China Plays the South Korea Card

Excellent point:

China will continue to support North Korea for the same reason it does Russia, Iran and Syria. It chooses to align itself with rogue regimes, revisionist powers and disruptive actors. It sees its interests aligning more with those who try to destabilize global stability rather than those who try to maintain peace. When Beijing no longer supports dangerous actors around the globe, it will no longer support North Korea. That day, however, is far from coming.

But I have to take strong issue with this: 

In light of Mr. Xi's visit to South Korea, it is incumbent on Washington and Tokyo to deepen their own relations with Seoul. That has been particularly difficult for Japan of late. But both President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe should be stressing the future of relations, not just the past.

Is Michael implying that relations between the US and Japan are"deeper" than between the US and the ROK?  Is he implying that the US-Japan alliance is somehow superior to the ROK-US alliance?  I am hopeful that this is not what Michael means but it certainly can be interpreted that way and we should consider it incorrect.  I think more correctly stated might be that the US should work hard to foster deeper relations between its two allies in Northeast Asia.  Implying subordination of one alliance to the other is unhelpful but I fear that that is how many inside the beltway view things because Japan appears to be much more compliant with US desires than the ROK.

China Plays the South Korea Card

President Xi's trip to Seoul was undoubtedly an attempt to isolate Japan. It won't work.

By 

MICHAEL AUSLIN

Updated July 10, 2014 7:19 p.m. ET

http://online.wsj.com/articles/auslin-reading-beijings-tea-leaves-1405011529#printMode

After Chinese President Xi Jinping's trip to South Korea last week, "Beijingology" is in full swing. Analysts are trying to interpret the tea leaves of his visit. Is he showing anger toward North Korea? Driving a wedge between Japan and South Korea? Is he responding to U.S. pressure?

Such speculation is as unhelpful as it was during the dark days of the Cold War, when Americans studied Soviet leaders' every move in an attempt to understand their motives and goals, a strategy known as "Kremlinology." As with the Soviet Union, today's China is often a blank palimpsest to its readers, who impose whatever interpretation of Beijing's motives and goals suits them.

The very existence of Beijingology is a healthy reminder that even as China has become the world's second largest economy, the Chinese Communist Party continues to control information and limits its cooperative relations with outside states. Still, analysts should refrain from reading too much into President Xi's trip to Seoul last week.

They are undoubtedly right that Mr. Xi wants to use his relationship with South Korean President Park Geun-hye to further pressure and isolate Japan. Yet there is very likely a limit to how far Ms. Park will go in her outreach to China. Seoul remains committed to the U.S. alliance, in no small part because Washington is the only realistic counterweight to Beijing's growing strength.

A recent poll indicated that 70% of South Koreans consider China's rise and power a threat to their country. And, despite deep historical anger and hatred toward Japan, South Korean officials know that democratic (and aging) Japan poses less of a threat than a revisionist China.

On top of all that, Seoul realizes it must to some degree work with Japan, since both are key allies of the United States. Any U.S. action to protect South Korea from the North would also involve U.S. bases in Japan.

As for North Korea, Mr. Xi is hardly sending a message to Kim Jong Un by visiting Seoul before Pyongyang. It is no secret that China has long found North Korea's behavior as infuriating and unpredictable as the rest of Asia.

(Continued at the link below)

http://online.wsj.com/articles/auslin-reading-beijings-tea-leaves-1405011529#printMode

South Korea: Responding to the North Korean threat

Probably the single most concise but comprehensive article on the military situation in South Korea and in particular ROK military develops and the OPCON transfer issue.  As a side note, MG Lee (in the photo below) and I were planners together on the CFC staff back in the 1990's.  The PDF of this article can be downloaded from the web site. This is an important read.

V/R
Dave

South Korea: Responding to the North Korean threat

Bruce E. Bechtol | American Enterprise Institute

http://www.aei.org/outlook/foreign-and-defense-policy/defense/south-korea-responding-to-the-north-korean-threat/

November 05, 2013

DefenseImagery.mil

Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, left, exchanges greetings with South Korean army Maj. Gen. Lee Seo-young, a South Korean defense attaché, during a gala hosted by South Korean President Park Geun-hye commemorating the 60th anniversary of the US-South Korean alliance May 7, 2013, at the National Portrait Gallery in Washington, DC.

Article Highlights

• S. Korean defense is unevenly prepared for the N. Korean threat.
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• Combined ROK-US wartime operating force must continue to exist to ensure readiness.
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• All other issues will be ancillary for Seoul as long as there is a DPRK.
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DOWNLOAD THE PDF

South Korea is in a unique position. It is an economic powerhouse and a thriving democracy that faces the most ­ominous and imminent threat on its borders of any democracy in the world. Moreover, this is a threat that continues to evolve, with increasing missile, cyber, special operations, and nuclear capabilities and a new leader who shows no signs that he will be any less ruthless or belligerent than his father. To meet this threat, Seoul has undertaken a number of efforts to better deter and defend against North Korean capabilities and provocations, including increasing the defense budget, upping training with US forces, creating new command elements, and establishing plans for preemptive strikes against imminent North Korean missile launches. However, in part because of administration changes in Seoul, the South Korean effort has been uneven. And decisions remain to be made in the areas of missile defense, tactical fighter aircraft, and command-and-control arrangements that will be significant for not only South Korea but all states that have an interest in Northeast Asia’s peace and stability.

Key points in this Outlook:

• South Korea faces a clear, present, and evolving threat from North Korea, with Kim Jong-un showing no indication of moving away from his father’s violent and corrupt policies.
• South Korea’s response to the North Korean threat has been uneven, with increased capabilities in some areas but less than what is needed in others.
• A key issue facing the ROK-US alliance is command and control of allied forces during wartime on the Korean Peninsula. A combined operating force must continue to exist to ensure full readiness and capability.

This is the seventh National Security Outlook in a series about the defense capabilities of America’s allies and security partners.[1] 

When analyzing the readiness, capabilities, and future initiatives of the Republic of Korea’s (ROK’s) military, one must take into account the unique geopolitical position that the ROK government finds itself in. There is no ambiguous set of threats for South Korea. Rather, the largest and most dangerous threat to the stability and security of the Korean Peninsula is obvious: the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK).

It is for this threat that policymakers in Seoul must ensure their military is ready. Providing an adequate defense against this threat is the cornerstone of the ROK–US alliance and the most important foreign policy issue between these two allies. As survival of the nation-state is the number-one priority for any national leader, all other issues for Seoul will be ancillary as long as there is a DPRK.

Recognizing that the threatening behavior of its belligerent neighbor to the north is the key military issue for the ROK, it is important to analyze that threat to determine what the priorities of the South Korean military will be and how the threat will influence planning for the ROK–US alliance. Since 2010, North Korea has conducted two violent military provocations: one with a submarine that sank a ROK naval ship and one that involved an artillery barrage against a South Korean island that killed both military and civilian personnel.[2] North Korea also conducted yet another nuclear test this past February.[3] 

In addition, the DPRK has shown with a test launch conducted in mid-December last year that it is now capable (or close to it) of building a missile that can hit Alaska, Hawaii, or perhaps even the west coast of the United States.[4] Pyongyang also has the capability of targeting all of South Korea and most of Japan with its ballistic missiles.[5] 

"All other issues for Seoul will be ancillary as long as there is a DPRK."North Korea has also continued to advance the capabilities and numbers of its armored forces, long-range artillery forces, and special operations forces.[6] And, finally, Kim Jong-un has shown no indication that he has any intentions except to carry on the violent and corrupt policies of his father Kim Jong-il. This means, of course, that South Korea and the ROK–US alliance must continue to prepare for the multifaceted North Korean threat for the foreseeable future.

Initiatives against the North Korean Threat

Despite calls by the Roh Moo-hyun administration (2003–08) for a “balancer policy”—a policy that moved South Korea away from its traditional security ties with the United States to a more neutral or balancing role between the United States, Japan, and the old communist bloc of China, Russia, and North Korea—the fact remains that the primary issue for which Seoul must build its military capabilities and plan its contingencies is North Korea.[7] This process has been exacerbated by the fact that the threat the DPRK presents has evolved and become even more complicated in recent years.

Following the two violent provocations in 2010 already described, it became obvious that the South Korean government and military needed to take steps to counter future provocations from North Korea. As noted North Korean specialist Robert M. Collins has stated, “Since the end of the Korean Conflict in 1953, the ROK–US alliance has done a very good job of deterring against a war initiated by North Korea. The alliance has not done a good job of deterring North Korean provocations.”[8] Thus, the planning, policies, and procedures South Koreans initiated (and coordinated with their key ally in Washington) are very timely and needed now more than ever.

During April 2013, it was reported that the United States and South Korea had finalized a plan to respond more forcefully and appropriately to North Korean provocations.[9] This new “counterprovocation” plan will ensure that there is a speedy “response in kind” that still prevents escalation to all-out war. The existence of the plan was also made public in part, it seems, because Seoul and Washington wanted to both warn the North Koreans and reassure the South Korean populace.

In an earlier and equally important move, the South Korean military established a separate Northwest Islands Command. The establishment of the new command and the appointment of a commander with the autonomy to respond with necessary force in a timely manner under more liberal rules of engagement empower the South Korean military to respond more effectively to violent provocations the North initiates in the Northern Limit Line (NLL) area.[10]

Formally established in June 2011, the command was first headed by Lt. Gen. Yoo Nak-jun, the commandant of the ROK Marine Corps, with a Marine major general as deputy commander and a staff that includes colonels from each of the ROK military services. Built around a division-sized joint unit, with the key contingents being the ROK Marine Sixth Brigade and the Yeonpyeong Defense battalion, the new command now has the ability to respond to North Korean attacks more effectively and rapidly. As such, ROK forces are now better positioned to deter and defend against North Korean provocations.[11]

The attacks in 2010 and the rhetoric from North Korea since have had the opposite effect of what Pyongyang likely wanted. If anything, DPRK behavior has strengthened South Korea’s resolve to strike back against North Korean aggression.[12] The South Korean Navy is now on a heightened state of readiness in the NLL area—the demarcation line in the West (Yellow) Sea between the DPRK and ROK—and has been equipped with the best maritime equipment that the government can provide.[13]

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.aei.org/outlook/foreign-and-defense-policy/defense/south-korea-responding-to-the-north-korean-threat/

Korea Cannot Let Japan Deploy Troops Abroad

I think Korea could be making a strategic error.  I fully understand all the historical animosity but the fact is that Japan is a sovereign nation and neither Korea nor the U.S. can prevent it from deploying troops or participating in collective self-defense any more than Japan can prevent Korea from doing so.

This is the time for cooler diplomatic heads to prevail in Korea. I think that contrary to the conclusion in the article Korea will have a better chance of boosting its geopolitical role by thinking and acting realistically and making decisions based on real interests. Yes history is important and we understand that suspicion lingers but policy cannot always be made based on that and even less on emotion (domestic politics notwithstanding).  And I think there is one thing that the Koreans should remember and that is that in the case of the Korean peninsula the international community 9and the US) is likely to have learned from history and will not allow a repeat of Taft Katsura in 1905 and the annexation of Korea in 1910 by Japan.  Putting the US in the middle between Korea and Japan and then asking the US to choose between the two is not a wise diplomatic move for either Korea or Japan (and certainly not for the US).

Korea Cannot Let Japan Deploy Troops Abroad

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/10/28/2013102802246.html

A high-ranking government official has asked U.S. officials to "reflect" Korea's sovereignty over the entire Korean Peninsula before endorsing Japan's right to engage the country's strictly defensive military in operations abroad. 

This is the first time that Korea has directly put its position to the U.S. about the issue of Japan's attempts to legitimize so-called "collective self-defense," which would allow Japanese troops to fight abroad if an ally is in some way under threat. This could lead to Japanese troops being deployed to the Korean Peninsula in support of the U.S. Forces Korea in the event of an emergency here.

Koreans have a deep-seated suspicion of Japan's military since the brutal occupation of the Korean Peninsula from 1910 until the end of World War II.

Although the UN Charter gives governments the right to collective self-defense, Japan voluntarily relinquished it due to its pacifist postwar constitution. But now the hard-right Abe administration is trying to amend the constitution to assert it again, Australia, the U.K. and the U.S. have endorsed the move in order to keep China's rising military power in check.

That is why Seoul wants to make sure that Japanese soldiers are never again allowed to land on Korean soil, whatever the circumstances. In order to make sure it does not happen, Seoul must strike a cast-iron agreement with the U.S. while strengthening its own defenses.

Japan's attempts at rearmament will have a major impact on Northeast Asian security. An arms race between China and Japan will create clouds of a new Cold War in the region, and U.S.-Japan relations could take precedence over U.S.-Korea ties. South Korea would then find itself in a dilemma because it is dependent on the U.S. for its security and on China for business.

The rightwingers now in charge in Japan are also aggressively pushing the country’s flimsy colonial claim to Korea's Dokdo islets. In every aspect, Japan's moves to assert the right to collective self-defense involve Korea.

(Continued at the link below)

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/10/28/2013102802246.html

JCS chief nominee vows to beef up S. Korea's defense capabilities

Admiral Choi is saying all the right things.  The ROK military and its leaders know what needs to be done.  The question is will the government resource all the requirements?  

In addition to what I think are the right comments on missile defense, nuclear deterrence, and OPCON transfer, I am especially heartened by this statement:

Choi also pledged to strike back against any provocations by North Korea, which killed 50 South Koreans in 2010 in a torpedo attack against a Navy warship and the shelling of a western border island.  

"I will strike the origin of attack as well as its command and supporting forces to stop any further provocations," Choi told lawmakers of the parliamentary defense committee. 

Although seemingly counterintuitive at the next kinetic provocation by the north, the ROK military must strike rapidly and decisively at the time and place of the provocation as ADM Choi outlines above in order to prevent escalation.  If they wait too long or strike targets deeper into north Korea that could very well be interpreted as a direct threat to the regime and cause a response we do not want.  But I believe the north actually will respect an immediate and decisive response (there  very good history of doing so in the immediate vicinity of the DMZ and the NLL where there have been significant exchanges of fire over the last 60 years that have not escalated beyond the immediate provocation).

But Admiral Choi has laid down the marker and he and the ROK military must execute decisively at the next provocation if one occurs along the lines of the Cheonan sinking or the artillery shelling of Y-P Do.

V/R
Dave

JCS chief nominee vows to beef up S. Korea's defense capabilities

http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20131011000488

Published : 2013-10-11 11:13
Updated : 2013-10-11 13:11

The nominee for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) vowed Friday to speed up major weapons programs to bolster defense capabilities, saying North Korea's missile and nuclear ambitions are posing the greatest threat to South Korean national security.

President Park Geun-hye last month appointed Adm. Choi Yun-hee to the JCS chief, marking the first time that a Navy chief has been appointed to the top commander post. His appointment is subject to parliamentary approval.

Choi said the South Korean military should speed up an upgrade of the current missile defense and acquire surveillance satellites to establish independent Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) and a pre-emptive missile destruction system, the so-called "Kill Chain."

"South Korea and U.S. forces should deter North Korea from using its nuclear weapons using a joint deterrence strategy," the 59-year-old Choi said during a parliamentary confirmation hearing.

"If there is a possibility of the North using (nuclear weapons) and imminent danger, we have to launch a pre-emptive strike using the kill chain. If there's still a nuclear threat, we have to counter it using the KAMD."

South Korea currently operates 48 PAC-2 missiles imported from Germany, which have an interception rate of less than 40 percent.

As part of a mid-term defense plan, the military plans to upgrade the current system to the "hit-to-kill" PAC-3 developed by Lockheed Martin with improved guidance accuracy, and adopt military satellites and spy drones.

North Korea is believed to have more than 1,000 missiles of varying types, with most only able to target South Korea and some capable of hitting some Japanese and U.S. military bases.

Pyongyang fired off a long-range rocket last December and conducted its third atomic test in February as part of efforts to produce a nuclear warhead with a greater range. Seoul's spy agency recently confirmed that Pyongyang has restarted a 5-megawatt plutonium reactor in Yongbyon.

"Considering the nuclear development so far, I believe (North Korea) has made considerable progress in warhead miniaturization," Choi said. 

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20131011000488

Hopefully we will tire of the discussion of OPCON transfer over the next year, we will conduct a thorough strategic analysis of how to best organize our combined military forces to achieve our alliance strategic objectives and when the plan is announced at next October's Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) it will not be controversial and will illustrate the proper evolution of the alliance as it adapts to changing conditions while always keep the alliance strategic objectives and threat in the forefront.

V/R

Dave

Yonhap News AgencyOctober 14, 2013 00:47

S. Korea, U.S. to decide timing of OPCON transfer next year

http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/yonhap-news-agency/131014/s-korea-us-decide-timing-opcon-transfer-next-year

By Kim Eun-jung

SEOUL, Oct. 14 (Yonhap) -- Seoul and Washington have agreed to reset the timing of the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) next year after reviewing North Korean threat and the South Korean forces capabilities to deal with it, the defense ministry here said Monday.

The issue of the OPCON transfer to Seoul surfaced as the major issue in this year's parliamentary audit on the defense ministry, which in May proposed the U.S. government to reconsider the December 2015 deadline in light of the rising North Korean nuclear and missile threat.

In a bilateral defense summit earlier this month, the two nations agreed to form a task force team to discuss conditions for the right timing and draw a conclusion in the first half of next year, the defense ministry said in a report.

South Korean Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin stressed the importance of the allies' combined surveillance capabilities to detect movments by the North Korean military, pledging to bolster his military's own capabilities to deter the present danger and potential threat.

"The South Korea-U.S. combined forces are critical in making command decisions, while South Korean forces have enough strike capabilities," Kim said during the parliamentary defense meeting. "The South Korean forces are currently preparing to cope with the North Korean threat, while preparing for potential threat in the future. We will consider mid- and long-term measures to bolster capabilities against potential threat."

South Korea is scheduled to take over the wartime operational command of all troops on the peninsula in December 2015, a timeline that had already been pushed back from the previous deadline of 2012, but rising threat from the communist rival fueled concerns over the planned transition.

In light of the heightened tension with Pyongyang's near-daily war threats against South Korea and the U.S. for their joint military drills in spring, Kim said he suggested that President Park Geun-hye reconsider the timing of the planned transition.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/yonhap-news-agency/131014/s-korea-us-decide-timing-opcon-transfer-next-year

U.S.-Japan Defense Accord Rankles South Korea

I asked Ambassador Ahn a question yesterday at the ICAS symposium after he discussed the "Asian Paradox" (simply the paradox that the Asian nations have grown more economically interdependent over time while their political relationships have been declining and becoming more strained).

Some would say that for the Untied States the relationship between its two most important treaty allies Korea and Japan is very important and key to its security, political and economic interests in Northeast Asia.  Given the history between the two and the growing friction I asked what advice he would offer to the U.S. In how to help improve the ROK-Japan relationship in the future.  Are there specific actions the US should take (an example being the current ROK-Japan-US naval exercises taking place in the East Sea)?  He went on to describe how he had hoped that with the elections of President Park and Prime Minister Abe they could consider history as beginning in January 2013.  He was hopeful for the first 3 months of 2013 and then in March things changed and he went on to describe the Japanese actions that have strained relations and highlighted the historical animosity.  But the specific answer to my question was ultimate one of a season diplomat.  He said that he was confident that the US would act wisely in terms of its relationship with both of its alliance partners.

V/R

Dave

October 12, 2013

U.S.-Japan Defense Accord Rankles South Korea

By Shim Jae Hoon

http://www.realclearworld.com/printpage/?url=http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2013/10/12/us-japan_defense_accord_rankles_south_korea_105510-full.html

The front-page picture in Korean newspapers told the story of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit.

South Korea's President Park Geun Hye, looking frosty and gazing in the opposite direction, ignored Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe standing next to her at the October 7 APEC in Bali. The two leaders barely exchanged greetings, according to a Japanese news dispatch, and kept their contact to a minimum, "only for a few seconds."

The awkward encounter was emblematic of widening gulf between two crucial East Asian neighbors, unable to settle age-old differences over past history, even as their security environment worsens with China's territorial assertiveness and North Korea's nuclear and missile threats.

But it was not just bilateral issues dividing them. Broadening US security ties with Japan is fueling resentment in South Korea that the US is eroding Seoul's strategic options by beefing up Japan. The October 3 US-Japanese agreement to revise their defense cooperation guidelines next year has raised the specter of Washington drastically strengthening Japan's independent military capability. This prompts concerns in Seoul that Japan, an ancient foe, may assume greater responsibility for regional defense on behalf of the United States. South Korea analysts fear that their country might once again become the proverbial shrimp caught between two Asian whales - Japan and China.

Such a prospect evokes unpalatable memories of Japanese invasions, occupation and brutalities - smack in the face of nuclear threats from the North. Increased Japanese responsibility not only augurs negatively for Seoul's independent strategic space but interferes with Seoul's attempt to forge stronger ties with China and use Beijing's leverage in containing North Korea's nuclear capability.

The US is shifting more responsibility to South Korea, too.

During his four-day trip to Seoul for assessment of North Korea's military capability, US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel announced a series of steps that would bolster the bilateral military alliance. His visit came against the backdrop of increasing US commitment for the defense of South Korea, which hosts 28,500 US troops. In their assessment of South Korean capability, Hagel and Korean Defense Minister Kim Kwan Jin came close to agreement on delaying the transfer of command authority of the combined forces to a Korean general in 2015. They also signed a new "strategic framework" authorizing what Korean officials described as "preemptive attack" on the North's nuclear facility in the event of a nuclear or missile attack against the South.

Then, Hagel traveled to Tokyo on October 3. Joined by US Secretary of State John Kerry, Hagel signed an agreement calling for revision of the US-Japan Defense Cooperation guidelines next year. The Obama administration did not consult Seoul on the decision to beef up the Japanese military capability. The angst in Seoul was exacerbated by the fact that the agreement came in the midst of the Abe government seeking what it called collective self-defense, which would allow Japan to consider an attack on its ally as attack on itself. That not only would make Japan a significant military force in the region, it would necessarily involve reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution that prohibits its rearmament.

---

The new guidelines clearly target North Korea with its nuclear arms and missile launches. Although China wasn't mentioned in the agreement, the guidelines suggest that China is becoming a new source of tension for Japan over territorial claims for nearby islets called Senkaku by Japan and Diaoyu by China.

The prospect of being sandwiched between a military superpower of China to the north and an unrepentant former colonial power, newly arming itself with help from the United States, discomfits Seoul. The strategy also interferes with President Park's policy of forging better relations with Beijing, which has considerable leverage over North Korea. At the same time, China is also a massive economic partner for South Korea, claiming a quarter of the country's global trade volume.

In contrast to frosty relations with Tokyo, Chinese President Xi Jinping at APEC offered more assurance of China's involvement in keeping North Korea under control. Meeting on the sidelines of summit, Xi assured Park that China not only banned a long list of export items that the North could use for developing its nuclear weapons technology, he declared Beijing stood "resolutely" against another nuclear test by the North. Indeed, he promised, China will scrupulously adhere to the UN Security Council resolution keeping North Korea under strict sanctions.

In short, China is going an extra mile to woo South Korea, in the hope of keeping the latter neutral if not on its side in the current competition for influence in East Asia.

(Continued at the link below)
http://www.realclearworld.com/printpage/?url=http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2013/10/12/us-japan_defense_accord_rankles_south_korea_105510-full.html

This debate comes back to OPCON transfer and can the ROK military defend their own country.  First let me state up front that it is my belief that if the ROK and north Korea were to have a war without outside intervention or assistance the ROK would win and in the end win decisively.  But both north and South would be devastated at the end and in fact things might look a lot like 1953 especially between Seoul and Pyongyang.  And of course it is unrealistic to think that there could ever be an isolated conflict not the Peninsula, that does not spillover into other parts of Northeast Asia and does not have a crippling global economic impact.  But if anyone can envision an isolated conflict then by all means plan accordingly.

However, I think the issue, for the US, should be about what is in the best interests of the US.  I would submit that it is in US interests both to deter such a catastrophic conflict but if such a catastrophic conflict occurs (whether the result of war or collapse) it is in US interests to both end the conflict as rapidly as possible, minimize destruction on the peninsula and in the region (to include Japan as well though that pains many on the mainland to hear), ensure a successful outcome of such conflict and then achieve the strategic end state of the Alliance (stated in 2009 and reaffirmed by both Presidents in May 2013) and that is the unification of the Korean Peninsula (ideally peacefully but of course north Korea has a say in that condition).  Working backward from that goal should guide the analysis as to how to best organize the combined military forces to achieve that end state.

Rather than make comments that belittle our alliance (which also betray a lack of understanding of both the alliance and the regional threat and context) we in the US should focus on what is in the best interests of the United States.  If we decide that it is not in the best interests of the United States to ever contribute to achieving "a stable, secure, peaceful, economically vibrant, non-nuclear peninsula, reunified under a liberal constitutional form of government determined by the Korean people" then perhaps we need to completely re-evaluate our commitment to the Alliance.  Talking about OPCON transfer is counter-productive and a distraction from the real issues which should be how best to organize the complementary military capabilities of the ROK and US to optimize their strengths and mitigate their weaknesses (yes the US military has weaknesses too when it comes to fighting on the Korean Peninsula) so that the military forces can most effectively contribute to achieving the alliance strategic end state.

V/R

Dave

South Korean official: Allied transfer of control in 2015 'inappropriate'

http://www.stripes.com/news/south-korean-official-allied-transfer-of-control-in-2015-inappropriate-1.246483

Passengers walk through Seoul Station on Tuesday evening, shortly after North Korea announced that foreigners should leave the country for their safety in case of war. Many in South Korea, accustomed to hearing threats from the North, have shown little serious concern about a possible military confrontation with Pyongyang.
ASHLEY ROWLAND/STARS AND STRIPES

By Ashley Rowland

Stars and Stripes

Published: October 11, 2013

In this photo released by the South Korean Unification Ministry, Kim Song Hye, center, the head of North Korea's delegation, shakes hands with an unidentified South Korean officer before crossing a military demarcation line, which has separated the two Koreas since the Korean War, for a meeting with South Korean delegates at Panmunjom in Paju, north of Seoul, South Korea, Sunday, June 9, 2013. Government delegates from North and South Korea began preparatory talks Sunday at the "truce village" on their heavily armed border aimed at setting ground rules for a higher-level discussion on easing animosity and restoring stalled rapprochement projects.

SOUTH KOREAN UNIFICATION MINISTRY

SEOUL — South Korea’s defense minister says the planned transfer of wartime control of allied troops to Seoul in 2015 is “inappropriate” in light of North Korean provocations earlier this year.

“North Korea is different from the past. Considering the third nuclear test and the situations from March to May, the December 2015 deadline is not appropriate,” Kim Kwan-jin told lawmakers during a defense committee meeting Tuesday. Videos of his remarks were posted on the National Assembly’s website.

North Korea issued a series of threats after the February nuclear test, which monitors indicated was its most powerful so far. Bolstered by a successful test of a three-stage rocket last December, it claimed it could hit U.S. targets, though experts say they think Pyongyang has not yet crafted a bomb small enough to fit in a warhead.

Kim said Pyongyang’s ongoing threats over joint U.S.-South Korean military exercises contributed to Seoul’s decision, backed by President Park Geun-hye, to seek a delay.

If war broke out on the peninsula today, the commander of U.S. forces would lead both U.S. and South Korean forces. After the OPCON transfer, the top South Korean general would assume that responsibility.

The transfer was initially supposed to take place in 2007 but was postponed until 2012. After the North’s sinking of a South Korean warship in 2010, the date was pushed forward again to 2015 amid questions about whether the South’s military was ready for the job.

U.S. Forces Korea commander Gen. Curtis “Mike” Scaparrotti, who assumed command last week, told the Senate Armed Services Committee in July that the OPCON transfer is “a good plan...and I think we should move forward with it.” He added that Seoul had to meet a variety of benchmarks before the transfer takes place.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.stripes.com/news/south-korean-official-allied-transfer-of-control-in-2015-inappropriate-1.246483

Gun Shy in Seoul Sixty years later, South Korea still isn't ready to take full control of its own defense.

To be blunt Mr. Lubold's  analysis is ignorant and insulting to the Koreans in terms of the OPCON transfer.  This is not about the ROK military not being ready to take full control of its own defense.  This is about whether the combined war fighting command should be dissolved.  Unfortunately for the mythical OPCON transfer to occur it requires the dissolution of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command (CFC) and the establishment of separate national war fighting commands.  

The Korean military is rightly  concerned (not gun shy) about two things:  First is the loss of unity of command (and thus unity of effort) when the ROK/US Combined Forces Command is dissolved.  Second, is the  concern that dissolution of CFC will be the next step in the reduction of the US military commitment to the Alliance (and this is exacerbated by the move to a rotational presence).  In actuality the ROK military is self confident enough to take a more long term strategic view of the situation and willingly accept the criticism and derision of those like Mr. Lubold in order to ensure the strength of the Alliance to ensure that the ROK and US military capabilities are organized in a way that can most effective deter defend, and fight, and win and serves the interests of both the ROK and US.  The ROK leaders know the importance of unity of command.

The other piece to this that I have not described for quite some time is the importance of the ROK/US Military Committee which was actually meeting this week in Seoul.  This is who  the Commander of the ROK/US CFC answers to and from whom he receives his strategic and operational guidance.  The Military Committee is made up of senior military officers from the ROK and US.  And it is because of this Military Committee that the ROK actually in effect does exercise co-equal "OPCON" over both its forces and the US forces as the US does the same over its forces and the ROK forces.  This is also why if the ROK/US CFC were to be commanded by a ROK General with a US Deputy that US forces would still not be placed under foreign control because that ROK General would still answer to the Military Committee that includes senior US officers.

Lastly, we should remember how this so-called OPCON transfer got started and grew legs.  This is a result of the perception of rising anti-American sentiment during the Kim Dae-jung and then Roh Moo-hyun administration combined with President Roh's political rhetoric about ROK control of military forces.  Second, this is a result of the disdain the Bush administration had for the Roh administration combined with the desire of Rumsfeld to get US forces off the Peninsula (where they were being "wasted," in his words) so that they could be put in the fight in the war on terrorism (read Iraq).  After the Roh administration was elected Rumsfeld, with no prior coordination with the US command in Korea, informed Roh's emissaries in January 2003 that he would move US forces out of Yongsan in Seoul and that he wanted to allow the ROK military to be responsible for the defense.  This is what started the chain of events and has brought us to this point.  But none of these plans or decisions were based on a strategic analysis of what the ROK and US militaries need to and can do, the best way to do it in terms of achieving both ROK and US strategic objectives in regards to the north Korean threat, and the outcome of either war or regime collapse.  These decisions were not just political but emotional and not based on sound strategic planning and logic.

But after only one command briefing in Seoul Mr. Lubold should not be expected to understand.  But I am sure he is enjoying his trip to Asia traveling with the SECDEF.

V/R
Dave

Gun Shy in Seoul

Sixty years later, South Korea still isn't ready to take full control of its own defense.

BY GORDON LUBOLD | OCTOBER 2, 2013

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/10/02/gun_shy_in_seoul_south_korea_military?page=full

SEOUL — When it comes to taking charge of coalition forces here on the Korean Peninsula, South Korea has been a little gun shy. South Korea and the United States this week are celebrating the 60-year anniversary of an alliance forged after the Korean War; there were two parades, a big dinner, video retrospectives, and a lot of talk of katchi kapshida ("we stand together"). But after decades of confidence-building joint exercises and billions of dollars in military assistance, it's time for the South Koreans to step up and assume what's called "operational control" of all forces stationed here if war should break out. The problem is, the South Koreans aren't quite ready.

The U.S.-South Korea alliance, a centerpiece of the Pentagon's pivot to Asia, is more dynamic than ever, South Korean and U.S. officials took pains to say this week. "We can't underestimate the true strength of this -- of the blood alliance," Gen. J.D. Thurman, the retiring commander of forces in South Korea, told reporters.

Currently, the United States retains authority over all forces in South Korea. If there were to be a significant provocation from North Korea, for example, the U.S. commander in South Korea would assume control not only of his own 28,000-man force, but South Korea's as well. For years, the United States has wanted to hand over operational control of the forces -- "opcon" in military parlance -- to South Korea. But past efforts to formalize the transfer of control, in 2009 and 2012, never went through. Now the transfer is scheduled again for 2015. Once again, however, the South Koreans want to delay it.

On Wednesday, Oct. 2, South Korean Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin and U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel issued a joint statement that formally accepts an approach long sought by South Korea to a "conditions-based" transfer; that's diplomatic code for giving the South Koreans as much time as they need. Now neither side will commit to saying just when operational control might occur.

The two countries also signed a pact to deter North Korea's potential use of nuclear arms or other weapons of mass destruction as concerns grow about what North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is capable of. That pact was also a little vague, and defense officials trying to explain what it does used words like "framework" to describe the new approach, which itself was a work in progress. In the end, it will be seen as a confidence-building measure for the South Koreans at a time when they need it. "It's a new strategy that creates enhanced deterrence," said a military official in a briefing to reporters.

Kim, North Korea's inexperienced young dictator, remains a mystery to the U.S. intelligence community but has shown himself to be an unpredictable leader as he works to live up to the bad-boy image of his forebears. Kim's successful missile launch in December and his nuclear test in February raised tensions to some of their highest levels in years and shook the South Koreans.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/10/02/gun_shy_in_seoul_south_korea_military?page=full