I strongly disagree with ending the "one Korea policy" As Jay Lefkowitz argues.  I would submit that we have had a "one Korea policy" in name only and only paid lip service to it over the past 6+ decades.  We have never really pursed a strategy to support the unification of the Peninsula which of course requires a long term integrated strategy with the US supporting the ROK in achieving unification.  Despite our rhetoric we have de facto supported two Koreas from recognizing the DPRK as a member of the United Nations to conducting direct negotiations (Agreed Framework and others) to maintaining back channel communications (the New York Channel and multiple track 1.5 talks). And of course de facto recognition of the two Koreas is exemplified by the 6 party talks.  And I will not even go into the details of negotiating with the regime and how it has undermined or broken every agreement made with the ROK, US and the international community.  (And note that his argument may be undercut by reports that President Moon is calling for deploying the additional THAAD launchers and developing organic ROK offensive missiles and increasing the range of current systems).

I also think that the Kim Family Regime's actions may also indicate another facet of its strategy that I have not recognized in the past. In addition to its standard blackmail diplomacy - conduct provocations to gain political and economic concessions (and also conduct provocations to support internal regime/domestic politics)  I think the regime's actions are designed for immediate effect and to draw immediate responses from the US in particular but the international community in general so that policy makers and strategists cannot design and implement long term policies and strategies.  American and international politics demand immediate responses to north Korea provocations and the regime understands this.  The regime continues to create dilemmas for the ROK, US and international community and take away the ability to have the initiative for a long term strategy.

At the risk of beating a dead horse here is what I have written before (and below the article I have pasted some additional details and links.

I would like to see the development of a holistic strategy for Korea and Northeast Asia as part of a new American Grand Strategy.  We cannot have policy and strategy focus on a single north Korean threat but instead must develop policy and strategy that will ultimately solve the "Korea Question" (which comes from paragraph 60 of the 1953 Armistice that recognized that the only solution on the Korean peninsula was through unification and resolution of the "Korea Question.") The Korean portion of the grand strategy would recognize and focus on the "Big 5" for the Korean peninsula:

    1. War - must deter, and if attacked defend, fight and win.

    2. Regime Collapse - must prepare for the real possibility and understand it could lead to war and both war and regime collapse could result in resistance within the north.

    3. Human Rights and Crimes Against Humanity - (gulags, external forced labor, etc) must focus on as it is a threat to the Kim Family Regime and undermines domestic legitimacy - and it is a moral imperative.

    4. Asymmetric threats (provocations, nuclear program, missile, cyber, and SOF) and global illicit activities.

    5. Unification - the biggest challenge and the solution.

The bottom line is that the only way we are going to see an end the nuclear program and threats and to the crimes against humanity being committed against the Korean people living in the north by the mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim Family Regime is through achievement of unification and the establishment of a United Republic of Korea(UROK) that is secure and stable, non-nuclear, economically vibrant, and unified under a liberal constitutional form of government determined by the Korean people.

Until we develop a strategy that allows us to cope, contain, and manage the Kim Family Regime (which must include a strategic strangulation campaign to cut off resources that support the regime elite and fund the nuclear and missile programs) while we pursue long term, integrated, and cohesive actions that focuses on the above strategic aim we will continue to be in the reactionary mode while the Kim Family Regime maintains the initiative.

Excerpt:

What is needed is a drastic change in our approach to the Korean Peninsula. Specifically, we should abandon our “One Korea” policy, long embraced by Republicans and Democrats. It’s no longer realistic or viable.

We Need a Radical New Approach on North Korea

• By Jay P. Lefkowitz, www.nytimes.com
• View Original
• July 29th, 2017

With its latest provocation — a ballistic missile launch in the direction of Japan — North Korea is reminding Washington that its boast of having weapons capable of reaching the “heart of the United States” may not remain propaganda for much longer. The threat from Pyongyang should be one of President Trump’s most urgent priorities.

Yet so far, despite the White House’s sharp rhetoric about how North Korea will not be allowed to continue its nuclear program and how China must bring North Korea in line, Mr. Trump’s policy appears to be as ineffectual as those of his predecessors. The proof? With every missile launch, the North moves incrementally closer to having a delivery system for its nuclear arsenal that can reach Seattle and San Francisco.

What is needed is a drastic change in our approach to the Korean Peninsula. Specifically, we should abandon our “One Korea” policy, long embraced by Republicans and Democrats. It’s no longer realistic or viable.

North Korean soldiers, rear, looking south at a photo op among officials commemorating the signing of the Korean War Armistice agreement. Credit Pool photo by Jung Yeon-JePhoto by: Pool Jung Yeon-Je

Ever since the cease-fire that halted the Korean War in 1953 and maintained the border between what became North and South Korea along the 38th parallel, the official stance of the United States has been to support a unification of the peninsula under the leadership of its close ally, South Korea. This, of course, is anathema to China, which more than anything else wants to reduce the influence of the United States in Asia.

Under no circumstances will China tolerate what it sees as a client state of the United States (and a vibrant free-market democracy) on its most porous border. The reality on the ground, as difficult as it may be for the Trump administration to stomach, is that despite America’s great military and economic might, it has very limited influence over North Korea. China, on the other hand, has substantial influence over the North: More than two-thirds of North Korea’s trade is with China. The reality is that the path to resolving the North Korea crisis goes through China.

The challenge for Mr. Trump is to find a way to persuade the Chinese that a regime change in North Korea — or, at the very least, serious containment of its nuclear ambitions — is actually in China’s best interest. Short of such a strategy, the president is left with two options, neither of which is practical: He can use force to decapitate the Kim regime on his own, or he can escalate America’s presence in the region by increasing the number of American troops and moving short-range missiles into South Korea and Japan to have an effective response to a first strike from Pyongyang.

The former option would destabilize the region and cause millions of North Koreans to seek refuge in South Korea and China. The latter option faces serious political obstacles. First, China’s foreign ministry spokesman made clear in June that any uptick in United States military presence in the region would “severely damage China’s security interests and undermine the regional strategic balance.” Second, Moon Jae-in, the newly elected president of South Korea, is vocal in his opposition to the installation of the THAAD (terminal high altitude area defense) antimissile defense system that the Pentagon has sought to deploy in South Korea.

So what can Mr. Trump do? The worst possible outcome would be for him to sit back, as some of his predecessors have done, proclaiming ever more red lines as North Korea methodically tests missile after missile. Eventually — and perhaps imminently — the Kim regime will develop a successful ballistic delivery system for its growing nuclear arsenal. And that will present a grave threat to Americans, not just those living in Alaska.

The right option, though painful, is to negotiate with China. Diplomacy is all about carrots and sticks. And the time is right to offer China a real carrot by making clear that our aim is no longer a unified peninsula. A major benefit of abandoning our “One Korea” policy is that if China does not reign in the Kim regime even after the United States assuages China’s concerns about American influence, the United States will then be on much stronger footing in resorting to sticks, such as unilaterally increasing its military presence in the region and deploying a missile defense system, much like Ronald Reagan did in the 1980s when he announced he would put missiles in Britain, Italy and Germany to send a message to the Soviet Union. Moreover, despite paying lip service to unification of the peninsula for reasons of nationalism, it isn’t clear that most South Koreans really want to absorb more than 20 million North Koreans into their nation. So a reversal of American policy could well lead to greater regional stability.

We should hope that the time doesn’t come when the United States has no alternative other than to challenge North Korea militarily. It’s not that Washington lacks the power to do so effectively. It’s that military action, as we have seen over the last two decades, brings with it unforeseen and often problematic collateral consequences. But diplomacy is ineffective when it is untethered from a realistic assessment of the needs and interests of all the relevant parties. And that is what has plagued recent administrations. If the United States finally wants to start making progress in its effort to combat more than a decade of nuclear expansion by North Korea, it has to start by dropping a cornerstone of its Korea policy.

Additional thoughts:

Assumptions:

1.  The KFR will not give up its nuclear and missile programs.

2.  China and Russia will not solve the Korean Question or force the KFR to give up its nuclear and missile programs.

3.  China and Russia will exploit KFR threats to undermine US credibility and split the ROK/US Alliance.

4.  A pre-emptive strike will not be able to eliminate the KFR nuclear and missile threats.

5.  A pre-emptive strike will result in a catastrophic response from the north.

6.  Survival of the KFR remains the vital national interest to the north, thus it can be deterred from catastrophic attack.

7.  The regime will not trust any security guarantee by the US and will not waver from the belief that the US seeks the end of the KFR.

8.  Sanctions do not help the problem without enforcement by China and the international community.

9.  KFR global illicit activities provide hard currency to support the regime and nuclear and missile programs

10.  The north will only submit to unification if the KFR remains in power.

11.  The north is prepared to achieve unification by coercion of the ROK or force.

12.  The most important deterrent to resuming hostilities by north Korea is to sustain the illusion that the Kim Family Regime will continue to survive.

13. Policy of the Trump and Moon administrations are mostly in accord re: NK and should remain constant — both agree to (1) pursue denuclearization of North Korea in a peaceful manner—i.e., without seeking ‘regime change’; (2) to the use of sanctions/pressure as diplomatic tools; (3) and to supporting South Korea’s lead role in re-opening inter-Korean dialogue

14. Emboldened by the above, President Moon Jae-in will doggedly pursue the policy tenets and principles that support his new Berlin Doctrine.

15. The only way we are going to see an end to the nuclear program and threats and to the crimes against humanity being committed against the Korean people living in the north by the mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime is through achievement of unification and the establishment of a United Republic of Korea that is secure and stable, non-nuclear, economically vibrant, and unified under a liberal constitutional form of government determined by the Korean people.

8 Contingencies

1. Provocations to gain political and economic concessions.

2. nK Attack – execution of the nK campaign plan to reunify the peninsula by force.

3. Civil War/Chaos/Anarchy.

4. Refugee crisis.

5. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster relief.

6. WMD, loss of control – seize and secure operations.

7. Resistance to foreign intervention (e.g., insurgency).

8. How to handle the nKPA during regime collapse short of war.

3 Guiding Principles:

1.  Defense of ROK is paramount – all decisions must support defense of ROK against the full range of threats from the north.

2.  Must provide options to national policy makers – early decisions required to overcome the law of physics: time, distance, and space.  Must have the right capabilities in the right place for employment at the right time.

3.  Transparency is critical when dealing with the 5 Parties and international community (except for the classified program to support internal resistance).  Must have decisive and consistent themes and messages.  This is not the situation in which we should employ deception.  Only through clear articulation of alliance priorities and intent can we have a chance of reducing the chance of conflict due to misunderstanding of intentions.  Examples for consideration (and these should be consistently expressed by the ROK/US Alliance):

            A.  Defense and Security of ROK is the number one priority.

            B. UNC and ROK/US CFC have the following priorities:

                        (1) Security of nuclear weapons, followed by chemical weapons and then the biological program

                        (2) Security, health, and welfare of the Korean people living in the north.

                        (3) UNC and ROK/US CFC desire to work with all interested nations to bring security, stability and long term peace to the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia.

                        (4) UNC and ROK/US CFC will support the establishment of a unified peninsula – a United Republic of Korea.

7 Steps of Preparation

1. Shared vision – a new durable political arrangement** 

2. Roles & Missions  - national responsibilities for action

3. Organizational Framework for operations  (UNC/ROK/US CFC, independent operations, other)

4. Command, Control, Coordination, and liaison processes & methods (including information sharing)

5. Concept of operations for deploying required forces (air, land, and sea)

6. Resource commitment – which countries provide what

7. And most important  - information/psychological preparation of the environment

1. The previous administration’s policy has been known informally and unofficially as strategic patience.  It rests fundamentally on two pillars:  first is maintaining effective deterrence and being prepared to defend against and defeat a north Korean attack the ROK and second it is focused on causing the Kim Family Regime to give up its nuclear weapons.  In fact all US diplomatic initiatives rest on the condition that the north must show that it is committed to denuclearization.

2.  However, the north has no intention of giving up its nuclear weapons and missile programs.  The regime has rewritten its constitution to name itself a nuclear power.  It believes that nuclear weapons are key to the survival of the Kim Family Regime which is the single vital national interest of north Korea - not survival of the nation state or the prosperity and welfare of the Korean people living in the north.  The regime believes that it must have nuclear weapons to deter the US from attack.  It believes that the US will not attack a nation with nuclear weapons and it looks to the example of Saddam and Qaddafi as to what happens when a nation does not develop nuclear weapons or gives them up (and the Libyan case makes the regime distrust the US more than anything else).  Nuclear weapons are also a key tool as art of its blackmail diplomacy as the threat of use, proliferation, as well as holding out the possibility of talks provides the regime with leverage to use with the US and international community.  Lastly, the regime wants to be recognized as a powerful nation and having nuclear weapons is key to such recognition.

3.  What does the north want?  It has no intention of negotiating away its nuclear weapons program,  It wants to be recognized as nuclear power.  In fact it would like to be so recognized on a par with the Russia, China, the UK, France, US, Pakistan, and India.  It would be willing to negotiate with the US but it wants to do so and focus on limitation and reduction talks in the same pattern as the US-USSR SALT and START negotiations during the Cold War

Whether or not the regime collapses will be a function of the internal dynamics of the regime unless there is a deliberate strategy to conduct "strategic strangulation."  This would require a concerted effort by the international community to deny hard currency and goods to the Kim Family Regime (KFR) through interdiction of all its illicit activities around the world from money laundering to counterfeiting to drug trafficking to sales of military equipment.  If the regime was sufficiently "strangled" and cut off from external support then we might see the conditions rise that could cause regime collapse along the lines of Robert Collin's Seven Phases of Regime Collapse (see Robert Kaplan's 2006 Atlantic article -linked below).  However, I am doubtful that the international community would be supportive of such a strategy.

If hard currency and luxury goods were cut off the regime could lose the support of the elite which could lead to regime collapse.  As we were conducting planning for north Korean instability and collapse in the 1990's we defined regime collapse as the inability of the Kim Family Regime (thought the Korean Workers Party) to "govern from the center" (I.e., Pyongyang) combined with the loss of coherency and support of the military.  Those two conditions can lead to active resistance to the regime, then fracture, and then formation of a new national leadership (or not) - See Robert Collins' Seven Phases of Collapse.

However, when thinking about causing the deliberate collapse of the Kim Family Regime we must keep in mind that the single vital national interest for north Korea is survival of the Kim Family Regime.  Its single strategic objective is to reunify the peninsula under regime control to ensure survival of the KFR.  This means when faced with imminent collapse Kim Jong-un may make the deliberate and from his perspective very rational decision to execute his military campaign plan to reunify the peninsula by force.  This means going to war.  This is why we have to take a holistic approach to the Korean security situation and look at it in terms of what I call the "Big 5." 

An Information Based Strategy to Reduce Korea’s Increasing Threat

http://bit.ly/2k7p6Mb

Unification Options and Scenarios: Assisting A Resistance

http://bit.ly/2kcNn5Y

Beyond the Nuclear Crisis: A Strategy for the Korean Peninsula

http://bit.ly/2kzKRI7

Should The United States Support Korean Unification And If So, How?

http://bit.ly/2kzVri7

Irregular Warfare on the Korean Peninsula

http://bit.ly/2ksIsMZ

Information and Influence Campaign in north Korea When, Why, and How?

http://bit.ly/2bGwLja

When North Korea Falls

https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/10/when-north-korea-falls/305228/

A Preemptive Strike on North Korea? Does it make sense? What comes after? What comes before?

https://warontherocks.com/2013/07/a-preemptive-strike-on-north-korea/

Ms. Darden misquoted me slightly (but I am sure it was the editor in order to cut down on words and to use a standard naming convention vice the subtle message I always try to get across).  I specifically said "Korean people living in the north" and not "north Korean people." Please consider the difference.

What would happen if Trump went to war with North Korea?

• By Lizzie Dearden, www.independent.co.uk
• View Original
• April 23rd, 2017

'There is not an intelligence service in the world that can tells us what he will do' AFP

“Now that we possess mighty nuclear power to protect ourselves from US nuclear threat, we will respond without the slightest hesitation to full-out war with full-out war and to nuclear war with our style of nuclear strike, and we will emerge victor in the final battle with the US.”

That is just one of the latest statements from North Korea’s interior ministry as tensions continue to rise over its continued missile tests and nuclear weapons programme. while today the ruling Workers' party newspaper said the country's forces were "combat-read to sink a US nuclear powered aircraft carrier with a single strike". The editorial further likened USS Carl Vinson to a "gross animal".

From sending new inter-continental ballistic missiles rolling through Pyongyang in a huge parade to threatening an “annihilating strike” on its American enemies, there’s little sign of Kim Jong-un’s government responding to international pressure.

Donald Trump has attempted to strike a tough tone, threatening to “properly deal” with North Korea if China is unable to rein in its ally and sending what he described as an “armada” of warships to the region.

His orders to destroy a cave system used by Isis militants in Afghanistan using the “mother of all bombs” – which had never before been deployed – and attack a government airbase in Syria were seen as warning signals to Pyongyang.

But the attacks have raised questions over whether the President would be prepared to take the same step in North Korea and risk all-out nuclear war.

David S Maxwell, a retired US Army special forces colonel who served in Korea and Japan, said an even more powerful bomb known as the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (Mop) had been developed for American forces with North Korea’s underground facilities in mind.

“There are many targets in the world buried deeply underground and the Mop was developed for that,” he told The Independent.

“But I think you have to ask the question: Can a military action against North Korea not result in a catastrophic response by the North?”

Mr Maxwell, who is now the associate director at the Centre for Security Studies at Georgetown University, warned that if Pyongyang felt the existence of its regime was threatened it could launch a nuclear attack.

“They would not win a war with South Korea and the US, but they might believe that’s their only option,” he added.

“Even if it’s a pre-emptive strike to take out missile and nuclear capabilities, North Korea may feel it has to respond… this is the dilemma that strategists and policy makers.”

The decorated former Special Operations Command Korea policy director warned that even an isolated air strike could trigger a “catastrophic response”, necessitating the evacuation of large parts of South Korea and deployment of American forces in preparation of a ground war.

Dr John Nilsson-Wright, a senior research fellow in the Asia programme at Chatham House, believes the probability of military intervention by the US is “very low”.

“The risk of provoking a conventional conflict or worse with huge casualties in South Korea militates against such a course of action,” he told The Independent.

“Washington cannot risk alienating Seoul and Tokyo, and Trump himself appears more interested in using the bully pulpit of calculated ambiguity and rhetorical provocation than any serious commitment to full blown military action.”

Mr Trump dialled down his rhetoric on Friday, calling China the “economic lifeline to North Korea” after discussing the issue with Xi Jinping.

“While nothing is easy, if they want to solve the North Korean problem, they will,” the President added.

His tweet came after defence sources repeatedly briefed journalists that the US was not considering a military strike, with Mike Pence insisting a peaceful resolution was still possible.

“We truly believe that, as our allies in the region and China bring that pressure to bear, there is a chance that we can achieve a historic objective of a nuclear-free Korea peninsula by peaceful means,” the Vice President said on Saturday.

“We are encouraged by the steps that China has taken so far.”

The strike force, led by the USS Carl Vinson, is heading for the Korean peninsularPhoto by: AFP

Mr Pence insisted a strike group headed by the USS Carl Vinson, which had been completing a training exercise with the Australian navy when Mr Trump made his announcement, would arrive in waters off the Korean peninsula “within days”.

Like the strikes in Syria and Afghanistan, the move could merely “harden North Korean resolve” to increase its military capabilities, Mr Maxwell warned.

He said the “real wildcard” was Kim himself, who has brutally purged challengers from his inner circle in his six years of power, adding: “There is not an intelligence service in the world that can tell us what he will do.”

South Korea is on heightened alert for potential new weapons tests as the 85th anniversary of the Korean People’s Army approaches on Tuesday, with a large concentration of military hardware massed on both sides of the border.

Joseph Yun, the US’ special representative for North Korea policy, will be in Tokyo on the day for meetings with Japanese and South Korean representatives.

North Korea has previously launched missiles or conducted nuclear experiments to mark key dates, while next week also coincides with the conclusion of its winter military drills and huge joint exercises conducted by the US and South Korea.

Satellite imagery analysed by 38 North, a Washington-based monitoring group, found activity underway at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site, but it was unclear whether the site was in a “tactical pause” before another test or was carrying out normal operations.

Dr Nilsson-Wright said that while there have been calls for the US to destroy North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction, its stockpiles would be difficult to pinpoint and heavily reinforced, with sites dispersed across the secretive country.

He argued that the only way the US can hope to solve the crisis is via coordinated pressure with allies – and a willingness to negotiate.

Possible measures could include economic sanctions from China, offering political concessions in exchange for a freeze on testing and peace talks involving regional actors.

Mr Maxwell agreed, saying that although Kim’s government had learned to “get around” international banking after previous crackdowns, financial action was still the most effective.

He urged the US to mitigate uncertainty and lower tensions by refusing to rise to “every missile test and every military movement with rhetoric.

“Kim acts like a terrorist and one of the things terrorists want is notoriety,” Mr Maxwell added.

The world should instead focus on North Korea’s appalling human rights record, he said, which has largely fallen off the radar since a UN investigation revealed “unspeakable atrocities” in 2014.

“When we talk about human rights, it undermines the legitimacy of the regime,” Mr Maxwell said.

“There is a moral and strategic value to informing the North Korean people that we know they are suffering.”

Below is a special report in the Washington Times for this week's nuclear security summit. There are 39 articles, essays, OpEds from  a wide range of people and Korea watchers (including yours truly)

North Korea's nuclear threat: Assessment, global responses and solutions

http://www.washingtontimes.com/specials/north-korea-nuclear-threat-assessment-global-respo/

North Korea's nuclear threat: Assessment, global responses and solutions is a Special Report prepared by The Washington Times Advocacy Department.

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NK's system of privilege, loyalty and 'human rights denial'

BY ROBERT M. COLLINS

Especially since the release of the report by the U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (UNCOI) in February 2014, Kim Jong-un's regime has come under increased scrutiny by the international community for its human rights abuses.

North Korea's motivations, capabilities and proliferation

BY BRUCE E. BECHTOL AND JR.

Recent rhetoric emanating from the North Korean regime has been quite threatening — and may signal a real "cold spell" for any outreach the isolated regime will be willing to embrace. But even more troubling are the actions that have been taken since January 2016. A successful underground nuclear test in January and a successful launch of a three-stage ballistic missile with the range to hit the mainland United States (under the cover of a "satellite launch") are only the beginning of the threatening behavior.

Kim Jong-un's leadership style

BY KEN E. GAUSE

While he has only been in power for less than four years, some information, albeit highly speculative, is beginning to emerge about Kim Jong-un's leadership style.

Crimes against humanity demand accountability

BY THE HON. MICHAEL KIRBY

North Korea challenges international peace and security. Its proved human rights abuses demand accountability of those responsible. But are these two imperatives compatible?

Miseries of women, others at DPRK prison camps revealed

BY ANN BUWALDA AND NIA EMERSON

On March 18, four women defectors of North Korea gave a powerful reminder that as the world turns its attention to North Korea's alarming nuclear activities, women and other North Korean citizens are silently suffering in the clutches of the brutal regime.

Loyal but exploited: North Korea's overseas laborers

BY GREG SCARLATOIU

North Korea's exportation of laborers to foreign countries earns the Kim Jong-un regime part of the hard currency needed to develop its weapons and to keep its elites loyal. Recent studies indicate that at least 50,000 North Korean laborers are officially dispatched overseas, earning the Kim regime between $120 million to $230 million per year. However, recent data from China and Russia indicate that the number of North Korean workers officially dispatched to those countries may have increased dramatically in recent years, with an estimated 47,000 reportedly in Russia in 2015.

South Koreans handling 'daily stress' of North's provocations

BY REP. JOHN DOOLITTLE

I was in South Korea in mid-February with a fact-finding delegation of experienced policy leaders on Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia issues sponsored by The Washington Times. Our visit was given a heightened immediacy by the fact that it happened to coincide with a flurry of strategic provocations from the North.

Trilateral security can check North Korea nuclearization

BY MCDANIEL D. WICKER

The Korean Peninsula has posed a seemingly intractable challenge for the United States for six and a half decades, and North Korea's latest round of provocations has crystalized the danger of a nuclear-armed regime. Beijing and Washington may disagree about the future of Korea, but leaders on both sides of the Pacific agree that such weapons have no place in North Korea. Unfortunately, previous efforts to deter Pyongyang have failed. Successfully prohibiting North Korea from nuclear weaponization requires a new strategy that utilizes a strengthened trilateral alliance between the United States, Republic of Korea and Japan.

Allied coordination needed to counter North Korea

BY BRUCE KLINGNER

North Korea is easy to ridicule. Its portly, rhomboid-haired leader looks like an Austin Powers villain. His over-the-top, bombastic threats sound like Soviet propaganda on steroids. Nighttime satellite photography suggests it can't even power a light bulb. No wonder it's been routinely dismissed as not posing a threat for "at least several more years."

Discussions could be 'achievable,' 'desirable' to all

BY AMBASSADOR JOSEPH R. DETRANI

The North Korean nuclear and missile programs are growing threats to the global community. To date, the international community's response to these programs has been weak and ineffective.

Sanctions can work, but new incentives are needed

BY THE HON. DAVID CLARKE

On April 25, Australia will commemorate Anzac Day to pay tribute to those who have served the nation in wars and conflicts from World War I until the present-day "war on terrorism."

Parliamentarian global network to build consensus

BY THE HON. DAN BURTON AND THE HON. JOSE DE VENECIA JR.

One hundred and fifty current members of parliaments from 50 nations convened in Seoul in February to propose the establishment of an organization without precedent.

Experts offer latest threat assessment, responses at TWT briefing

BY CHERYL WETZSTEIN

The threats posed by North Korea are at their greatest level in two decades -- and there isn't clarity about what geopolitical responses should be planned, experts told a recent panel discussion held at The Washington Times.