Which is the real Korea? Behind the North’s strange behavior and the South’s strange indifference is a still-unsettled war.

I just received a copy of the author's new book on Korea and it is well worth the read. I think it makes a very important contribution to Korean War and contemporary history and should be considered for use in Korean history studies.  But in answer to the rhetorical question of the title perhaps the questions is who are the real Korean people?  As I have recently written there are two Korean Miracles:  The one we all know about: "The Miracle on the Han: which is  the miraculous economic growth and transition to a vibrant democracy in South Korea.  The second is the "Miracle on the Taedong," which is the miracle that the north Korean people have survived their horrendous conditions living under the iron totalitarian rule of the Kim Family Regime.  The connection between the two is that both miracles rest on the traditional Korean culture that allows for survival in the face of extreme hardship as well as the creative, entrepreneurship of the people and the ability of the nation to survive and thrive as a "Shrimp among whales."  I think this theme is worth exploring for use in ROK PSYOP to help prepare the north Korean people for unification.  Although there are vast differences between north and South, the underlying fabric of traditional Korean culture may be useful in helping to bridge those differences and help facilitate the unification process. Credit for the idea of the Miracle on the Taedong goes to retired ROK Navy Admiral and Ambassador to Kuwait who mentioned it to me over lunch this week at a conference in Korea.

As far as the subtitle to this piece it is an important reminder of paragraph 60 of the 1953 Armistice that called for a meeting of ally he powers within 90 days of the signing to resolve the "Korea Question."  Such a meeting never took place but it does illustrate the unfinished war of 1950-1953 and recognized even then that the only solution to the Korea question is unification.

V/R

Dave

Which is the real Korea?

Behind the North’s strange behavior and the South’s strange indifference is a still-unsettled war.

By Sheila Miyoshi Jager |  GLOBE CORRESPONDENT     JUNE 30, 2013

HTTP://WWW.BOSTONGLOBE.COM/IDEAS/2013/06/29/WHICH-REAL-KOREA/QJSJGE9CGKTVX2CHOOEERO/STORY.HTML

WHAT DOES NORTH KOREA WANT? Internationally isolated, the North Korean regime has a long history of confrontation with the outside world, having threatened to engage South Korea and the United States in another war on numerous occasions. North Korea successfully tested its first nuclear device in 2006; most recently, its provocations have included a third nuclear test in February 2013 and a renewed threat to turn Seoul “into a sea of fire.” Stories from North Korean defectors reveal a life of desperate poverty and unimaginable repression. To Westerners, this belligerence and isolation in the context of such national suffering have often seemed baffling, even shocking. Guessing what motivates the regime, and what its inexperienced leader Kim Jong Un might do next, has become almost a parlor game.

To the south, meanwhile, sits a country where conditions could not be more different, and one where the threats of its neighbor to the north have been met with surprising calm, even indifference. “North Korea threatens to start a nuclear war, while South Korea dances to ‘Gangnam Style’,” observed German journalist Ullrich Fichtner about South Koreans’ reactions to North Korea’s rantings this spring. “War has never been this close, but Koreans in Seoul confront their fears by going about a bizarre version of everyday life, complete with truffle pasta and super-smart phones.” South Koreans even seem indifferent to the plight of the North Korean people themselves. Shin Dong-hyuk, who published a memoir in 2012 with journalist Blaine Harden about his early life spent entirely in a North Korean prison camp, bitterly suggested in a recent interview that “South Korea should be put on trial next to the North Korean regime for turning a blind eye” to North Korean human rights violations.

The strange contrast between the two Koreas—and the dynamic between them, one of total preoccupation from the North and apparent nonchalance from the South—is striking, a vexing clash of worldviews with major implications for the stability of East Asia and beyond. But it may not be as mysterious as it seems. The attitudes of the two nations can be understood as faces of the same coin, one that is a product of a war fought over 60 years ago in which neither side ever actually admitted defeat—and which North Korea continues to fight today.

For decades, the most important struggle for both of the Koreas has been the contest for legitimacy. The people of the South understand that this contest is decisively over, and now worry more about their own prosperity than the blusterings of their neighbor. The North, however, has so far refused to come to terms with its defeat. For us to navigate its continuing threats, we need to realize that the conventional explanations of the regime’s behavior—as recklessly seeking to maintain its hold on power and privilege, or as rationally responding to threats posed by hostile powers like the United States—miss something important. To North Korea, the main security threat is not the United States. It is the prosperity, wealth, and prestige of South Korea.

***

Which would become the legitimate Korea? As surprising as it may sound today, the answer at first appeared to be the North.

THE ORIGINS of the Korean conflict can formally be traced to the end of the Second World War, when the Korean peninsula was liberated from Japan and divided at the 38th parallel by the victorious United States and the Soviet Union. This new occupation—with the Soviets in the northern half and the Americans in the south—reinforced a divide that had already grown in Korea under the stresses of Japanese colonial occupation and created two partisan camps with the support of two rival patrons.

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HTTP://WWW.BOSTONGLOBE.COM/IDEAS/2013/06/29/WHICH-REAL-KOREA/QJSJGE9CGKTVX2CHOOEERO/STORY.HTML

As North Korea Blusters, South Flirts With Talk of Nuclear Arms

Excerpt:

But beyond the immediate fear of a military provocation, analysts say deeper anxieties are also at work in the South. One of the biggest is the creeping resurgence of old fears about the reliability of this nation’s longtime protector, the United States. Experts say the talk of South Korea’s acquiring nuclear weapons is an oblique way to voice the concerns of a small but growing number of South Koreans that the United States, either because of budget cuts or a lack of will, may one day no longer act as the South’s ultimate insurance policy.

People ask how this squares with the potential new ROK Defense Minister being "anxious" about the "OPCON Transfer" with the perception that the ROK cannot stand on its own two feet by taking over OPCON.

As I have said this is not about OPCON transfer.  This should be about the Alliance and what is best for the Alliance.  We have a continuous pattern of reducing our commitment to the ROK since Carter attempted to withdraw troops in 1978 (gradually reducing 2dID forces, disbanding the Combined Field Army, withdrawing tactical nuclear weapons, cancelling Team Spirit, withdrawing US forces from DMZ patrols, removing an entire ground combat brigade at once to go to Iraq never to return, removing all US combat forces from the Western Corridor or Kaesong-Munsan approach, to name a few examples). All these actions made logical sense (to some) at the time of the decision but taken as a whole there is the perception of a continuous reduction of the US commitment.  That is the perception of some in the ROK and of course it is the north's perception as well because one of the key conditions they have sought for 6 decades is splitting the Alliance and the dissolution of the ROK/US CFC will be their biggest achievement yet.  But if we were really serious about letting the "ROK's stand on their own two feet" why do we force them to pay the bulk of the costs for moving US forces instead of them being able to invest all the those funds in independent War fighting capabilities? 

Although some in the ROK have questioned whether US really is committed to extended deterrence and we should keep in mind there are some voices in the US who question whether we should have any forces there or maintain the Alliance at all.

But for me I want this  question objectively answered: what is the best way for the Alliance to organize its military instruments of power from a military, political, and economic or financial perspective?  From all those who favor the dissolution of CFC and the red herring and mythical OPCON transfer I would like to see their objective analysis as to how that course of action is best from a military, political, and economic perspective for both members of the Alliance. Show me the real objective analysis that says it is the most feasible, suitable, and acceptable COA to dissolve the ROK/US CFC while faced with a very real threat from the north.

V/R

Dave

March 10, 2013

As North Korea Blusters, South Flirts With Talk of Nuclear Arms

By MARTIN FACKLER and CHOE SANG-HUN

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/11/world/asia/as-north-korea-blusters-south-breaks-taboo-on-nuclear-talk.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&smid=tw-nytimesworld&_r=1&&pagewanted=print

SEOUL, South Korea — As their country prospered, South Koreans have largely shrugged off the constant threat of a North Korean attack. But breakthroughs in the North’s missile and nuclear programs and fiery threats of war have heightened fears in the South that even small miscalculations by the new and untested leaders of each country could have disastrous consequences.

Now this new sense of vulnerability is causing some influential South Koreans to break a decades-old taboo by openly calling for the South to develop its own nuclear arsenal, a move that would raise the stakes in what is already one of the world’s most militarized regions.

While few here think this will happen anytime soon, two recent opinion polls show that two-thirds of South Koreans support the idea posed by a small but growing number of politicians and columnists — a reflection, analysts say, of hardening attitudes since North Korea’s Feb. 12 underground nuclear test, its third since 2006.

“The third nuclear test was for South Korea what the Cuban missile crisis was for the U.S.,” said Han Yong-sup, a professor of security policy at the Korea National Defense University in Seoul. “It has made the North Korean threat seem very close and very real.”

In recent weeks, the North has approached a crucial threshold with its weapons programs, with the successful launching of a long-range rocket, followed by the test detonation of a nuclear device that could be small enough to fit on top of a rocket. Those advances were followed by a barrage of apocalyptic threats to rain “pre-emptive nuclear strikes” and “final destruction” on Seoul, the South’s neon-drenched capital. The intensification of North Korea’s typically bellicose language shocked many South Koreans, who had thought the main target of the North’s nuclear program was the United States.

Adding to South Koreans’ worries, the North and its nuclear arsenal are in the hands of a young new leader, Kim Jong-un, whose brinkmanship appears to be an effort to ensure the support of his nation’s powerful military.

The South also has a new president, Park Geun-hye, the daughter of a military strongman who stood firm against North Korea, who herself also faces pressure to stand fast against the North. Just two weeks after her inauguration, Ms. Park faces a crisis as the North makes vague threats interpreted by many South Koreans as the precursor to some sort of limited, conventional military provocation. Ms. Park has promised to retaliate if her nation is attacked, aware of the public anger directed at her predecessor, Lee Myung-bak, when he showed restraint after the North shelled a South Korean island in 2010, killing four people.

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http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/11/world/asia/as-north-korea-blusters-south-breaks-taboo-on-nuclear-talk.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&smid=tw-nytimesworld&_r=1&&pagewanted=print

NightWatch For the night of 7 March 2013: north Korea, Egypt, Mail

Mr. McCreary provides a thorough analysis of the north Korean rhetoric and actions of the past 48 hours.  Two key judgements highlighted below. But these excerpt are particularly "interesting."

Closure of direct communications channels is a classic indicator of general war. If North Korea recalls diplomats, closes the borders and airport and discloses more actions indicating it is in a semi-war state of readiness, the Allies must prepare for a North Korean military incident, if not an attack by fire. 

This is an enormous gamble, which brings into focus the defensive imperative. The people must be ready for war in the event the gamble fails. Kim and his advisors exude confidence but they cannot know for sure how the US will react. The absence of an Armistice also means the US and the South can shoot at will.

Although the propaganda includes reference to conditions before the Korean War as I have mentioned before the Korean War the north ceased rhetoric and was executing what might be termed a charm offensive attempt call for talks and ceasing propaganda so it could achieve surprise. What the north does not have at this time is the element of surprise.  We should should keep this in mind because the best course of action in this situation is to stand toe to toe, maintain the highest state of readiness, and continue Alliance exercises.  Backing down now or giving in to demands will have long term negative diplomatic and security implications.  If the north is making a decision to go to war or conduct a large scale provocation there is now little that can be done to prevent them from doing so – except to maintain the highest state of readiness.  Any apparent weakness in the Alliance will be exploited and will embolden the regime to push further or act.

V/R

Dave

NightWatch

For the night of 7 March 2013

Administrative note: This edition addresses in lengthy detail North Korean actions in the past 48 hours through this Watch. The statements and actions to dismantle the Armistice are unprecedented and historic because they officially restore an active state of war.

NightWatch's review of events since 1 January indicates that the North Koreans have been preparing this breakout since 2 February when Kim Jong Un began a series of meetings, starting with the Military Central Commission.

NightWatch judges the actions are deliberately planned because of their breadth, coherence and consistency. The North's depiction of itself as a victim reacting defensively is part of its deception strategy.

Readers not interested in North Korea will want to skip this lengthy treatment.

North Korean Actions on 7 March Before the UN Vote: North Korea's Foreign Ministry joined the official chorus with an official statement that stressed three points, according to the Korean Central News Agency.

"First, now that the U.S. is set to light a fuse for a nuclear war, the revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK will exercise the right to a preemptive nuclear attack to destroy the strongholds of the aggressors and to defend the supreme interests of the country."

"The Supreme Command of the Korean People's Army declared that it would totally nullify the Korean Armistice Agreement (AA) from March 11 when the U.S. nuclear war rehearsal gets into full swing. This meant that from that moment the revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK will take military actions for self-defence against any target any moment, not restrained by AA."

"Second, the farce for the adoption of "resolution on sanctions" against the DPRK being backed by the U.S. at the UN Security Council will compel the DPRK to take at an earlier date more powerful second and third countermeasures as it had declared.

"Third, given that it has become difficult to avert the second Korean war, the DPRK strongly warns the UN Security Council not to make another big blunder like the one in the past when it earned inveterate grudge of the Korean nation by acting as a war servant for the U.S. in 1950….

"Justice can be defended only when strength is reacted with strength and nuke with nuke." It also called on the UN to disband the UN Command.

Comment: This statement was made in anticipation of the UN Security Council Resolution which had not yet been passed. It completes the set of statements by government and party groups who have responsibilities for maintaining the Armistice. It means that ending the Armistice is a unified party and government operation.

The reference to 1950 is particularly ominous because it betrays an inaccurate view of the situation today. The message is that the UN is acting today as it did in 1950. Nothing could be farther from the truth.

That is what is known as an incongruity, in propaganda analysis.  It means the North Korean leadership is not reading the current situation accurately and that is extremely dangerous.

In Pyongyang, on 7 March, North Korea staged a large rally as a show of support for the 5 March statement by the Supreme Command.

The party daily, Rodong Sinmun published the remarks by Colonel General Kang Pyo Yong who addressed the rally, as reported by South Korea's Yonhap. This statement did not mention the UN sanctions resolution.

"According to Rodong Sinmun, Colonel General Kang said soldiers are already positioned to launch a war of reunification if the order is given by its leaders. The paper said the general made clear at a speech given at a rally in Pyongyang that intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and other rockets capable of attacking pre-set targets have been armed with various types of atomic warheads."

"He claimed that missile warheads have been made lighter and smaller, and can turn Washington and other lairs of forces that collaborate with the U.S. imperialists into a 'sea of fire.'"

"Kang also said that with the Korean War Armistice Agreement having become null and void, the North Korean military can now launch preemptive strikes against the country's enemies without warning or restraint."

In a separate article, the Daily NK reported that the same issue of RodongSinmun carried a front page editorial that said "Our battle strategy has already been approved. Our ten million soldiers and citizens are full of the will to destroy the enemy."

The Daily NK reported that the 7 March issue of the party daily contained 15 articles threatening the US and South Korea because of the ongoing allied exercises in the South.

Comment: Colonel General Kang's speech indicates that North Korea is maintaining its missiles in a ready condition with warheads fitted. That is an essential condition for a pre-emptive attack and is believed to have never been stated in public before. Kang also accurately described the implications of no armistice.

The excerpt from the Rodong Sinmun editorial adds the information that the battle strategy has been approved already. North Korean leaders never tell the North Korean public about war plans or strategic weapons... until now.

Based on North Korean propaganda trends in past crises, six articles or broadcasts with variations on a single theme in a single day directed at the North Korean population is the threshold that indicates the North is in crisis mode. Rodong Sinmun published 15 in a single issue.

The intensive indoctrination of the North Korean public is more worrisome than specific announcements or actions. Through public statements, speeches and official news reports about actions at Panmunjom, North Korean leaders are generating a national perception that North Korea is under threat and that war is coming. 

United Nations-North Korea: The United Nations Security Council has voted unanimously to punish North Korea for last month's nuclear test with a toughened sanctions regime.

Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, a former South Korean foreign minister, said the resolution "sent an unequivocal message to that the international community will not tolerate its pursuit of nuclear weapons."

North Korean reaction: The first known North Korean media reaction to the UN vote is a statement in English by the North's Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland and published by the Korean Central News Agency at about 0900 on 8 March.

This statement contains a single paragraph that refers to the UN sanctions vote, which looks like a last minute insertion of a text already prepared for publication. Most of the content repeats the message of the Korean People's Army Supreme Command on 5 March. This statement, however, adds details that are focused on communications and crisis management channels with South Korea.

- "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) abrogates all agreements on non-aggression reached between the North and the South…"

"The South Korean puppet forces are working with bloodshot eyes to invade the DPRK in collusion with the U.S. This situation reduced to dead papers the north-south agreements on nonaggression which calls for nonuse of force against the other party, prevention of accidental military clashes, peaceful settlement of disputes and the issue of nonaggression demarcation line.

Therefore, the DPRK officially declares that from the moment the Korean Armistice Agreement is made totally invalid on March 11 all the said agreements will be completely nullified. …."

-"Second, the DPRK totally nullifies the joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula…."

"The U.S. and the puppet forces' nuclear war moves against the DPRK virtually put an end to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula long ago and rendered the joint declaration on its denuclearization totally meaningless. "

"Hence, the DPRK re-clarifies that the joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula has become totally invalid."

"From now on, no one is allowed to utter such words as the DPRK's 'dismantlement of nukes' and 'no-use of nuclear weapons.'"

-"Third, the DPRK will close the Panmunjom liaison channel between the north and the south."

"There is nothing to talk to the puppet group of traitors hell-bent on the moves for a war of aggression against the north, blinded with confrontation and hostility towards compatriots."

"What remains to be done is to settle accounts with them by physical force only. "

"It is a mockery and insult to the noble Red Cross spirit to discuss compatriotism and humanitarian issues with those who consider confrontation with compatriots as a means for their existence."

Comment: What is curious about the above statement is that part of the justification for cutting communications with South Korea is that the US and South Korea are not taking the North's threats seriously. As a result, the Kim leadership group has ordered more actions. Senior military officers appear to be the public face of the leadership.

After the North Koreans complete the actions stated above, they will have cut all direct channels of communications with South Korea as well as the US, including the Red Cross channel. 

Closure of direct communications channels is a classic indicator of general war. If North Korea recalls diplomats, closes the borders and airport and discloses more actions indicating it is in a semi-war state of readiness, the Allies must prepare for a North Korean military incident, if not an attack by fire.

Kim's visit. South Korean and North Korean media reported that Kim Jong Un visited the southwest coastal artillery units that shelled the South Korean offshore islands in November 2010. That shelling, along with the sinking of the patrol ship Cheonan, also is attributed to Kim's military genius.

Comment: A visit by Kim and his entourage always signifies that the host unit is in a high state of readiness. South Korea should have detected a buildup of artillery and supplies, as it did before the shooting in 2010.

Warning: The North's creation of a crisis atmosphere is driven by its decision to terminate the Armistice. This will create a fundamental change in the security situation. The decision to terminate the Armistice probably was made by the leadership in late January and discussed in the extensive and expanded Party and Government leadership meetings in early February.

This decision contains two immediate imperatives. One is offensive and the other is defensive. The offensive imperative is to show the US and South Korea that the Armistice is truly ended and the security situation on the peninsula has changed fundamentally. This creates conditions for negotiations based a very different set of assumptions about security.

The challenge is to do this without starting a general war, which North Korean leaders have long known they cannot survive. That explains Kim's trip to the southwest. In November 2010 North Korea fired on South Korea, ostensibly at Kim's direction, but the situation did not escalate to general war. He might judge that he can repeat that performance and the US and South Korea will understand that he is making a point, not starting a war.

This is an enormous gamble, which brings into focus the defensive imperative. The people must be ready for war in the event the gamble fails. Kim and his advisors exude confidence but they cannot know for sure how the US will react. The absence of an Armistice also means the US and the South can shoot at will.

That explains the intense indoctrination of the civilian population about the threat and the civil defense preparations. They are aimed at preparing the population to expect deprivation and hardship and to make exceptional exertions. An editorial on 7 March was entitled, "DPRK People Determined to Rise up in All-Out Action." In it , a farm leader said the agricultural workers are in full readiness for a sacred war for national reunification. That is not normal.

In the NightWatch experience, the last time North Korean media and behavior were so bellicose was prior to the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul. The key language in propaganda at that time, delivered by a Vice Marshal, was a statement, in paraphrase, that the situation is like that prior to the Korean War.

(Note: North Korea had partially mobilized at that time, but apparently was deterred from taking action by the presence of a US battleship task group and an aircraft carrier task group.)

The Foreign Ministry's statement on the 7th was comparable.

The South Korean offshore islands along the Northern Limit Line northwest of Seoul appear to be obvious targets to show that there is no armistice and that a permanent peace is urgently needed.

However, all North Korean forces will be at high readiness, especially along the Demilitarized Zone, to be ready for possible escalation. They can maintain a semi-war state of readiness for at least six months.

At this time, the North's civilian population does not yet appear fully ready for war, but they can be within two weeks.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.kforcegov.com/Services/IS/NightWatch/NightWatch_13000059.aspx

Why the Korean War still matters

Yes it does.  It is not over.  A useful historical summary below.  One thing that it overlooks is that before the war broke out in 1950 the north had called for talks in Kaesong and had ceased its anti-South propaganda.    Please read the last 3 paragraphs about China and the editorial that doubt's the north's usefulness to China today.  This is important because as a mentor, friend and China hand has pointed out to me on more than one occasion is that when China realizes that its security and interests will be met through its relationship with Seoul rather then Pyongyang, we will see the dynamics of the Peninsula significantly altered.

I have attached the CRS report on the history of north Korean provocations and a paper that I wrote that will be published this spring in the International Journal of Korean studies this spring.

CRS Report:  http://db.tt/VSkWOnuj

Provocation Strategy Paper: http://db.tt/E1hI9gka

One thing we should keep in mind is that the north is unlikely to attack into a ready force that is assessed to be stronger unless the element of surprise (strategic as well as tactical) can be achieved.  Right not it cannot achieve surprise.

The rhetoric is stronger than usual but it fits the pattern of the regime over the past 60 years.  Here are examples from the attached CRS report:

04/1996 — On three occasions, a combined total of several hundred armed North
Korean troops crossed the military demarcation line into the joint
security area of the DMZ at Panmunjom and elsewhere in violation
of the Korean armistice agreement, after Pyongyang’s unilateralannouncement that it no longer would abide by the armistice
provisions concerning the integrity of the DMZ.

2/18/03 — North Korea threatened to abandon the 1953 armistice that ended the
Korean War if the United States imposed trade sanctions against the
North claiming that a blockade against it would violate article 15 of
the armistice. Pyongyang also accused the United States of plotting
an attack.


2/19/03 — A North Korean fighter jet briefly crossed seven miles into South
Korean airspace over the Yellow Sea prompting the South Korean air
force to send six fighter planes of its own and put ground-to-air
missiles on alert. The two-minute incursion ended without incident
but nonetheless raised tensions at a time when nerves were already on
edge over the North’s nuclear program and its threat to pull out of the1953 armistice that ended the Korean War. South Korea’s militarysaid that the flight was the first such incursion since 1983 and that it
would lodge an official protest.

One of the things I worry about is the combination of Kim Jong-un's inexperience combined with what possibly might be an unwarranted self confidence (arrogance) because he thinks he has "worldly experience" due to his western education and also combined with the "advice" he might be getting from his military and party elite that is driving this seemingly extreme rhetoric.

I think we very well may see a provocation (they are closing air space on the east coast and we think they are preparing for a large scale exercise  - probably on a scale not seen since the 1998-2000 time frame – there rumors that Kim Jong-un thinks that his military has become a "garrison army" so he is going to exercise it.

But I think we are going to continue to see the rhetoric and possibly provocations (could be kinetic and could be tests)  They conduct provocations to gain political and economic concessions and the fact is that the north has not really received a concession since Leap Day last year.  After the April test launch failure the ROK and US and the international community has not given in and begged them to return to talks.  This is kind of an interesting dilemma because we are not rewarding bad behavior so we are forcing them to ratchet up their rhetoric and possibly provocations.  Once we do eventually try to return to talks and diplomacy they will consider their actions to be successful – even it is a year or two away – they have much more patience than we do.  

But I cannot predict what is going to happen.  Are there problems within the regime elite that is causing this?  Is Kim getting bad advice (from sycophantic generals) or is he directing this?  And of course the big problem is will their be a miscalculation by any party? 

V/R

Dave

Why the Korean War still matters By Madison Park , CNN updated 9:21 PM EST, Thu March 7, 2013 http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/07/world/asia/korean-war-explainer/index.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+rss%2Fcnn_topstories+%28RSS%3A+Top+Stories%29

CNN.com

Korean refugees flee the war and head south on board trains in this file photo dated 1951.

(CNN) -- It's the war that never really ended -- leaving the Korean peninsula splintered in 1953. The brutal war that raged 60 years ago killed more than two million Koreans, separated thousands of families, and created the world's most heavily fortified border. It also drew the alliances that exist today.

The armistice agreement that ended the war is a truce, rather than a peace treaty. Starting on Tuesday, North Korea threatened to dismantle the armistice, as it has done so in the past.

In 2009, North Korea said its military would no longer be bound by the agreement because South Korea was joining a U.S.-led anti-proliferation plan. In 2003, Pyonyang's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) announced that it may have "no option" but to stop honoring the armistice because of the United State's "persistent war moves."

This time, KCNA declared that come March 11, North Korean forces will "completely declare invalid" the armistice agreement, because "the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet forces" have violated it. It cited joint U.S.-South Korean military exercises as "an open declaration of a war" and slammed the countries using its trademark colorful language.

"The U.S. is, however, working with bloodshot eyes to swallow up the DPRK (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea's official name), not content with having incurred the pent-up grudge of the Korean people which can never be settled. What matters is that the South Korean puppet forces steeped in worship and sycophancy toward the U.S. are dancing to its tune," KCNA said.

The latest flare-up stems from tougher sanctions passed in the U.N. Security Council against North Koreain response to its nuclear test on February 12. Pyongyang carried out its third nuclear test, despite international condemnation.

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http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/07/world/asia/korean-war-explainer/index.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+rss%2Fcnn_topstories+%28RSS%3A+Top+Stories%29