Day 2 Closing Remarks
| ||
|
|
Thursday, July 2, 2015
Video of the Conference: Unification of the Korean Peninsula: Issues and Opportunities
Below are the links to each of the panel videos for the conference described below that was held on 25-26 June 2015.
Day 2 Closing Remarks
Day 2 Closing Remarks
Sunday, June 28, 2015
Why Military Advising Was So Successful in Vietnam…
Of course how did Vietnam turn out in the long run in its relationship with China? The PLA got their butts kicked by them in 1979 and now there is friction over the South China Sea with Vietnam siding with other regional powers and asking the US for support. The Chinese advisory operations did not result in an alliance that was closer than lips and teeth the way their intervention on behalf of the north Koreans did (though they are probably regretting that relationship now!)
But these three factors for Chinese success (or effectiveness) outlined here are are important considerations and should factor into both decision making and planning. There are a number of very important lessons to which we should pay attention though those with professional advisory experience will tell you they are common sense. E.g.:
In contrast, the US advisors shared no historical background with their South Vietnamese counterparts, and there was a complete lack of cultural understanding between the two. American advisors were confident in their experience from World War II and the Korean War, and any reluctance by their Vietnamese counterparts to do exactly as the Americans would do was often perceived as laziness or incompetence[II]. The foundational relationship for a successful military assistance partnership was simply not strong as it was for the Chinese and the Vietnamese Communists.
The highlighted excerpt above is an illustration of our lack of cultural understanding and the one track path we follow, e.g., fight the American way or you cannot fight.
To be clear, China’s assistance was critical. As Seals[VIII] points out, China provided professional advice, weapons, logistics, and a strategic deterrence against a US invasion of the North Vietnam. But the fighting was always left to the PAVN and thus China never took the feeling of ownership of away from the Vietnamese.
This is why I advocate that while we need expertise in counterinsurgency we should not be conducting COIN ourselves but instead conducting foreign internal defense to help a friend, partner or ally in their internal defense and development programs so that they can defend themselves from lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, and terrorism. If we are doing it for them then we know how that turns out.
Could we substitute Iraq and Afghanistan below?
This is in stark contrast to the ARVN forces who, as US support decreased later in the war, complained that their way of fighting had become dependent on massive amounts of supply and ammunition and significant air support[VI]. They had become accustomed to fighting a materiel and ordnance heavy fight like their US advisors, which was not at all suited to the nature of counterinsurgency warfare fought among the civilian population. Nor were such methods of fighting suited to the ARVN forces capacity to sustain it.
But we should also realize that no two situations are the same and that there are no exact models that are transferable in every way but there are many lessons that do carry over.
Conclusion:
The Chinese may have simply been lucky to support a motivated and culturally compatible Vietnamese military. Given less favorable circumstances the task would no doubt have been exponentially more difficult. Could Mao’s PLA have advised the Vietnamese, if necessary, in a strategy other than People’s War? Could it have successfully advised a military with which it shared no culture or history if the situation required it? Could Chinese encouragement have provided the necessary enthusiasm for the cause if the Vietnamese Communists were reluctant? One can only speculate. More importantly, can the US advise any of its allies in anything other than its own methods and doctrine if the situation requires something different? Can it tailor advising and assistance to a military that culturally is a poor fit for US institutions? Can the US encourage host nation ownership? Judging from the current efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the answer unfortunately seems to be no.
And a friend responded to my comments on this article on my national security list serve to remind me of this pithy quote that also illustrates one of our American strategic weaknesses:
- “The very massiveness of our intervention actually reduced our leverage. So long as we were willing to use U.S. resources and manpower as a substitute for Vietnamese, their incentive for doing more was compromised.” – Komer, Bureaucracy At War.
Why Military Advising Was So Successful in Vietnam…
by Peter Murphy
Journal Article | June 28, 2015 - 3:58pm
Why Military Advising Was So Successful in Vietnam…for the Chinese: And What the US Can Learn From It
Peter Murphy
In post-World War II Vietnam, the fact that the Vietnamese Communists consistently demonstrated more motivation to fight and maintained greater popular support than their adversaries leads many to conclude that the communist victory was inevitable and no military action would change what was ultimately a political situation favorable to the communists. It is true that the Vietnamese Communists did enjoy these advantages over the French and later the South Vietnamese government and its poorly motivated military forces. But military action was necessary for the Vietnamese Communists to force out the French and later to force out the South Vietnamese government. No popular uprising was sufficient to create the unified Vietnamese state under communist control without the military victory.
The Vietnamese Communist government and People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) received some material assistance from the Soviet Union, but were primarily advised and assisted by People’s Republic of China (PRC) throughout most of the Indochina Wars. Those Vietnamese troops decisively defeated the French, survived a war of attrition against the US, and completely overran the South Vietnamese forces that had received decades of French and US assistance. It seems the Chinese must have done something right in their military assistance effort. There are undoubtedly many contributing factors that led to the success of the Chinese assistance effort in Vietnam. The three most significant of those factors will be examined to see how they facilitated such a success, and why it seems the US continues to have difficulty finding similar success.
The Historical Relationship Between Advisors and the Advised
The first key factor contributing to China’s successful assistance to the Vietnamese Communists was the dynamic of the relationship between the two countries. The Vietnamese Communists and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) shared a common brotherhood from their leaders’ mutual involvement in the communist movements of the early twentieth century. Additionally, both countries had recently emerged from struggles against the Japanese and had both been the victims of western imperialism. But perhaps even more important, the two countries shared a much longer historical relationship. The Chinese empires had always exerted a significant cultural and philosophical influence on Vietnam, a country on the periphery of the old Chinese tributary system. But Vietnam also had its own unique heritage and with it a history of resisting Chinese interference in Vietnamese affairs[I].
This created a situation where some cultural similarities mixed with the shared communist ideology and resistance to colonialism would facilitate a mutual understanding and a good working relationship. Yet this was balanced by a history of Vietnamese independence and mistrust toward their larger neighbor. This second element of the relationship is important because though Vietnam and China quickly established an effective cooperative relationship, this sense of Vietnamese independence helped Vietnamese Communist leadership resist attempts by the Chinese to play too active a decision making role in what was after all a Vietnamese struggle.
In contrast, the US advisors shared no historical background with their South Vietnamese counterparts, and there was a complete lack of cultural understanding between the two. American advisors were confident in their experience from World War II and the Korean War, and any reluctance by their Vietnamese counterparts to do exactly as the Americans would do was often perceived as laziness or incompetence[II]. The foundational relationship for a successful military assistance partnership was simply not strong as it was for the Chinese and the Vietnamese Communists.
The Assistance and Mentorship Was Appropriate
(Continued at the link below)
Saturday, June 27, 2015
The Iraqi Army Can't Be Westernized
If we cannot get the highlighted line imprinted in our brains or at least tattooed on the inside of our eyelids we will never be successful at working through and with indigenous or host nation forces. This is probably our single most problematic weakness with all the concepts of building partner capacity, train advise and assist, organize, train, equip, rebuild and advise, and yes even foreign internal defense. We have spent the last 14 years believing we could organize and train Afghans and Iraqis and others and yet we have not learned from history and we have tried so hard to create not only militaries in our image but also many other institutions. We have spent so much time coming up with new concepts with new names and variations on foreign internal defense that have NOT been built on the important history we should have learned long ago and instead we continue to conduct social experiments to try to create armies and governments in our image. Until we understand and accept the sentence below we will never be able to work effectively with host nation forces.
Can the Iraqis readjust their army to better reflect culture and clan in time for the next offensive? Can the United States commit to an air campaign to rival Desert Storm? Can we provide enough moral and technical support to make all this possible by the beginning of the next campaign season in April and May 2016? I don't know. But I do know that history has been harsh to those who try to build alien armies in their own image. All the American firepower and "boots on the ground" will be for naught unless we allow the Iraqis to fight their war their way.
The Iraqi Army Can't Be Westernized
Arabs fight best in formations organized around familiar groups sharing more than the same national flag.
By
June 25, 2015 7:10 p.m. ET
ROBERT H. SCALES
Twenty-four years ago, in June 1991, as American troops began to gear up to invade Iraq, I started writing and researching my book "Certain Victory," the U.S. Army's official history of the Gulf War. I spent nine months reading documents and interviewing soldiers ranging from private to four-star general. I asked one question of everyone: How did the U.S. defeat the world's fourth-largest military in only 100 hours of combat?
The universal answers from the soldiers: We fought with superior equipment, bought by the taxpayers during the Reagan years; our leaders overcame the malaise of Vietnam to build a new volunteer military; the revolutions in training and doctrine of the 1980s proved their worth.
All true. But as I started to write, I knew something was missing. One afternoon at my office I convened a roundtable discussion with some of the most successful operational commanders against Saddam Hussein in Desert Storm. I asked the same question and got the same stock answers. But then one general and dear friend of mine paused for a moment, looked into the air pensively and said: "You know, Bob, Arab armies really can't do this very well. Remember we not only fought an Arab army, we fought with Arab armies, and the Saudis and Syrians weren't any better than Saddam's Republican Guard."
It was a politically incorrect moment to be sure. But after watching nearly a quarter-century of history pass, I must conclude he had a point. T.E. Lawrence (of Arabia) certainly knew this to be true when he ignored orders from senior British Army officers to make his Saudi Bedouin brothers into a proper conventional force. The Israeli Defense Forces have racked up four wins and zero losses in wars against Arab armies that tried to fight them with Western methods and equipment. Our march to Baghdad in 2003 lasted only three weeks and crushed Iraq's conventional army.
The stark consistency of contemporary history tells us several things as we ponder why the Iraqi military is proving to be so inept in its war against Islamic State. First is the immutable tenet that wars are human endeavors and that culture counts. Arab culture is based on family, tribe and clan. Thus it should come as no surprise that Arabs fight best in formations that are organically grown and organized around familiar groups that share more than the same national flag.
(Continued at the link below)
Friday, June 19, 2015
IMPORTANT FOLLOW-UP NDAA provisions on Countering Unconventional Warfare
Sometimes it is good to be wrong and good to be corrected. I received an important response to my comments below:
Your comment below is incorrect.
"Although the mark-up to the house bill directing the SECDEF to develop a plan "to counter unconventional warfare threats posed by adversarial state and non-state actors" did not make it into the final bill agreed to by the House and Senate, a somewhat watered down version from the Senate version was agreed upon that focuses on Russia and Europe."
Congress has notconferenced the bill yet, so the House language is still absolutely play. What the Senate just passed today was only their version of the NDAA. Now the conversation starts about merging the House and Senate bills, and both chambers voting again to send it to POTUS. So the House-Senate negotiated outcome could be a combination of the two UW focused provisions, or both standing as is.The language on theHouse side has Chairman Thornberry's full backing so it is likely to stand as is - and those negotiations will start in the coming weeks.
We are very fortunate to have Congressman Thornberry backing UW and counter-UW.
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: David Maxwell <David.Maxwell@georgetown.edu>
Date: Wed, Jun 17, 2015 at 4:08 PM
Subject: NDAA provisions on Countering Unconventional Warfare
To:
From: David Maxwell <David.Maxwell@georgetown.edu>
Date: Wed, Jun 17, 2015 at 4:08 PM
Subject: NDAA provisions on Countering Unconventional Warfare
To:
Although the mark-up to the house bill directing the SECDEF to develop a plan "to counter unconventional warfare threats posed by adversarial state and non-state actors" did not make it into the final bill agreed to by the House and Senate, a somewhat watered down version from the Senate version was agreed upon that focuses on Russia and Europe.
Of course there is a big difference between require and urge. Urge means it probably won't get done because the SECDEF does not have to do it.
I still think the HASC mark-up was useful and wish we could get the leadership to focus on this and language of the mark-up is probably the best description and understand of the threat that we could expect form Congress (the original language is below and I hope the HASC staffers are able to get something like it in next year's approved NDAA).
Page 183 from the JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT TO ACCOMPANY THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015
Page 183:
The House bill contained a provision (sec. 1080) that would require the Secretary of Defense to submit to the congressional defense committees a plan recommending actions and resources to enhance the capabilities and capacities of U.S. Armed Forces in Europe to counter the conventional, unconventional and subversive activities of the Russian Federation in the U.S. European Command’s area of responsibility and to respond under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Senate committee-reported bill contained no similar provision. The agreement does not include this provision. We note that a provision requiring a security strategy for Europe is included under another title of the Act.
Page 256-257:
European Reassurance Initiative (sec. 1535) A proposed amendment to the Senate committee-reported bill (amendment number 3875) contained a provision (sec. 1527) that would specify the purposes for which amounts authorized to be appropriated for the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) could be used and provide other limitations on the use of such funds. The House bill contained no similar provision. The agreement includes the Senate provision with an amendment clarifying that for fiscal year 2015 $1.0 billion is authorized to be appropriated in Overseas Contingency Operations funds for the ERI. The amendment would also provide that of these funds not less than $75.0 million would be available for programs, activities, and assistance to support Ukraine, and not less than $30.0 million would be available for programs and activities to build the capacity of European allies and partner nations. Amounts specified for the ERI fund would be available for the purposes of ERI through September 30, 2016. We are deeply concerned about the ongoing violations of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and note that a provision in another section of this title expresses the sense of Congress in support of providing Ukraine military assistance, both non-lethal and lethal assistance, that is defensive and non-provocative. We are also concerned about the potential spread of the unconventional and hybrid warfare tactics used by Russia in Ukraine to other countries in the region, potentially including the Baltic countries, Moldova, and Georgia. We urge the Secretary of Defense to devote the appropriate level of planning and resources, including resources under the ERI, to countering the threat
The original HASC Mark-up:
Section 10XX—Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Unconventional Warfare
This section would required the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the President and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to develop a strategy for the Department of Defense to counter unconventional warfare threats posed by adversarial state and non-state actors. This section would require the Secretary of Defense to submit the strategy to the congressional defense committees within 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. The committee is concerned about the growing unconventional warfare capabilities and threats being posed most notably and recently by the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The committee notes that unconventional warfare is defined most accurately as those activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied area. The committee also notes that most state-sponsors of unconventional warfare, such as Russia and Iran, have doctrinally linked conventional warfare, economic warfare, cyber warfare, information operations, intelligence operations, and other activities seamlessly in an effort to undermine U.S. national security objectives and the objectives of U.S. allies alike.
Winning Irregular War: Conflict Geography
This might be a very useful resource. The 685 page 10MB PDF can be downloaded at the link below. Table of contents below;
Winning Irregular War: Conflict Geography
by Geoff Demerst
QUICK START: HOW TO READ THIS BOOK
You can take a traditional approach, reading the sections in numerical
sequence; or you can read the author’s preface, the first seven-fifteen sections,
then the last several, then the middle (say 68-76), then skip around.
Going backwards from 144 to 1 will work, or you can peruse the Contents
and go to whatever sections interest you, which I hope will be all of them.
Some of the sections have expansive titles like Legitimacy or Human
Rights. They aren’t intended to encapsulate those subjects, but just tie those
themes to the book’s central assertions. Other titles, like Dogs and Mules,
or Forts and Walls, or Poop are less abstract, but relate to the same assertions.
Those assertions, or propositions, include:
• An impunity-based definition of State success;
• Attention to anonymity as a competitive emphasis;
• Inventorying as an indispensable knowledge activity;
• Withdrawal and pursuit as key operational and strategic concepts;
• Deception as a compulsory element of strategic thinking;
• Geography as the academic discipline of choice;
• Property analysis as tool for exposing the distribution of power;
• Distance as a key variable in the measurement of relative power;
• Civil engineering and construction as noble activities;
• Personal dignity and honor as key quantities of a durable victory;
• Adaptation of classic strategy as operational artistry; and
• Formal property regimes as a basis of peaceful social compacts.
‘Winning’ means not just neutralizing your enemies, but doing so
without creating more of them. It may also mean building places that do not
create enemies.
Building such places requires that ideology, political philosophy,
epistemology, engineering, and shooting all get along, so the book assumes
these things cannot be distanced one from another. Below each section is a
joke, quotation, or piece of poetry. They are interrelated in a way similar to
the text, and with the text. They are like the fins on a `60 Cadillac.
You can take a traditional approach, reading the sections in numerical
sequence; or you can read the author’s preface, the first seven-fifteen sections,
then the last several, then the middle (say 68-76), then skip around.
Going backwards from 144 to 1 will work, or you can peruse the Contents
and go to whatever sections interest you, which I hope will be all of them.
Some of the sections have expansive titles like Legitimacy or Human
Rights. They aren’t intended to encapsulate those subjects, but just tie those
themes to the book’s central assertions. Other titles, like Dogs and Mules,
or Forts and Walls, or Poop are less abstract, but relate to the same assertions.
Those assertions, or propositions, include:
• An impunity-based definition of State success;
• Attention to anonymity as a competitive emphasis;
• Inventorying as an indispensable knowledge activity;
• Withdrawal and pursuit as key operational and strategic concepts;
• Deception as a compulsory element of strategic thinking;
• Geography as the academic discipline of choice;
• Property analysis as tool for exposing the distribution of power;
• Distance as a key variable in the measurement of relative power;
• Civil engineering and construction as noble activities;
• Personal dignity and honor as key quantities of a durable victory;
• Adaptation of classic strategy as operational artistry; and
• Formal property regimes as a basis of peaceful social compacts.
‘Winning’ means not just neutralizing your enemies, but doing so
without creating more of them. It may also mean building places that do not
create enemies.
Building such places requires that ideology, political philosophy,
epistemology, engineering, and shooting all get along, so the book assumes
these things cannot be distanced one from another. Below each section is a
joke, quotation, or piece of poetry. They are interrelated in a way similar to
the text, and with the text. They are like the fins on a `60 Cadillac.
CONTENTS
DEDICATION ..............................
QUICK START ..............................
FOREWORD ..............................
AUTHORS PREFACE ..............................
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ..............................
CONTENTS ..............................
LIST OF MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS .............................. p. xxi
GLOSSARY ..............................
RESTATEMENT ..............................
SYNTHESIS ..............................
APPENDIX: MISCELLANEOUS LISTS .............................. p. 573
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..............................
ENDNOTES ..............................
NDEX ..............................
BOUT THE AUTHOR ..............................
ECTIONS 1-144:
1, Impunity...executive strategy ..............................
2, Anonymity...operational art ..............................
3, The Domesday Book...executive strategy ..............................
4, Defining Enemy...executive strategy ..............................
5, Vocabulary of Classic Strategy...knowledge process .................... p. 14
6, The Operational Equation...operational art ..............................
7, Sanctuary...operational art ..............................
8, Linearity and the Line of Retreat...operational art ...................... p. 28
9, White Bird...historical vignette, Chief Joseph’s failed retreat ........... p. 31
10, Decisive Battle...operational art ..............................
11, Protraction and Diligence...executive strategy .......................... p. 40
12, Commitment of the Reserve...operational art ........................... p. 44
13, Puthukkudiyirippu...historical vignette, Sri Lankan war .............. p. 46
14, Legitimacy...executive strategy ..............................
15, NGOs, IOs, and Unions...environment ..............................
16, Presence...operational art ..............................
17, Keeping Secrets...operational art ..............................
18, Whole of Government...executive strategy ..............................
19, Mercatus...environment ..............................
20, Rule-of-Law...synthesis ..............................
21, Iximché…historical vignette, warfare in Guatemala circa 1982 ...... p. 83
22, Badassoftheweek.com…
23, Mens Rea…environment ..............................
24, Ruthlessness and Resolve...environment ..............................
25, Why Humans Don’t Fight...environment ..............................
26, How Violent Groups Form...environment .............................. p. 105
27, ‘Nonviolent’ Action...operational art ..............................
28, Takeovers and Sieges...operational art ..............................
29, Heavy Machines...executive strategy ..............................
30, Control Technology...executive strategy ..............................
31, Holes in the Ground...operational art ..............................
32, Land-use Planning...knowledge process ..............................
33, Engineers & Built Environment...environment ...................... p. 130
34, Urban or Rural...environment ..............................
35, Comuna 13...historical vignette, a troubled borough in Medellín .. p. 137
36, The Denver Broncos...environment ..............................
37, School Lunches...operational art ..............................
38, Cultural Study for What?...knowledge process ........................ p. 153
39, Socioeconomic Causation...knowledge process ....................... p. 155
40, Popular Support...knowledge process ..............................
41, Dear Westy...historical vignette, a letter to Gen. Westmoreland ... p. 163
42, Brigands...environment ..............................
43, Sam Spade’s Whereabouts...knowledge process ....................... p. 174
44, Political/Military/
45, Police or Military...executive strategy ..............................
46, Taxation and Debt...environment ..............................
47, Why the County...knowledge process ..............................
48, Grading the Social Compact...knowledge process ................... p. 192
49, Territorial Scrutiny...knowledge process ..............................
50, U.S. Persons...environment ..............................
51, Get Willy...historical vignette, manhunt in part of Colombia ........ p. 204
52, Sovereignty...knowledge process ..............................
53, Hohfeldian Grievance Analysis...knowledge process .............. p. 215
54, Extortion...executive strategy ..............................
55, Kidnapping...environment ..............................
56, Militias and Gun Control...executive strategy ......................... p. 225
57, Dogs and Mules...executive strategy ..............................
58, Condottieri...executive strategy ..............................
59, Spontaneity...environment ..............................
60, War Nouveau...historical vignette, the world circa 1900 ............. p. 239
61, The Geography of Dope...environment ..............................
62, Bank Robbery...environment ..............................
63, Roadblocks and Checkpoints...operational art ........................ p. 258
64, Measuring Distance and Comparing Power ...knlg process . p. 262
65, Smuggling...environment ..............................
66, GIS...knowledge process ..............................
67, Points, Lines, Spaces...knowledge process ..............................
68, Scale...knowledge process ..............................
69, Measuring Effects of Actions on Enemies...knowledge process . p. 281
70, Measuring Effects of Actions on Structure..knowledge process p. 288
71, Jerusalem...historical vignette, the Zionists create a nation state ...... p. 293
72, Land Strategy...executive strategy ..............................
73, Property and the Social Compact...ideology ............................. p. 306
74, Refugees and Displaced Persons...environment ......................... p. 313
75, The Price of Real Estate, and Tourism...knowledge process ...... p. 316
76, Gender...environment ..............................
77, Sex...environment ..............................
78, Identity... knowledge process ..............................
79, Suicide... moral compass ..............................
80, Why You Should Like Geography...knowledge process ........... p. 333
81, What a Clergy Wants...environment ..............................
82, Conflict Thresholds...knowledge process ..............................
83, Why Are Irregular Wars Lost?...synthesis ..............................
84, Cultures of Violence...environment ..............................
85, Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck...historical vignette ............... p. 348
86, Shifting Covet-geographies....
87, Water Wars...environment ..............................
88, Escape Geography...operational art ..............................
89, The Dot Game and Go...operational art ..............................
90, Prisons & Prisoners....operational art ..............................
91, Forts and Walls….operational art ..............................
92, Graves Registration...environment ..............................
93, Diseases and Disasters...environment ..............................
94, Poop...environment............
95, Childhood...moral compass ..............................
96, Combatant Status...executive strategy ..............................
97, Oviedo...historical vignette, start of Spanish Civil War ............ p. 386
98, Jorge Verstrynge and Pio Moa...ideology ..............................
99, Postmodern and Post-structural...ideology ............................. p. 399
100, What the Foucault?...ideology ..............................
101, Magical Realism...knowledge process ..............................
102, Negotiations...executive strategy ..............................
103, Amnesty...executive strategy ..............................
104, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction...environment ............................ p. 419
105, Genocide Geography...knowledge process ............................ p. 422
106, Massacres...historical vignette, repugnancy ............................ p. 428
107, Guerre d'Algérie...historical vignette, Algerian War .............. p. 434
108, Common Knowledge...knowledge process ............................ p. 443
109, Your Staff Work Sucks...knowledge process ......................... p. 446
110, Knowledge Gaps...knowledge process ..............................
111, Knowledge Cultures...knowledge process ............................. p. 454
112, DIME and PMECII...knowledge process ..............................
113, Unrestricted Chi Whiz...executive strategy ........................... p. 465
114, R.V. Jones...knowledge process ..............................
115, Academies...executive strategy ..............................
116, Songs of Chu...operational art ..............................
117, Strategic Communication...executive strategy......................
118, Democracy...ideology ..............................
119, Declaration of Counterinsurgency...moral compass ............. p. 479
Montana circa 1878 ..............................
Sri Lanka circa 2006 ..............................
Bolivia, La Paz and El Alto ..............................
Guatemalan Highlands circa 1982 ..............................
Comuna 13, Medellín, Colombia circa 2002 ..................... p. 146
Hell with Limbo (Purgatory?) circa 1300 ......................... p. 188
Yoknapatawpha circa 1936 ..............................
South-central Colombia circa 2012 ..............................
World Map circa 1900 ..............................
Palestine circa 1920 ..............................
East Africa circa 1914-1918 ..............................
The Revolution of ’34 in Asturias ..............................
Colombia, various locations ..............................
French Algeria circa 1954-1962 ..............................
Europe circa 1805 ..............................
Kansas-Missouri Border circa 1858..........................
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
-
From a project Peter Neumann of King's College is working on. You can find interesting things in the "Twitterverse" Pet...
-
I would like to call attention to Kyle Johnston's excellent article in our Georgetown Security Studies Review at this link on page 84: ...
-
Eight Points of Irregular Warfare: Special Warfare is the execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and nonlethal ...
