and there is no other vital interest.  Carrots and sticks have little to no effect but in the end because of the nature of the regime it cannot and will not change. We have to understand that this as we move forward in trying to implement the the 2009 Joint Vision Statement and even thought the desired end state is peaceful unification of the Peninsula we must now see with very clear eyes how the north will play its hand.  But to those who think there could be change to the nature of the regime know that to understand the regime we should study its history and should be reminded of the lyrics from the Talking Heads - "same as it ever was."  Now let's move on.

V/R
Dave

A North Korean message to the world?

We ask how the world should react to Kim Jong-un's long-range rocket launch after barely a year in the top job. http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2012/12/2012121385948687580.html Inside Story Last Modified: 13 Dec 2012 10:38 inShare Email Print Share Feedback

North Korea has successfully launched a long-range rocket which it says was designed to put a weather satellite into orbit. "The launch surely has a primary purpose, given the timing, of influencing South Korean presidential elections. There are a majority of South Koreans who do not want any kind of conflict with the North .... The North Korean goal quite clearly is to persuade South Korean voters they're better off with a president who is willing to engage with the North, than one who is not." - Paul Chamberlin, a former US military attache to Seoul The move sparked an international outcry, with the US, South Korea and Japan saying it was a test of technology that could, one day, be used to deliver a nuclear warhead. North Korea followed what it said was a similar successful launch in 2009 with a nuclear test that prompted the UN Security Council to stiffen sanctions that it originally imposed in 2006 after the country's first nuclear test. North Korea is banned from developing nuclear and missile-related technology under UN resolutions. The man at North Korea's helm, Kim Jong-un, has been in office barely a year but he has been making his mark. (Continued at the link below) http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2012/12/2012121385948687580.html

A PSYOP Proposal following north Korea's missile test

I received the below recommendations from a PSYOP (MISO) professional who knows his PSYOP history on the Peninsula as a follow-up to Michael Mazza's assessment on our lack of action.  As he notes I am a great believer in using PSYOP against north Korea and multiple target audiences (not only regime leadership but also the second tier leadership and the population) to prepare for the eventual change that will occur on the Peninsula either through regime collapse or war.  The recommendation below is certainly a proposal that is targeted on influencing the regime leadership but it could do that by also targeting the other audiences.  But the bottom line is we do need to get back in the game on the Peninsula and stop being afraid to use PSYOP (or MISO) overtly.

V/R

Dave

There is one thing the U.S. could do that we haven't done sine approximately 1971/2 when "Voice of the United Nations" operated by the 14th PSYOP Battalion was taken off air.  It's something you always say we should be doing more of - that of course being PSYOP against nK. 

If the US wants to show the north they have in fact crossed a red line and alter their behavior in the future - perhaps say stopping the transfer of the missile to Iran or Venezuela - then the US should get into the game again.  The message on the product - broadcast or print - would be irrelevant.  The message to the regime would be you've gone too far so now the US is rejoining the battle in the information (or human) domain.  Products can be benign information but just that they admit the US through DoD is doing them would send a message and achieve the desired effect. 

It would be clear to them that, to steal Yamamoto's words, they had awakened the sleeping giant.  If they are worried about defector balloons and leaflets and what the ROK can do, now they would truly have something to be scared of with the potential of the full weight of the ROK-US Alliance focused on winning the information war.  I am sure that is a war they know they can't win and won't want to fight.  After 6 months or a year of that, I think they'd be very ready to discuss ways to reduce the pressure on themselves. 

And for those who think PSYOP would have no impact, we only have to look at the north's own demands.  Not their demands against the very limited in scope and effect defector operations, but their demands in 1999-2004 to the Kim Dae Jung and Roh administrations.  Their demands to both before talks and summits was got the ROK to stop its PSYOP efforts.  Which in both cases it did.  Stopping balloon - and gift sets of rice and toiletries - before the 2000 summit and all remaining PSYOP -radio, visual, and loudspeaker ops along DMZ in 2004.  What did ROK get in return - 2 nuke tests, 3 ICBM tests, and the attacks on the Cheonan and Yongpyeong island.   

This is a case where the pen is mightier (and safer) than the sword.  The threat isn't doing PSYOP.  the threat to the ROK, the US, and the world is the world community doing nothing once again. 

Just my thoughts of course, no one else's.

How Obama Got North Korea Wrong

A pretty provocative assessment by Michael Mazza.  Of course if his recommended course of action had been executed it would have also deprived Iran of a missile capability.

President Obama made a serious error when he failed to order that the rocket launched in April be shot down — if not destroyed on the launch pad, admittedly a highly provocative act. Had he done so, he would have deprived the North Koreans of the lessons it learned from that missile’s failure and we might not be where we are today. In fact, had the president established a new precedent — the United States simply does not allow North Korea to conduct unfettered missile tests — he might have quickly made such tests a thing of the past.
…
If President Obama was mistaken in not adopting a more proactive approach in April, he was negligent in failing to do so this time around. New circumstances in North Korea virtually screamed for a novel approach in responding to the missile launch.

But the bottom line mistake that has been made by ROK, US and international policymakers and strategists is the flawed strategic assumption that the Kim Family Regime can or would change its behavior in response to carrots and sticks. We must understand north Korea as it really exists.  Michael makes some good comments about regime legitimacy and the importance of a successful missile launch to its myth of international strength.  

But I just wonder if the north did not execute a deception operation to guard against its missile from being shot down.  Did the extension of the launch window and the announcement of technical problems cause a reduction in readiness?  It has been reported that after the launch window was extended the ROK military alert status was reduced.  I doubt this would have affected US military readiness and of course we do not know if there was even a plan and authorization to shoot it down at all,  but again I just wonder if the north was executing a planned deception operation as a precaution.  We should know the deception is a key aspect of north Korean military strategy and operations.

VR

Dave

How Obama Got North Korea Wrong

By Michael Mazza

December 13, 2012

http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2012/12/13/how-obama-got-north-korea-wrong/

Just hours ago North Korea successfully tested what many consider to be intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology, underscoring the failure of two decades of U.S. policy. How Washington expected to halt Pyongyang’s missile development program without taking serious steps to do so remains a mystery. While ineffective policies date back to the previous Bush and Clinton administrations, the current administration bears its fair share of the blame.

President Obama made a serious error when he failed to order that the rocket launched in April be shot down — if not destroyed on the launch pad, admittedly a highly provocative act. Had he done so, he would have deprived the North Koreans of the lessons it learned from that missile’s failure and we might not be where we are today. In fact, had the president established a new precedent — the United States simply does not allow North Korea to conduct unfettered missile tests — he might have quickly made such tests a thing of the past.

But for whatever reason, when Pyongyang launched its rocket in April, the president chose to stick to an old playbook full of defensive formations that has never given North Korea pause. The State Department unwittingly admitted last week that the old approach — stern warnings before a launch, stepped up sanctions after — has all but failed. As spokesman Mark Toner explained at last Wednesday’s press briefing, “there’s always ways to toughen enforcement of sanctions. They can always be tweaked or modified so that there’s better enforcement of existing sanctions.”

In other words, existing sanctions are porous and have failed to stop North Korea from developing its missile technology. Mr. Toner was right to assert that present sanctions enforcement can be strengthened, but there is little reason to believe that China, Kim’s favorite enabler, will acquiesce in any effort to do so. Indeed, following Wednesday’s demonstration that North Korea is closer to acquiring the capacity to strike the United States, Beijing merely expressed “regret” that the test had occurred and appealed for “calm” from all sides, while making it a point to emphasize that “the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has the right to make peaceful use of outer space,” albeit a restricted one in light of relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

If President Obama was mistaken in not adopting a more proactive approach in April, he was negligent in failing to do so this time around. New circumstances in North Korea virtually screamed for a novel approach in responding to the missile launch.

First, the Kim regime may actually be less stable today than it was back in April. Top military officers have continued to be purged since the summer, and, according to some estimates, Kim has now purged at least 31 top military officers since taking control of the country after the death of his father a year ago. While that suggests Kim has sufficient authority over personnel choices, it also suggests he may be struggling to find lieutenants he can trust. Reports that Kim goes nowhere without conspicuous armed guards and that he has stepped up repression of the hungry masses point to an insecure leader uncertain of his own safety.

Second, this launch marked the shortest-ever interval between North Korean long-range missile tests. The four previous tests occurred in 1998, 2006, 2009, and April 2012. The decision to conduct a second test this year may have indicated that the young Kim is desperate to consolidate his power over the military. But the stepped-up testing frequency also suggests Pyongyang is actually serious about developing a functioning intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), instead of simply using occasional tests to extract aid concessions from the international community. That the North’s rocket scientists apparently determined the causes of the April test’s failure and corrected those flaws should tell us that they are not to be underestimated.

Shooting the missile down would have undermined what is perhaps the regime’s greatest myth — that it is powerful and feared abroad. Now, that myth has been reinforced. Intercepting the rocket in flight might also have sown dissension within the ruling clique, as military and party leaders could not have helped but notice that the United States had never taken such bold action when Kim Jong-il was alive. But in sticking to the old script, Washington passed up an opportunity to destabilize the regime, a necessity if America’s ultimate goal is to reunify the Korean Peninsula under Seoul’s democratic leadership.

(Continued at this link)

http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2012/12/13/how-obama-got-north-korea-wrong/

The Kim Family Regime Cannot and Will Not Change

The Kim Family Regime Cannot and Will Not Change

By Dave Maxwell

There should be no doubt now about north Korea, the Kim Family Regime and the intentions of Kim Jong-un.

Those who hoped for change with the succession of the western educated Kim Jong-un have had their hopes dashed.

The ballistic missile launch that occurred on 12/12/12 confirms what many have suspected for a long time:

The north Korean nation-state under the rule of the Kim Family Regime is incapable of being a responsible member of the international community.

We really need to understand this fundamental problem and the conundrum with which we are faced on the Korean Peninsula.

There is a wide range of speculation about why the north conducted this ballistic missile test:  some examples include regime legitimacy, solidification of Kim Jong-un’s leadership, domestic propaganda – live up to the goal of 2012 as the year of strength and prosperity; support to Iranian missile development and for international sales and proliferation; influence on the ROK and Japanese elections; to somehow gain political and economic concessions and support to its blackmail diplomacy; deterrence and national security and finally because it was required to move the missile program to the next level of development.

Regardless of the reasons the regime is likely to face international condemnation and perhaps increased UN sanctions if that is possible.  It will likely lose the opportunity for a near term return to any type of Sunshine Policy or “Trustpolitik” with the ROK depending on who is elected as the next ROK President.  Efforts to support the Proliferation Security Initiative will be increased.  International aid could very well dry up.

But regardless of the rationale for this test launch one thing should be absolutely clear about the regime:

            It has prioritized its missile (and likely its nuclear) program over all else. 

This is a clear indication that regime survival remains its vital national interest and the leadership believes that it must have a strong military capability for deterrence and security even at the expense of the welfare of its people.  It has no intention of returning to the Six Party Talks, making economic or political reforms to improve the life of its people, or doing anything whatsoever to give even the appearance of being a reasonably responsible member of the international community.

North Korea apologists can blame the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations, or the Kim, Roh and Lee administrations but each has made offers and overtures, tried to reach out and give a hand up, and provided aid (food and energy) and the only thing to show for their efforts are missile and nuclear tests, continued provocations, and a failed economy and the suffering of 23 million people on a scale likely never before seen in history.

The Kim Family Regime will not change.  It cannot change because to do so means that its legitimacy will be undercut and this will lead to regime collapse.

Although north Korea is a Communist state, it is in name only and cannot be compared to China or the former Soviet Union. North Korea, being more homogenous than either of those countries, has been able to both indoctrinate and suppress its people to degrees that Stalin and Mao could only dream.  Kim Jong-un cannot allow for any relief of this suppression nor can he allow economic reform in any way because it will lead to political pressures under which the regime will not survive.  It is the design of the system itself which is focused only on the perpetuation of the Kim Family Regime that prevents it from changing.  

As we move forward from 12/12/12 policy makers and strategists must understand the situation and the Kim Family Regime  as it really exists and not as they would wish it to be.  For the last two decades a lot of wishful thinking about north Korea has formed the basis for strategic assumptions.

Today the Chinese news agency Xinhua made the following comment:

“In international relations, as in life, the best way to make an enemy of a country is to treat it like one. This rule of thumb is also true with making friends.”

We have seen how the Kim Family Regime has acted despite the Agreed Framework, the ROK Sunshine Policy and the Six Party Talks.  Perhaps the Xinhua ideal applies in life and in international relations. I do not think it applies to north Korea.  Therefore we must plan accordingly.

Commentary on north Korean Capabiltiies

Some very important comments from Dr. Bechtol regarding north Korean capabilities:

There is, already, some semi-accurate information being disseminated - just hours after the (what appears to be) successful test launch of the Taepo Dong 2.  How very fascinating!

I heard a CNN reporter early this morning talk about how the North Koreans may still face issues with "re-entry technology."

Not exactly.

They already have the the technology.  I guess he does not realize that one needs such technology for other ballistic missiles (successfully tested by the NK's), such as the Musudan.

He also stated that accuracy will "be a problem."

Again, not exactly.

Not likely to be a concern for the North Koreans.  If they hit Oahu (something they have just proven they can do), they have an 75% chance of hitting a population center (3/4 of the island is heavily populated now).  Even if the missile is only equipped with a chemical warhead - and not a nuke - they would be able to create casualties (mostly civilians) in the thousands.

This is a big deal.

There are three major issues that the North Koreans must overcome (of course not widely discussed in reporting yet - but hopefully soon):

- Launching the missile by avoiding a preemptive strike.  A difficult measure right now for the North Koreans, since everything is out in the open and the Americans could destroy the missile well before it is launched.  The North Koreans will need to either develop a mobile launcher and/or site, or a covert site where we cannot detect launch preparations ahead time (as we can now).

-  Placing a nuclear payload on the missile.  It is unclear if the North Koreans have stablized the platform to the point that they could place a nuclear warhead on the missile.  In fact, it is unlikely that they have been able to do so yet.  Their big challenge now will be fitting a nuclear warhead to a Taepo Dong 2.  If they are (so far) unable to do so, the likely alternative is a chemical payload - a much easier proposition. 

-  Proliferating the missile to Iran.  The Taepo Dong 2 is so big that it would likely have to be sent to Iran in stages if transported by aircraft.  Because of PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative) it will be difficult to fly aircraft to Iran without having to pass through the airspace of nations who would force it down.  One alternative of course, is to fly through China and then south to Iran.  The question is, will the Chinese allow this (as they did with HEU parts and No Dong missiles going back and forth to Pakistan during the 1990s until 2002)?  Alternatively, the North Koreans could use maritime means to transport the missiles to Iran.  This has proven to be dicey at times as well (largely, again, because of PSI), but the North Koreans have proven to be quite clever in their use of tactics, techniques, and procedures for getting around international counter-proliferation.
Best Wishes,
Bruce

N. Korea shouts 'look at me' with rocket

Excerpt:

The curious timing of North Korea's Unha-3 rocket launch, outside of its usual spring-summer launch window, raises questions about the political motivations behind Pyongyang's attention-grabbing move.
…
Taking heed of launch and the usual caveats about reading North Korean government behavior, we can discern three motives underlying Pyongyang's latest move: international bargaining, domestic legitimacy and strategic leverage.

Or the test was necessary to advance their program.

V/R

Dave

N. Korea shouts 'look at me' with rocket

By Benjamin Habib, Special to CNN

updated 9:18 PM EST, Tue December 11, 2012

http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/11/opinion/north-korea-rocket-timing/

North Korean technicians check the Unha-3 rocket at Tangachai -ri space center on April 8, 2012.

STORY HIGHLIGHTS

• Report: North Korea launches long-range rocket Wednesday
• Habib: Timing of North Korean regime rocket launch is out of ordinary
• Habib: Successful launch would be sterling commemoration of Kim Jong Il's death

Editor's note: Benjamin Habib is a Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia. Habib is an internationally published scholar with research and teaching interests including the political economy of North Korea's nuclear program, East Asian security, international politics of climate change.

Melbourne (CNN) -- The curious timing of North Korea's Unha-3 rocket launch, outside of its usual spring-summer launch window, raises questions about the political motivations behind Pyongyang's attention-grabbing move.

On Wednesday morning, just before 10 a.m. local time, South Korean news agency Yonhap and the Japanese government reported that the rocket had been launched. It came just days after North Korea extended the launch window due to technical issues.

Read more: North Korea rocket breaks up in flight

Taking heed of launch and the usual caveats about reading North Korean government behavior, we can discern three motives underlying Pyongyang's latest move: international bargaining, domestic legitimacy and strategic leverage.

This year, Northeast Asia is experiencing a unique convergence of elections and leadership transitions in the United States, China, Japan and South Korea. This follows the change of leadership in North Korea in December 2011.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/11/opinion/north-korea-rocket-timing/

north Korea says launch was a success

BREAKING: NORTH KOREA LAUNCHES ROCKET

http://www.nknews.org/2012/12/breaking-north-korea-launches-rocket/

NORTH KOREA LAUNCHED ITS LONG-RANGE ROCKET AT 0951KST. DEBRIS HAS FALLEN INTO WATERS TO THE WEST OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA, AND THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT SAYS THE ROCKET HAS ALREADY PASSED OVER OKINAWA.

 December 12, 2012

Reports in South Korean media say North Korea launched its rocket at 0951KST today from the West coast of the Korean peninsula, and that it has already passed over the Japanese island of Okinawa, and that the satellite is now in orbit.

North Korean official state media said:

The launching of the satellite ‘Gwangmyongsong-3′ using the “Unha-3″ rocket was a success, and the satellite has entered into the planned orbit.

South Korean government spokesman Kim Min-seok told South Korean media gathered for a press conference at the Ministry of Defence in Seoul:

At 0951 this morning, the [North Korean] rocket was launched from the Tongch’ang-dong Space Launch Center. The rocket was tracked until 0958, when the object passed over the West of Okinawa

Kim also told reporters that there were indications of the launch since yesterday, but this information was not revealed to the public. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak has reportedly called an immediate national security meeting and Japan has requested that the UN Security Council convene today [Wednesday] and Japanese Prime Minister Noda has called a national security meeting for 1055 Tokyo time.

Speaking to CNN, a senior US official said that they were “surprised” by the launch and that it was “not expected”.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.nknews.org/2012/12/breaking-north-korea-launches-rocket/

North Koreans Launch Rocket in Defiant Act

The north Koreans are doing a nice job of playing the international community.  They had everyone thinking they had technical difficulties, extended the launch window, and then launched.  It will be interesting to see the data and if it was successful in putting a satellite in space.  If they are successful then they potential have an intercontinental ballistic missile capability that can potential carry a nuclear warhead (though there is still more work to do on that capability)

V/R
Dave

December 11, 2012

North Koreans Launch Rocket in Defiant Act

By CHOE SANG-HUN

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/world/asia/north-korea-launches-rocket-defying-likely-sanctions.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0&pagewanted=print

SEOUL, South Korea — North Korea defied the likelihood of more sanctions by the United Nations Security Council to launch a rocket on Wednesday, demonstrating that the government of its new leader, Kim Jong-un, was pressing ahead to master the technology needed to deliver a nuclear warhead on intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The Unha-3, or Galaxy-3, rocket blasted off from the Sohae Satellite Launching Station in Tongchang-ri on North Korea’s western coast near China on Wednesday morning, a spokesman for South Korea’s Defense Ministry said.

“That’s all we can confirm right now,” the spokesman said, speaking on the condition of anonymity until his government made an official announcement.

It was not immediately known whether the rocket had succeeded in fulfilling North Korea’s stated goal of putting a satellite into orbit.

North Korea has said its three-stage rocket would carry an earth-observation satellite named Kwangmyongsong-3, or Shining Star-3, and that it was exercising its right to peaceful activity in space.

But Washington and its allies have said they think that North Korea’s rocket program has less to do with putting a satellite into orbit than with developing a delivery vehicle for a nuclear warhead and trying to turn the country into a more urgent threat that Washington must deal with by offering diplomatic and economic concessions.

While North Korea may still have other technological thresholds to cross, like the miniaturizing of its nuclear weapons, a successful launching of a satellite into orbit would suggest that the country had overcome a major hurdle in its efforts to demonstrate its potential of mating its growing nuclear weapons program with intercontinental ballistic missile capability.

A failure would be an embarrassment for the young Mr. Kim, who has been struggling to establish himself a new North Korean leader hailed at home and feared abroad. Whether the launching was successful or not, Mr. Kim, by attempting a second rocket launching in the first year of his rule despite international condemnations, was dashing hopes among some analysts that he might soften North Korea’s confrontational stance. Instead, he was seen as intent on bolstering his father’s main legacy of nuclear weapons and long-range missile programs to justify his own hereditary rule.

Only Monday, the Korean government told the rest of the world that it had found a technical problem with its rocket and needed until Dec. 29 to fix it and carry out the launch. Outside analysts have been speculating what might be going on behind the dark cover North Korean engineers had put up around the launching pad to prevent United States spy satellites from watching.

“A successful test would raise as a top-line national security issue for the Obama administration the specter of a direct North Korean threat to the U.S. homeland,” Victor D. Cha and Ellen Kim wrote in a recent analysis posted on the Web site of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Mr. Kim hardly needed another failure. The North’s first rocket launched since he took over after the death of his father a year ago broke apart shortly after blastoff in April, forcing his government to admit to the failure in front of the foreign journalists it had invited to watch the test. This time, North Korea did not invite foreign journalists. Nor did the government announce the launching plan to its domestic audience.

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http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/world/asia/north-korea-launches-rocket-defying-likely-sanctions.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0&pagewanted=print

Iranian experts at N Korea’s rocket site: report

I received these comments along with the article below from Dr. Bruce Bechtol who arguably studies this problem more than any Korean scholar and knows more about the north Korea-Iranian relationship (and north Korean missiles) than anyone I know.

Please see the press piece below. I cannot beat on this drum enough; there is a clear and longstanding relationship between North Korea and Iran that involves nuclear weapons (HEU), ballistic missiles, and conventional weapons.  But there is no (zero) "assistance" going from Iran to North Korea. This is simply a buyer-seller relationship - with North Korea being the seller and Iran the buyer.  There are most certainly Iranian missile experts in North Korea - there have been Iranian missile experts in North Korea for every single ballistic missile launch Pyongyang has conducted.  But they have been there in the past and are there now to learn and to consider buying a product - not to "offer technical assistance."  Any reporter, scholar, or pundit who states this incorrect assessment simply has not done their research.  It is true that Iran has launched - successfully - satellites in the past.  But they were TWO-STAGE platforms.  And these platforms were launched with a great deal of technical assistance from the North Koreans.  The Iranians are in North Korea right now to see if the DPRK can successfully launch - finally - a three stage, intercontinental, ballistic missile.  If they can, the Iranians will likely pay the North Koreans billions (yes, with a "B") of dollars in hard currency to get this technology (and likely several of the missiles themselves).  This would give the Iranians an ICBM capability.  One they have been wanting for years.  

V/R

Dave

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2012%5C12%5C11%5Cstory_11-12-2012_pg14_2

Tuesday, December 11, 2012

Iranian experts at N Korea’s rocket site: report SEOUL: A group of Iranian missile experts are in North Korea offering technical assistance with a planned long-range rocket launch condemned by the international community, a report said Monday. The Iranians were invited after Pyongyang’s last rocket launch in April ended in failure, the Chosun Ilbo newspaper said, citing a Seoul government official. “A car seen at the... launch site has been spotted driving back and forth from the accommodation facility nearby. It is believed to be carrying Iranian experts,” Chosun quoted the unnamed official as saying. “It appears that the connection between the North and Iran in missile (development) dating back to the 1980s is more extensive than previously believed,” the official said. Earlier this month, Japan’s Kyodo news agency quoted a western diplomatic source as saying Iran had stationed defence staff in North Korea since October to strengthen cooperation in missile and nuclear development. (Continued at the link below) http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2012%5C12%5C11%5Cstory_11-12-2012_pg14_2