Showing posts with label SOCPAC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label SOCPAC. Show all posts

Wednesday, February 7, 2018

Special Warfare Magazine - Special Operations In the Pacific

For those with an interest in SOF in the Asia-Pacific Region the latest edition of Special Warfare Magazine from the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School has about 90+ pages of articles.



ARTICLES 
06 | SOCPAC Overview and Map 
08 | In Depth: SOCPAC Commander 
11 | Asia Threat Overview 
15 | Remaining First in Asia 
20 | Tailoring Logistics Support 

22 | SECTION: NEPAL 
22 Nepal Overview 
31 Maiti Nepal 
32 SOF Mountaineering and Training 
34 Mahabir Rangers 
40 Left of Zero: SOF Crisis Response 

44 | SECTION: SRI LANKA 
44 Sri Lanka Overview 
54 Crisis Response: Floods and Landslides 
56 Flood Response 
58 | Photostory: India 

60 | SECTION: PHILIPPINES 
60 Operation Enduring Freedom 
62 Sustaining Partnerships 
64 Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination 
66 The Philippine Primer 

72 | Narrative Fusion Cell 
74 | Republic of Korea: Engagements that Last 

76 | SECTION: THAILAND 
76 Photostory: Thailand 
78 SOF Roots in Thailand 
80 Cobra Gold 2017 

83 | Japan: Permanent Partners in the Pacific Rim 

84 | Effectiveness of a Forward-stationed Special Forces Battalion 

86 | Mongolian SOF 

88 | Photostory: Singapore 

90 | Maritime FID in Bangladesh

Wednesday, April 6, 2016

U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014


This excerpt can be summarized as Special Operations Forces simply doing their job by relying on their training, long term relationships with the host nation military, understanding of the operational environment because of continuous training in country for decades and most important employing the fundamental SOF doctrine as it existed at 9-11.

  • U.S. counterterrorism policy in recent years has sought to rely increasingly on indigenous forces. Some efforts have enjoyed greater success than others, including this Philippine example. The study found that key factors that contributed to success in this case were: 1) maintaining the sovereign government lead, which avoided U.S. dependency; 2) adjusting plans through regular assessments; 3) employing SOF and other capabilities in a synergistic way; and 4) creating and maintaining interagency coordination. These findings may be useful in developing policy options and plans for other long-term SOF and partner building missions.


U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014



This report examines the 14-year experience of U.S. special operations forces in the Philippines from 2001 through 2014. The objective of this case history is to document and evaluate the activities and effects of special operations capabilities employed to address terrorist threats in Operation Enduring Freedom — Philippines through (1) training and equipping Philippine security forces, (2) providing operational advice and assistance, and (3) conducting civil–military and information operations. The report evaluates the development, execution, and adaptation of the U.S. effort to enable the Philippine government to counter transnational terrorist groups.
An average of 500 to 600 U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps special operations units were employed continuously under the command of a joint special operations task force. They provided training, advice, and assistance during combat operations to both Philippine special operations units and selected air, ground, and naval conventional units; conducted civil–military and information operations on Basilan, in the Sulu archipelago, and elsewhere in Mindanao; provided intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, medical evacuation, and emergency care; aided planning and intelligence fusion at joint operational commands and force development at institutional headquarters; and coordinated their programs closely with the U.S. embassy country team. The authors conclude that Operation Enduring Freedom — Philippines contributed to the successful degradation of transnational terrorist threats in the Philippines and the improvement of its security forces, particularly special operations units. It identifies contributing and limiting factors, which could be relevant to the planning and implementation of future such efforts.

Research Questions

  1. What effect did U.S. special operations forces' activities have on the transnational terrorist threat?
  2. What effect did those activities have on the Philippine security forces' capabilities at the tactical, operational, and institutional levels?

Key Findings

U.S. Special Operations Forces' Activities in the Philippines Between 2001 and 2014 Contributed to a Reduced Transnational Terrorist Threat and Support for Threat Groups

  • The number of enemy-initiated attacks has dropped, the number of Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) militants has decreased, and polls show reduced support for the ASG and a substantial majority reporting satisfaction with Philippine security forces.

U.S. Special Operations Forces' Activities in the Philippines During That Period Also Increased Philippine Security Forces' Capabilities at the Tactical, Operational, and Institutional Levels

  • At the tactical level, U.S. special operations forces (SOF) provided training, advice, and assistance to conventional Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) units at all echelons throughout Mindanao, including Philippine Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force units. In the later years of Operation Enduring Freedom — Philippines, U.S. SOF also provided training, advice, and assistance to the PNP Special Action Forces. U.S. SOF interviewees judged that Philippine SOF are among the most proficient of those Asian SOF units with which they had worked.
  • At the operational level, U.S. SOF advised and assisted the AFP headquarters to improve its joint processes and integrate command and control, planning, and intelligence functions.
  • At the institutional level, U.S. SOF contributed somewhat to strategy, planning, and coordination at the AFP national headquarters, and they helped Western Mindanao Command develop its plans and intelligence analysis and fusion capabilities.

Activities During That Period Had Other Effects as Well

  • The activities enhanced the bilateral defense ties between the United States and the Philippines.

Recommendations

  • U.S. counterterrorism policy in recent years has sought to rely increasingly on indigenous forces. Some efforts have enjoyed greater success than others, including this Philippine example. The study found that key factors that contributed to success in this case were: 1) maintaining the sovereign government lead, which avoided U.S. dependency; 2) adjusting plans through regular assessments; 3) employing SOF and other capabilities in a synergistic way; and 4) creating and maintaining interagency coordination. These findings may be useful in developing policy options and plans for other long-term SOF and partner building missions.

Table of Contents

  • Chapter One
    Introduction
  • Chapter Two
    U.S.-Philippine Relations in Historical Perspective
  • Chapter Three
    2001–2004: The Initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom — Philippines
  • Chapter Four
    2005–2007: The Move to Jolo and Operation Ultimatum
  • Chapter Five
    2008–2010: Expansion of Effort
  • Chapter Six
    2010–2012: Transitioning Up
  • Chapter Seven
    2012–2014: Zamboanga Siege and Transitioning Out
  • Chapter Eight
    Conclusion
  • Appendix A
    Balikatan 02-1 Terms of Reference
  • Appendix B
    Plan Analysis Tool

Thursday, June 26, 2014

US ENDS PHILIPPINES ANTI-TERROR FORCE

Jun 26, 6:59 AM EDT

APNEWSBREAK: US ENDS PHILIPPINES ANTI-TERROR FORCE
BY JIM GOMEZ 
ASSOCIATED PRESS

HTTP://HOSTED.AP.ORG/DYNAMIC/STORIES/A/AS_PHILIPPINES_US_WAR_ON_TERROR?SITE=AP&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT&CTIME=2014-06-26-02-21-03

AP Photo
AP Photo/Aaron Favila


MANILA, Philippines (AP) -- After more than a decade of helping fight Islamic militants, the United States is disbanding an anti-terror contingent of hundreds of elite American troops in the southern Philippines where armed groups such as Abu Sayyaf have largely been crippled, officials said Thursday.
But special forces from the U.S. Pacific Command, possibly in smaller numbers, will remain after the deactivation of the Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines (JSOTF-P), to ensure al-Qaida offshoots such as Abu Sayyaf and the Indonesia-based Jemaah Islamiyah do not regain lost ground, according to U.S. and Philippine officials.

The move marks a new chapter in the long-running battle against an al-Qaida-inspired movement in the southern Philippines, viewed by the U.S. as a key front in the global effort to keep terrorists at bay. It reflects shifting security strategies and focus in economically vibrant Asia, where new concerns such as multiple territorial conflicts involving China have alarmed Washington's allies entangled in the disputes.

A year after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the U.S. military established the task force in the southern Philippines to help ill-equipped Filipino forces contain a bloody rampage by Abu Sayyaf gunmen, who carried out bombings, terrorized entire towns and kidnapped more than 100 people, including three Americans.
Although U.S. forces are barred by the Philippine Constitution from engaging in combat, the advice, training, military equipment and intelligence, including drone surveillance, that they provided helped the underfunded Philippine military beat back the Abu Sayyaf. U.S.-backed Philippine offensives whittled the militants' ranks from a few thousand fighters - mostly drawn from desperately poor hinterland villages - to about 300 gunmen, who survive on extortion and kidnappings for ransom while dodging military assaults.

"Our partnership with the Philippine security forces has been successful in drastically reducing the capabilities of domestic and transnational terrorist groups in the Philippines," U.S. Embassy Press Attache Kurt Hoyer said in a written response to questions sent by email by The Associated Press.

The remaining terrorists, he said, "have largely devolved into disorganized groups resorting to criminal undertakings to sustain their activities."

That success has led U.S. military planners in coordination with their Philippine counterparts "to begin working on a transition plan where the JSOTF-P as a task force will no longer exist," Hoyer said, adding there were currently about 320 American military personnel left in the south.

Before the drawdown, about 500 to 600 Americans had been deployed there.
Hoyer said a still-unspecified number of U.S. military personnel would remain under a new unit called the PACOM Augmentation Team to provide Filipino forces with counterterrorism and combat training and advice, and "ensure that violent extremist organizations don't regain a foothold in the southern Philippines."
He suggested the remaining American staff would move away from training exercises to working with Philippine security forces at unified commands and headquarters units.

The timing of such withdrawals from counterterrorism campaigns from the southern Philippines to Afghanistan has been a dilemma for the U.S., which must ensure that remaining extremist forces are not able to bounce back.

While Abu Sayyaf attacks have considerably gone down, ransom kidnappings have increased, with some militants even crossing into neighboring Malaysia to snatch tourists.

Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin said Philippine officials have been notified of the U.S. move and expressed confidence that Filipino forces could deal with any lingering threat in the south, scene of a decades-long Muslim separatist rebellion in the predominantly Roman Catholic nation.

Gazmin said that with the scaling down of the U.S. presence in the south, the Americans would renew a presence elsewhere in the country to help address another security concern - China's increasingly assertive behavior in the disputed South China Sea, where Beijing, Manila and four other governments have been locked in increasingly tense territorial disputes.

"It's like they never left," he said.

After closing down military bases in the Philippines in 1991, the U.S. signed a 10-year pact in April with Manila, a defense treaty ally, that will allow possibly thousands of American forces temporary access to selected military camps and enable them to preposition fighter jets and ships.

The Philippines' efforts to protect its territory have dovetailed with Washington's aim to pivot away from years of heavy military engagement in the Middle East to Asia, partly as a counterweight to China's rising clout.
---
Associated Press writers Lolita Baldor and Matthew Pennington in Washington contributed.

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