The 185 page report can be downloaded directly here. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1236/RAND_RR1236.pdf

This excerpt can be summarized as Special Operations Forces simply doing their job by relying on their training, long term relationships with the host nation military, understanding of the operational environment because of continuous training in country for decades and most important employing the fundamental SOF doctrine as it existed at 9-11.

• U.S. counterterrorism policy in recent years has sought to rely increasingly on indigenous forces. Some efforts have enjoyed greater success than others, including this Philippine example. The study found that key factors that contributed to success in this case were: 1) maintaining the sovereign government lead, which avoided U.S. dependency; 2) adjusting plans through regular assessments; 3) employing SOF and other capabilities in a synergistic way; and 4) creating and maintaining interagency coordination. These findings may be useful in developing policy options and plans for other long-term SOF and partner building missions.

U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014

by Linda Robinson, Patrick B. Johnston, Gillian S. Oak

http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1236.html

This report examines the 14-year experience of U.S. special operations forces in the Philippines from 2001 through 2014. The objective of this case history is to document and evaluate the activities and effects of special operations capabilities employed to address terrorist threats in Operation Enduring Freedom — Philippines through (1) training and equipping Philippine security forces, (2) providing operational advice and assistance, and (3) conducting civil–military and information operations. The report evaluates the development, execution, and adaptation of the U.S. effort to enable the Philippine government to counter transnational terrorist groups.

An average of 500 to 600 U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps special operations units were employed continuously under the command of a joint special operations task force. They provided training, advice, and assistance during combat operations to both Philippine special operations units and selected air, ground, and naval conventional units; conducted civil–military and information operations on Basilan, in the Sulu archipelago, and elsewhere in Mindanao; provided intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, medical evacuation, and emergency care; aided planning and intelligence fusion at joint operational commands and force development at institutional headquarters; and coordinated their programs closely with the U.S. embassy country team. The authors conclude that Operation Enduring Freedom — Philippines contributed to the successful degradation of transnational terrorist threats in the Philippines and the improvement of its security forces, particularly special operations units. It identifies contributing and limiting factors, which could be relevant to the planning and implementation of future such efforts.

Research Questions

1. What effect did U.S. special operations forces' activities have on the transnational terrorist threat?
2. What effect did those activities have on the Philippine security forces' capabilities at the tactical, operational, and institutional levels?

Key Findings

U.S. Special Operations Forces' Activities in the Philippines Between 2001 and 2014 Contributed to a Reduced Transnational Terrorist Threat and Support for Threat Groups

• The number of enemy-initiated attacks has dropped, the number of Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) militants has decreased, and polls show reduced support for the ASG and a substantial majority reporting satisfaction with Philippine security forces.

U.S. Special Operations Forces' Activities in the Philippines During That Period Also Increased Philippine Security Forces' Capabilities at the Tactical, Operational, and Institutional Levels

• At the tactical level, U.S. special operations forces (SOF) provided training, advice, and assistance to conventional Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) units at all echelons throughout Mindanao, including Philippine Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force units. In the later years of Operation Enduring Freedom — Philippines, U.S. SOF also provided training, advice, and assistance to the PNP Special Action Forces. U.S. SOF interviewees judged that Philippine SOF are among the most proficient of those Asian SOF units with which they had worked.
• At the operational level, U.S. SOF advised and assisted the AFP headquarters to improve its joint processes and integrate command and control, planning, and intelligence functions.
• At the institutional level, U.S. SOF contributed somewhat to strategy, planning, and coordination at the AFP national headquarters, and they helped Western Mindanao Command develop its plans and intelligence analysis and fusion capabilities.

Activities During That Period Had Other Effects as Well

• The activities enhanced the bilateral defense ties between the United States and the Philippines.

Recommendations

• U.S. counterterrorism policy in recent years has sought to rely increasingly on indigenous forces. Some efforts have enjoyed greater success than others, including this Philippine example. The study found that key factors that contributed to success in this case were: 1) maintaining the sovereign government lead, which avoided U.S. dependency; 2) adjusting plans through regular assessments; 3) employing SOF and other capabilities in a synergistic way; and 4) creating and maintaining interagency coordination. These findings may be useful in developing policy options and plans for other long-term SOF and partner building missions.

Table of Contents

• Chapter One
  Introduction
• Chapter Two
  U.S.-Philippine Relations in Historical Perspective
• Chapter Three
  2001–2004: The Initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom — Philippines
• Chapter Four
  2005–2007: The Move to Jolo and Operation Ultimatum
• Chapter Five
  2008–2010: Expansion of Effort
• Chapter Six
  2010–2012: Transitioning Up
• Chapter Seven
  2012–2014: Zamboanga Siege and Transitioning Out
• Chapter Eight
  Conclusion
• Appendix A
  Balikatan 02-1 Terms of Reference
• Appendix B
  Plan Analysis Tool

Filipino Extremists Face New Foe: Fellow Rebels

Pretty good article. There is some much overlap and conflict among all these groups. Interesting that Malik is quoted. In April 2007 he major attacks against government forces on Jolo that lasted about a week. While everyone wants a nice neat conventional order of battle the reality is there are so many family/clan and tribal relationships and conflict that the situation is very complex. One way we used to describe it is that a grandfather might be old MNLF while his son might be MILF and the grandson ASG. simplistic and complex at the same time. Both the MNLF and the MILF have also benefited from the ASG as it provided a focus for responsibility for terror attacks. But with the new agreement between the government and the MILF the real challenge is how the MNLF and MILF are going to resolve the differences because of course they are all Moros with the same ancestral domain claims. I think the situation in Mindanao will remain "interesting" for years to come.

V/R

Dave

February 10, 2013

Filipino Extremists Face New Foe: Fellow Rebels

By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2013/02/10/world/asia/ap-as-philippines-warring-rebels.html?ref=world&pagewanted=print

MANILA, Philippines (AP) — After years of fighting the government from hidden jungle bases in the southern Philippines, an Al-Qaida-linked militant group is facing a new adversary: fellow Muslim insurgents who can match their guerrilla battle tactics and are eager to regain their lost stature by fighting the widely condemned terrorist group.

The emerging enmity between the Abu Sayyaf militants and the Moro rebels could bolster a decade-long campaign by the Philippines and Western countries to isolate the al-Qaida offshoot Abu Sayyaf, which remains one of the most dangerous groups in Southeast Asia.

In their first known major clash, Abu Sayyaf gunmen battled rebels from the larger Moro National Liberation Front in fighting early this week, leaving at least 22 combatants dead in the mountainous jungles on southern Jolo Island. A Moro rebel was beheaded — Abu Sayyaf's signature act.

Bonded by blood ties and war, the two armed groups had co-existed for years on Jolo in a predominantly Muslim region, where abject poverty, guns and weak law enforcement have combined in an explosive mix to fuel their rebellions and pockets of lawlessness.

The trouble began after the Moro rebels — seeking to regain their former dominance in the region — tried to arrange the release of several hostages held by the Abu Sayyaf, including a prominent Jordanian TV journalist and two European tourists. When the Abu Sayyaf commanders refused to free the hostages, Moro rebels launched an attack.

The Moro rebels are now trying to rescue the captives and end the Abu Sayyaf's reign, Moro commander Khabier Malik told The Associated Press.

"We breath the same air, speak the same language and live and fight in the same jungle," he said by telephone. "We're a bigger force and we cannot allow this small group to reign with this brutality."

For years, a shadowy alliance is believed to have existed between the groups. While the Moro rebels signed a limited peace deal with the government years ago, some Moro commanders are suspected of giving sanctuary to Abu Sayyaf men and carrying out kidnappings for ransom with them.

"Collusion between the Abu Sayyaf Group and MNLF members — many of whom are relatives — on Jolo is a major reason why large swaths of the island have been essentially ungovernable for years," said Bryony Lau of the Brussels-based International Crisis Group think tank. The government "should consider whether the recent clash has shifted relations between them in a way that could make it easier to isolate senior figures of the Abu Sayyaf Group."

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2013/02/10/world/asia/ap-as-philippines-warring-rebels.html?ref=world&pagewanted=print