Showing posts with label special operations and conventional forces interdependence. Show all posts
Showing posts with label special operations and conventional forces interdependence. Show all posts

Wednesday, November 6, 2013

Curb your enthusiasm!: Special Operations Forces should be niche units, not our foundational military assets

I think people who argue that SOF should be the foundational military assets  are those that are not experienced with SOF.  I do not think any true SOF professional will tell you that SOF should be a foundational military unit.  It is simply one capability of the full spectrum of joint force capabilities and we need to have the right mix of conventional and unconventional forces to be able to address the myriad national security threats we face.
V/R
Dave

By Richard L. Russell
Best Defense guest columnist
We need to take a breath and see Special Operations Forces in context with the history and uses and limitations of the threat, use, and management of force in American national security. Lest we forget, Special Operations Forces are just that -- special. They provide unique, niche military capabilities that place a premium on stealth and clandestine operations. Yet many, if not most, demands for the threat and use of American military might require that they be used openly and publicly. As former head of Joint Special Operations Command Gen. Stanley McChrystal warned, "That's the danger of special operating forces. You get this sense that it is satisfying, it's clean, it's low risk, it's the cure for most ills. That's the way many new presidents are initially enamored with the Central Intelligence Agency, because they are offered a covert fix for a complex problem. But if you go back in history, I can't find a covert fix that solved a problem long term."
These traditional military capabilities, moreover, often are the foundations upon which clandestine Special Operations Forces must launch their high-risk assaults. Delta or SEAL teams might be dispatched into a building, for example, to kill or capture a high value target. But the building's neighborhood would be secured by larger, more traditional forces such as the Army Rangers. A SEAL team might be dispatched across an international border to capture or kill a high value target, but the base the team might be launched from and supported with communications, command, control, and intelligence would come from more traditional military forces. 
The United States must guard against gutting its traditional and foundational military capabilities out of love of the glamour for Special Operations Forces. The world today has a fair share of countries with very capable niche or boutique-type military forces for special operations. The Germans, for example, are known to have very capable hostage rescue forces, while the Australians and the British have impressive special operations forces that have been put to hard work in the Afghanistan and Iraq military theaters. Yet the United States, with its global security interests, could hardly afford to have its military mirror that of Germany, Australia, or Britain. 
The United States, moreover, will have to avoid the pitfall of growing its Special Operations Forces too large. The Special Operations Forces community prides itself on taking the most physically fit and intellectually nimble of the military duty pool. But the faster and larger it grows, the lower the physical and intellectual standards will go to bring down the overall quality of Special Operations Forces. 
Above all, Americans must remember that our chief enemy -- al Qaeda -- for the past decade has been one uniquely teed-up to be attacked by Special Operations Forces, whether in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, or the Horn of Africa. Al Qaeda in Iraq and Afghanistan or the Taliban, like most terrorist organizations and insurgent groups, generally recruit, train, organize, and plan operations in tight-knit cells and small groups making them attractive targets for small Special Operations Forces. One would prefer to dispatch a SEAL or Delta team against al Qaeda or Taliban cells to try to capture individuals and to gather intelligence rather than to drop payloads on them from a B-52 to destroy both individuals and documentation and computers.
Notwithstanding common wisdom today, our enemies of the future are likely to be nation-states as well as traditional ideological insurgent movements like al Qaeda. For all of the grave threats that al Qaeda has posed to the United States, we have to remember that while its Islamic ideology has powerful appeal in the world today, especially in the Middle East and South Asia, it still lacks the power of a nation-state. Nation-states in contemporary international security remain the pinnacle of power, and that's why al Qaeda has off and on wanted to gain control in a nation-state -- whether Egypt in the 1990s or Saudi Arabia after 2003 and arguably Pakistan today. The United States needs to prudently guard against al Qaeda remnants and successors, all the while mindful of the ebbing and flowing of the international distribution of power among nation-states. 
Because Special Operations Forces typically are small and lightly armed and protected they require stealth and clandestine operations for their protection. If they are behind enemy lines and detected by regular forces they will be in a "world of hurt." Special Operations Forces have ably gone behind enemy lines in Iraq to knock-out critical Iraqi radars to create blind spots for the Army invasion of Kuwait in the 1990-91 war. But Kuwait was liberated by traditional military forces, not Special Operations Forces in 1991, just as Saddam Hussein's regime was ousted by the 3rd Infantry Division in 2003, not by a SEAL or Delta team.
(Continued at the link below)

Thursday, December 20, 2012

The Army Capstone Concept 19 December 2012


GEN Cone's forward is below.  Note the new term in this concept:

special operations and conventional forces interdependence The deliberate and mutual reliance by one force on another’s inherent capabilities designed to provide complementary and reinforcing effects. Integration and interoperability are subsets of interdependence.

You can download the entire concept at the link below.
V/R
Dave

Foreword 
From the Commanding General 
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 

For generations, the U.S. Army has proudly served the Nation by winning wars, securing peace, and protecting national interests as part of the joint force. From Yorktown to Sadr City, the men and women of the Army demonstrated the ability to force terms upon our enemies when all other options failed. There are many elements of national power, but a force that can root out and defeat our enemies, and exert control to prevent and end conflict remains the foundation of our Nation's ability to deter aggression. Concurrently, through partnership activities, the Army creates shared values and interests that provide for our long-term security, decreasing the likeliness we have to use force in defense of our Nation. 

The Army remains the foundation of our Nation’s security, now and into the future, by maintaining a force that prevents miscalculation by potential adversaries, shaping the operational environment, and, when required, winning decisively. Our Army must provide depth and versatility to the joint force; remain agile, responsive, and effective for combatant commanders; and offer options to national security decisionmakers in defense of the Nation at home and abroad. 

As the lead document of the Army Concept Framework, TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, The U.S. Army Capstone Concept (ACC) describes our vision of the future operational environment, the role of the Army in the joint force, and the broad capabilities required by future Army forces. Greater speed, quantity, and reach of human interaction and increased access to military capabilities make the operational environment more unpredictable and complex, driving the likelihood and consequence of disorder. 

The ACC provides a guide to how the Army will apply available resources to overcome these challenges and prevent, shape and win in support of recent strategic guidance. The ACC also serves as the foundation for a campaign of learning that will evaluate and refine its major ideas and required capabilities. Finally, the ACC provides a roadmap for development of a comprehensive investment strategy that will rebalance the Army’s force structure, readiness, and modernization efforts in support of national strategy. 

TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 establishes that, to meet the challenges of the future operational environment, the Army must maintain a credible capacity to win decisively and support combatant commanders across a wide range of military operations at home and abroad. The credibility of our Army, robust, ready, and modernized, underpins our ability to prevent conflict, shape the operational environment, and win the Nation’s wars as part of the joint force. Further, the ACC retains the idea of operational adaptability as the fundamental characteristic of the Army required to execute a wide variety of missions. The ACC expands operational adaptability to the people and organizations that comprise the institutional Army as well as the operating force. Finally, the ACC also provides insight into the wide array of Title 10 requirements the Army provides the joint force.

The ACC hones the Army’s understanding of emerging challenges and informs our preparation for the future, ensuring our Army stands ready to meet the demands that lie ahead. In the end, if we build a capable, credible Army in peace, we are far less likely to use it in war. 

ROBERT W. CONE 
General, U.S. Army 
Commanding

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