U.S. Special Operations Forces at 9-11, Today, and for the Future

thecipherbrief.com · September 11, 2016

September 11, 2016 | LTG Charles Cleveland and COL David Maxwell

LTG Charles Cleveland
Senior Fellow, Madison Policy Forum

Col David Maxwell
Associate Director, Center for Security Studies, Georgetown University

Following the tragic attack on 9-11, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) and the CIA, supported by airpower, conducted a punitive expedition that resulted in the Taliban and al Qaeda being routed from Afghanistan. In 2003, working with the Kurds, U.S. SOF conducted operations in northern Iraq, accomplishing the mission intended for a U.S. infantry division that was not allowed to deploy through Turkey. U.S. SOF were already advising and assisting Colombian military and police operations as part of Plan Colombia that contributed to the peace agreement in 2016. And in Asia, U.S. SOF supported the Philippine security forces in degrading and destroying terrorist organizations linked to al Qaeda while supporting peace negotiations with Moro insurgent groups.

U.S. SOF were well positioned and ready in 2001 to execute their fundamental doctrinal missions for which they were organized, trained, equipped, educated, and optimized: unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense or Special Warfare. However, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations soon came to dominate the U.S. military campaigns for both special operations and regular forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, and later in Yemen and throughout Africa.

What emerged after 9-11 was a special operations Surgical Strike capability that combined exquisite intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities with precision strikes from unmanned aerial systems and the unparalleled special operations ground and maritime capability to capture or kill high value targets at the time and place of our choosing, including killing Osama bin Laden in 2011. The development of such concepts as F3EAD – find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate – allowed the U.S. national mission force, often supported by regular forces, to take down enemy networks by operating at a tempo that paralyzed terrorist organizations. Counterterrorism direct action operations were raised to a high art form.

The 2006 QDR (Quadrennial Defense Review) called for a massive growth in SOF to nearly 70,000 personnel in the United States Special Operations Command. While the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs), Ranger Regiment, Special Operations Aviation (Air Force and Army), the National Mission Force, SOF headquarters, and enabling forces (intelligence, communications, and logistics) expanded, the planned growth objectives for Army Special Forces and Navy SEALs were unable to be achieved. This proved two of the five SOF truths: competent SOF cannot be produced after emergencies occur, and SOF cannot be mass produced. One of the important developments post-9-11 was the establishment of SOF operational HQ in theaters as either Special Operations Command Forward (SOC-FWD) or Joint Special Operations Task Forces (JSOTF) to provide command and control of the tactical forces executing the full range of special operations missions for the Theater Commander.

While terrorism has been at the forefront of our security strategy the past 15 years, we are coming to realize that the threats we face now and in the future are larger than terrorism alone. Russia’s new generation warfare or non-linear warfare employing active measures and reflexive control; China’s Three Warfare’s: media warfare, lawfare, and psychological warfare; the Iran Action Network , and non-state actors such as ISIS and AQ are exploiting the conditions of political instability and ungoverned spaces and creating new security problems that cannot be addressed through counterterrorism operations as the single focus main effort.

The conditions can be described as revolution, resistance, insurgency, and civil war, and countries and non-state actors are exploiting them to achieve their geostrategic objectives. They are practicing a modern form of what George Kennan described in 1948 as Political Warfare. This is the norm in the Gray Zonespace between peace and war.

(Continued at the link below)

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/north-america/us-special-operations-forces-9-11-today-and-future-1091

Fighting And Winning In The "Gray Zone" & My Thoughts on Revolution, Resistance and Insurgency

To add to this important essay I would recommend reading the USASOC White Paper SOF Support to Political Warfare as a construct for fighting and winning in the "gray zone."  It can be accessed at this link:  http://maxoki161.blogspot.com/2015/03/sof-support-to-political-warfare-white.html Below this article are my summarized thoughts in 7 charts on revolutions, resistance and insurgency and strategy in the gap between peace and war.

FIGHTING AND WINNING IN THE “GRAY ZONE”

David Barno and Nora Bensahel

May 19, 2015 · in Strategic Outpost

http://warontherocks.com/2015/05/fighting-and-winning-in-the-gray-zone/?singlepage=1

---

The United States possesses the most capable armed forces in the world. America leads the world in military expenditures, spending more than the next nine nations combined — seven of which are either U.S. friends or allies. In part because of this dominance, the world has been free of major power wars for decades.

But trends such as globalization, mass access to technology and communications, and asymmetric reactions to U.S. tactics in Afghanistan and Iraq are converging into an era where more and more conflicts are being fought at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. These form a “gray zone”between traditional notions of war and peace.

Gray zone conflicts are not formal wars, and little resemble traditional, “conventional” conflicts between states. If the spectrum of conflict is conceived as a line running from peaceful interstate competition on the far left to nuclear Armageddon on the far right, gray zone conflicts fall left of center. They involve some aggression or use of force, but in many ways their defining characteristic is ambiguity — about the ultimate objectives, the participants, whether international treaties and norms have been violated, and the role that military forces should play in response.

Gray zone conflicts abound in today’s world. Within the past 18 months alone, Russia annexed Crimea and is fomenting civil conflict and separatism in eastern Ukraine; the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) burst into international headlines by beheading civilians and grabbing land in Iraq and Syria; Boko Haram has been conducting a brutal insurgency in Nigeria; and the Houthi rebellion in Yemen has accelerated and driven the country’s president out of the capital. Each of these confrontations is characterized by“hybrid” threats that may combine subversion, destabilizing social media influence, disruptive cyber attacks, and anonymous “little green men” instead of recognizable armed forces making overt violations of international borders.

(Continue reading the above article at the link below)

http://warontherocks.com/2015/05/fighting-and-winning-in-the-gray-zone/?singlepage=1

Not mentioned below but almost everything written fits into this category: Revolution, resistance and insurgency.  Examples (http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/ARIS.html):

•Modify the Type of Government

–NPA, FARC, Shining Path, Iranian Revolution, FMLN, Karen National Liberation Army

•Identity or Ethnic Issues

–LTTE, PLO, Hutu-Tutsi Genocides, Kosovo Liberation Army, PIRA

•Drive out Foreign Power

–Afghan Mujahidin, Vietcong, Chechen Revolution, Hizbollah, Hizbol Mujahedeen

•Religious Fundamentalism

–Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Taliban, Al Qaeda

•Modernization or Reform

–Niger Delta (MEND), Revolution United Front (RUF), Orange Revolution, Solidarity

Nations and non-state actors around the world are conducting their unique forms of unconventional and political warfare.  We would do well to study and understand the phenomena in order to develop strategies and campaign plans to address these threats and conditions.

What the ISIS Campaign Teaches Us About the Future of War

http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2015/04/what-isis-campaign-teaches-us-about-future-war/110257/

APRIL 16, 2015BY PETER W. SINGER

Winning today's fights still means reaching an actual victory, focusing on changing players, and heeding history.

 

• Future of War 

It has now been over 250 days since U.S. forces began air strikes on the Islamic State, or ISIS,. U.S. warplanes have conducted 2,893 air strikes that have hit 5,314 targets ranging from 1,425 buildings to 58 boats, according to the most recentU.S. Central Command figures for Operation Inherent Resolve. The cost has reached roughly $8.5 million per day, summing just under $2.5 billion so far.

SUBSCRIBE

Receive daily email updates:

Subscribe to Defense One Today.

Be the first to receive updates.

AUTHOR

Peter W. Singer is a strategist and senior fellow at New America, consultant for the U.S. military and Defense Intelligence Agency, author of multiple bestselling books including Corporate Warriors, Children at War; Wired for War; Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know and the ...Full Bio

History is written by the victors, it is said, and this conflict is certainly far from over. But surely some lessons of battle can be learned in the midst of war. For example, by the 250^th day mark of World War I, it was clear that trench warfare had changed the flow of battle and new technologies like the machine gun and submarine would play a bigger role than expected. Or 250 days into the Iraq War, it was clear the U.S. quick takeover of Iraq had devolved into a painful insurgency that was more than a few “small pockets” of “dead-enders,” as infamously claimed by former Defense Secretary Don Rumsfeld.

So we asked our multidisciplinary Future of War network of more than 20 experts and leaders:

What lessons can we learn from the experience of the campaign against ISIS so far, not merely for Iraq and Syria, but the future of war more broadly?

Three themes seemed to cut across the reactions of a group that ranges in background from Navy SEALs to lawyers, technologists, and historians:

• “Depression is the inability to construct a future.” – The existential psychologist Rollo May would have a field day with the American security community today. A pervading sense of frustration seemed to color the responses. None of the more than 20 experts was exultant and most were downright gloomy. This is notable in that they were asked about an operation in which U.S. forces have not lost a single battle nor life. Certain aspects of the future of warfare seem easier than ever, but not the part that matters most: achieving victory.
• The Future of War is ‘Mad Men’ Meets ‘Game of Thrones’ – War is about politics by other means, but the storylines, structures, and maybe even ends of politics in the 21^stcentury are shifting. Social media and strange alliances characterize this fight as much as the traditional tools, meaning Don Draper and Littlefinger might be apt players today. The concern is that in both the sale and ugly strategy of war, non-state actors are more nimble, more successful, or at least more disruptive than ever. How to counter that will shape the future of war.
• History is the Future; The Future is History – Again and again, the experts cited ways in which history seemed to be either repeating itself or was being ignored. Perhaps then the secret to the future of war may be how better to apply the lessons of the past to today’s fight?

Continued at the link below:

http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2015/04/what-isis-campaign-teaches-us-about-future-war/110257/

Unconventional Warfare Readings and Background

In response to my recent comments about unconventional warfare based on John Schindler's   and Michael Noonan's articles on "Special War"  (here) and (and here), someone asked me  for the three to five best books on unconventional warfare.  Below was my response and I thought I would share it with everyone in case anyone is interested in thinking about unconventional warfare.

Perhaps more than you asked for:

The foundational readings are at this web site: http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/ARIS.html which is the Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) Project.  

This includes not only the original 1962 casebooks on insurgency and revolution  done by the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) in the 1960s but the updated casebook with 23 new case studies of revolutions and insurgencies through 2009 (and published in 2012 and 2013) done by Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab for the US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). 

It also includes probably the most important two books to read, the updated versions of  Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary and Resistance Warfare (edited by Robert Leonhard by the way) and Human Factors Considerations of Underground in Insurgencies.

(Note that the IW annotated bibliography {COIN/CTUW) does not seem to fully download from the above site but it can be downloaded completely here: annotated IW bibliography

Though not a book I would go to this web site here   "Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism" 1940-1990." 

I would also read John Collins' book on Military Strategy (which on I keep on my desk bookshelf as well as bookmarked on Google Books at this link: 

(Military Strategy)  and pay particular attention to his chapters on insurgency and counterinsurgency strategies. (and you should read his book on Military Geography as well and keep in mind that he is the father of the Five SOF Truths (found here)

Below is a slide with my list of recommended readings I usually offer in my UW strategy lectures I give at the UW network develop course at Bragg and to the Naval Special Warfare command's strategic level combatting terrorism course for international officers. I am particularly fond of the late Sam Sarkesian's 1993 book on Unconventional Conflict as well as the late Jack McKuen's 1966 book The Art of Counter-revolutionary Warfare.

And of course Clausewitz very much applies to Unconventional Warfare as I think Mao would attest (The one disagreement I have with Sam Sarkesian is that in his book he says unconventional conflict is more along the lines of Sun Tzu than Clausewitz because I think he [incorrectly in my opinion] associates population focus with Sun Tzu and strictly conventional military forces with Clausewitz – see second slide below the readings.  But otherwise I think his book is very important).

Lastly I would say that Max Boot's new Invisible Armies is a useful historical overview of various forms unconventional warfare.

And finally I would close with the reminder that there is nothing new here.  The more things change the more they stay the same (or at least similar):

President Kennedy 1962 West Point Graduation :

 “This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origins - war  by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of  combat; by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It requires - in those situations where we must encounter it - a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore, a new and wholly different kind of military training.” 

President Obama 2009 Annapolis Graduation:

“History teaches us that nations that grow comfortable with the old ways and complacent in the face of new threats, those nations do not long endure.  And in the 21^st century, we do not have the luxury of deciding which challenges to prepare for and which to ignore.  We must overcome the full spectrum of threats – the conventional and unconventional; the nation-state and the terrorists network; the spread of deadly technologies ad the spread of hateful ideologies; 18^th century-style piracy and 21^st century cyber threats.”

Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies

For anyone interested in studying unconventional warfare please see this web site:

http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/ARIS.html

We owe a great debt to Paul Tompkins and USASOC for reviving and updating this seminal (but long dormant) work begun by the Special Operations Research Office.  It sure would be nice to re-establish it.  Perhaps JSOU should become the new SORO.

V/R

Dave

ARIS STUDIES

• Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Vol. 1: 1933-1962
• Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Vol. II: 1962-2009
• Irregular Warfare Annotated Bibliography
• Human Factors Considerations of Underground in Insurgencies
• Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary and Resistance Warfare

The Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) series consists of a set of case studies and research conducted for the US Army Special Operations Command by the National Security Analysis Department of The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory.

The purpose of the ARIS series is to produce a collection of academically rigorous yet operationally relevant research materials to develop and illustrate a common understanding of insurgency and revolution. This research, intended to form a bedrock body of knowledge for members of the Special Forces, will allow users to distill vast amounts of material from a wide array of campaigns and extract relevant lessons, thereby enabling the development of future doctrine, professional education, and training.

From its inception, ARIS has been focused on exploring historical and current revolutions and insurgencies for the purpose of identifying emerging trends in operational designs and patterns. ARIS encompasses research and studies on the general characteristics of revolutionary movements and insurgencies and examines unique adaptations by specific organizations or groups to overcome various environmental and contextual challenges.

The ARIS series follows in the tradition of research conducted by the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) of American University in the 1950s and 1960s, by adding new research to that body of work and in several instances releasing updated editions of original SORO studies.