Is the OSS Contribution to Special Forces a Result of Disinformation?

Is the OSS Contribution to Special Forces a Result of Disinformation?

David Maxwell

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/oss-contribution-special-forces-result-disinformation

It pained me to read the latest issue of the USASOC Historian Office's publication Veritas and it pains me even more to have to write these words.  You might not be familiar with Veritas because it is not published on line, only in an expensive high gloss print publication.  The specific article in the recent edition is “The OSS Influence on Special Forces.”  The article can be downloaded HERE. 

The author's thesis is that since only 14 members of the OSS actually served in Special Forces their contribution was not as great as has been described over the years.  The author uses fashionable modern academic analysis focusing solely on data and numbers to reach this outrageous in this conclusion: “The result was concrete evidence of disinformation and exaggeration perpetuated by the active force and veteran associations.”  The only “concrete evidence” the author cites is the number 14.  (As an aside there were at least 15 members of the OSS who served in Special Forces from 1952 to 1954. His list fails to include Robert McDowell who served with the OSS in Yugoslavia.)

The author is trying to prove his thesis by relying on numbers.  However, he undermines his argument with this statement:

Therefore, the five former OSS instructors in the SF Department, constituting approximately one-third of the instructor cadre from 1952-1954, are the ones who provided the most influence from their OSS experiences on the developing force. Because the five interacted with or impacted every soldier trained in the SF program at the school, they gave students undergoing instruction an exaggerated impression about the overall presence of former OSS veterans in SF.

What the author fails to recognize and appreciate is that the OSS was an organization known for two things: punching well above its weight, i.e., making outsize contributions from its small numbers; and for conducting effective influence operations. At its peak there were some 13,000 members with 7500 serving overseas which was less than one Army division while the Army fielded over 90 divisions in WWII. Its Morale Operations branch focused on “persuasion, penetration, and intimidation” to destabilize governments and mobilize indigenous resistance at the strategic and tactical level.

Rather than assess the numbers of OSS members in SF the author would do a great service by reminding readers that today’s SF assessment and selection, organization (especially the ODA), training, doctrine, and most important the foundational mission of SF, unconventional warfare, are directly related to and descended from the OSS.  For those interested I recommend perusing the USASOC web site OSS Primer and Manuals accessed HERE.  USASOC’s own website says: “Special Forces traces its roots as the Army’s premier proponent of unconventional warfare from the Operational Groups and the Jedburgh teams of the Office of Strategic Services.” I personally traced the development of SF doctrine and the unconventional warfare mission from the OSS to the present (then 1995) HERE.

Continued at Small Wars Journal here:

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/oss-contribution-special-forces-result-disinformation

Special Operations Today: FSR Interviews LTG Cleveland (Ret.) Formerly Commanding General, USASOC

From the Fletcher Security Review.  The entire interview can be downloaded at this link: http://media.wix.com/ugd/c28a64_c14626a276f942c0aed3b777abd0dd0d.pdf

I have placed an excerpt regarding the question "highly SOF kinetic" versus "models for the future for SOF on the lower end of the conflict scale" as well as "the important elements of an unconventional warfare campaign" below.

12 August 2015

Special Operations Today:

FSR Interviews LTG Cleveland (Ret.)

Formerly Commanding General, 

USASOC

http://www.fletchersecurity.org/#!ltg-cleveland-interview/c7ay

Lieutenant General Charles T. Cleveland, an Army Special Forces Officer, relinquished command of the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and retired after 37 years of military service on 01 July 2015. He previously commanded the Special Operations Command Central and Special Operations Command South as well as the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-North during Operation Iraqi Freedom. LTG Cleveland is a native of Arizona and a 1978 graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. His military awards and decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal and the Legion of Merit Medal.

FSR: On a related note, highly kinetic SOF operations tend to get more press than other operations – when prominent terrorists are killed, etc. Can you give examples that you believe to be successes and models for the future for SOF on the lower end of the conflict scale? 

LTG Cleveland: I think it’s natural that those types of operations gain a lot of press. Long term we’ve had good success in the Philippines. Working with the Filipino military has gained us a little bit of notoriety. There are some good cases in Africa, including the efforts to counter Koney [Joseph Kony, leader of the Uganda-based Lord’s Resistance Army rebel group] and the influence of the Lord’s Resistance Army in the region. There are lots of successes coming from our ability to message to his fighters that there is an alternative. You don’t get a lot of press on that, but those are all good successes from an influence ops standpoint. There are also a lot of places where we have had capability building success. In Colombia, for example, we have shown considerable progress in their development and we’ve done so, by and large, under the radar. It took a long-term, disciplined approach to the campaign. 

FSR: What would you characterize as the most important elements of a successful unconventional warfare campaign, or is that even something that can be done given the primacy of context? 

LTG Cleveland: Every one of these [campaigns] is highly individualistic. Every campaign is going to be different. As an example, we’re now changing our vocabulary to talk about special warfare as opposed to just unconventional warfare or foreign internal defense. In reality, what you see is that there are places where we are doing ostensibly a FID [Foreign Internal Defense] mission but it has unconventional warfare activities included in it. There are places where we are doing things that are necessarily part of working 100% with your partner – there are [also] things we do unilaterally, for example at the same time as training and capability building. There are other places – we have very publicly spoken about the Syria train and equip mission. That is a very unconventional warfare activity, but it has pretty significant FID overtones to it. We’re going to “train and equip” – that’s even the words that we use. The Northern Alliance and working with the Peshmerga at the beginning of both Afghanistan and Iraq were unconventional warfare efforts, but again, there was a chain of command and it was done somewhat from sanctuary [at least initially] and so it had FID-like qualities to it. There are a couple of activities in places where it is purely unconventional warfare, working with surrogate groups. So each one of these cases is tailored by the circumstance, what’s generating the problem, and by the capacity and capability of whoever is there. If there is one overriding thing, it’s having the ability to understand the local and indigenous problems and using that and leveraging that in order to develop the appropriate solutions. You have to know up front what it is. You can’t just take the formula from the last successful venture and think it’s going to work in the next one. That is why there is a premium on language understanding and area knowledge.

Understanding “Jade Helm” Part 1: UW vs. DA and Part 2: Why We Need This Kind of Training

Good summary here (from Part 2):

To put it in very plain terms, once the decision had been made by the senior leaders within USASOC and Special Forces Command to refocus on Unconventional Warfare:

• 2012, Army Doctrine Publication 3.05 formally introduced into doctrine the two complementary capabilities of ARSOF: special warfare (UW) and surgical strike (DA).
• 2012 USASOC created a 10 year plan, or blueprint to refocus the Green Berets from kicking doors, back to training guerrilla forces.
• 2013 released ARSOF 2022 (the ten year blueprint)
• 2014 released ARSOF 2022 part 2 showing the lesson learned, progress and way ahead.
• 2014 created 1st SFC (A) which combines all the Army units trained in UW
• JULY 15 – SEP 15 2015 JADE HELM

Basically JADE HELM 15 is the culmination of three years of work. It is an exercise for USASOC and the 1st Special Forces Command (A) to see how their 10 year blueprint is coming along. It will allow them to find out which skills are on track, and find those that need more work. deficient and need to be emphasized. and at what level that need to be

With all that being said and explained what does it have to do with Jade Helm 15? Jade Helm 15 has two goals. The first is to give the teams on the ground a chance to practice all of the varied skill’s required to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating “by with and through” an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.

The second and in my opinion the most important reason for Jade Helm 15 is to give the commanders, and staffs at multiple echelons a chance to practice command and control of a SIMULATED regional UW campaign.

Every Green Beret has to go through Robin Sage before they graduate. Robin Sage is UW training that happens during the last phase of the Special Forces Qualification Course. It takes place in south central NC, and has for over 50 years. (For more information on Robin Sage and other types of off realistic military training RMT check out Jade Helm 15: Special Forces Off-Post Training.)

Richard, a Green Beret on the popular Special Forces forum Professionalsoldiers.com put Jade Helm 15 vs Robin sage in a beautifully simplistic way everyone can understand.

Robin Sage, the large UW exercise for SF students which has been taking place throughout NC for over fifty years, is only an introductory 100 level undergrad course for an SF soldier in training.

Once assigned to an SF Group, follow-on exercises like Jade Helm 15, for example, are the 500-800 level courses for advanced studies in UW to be applied world-wide when directed in support of US strategic policy.

Understanding “Jade Helm” Part 1: UW vs. DA

July 16, 2015 by Loren Schofield ~ Leave A Comment

http://www.havokjournal.com/nation/understanding-jade-helm-part-1-uw-vs-da/

To understand Jade Helm 15, and why this type of training is important, people need to understand two major key concepts. The first is Unconventional Warfare (UW); what it is, why it is used and the training required to become proficient at it. The second is the internal fight within the Special Forces community on the UW vs. Direct Action (DA) mentality.

Understanding “Jade Helm” Part 2: Why We Need This Kind of Training

http://www.havokjournal.com/nation/understanding-jade-helm-part-2-need-kind-training/

July 18, 2015 by Loren Schofield ~ Leave A Comment

If you missed Part 1 of this series, you can read it here.  And if you are not familiar with Special Forces history I recommend looking at my article Special Forces Primer: Lesson 1 – Correcting Misconceptions:

Special Forces traces its roots as the Army’s premier proponent of unconventional warfare from the Operational Groups and Jedburgh teams of the Office of Strategic Services. The OSS was formed in World War II to gather intelligence and conduct operations behind enemy lines in support of resistance groups in Europe and Burma. After the war, individuals such as Col. Aaron Bank, Col. Wendell Fertig and Lt. Col. Russell Volckmann used their wartime OSS experience to formulate the doctrine of unconventional warfare that became the cornerstone of the Special Forces. In June of 1952, the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) was established under Col. Aaron Bank. Concurrently with this was the establishment of the Psychological Warfare School, which ultimately became today’s John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. Special Forces Soldiers first saw combat in 1953 as individuals deployed from 10th SFG (A) to Korea.

For eight or nine years Special Forces was getting further and further away from their roots. As the GWOT progressed, Special Forces commanders were only giving lip service to UW. Instead they focused more and more on DA. During this time there were people within the community screaming, that we can’t lose our UW skills. Behind closed doors there was intense and extremely heated debates. From the team rooms to the highest level of command, up and down the hallways there was the argument on UW vs DA.

With Iraq over in 2011, and (at the time) what looked like U.S. troops being pulled out of Afghanistan, coupled with the downsizing of the military, Special Forces Command finally realized the need to rebuild their UW capabilities, and use the lessons we learned from over a decade of war. In July of 2012, LTG Charles T. Cleveland took command of the United States Special Operations Command (USASOC) and in April of 2013 releasedARSOF 2022.

LTG Cleveland said in a 2014 interview:

Last year, USASOC took a major step forward by introducing ARSOF 2022 as our blueprint for the future. ARSOF 2022 sought to clarify the narrative for Army special operations, provide direction to the force, and establish a process for future force development that leads to better support of joint force commanders in the future environment. It set in motion a number of changes primarily focused on the tactical aspects of our business and exploring the beginnings of SOF operational art.

I think that Army Special Operations Forces are very fortunate to have this exercise in Texas and surrounding states.  The controversy that has erupted has really allowed the exercise to develop even more realistically.   First the information operations that are being conducted by opponents of makes the exercise more realistic because the forces have to learn how to operate in a hostile information environment.  This could not have been scripted better by the exercise planners.  Second the emerging "OPFOR"  (opposing force)who are actively trying to find  personnel and units conducting the exercise are adding a very important physical dimension to the exercise.  The soldiers are going to have to practice very good counter-surveillance techniques against an unpredictable, unscripted "enemy" force.  For the exercise planners to develop scenarios along these lines and employed role players to do what the conspiracy theorists and anti-Jade Helm activists are doing would probably have cost millions of dollars to replicate through contract support and it would not be nearly as realistic and effective.  I just hope all those who are contributing to the exercise by opposing it do not end up asking for compensation.  I hope we can continue do to this exercise because the Texans are saving taxpayers a lot of money by doing what they are doing.

Excerpts:

Eric Johnston, a retired firefighter from Kerrville who is the Texas spokesman for the group Counter Jade Helm, said six volunteers arrived Wednesday in Bastrop to keep an eye out for the military exercises. The volunteers, he said, will only be “observing and reporting” troop activities in public areas. He said he followed a water truck he thought belonged to the military, but it turned out to be civilian; that kind of monitoring is about as aggressive as Counter Jade Helm will be, he said.

“We, for lack of a better term, are performing a neighborhood watch over Jade Helm exercises,” Johnston said.

He said the Counter Jade Helm participants don’t believe a military takeover is afoot, but he said the federal government’s contradictory statements have given Americans reason to worry. For instance, he said, a military spokesman said the operation would partly involve seeing if the troops could infiltrate the population, but also said they would be wearing military uniforms with bright orange arm bands.

Texas civilians find all is quiet during Jade Helm exercise

A convoy of National Guard troops moves on Camp Swift, which is also hosting the Operation Jade Helm 15 military exercise, on Wednesday, July 15, 2015, in Bastrop, Texas.
JAY JANNER/AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN/TNS
View Photo Gallery »

By Marty Toohey 

Austin American-Statesman (Tribune News Service)

Published: July 15, 2015

http://www.stripes.com/news/us/texas-civilians-find-all-is-quiet-during-jade-helm-exercise-1.358083?utm_medium=feed&utm_source=feedburner&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+starsandstripes%2Fgeneral+%28Stars+and+Stripes%29

View Photo Gallery »

A convoy of National Guard troops moves on Camp Swift, which is also hosting the Operation Jade Helm 15 military exercise, on Wednesday, July 15, 2015, in Bastrop, Texas.

JAY JANNER/AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN/TNS

RELATED

• 
  

  Why some Texans are suspicious of a massive military operation called Jade Helm 15

  Jade Helm 15 is scheduled to start Wednesday, prompting concerns among some residents, especially in Texas, where the governor ordered the state guard to monitor it.
• 
  

  Army says Texas won't see much as Jade Helm 15 initiates

  On a recent weekday evening, Bastrop’s small downtown was quiet, with a few pedestrians checking out the restaurants. Along its highways and other prominent spots, there were no protests, no billboards declaring the U.S. Army a threat to liberty — no sign at all, really, that Bastrop is enmeshed in the controversy over Jade Helm 15.
• Jade Helm 15 to open without media access
• The Americans are coming! Texans fear Obama-led US military invasion

BASTROP, Texas (Tribune News Service) — The search for Jade Helm 15 began Wednesday for Derrick Broze and Mark Jankins with a drive through Camp Swift.

The two men, who drove into Bastrop intending to monitor part of the U.S. military’s Special Operations exercise spanning seven states, said they saw nothing out of the ordinary. In Camp Swift itself, as elsewhere in Bastrop, Jade Helm was nowhere to be seen, the two men said, noting they had been escorted out after driving fairly far into the Texas Army National Guard post and taking pictures.

“We just thought we would come out and see what’s going on, as opposed to having people tell us what’s going on, and tell us the United Nations is coming in or something like that,” Jankins, who is from Round Rock, said as he stood in the parking lot across Texas 21 from one of Camp Swift’s entrances.

“There wasn’t really a lot going on,” he added.

That was how the day went in Bastrop, a city of roughly 7,000 that made national news earlier this year after people at a public meeting about Jade Helm shouted accusations of a military takeover at an Army lieutenant colonel. That meeting followed weeks of speculation on the Internet that the training exercise could be used to impose martial law.

If there is such a plan, it wasn’t in evidence Wednesday. The military isn’t releasing the location of the training on private property, but says it will be little noticed, if at all. Bastrop — a town with military ties, roots that reach back to the founding of Texas and a mayor who is trying to establish an International Society of Bridge Spitters — looked no different than it usually does, as military officials and Bastrop leaders predicted.

Eric Johnston, a retired firefighter from Kerrville who is the Texas spokesman for the group Counter Jade Helm, said six volunteers arrived Wednesday in Bastrop to keep an eye out for the military exercises. The volunteers, he said, will only be “observing and reporting” troop activities in public areas. He said he followed a water truck he thought belonged to the military, but it turned out to be civilian; that kind of monitoring is about as aggressive as Counter Jade Helm will be, he said.

“We, for lack of a better term, are performing a neighborhood watch over Jade Helm exercises,” Johnston said.

He said the Counter Jade Helm participants don’t believe a military takeover is afoot, but he said the federal government’s contradictory statements have given Americans reason to worry. For instance, he said, a military spokesman said the operation would partly involve seeing if the troops could infiltrate the population, but also said they would be wearing military uniforms with bright orange arm bands.

More volunteers with Counter Jade Helm will arrive over the next few days, said Pete Lanteri, a retired Marine and Minuteman organizer who founded the effort.

“The main point is so people know there are regular citizens monitoring this,” Lanteri said. “Hopefully this will calm people down.”

At Gov. Greg Abbott’s request, the Texas State Guard has set up a joint operations center at Austin’s Camp Mabry, with four or five troops keeping in touch each day with Jade Helm organizers. The State Guard is providing a daily report to the governor that includes a summary of the previous 24 hours and a 72-hour look ahead.

The goal is to make the governor’s office a clearinghouse that residents with concerns can call. Most of the calls have been of the logistical nature, the governor’s office said, such as whether rumors of a helicopter circling on a particular day are true.

UPDATED - ARSOF NEXT A Return to First Principles

I received these comments from a friend in response to my comments on SOCAP.  I think these are very important clarifying comments especially in terms of Conventional and Special Operations Forces Interdependence, Interoperability and Integration (a new term I just learned): QUOTE: Would like to add that this program focuses on educating Army planners to develop campaigns that incorporate Special Operations capabilities at the operational level,,,,,, but is intentionally at Fort Leavenworth and includes approximately 50% conventional force students.  It isn't just a SOF course.  Furthermore, we have been aggressively pursuing coalition partner attendance as well - the more diverse perspectives, the better.  Interagency students are also welcome. In the end, this education opportunity addresses Conventional and Special Operations Force Interdependence, Interoperability, and Integration (CF/SOF I3), confronts the problematic striations that some have recently highlighted on this distro list, and invests in critical thinking about campaigning.   This course is on its fourth iteration, runs once a year from Feb - Jun, should be institutionalized with a MOA in the next few weeks, and is resourced for 24 students.  Great collaboration between the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (UFMCS / Red Team School), ARSOF, and CAC over the last few years has made this possible. END QUOTE

Original Comments:

If you are interested in the nature of Army SOF (with a discussion of love that you will not find in any military manual), its missions, organizations, equipment and training and education, and where Army Special Operations is headed this is the document to read.  The entire document in Special Warfare Magazine can be downloaded here. http://www.soc.mil/swcs/SWmag/archive/ARSOF_Next/ARSOF%20Next.pdf 

Table of concepts below the Commander's message.

As an aside I spent a couple of days this week at Fort Leavenworth at the Special Operations Campaign Artist Program (SOCAP).  It is an 18 week course to prepare them to serve in the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC).  It is adapted from and built on the Red Team Leaders Course or Red Team "chassis" as some say.  It is the best SOF course I have seen that focuses on campaign planning and design for SOF and does an excellent job of teaching design, red team methodology and most importantly critical thinking skills.  I especially liked the new concept I learned called the pre-mortem analysis (though I guess this has been around Red Teaming for quite some time).  I was especially impressed with the students who gave me a pre-mortem analysis of all the things that might make Korean unification fail.  I strongly recommend this course.

ARSOF NEXTA Return to First Principles

///FROM THE COMMANDER 

After a period of successful but intense transition, it is time to refocus on what is most important to ARSOF: Our people. ARSOF Next; A Return to First Principles brings the ARSOF 2022 vision full circle by defining who we are and where we come from. It reminds us of our principles, which are deeply ingrained in the traits of the ARSOF Soldier, the characteristics of an ARSOF Unit and our Promise to the Nation. It explores our collective shared history, demonstrating that these first principles are not only who we are, but also who we have always been. 

ARSOF Next is about similarities; similarities between our ARSOF Soldiers and ARSOF units. The interwoven traits coupled with the unit characteristics generate “One Force, Without Equal.” The U.S. Army Special Operations Command is a force with more than 25 years of history providing the world’s premier special warfare and surgical strike capabilities to protect our nation against its enemies world wide. 

On the advent of our 25th anniversary, we sought to do what many thought impossible — rapidly change our organization to adapt and prepare for the future, while maintaining our operational commitment to the geographic combatant commanders. Fiscal year 2015 has been a year of execution, and USASOC can take great pride in the milestones we’ve achieved. For example, we established the 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne)(Provisional), a force of 21,000 that is counted as one of the Army’s divisions. We created the foundation and backbone for SOF operational art and made sound progress in incorporating it into the national defense lexicon. We restored our unconventional warfare focus and deployed revitalized unconventional warfare capabilities in support of geographic combatant commanders and our interagency partners. 

I am extraordinarily proud of all that you have achieved over the last two years, but more so of your legacy as warriors. In many ways ARSOF Next is a story of recognition that honors these efforts and the people who made ARSOF 2022 a reality. More than this, it is an acknowledgement of the excellence that has been the benchmark of our first 25 years, and a promise to deserve the unbreakable trust of the nation for the next 25 years, and beyond. 

CHARLES T. CLEVELAND 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL, USA COMMANDING

03 > Commander’s Note 

04 > Introduction 

06 > ARSOF 2022 Review 

08 > ARSOF 2022 Execution 

11 > ARSOF 2022 Priorities 

24 > ARSOF Lineage 

26 > Characteristics of the ARSOF Unit 

34 > Traits of the ARSOF Soldier 

46 > Conclusion 

47 > ARSOF Promise to the Nation

The U.S. Army Has Quietly Created a New Commando Division 1st Special Forces Command brings together thousands of Green Berets

At this link to the web site at Ft Benning you can download 14 charts from BG Rogers (the commander of the 1st Special Forces Command) that explain the ground truth to this article.  (note also that nowhere on the charts does he use the term "commando.")

 http://www.benning.army.mil/mcoe/maneuverconference/presentation/pdf/BGRogers.pdf

As you can see what this does is to reorganize the units of US Army Special Operations command in order to provide the Theater Special Operations Commands and the Geographic Combatant Commanders for whom they work with an integrated and holistic approach to employment of Special Warfare Capabilities equal to the level of effort of our Surgical Strike capabilities.  Or another way to describe this is to provide capabilities to operate in the "missing middle" between diplomacy and war.

So on this Thanksgiving Day I am thankful for the rise in stature of our nation's Special Warfare organization and capabilities.

Wish we could get the commando word out of the press and the pundit's vocabulary at least as it applies to Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations which is what this new command consists of.  And the Special Forces (Green berets) have always been "together" assigned to the US Army Special Forces Command.  Now that command has been redesignated as the 1st Special Forces Command

Excerpts:

But from the 1940s into the 1990s, the Special Forces mostly practiced unconventional warfare—indirect action, if you will, and the focus of the new 1st Special Forces Command. In that way, the new HQ brings Special Forces “back to its roots,” said Newson, a SEAL officer who served in Afghanistan, Iraq and Yemen.

This indirect method of warfare is ideal in situations where an American presence could be “too costly or be counter-productive,” Newson explained.

A return to the roots for a vision of the future (that was the title of my first master's thesis in 1995).

We should keep in mind this fact:

Now, the Army’s new Special Forces structure doesn’t actually add manpower. In fact, the Green Berets will actually cut 1,000 people in order to stay within shrinking budgets, an official told War Is Boring.

The U.S. Army Has Quietly Created a New Commando Division

1st Special Forces Command brings together thousands of Green Berets

On Sept. 30, the U.S. Army unceremoniously stood up a new headquarters—

the 1st Special Forces Command—at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The division-level unit 

brings together more than 15,000 

Green Berets and other special troops in a single new organization.

Previously, the Army’s Special Operations Command had directly controlled all of these troops plus 

others on a wide range of missions. The idea behind the new HQ is to assemble a force specifically 

tailored for dealing with what the Pentagon calls “hybrid warfare.”

Simply put, hybrid warfare is a blend of straight-up traditional combat—with infantry, tanks and 

artillery—and secretive insurgency. Probably the biggest practitioner of hybrid warfare is Russia.

Just look at what’s going on in Ukraine, where Russian-supplied separatist insurgents are fighting 

alongside disguised Russian troops in an attempt to seize territory from the government in Kiev and 

bring it under Moscow’s sway.

Among other tasks, the U.S. Army’s new 1st Special Forces Command could help the ground combat 

branch counter hybrid warfare—by sending Green Beret advisers to train, advise and lead native troops 

in embattled countries.

“This is … a real requirement based on Russia’s hybrid warfare approach, as well as the need for partners 

in places like Libya, Syria and Iraq, where we want to help stabilize the chaos,” Navy captain Robert Newson, 

a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, said of the new Army HQ.

(Continued at the link below)

https://medium.com/war-is-boring/the-u-s-army-has-quietly-created-

a-new-commando-division-2b90961b4821

U.S. Army Special Operations Command Counter-Unconventional Warfare White Pa

This is from the Public Intelligence web site.  The white paper can be downloaded at this link:  

https://info.publicintelligence.net/USASOC-CounterUnconventionalWarfare.pdf

U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

U.S. Army Special Operations Command Counter-Unconventional Warfare White Paper

https://publicintelligence.net/usasoc-counter-unconventional-warfare/

October 13, 2014

Counter-Unconventional Warfare White Paper

• 46 pages
• September 26, 2014

During the last decade, the U.S. military, along with its interagency and international partners, has generated significant capability to counter the irregular threats presented by non-state terrorists, insurgents, and criminal groups. During these same years, a distinct challenge to America and its partners in NATO and beyond has arisen through an innovative mix of such irregular threats. This challenge is Hybrid Warfare combining conventional, irregular, and asymmetric means, to include the persistent manipulation of political and ideological conflict. Foreshadowed by Iranian actions throughout the Middle East and by Chinese “unrestricted warfare” strategists in the 1990s, Hybrid Warfare has now reached its most brazen form in Russia’s support for separatist insurgents in Ukraine.

(Continued at the link below) 
https://publicintelligence.net/usasoc-counter-unconventional-warfare/