I just have to chuckle at the issues that people jump on to criticize our government to support their own agendas. In this case Mr. Epstein is throwing stones in a glass house.  If he really wants to be consistent with his theme then he should not be capitalizing the "n" in north Korea.  In his haste to denigrate the State Department spokesperson ("Spox") he provides north Korea with equal legitimacy to South Korea (or the ROK) by capitalizing the "n." Perhaps Mr. Epstein out to find something more substantive to comment on.

V/R

Dave

State Department Spox Calls North Korea the ‘DPRK’

Joins China Daily, Pravda, and KCNA.

4:03 PM, AUG 30, 2013 • BY ETHAN EPSTEIN

http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/state-department-spox-calls-north-korea-dprk_751470.html

When it comes to North Korea, it’s helpful to keep a simple rule of thumb in mind: don’t trust anybody who refers to the country as the “DPRK.” (That would be the “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” the country’s official – and yes, bleakly ironic – name.) Calling North Korea the “DPRK” is not only woefully misleading – there’s nothing democratic, republican, or people-oriented about the brutal dictatorship – but it also lends legitimacy to the ruling regime. It’s little surprise that those who call North Korea the “DPRK” constitute a real rogue’s gallery: the China Daily and Xinhua, China’s state-run news sources, both do so, as does Moscow’s Pravda, and of course KCNA, the North Korean news service. Non-authoritarian news sources, meanwhile call a spade a spade. Heck, even the New York Times always refers to North Korea as North Korea. 

It would appear, however, that our own State Department does not. In an announcement today that North Korea has rescinded an invitation for a visit to a U.S. envoy, State Department spokesman Marie Harf first said in a written statement that she was "surprised and disappointed by North Korea's decision" before adding, "We have sought clarification from the DPRK about its decision and have made every effort so that Ambassador King's trip could continue as planned or take place at a later date.”

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/state-department-spox-calls-north-korea-dprk_751470.html

Some South Korean POWs still trapped in the North, 60 years after armistice

As we look at our own controversy with the US Joint Prisoner of War and Mission in Action Accounting Command (JPAC) we should note that the Republic of Korea has had their own Soldiers held as POWs in north Korea for some 60 years.  Another indication of the inhumanity of the Kim Family Regime (as if anyone needed more proof).

V/R
Dave

Some South Korean POWs still trapped in the North, 60 years after armistice

By Chico Harlan, Published: July 13

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/some-south-korean-pows-still-trapped-in-the-north-60-years-after-armistice/2013/07/13/0e094914-e54e-11e2-aef3-339619eab080_story.html

SEOUL — Sixty years ago this month, a 21-year-old South Korean soldier named Lee Jae-won wrote a letter to his mother. He was somewhere in the middle of the peninsula, he wrote, and bullets were coming down like “raindrops.” He said he was scared.

The next letter to arrive came days later from the South Korean military. It described a firefight in Paju, near the modern-day border between the North and South, and said Lee had been killed there in battle. His body had not been recovered.

“We never doubted his death,” said Lee’s younger brother, Lee Jae-seong. “It was the chaos of war, and you couldn’t expect to recover a body.”

But Lee was not dead. Rather, he had been captured by Chinese Communists and handed to the North Koreans, who detained him as a lifetime prisoner, part of a secretive program that continues 60 years after the end of the Korean War, according to South Korean officials and escapees from the North.

Tens of thousands of South Korean POWs were held captive in the North under the program, penned in remote areas and kept incommunicado in one of the most scarring legacies of the three-year war. South Korean officials say that about 500 of those POWs — now in their 80s and 90s — might still be alive, still waiting to return home. In part because they’re so old, South Korea says it’s a government priority, though a difficult one, to get them out.

Almost nothing was known about the lives of these prisoners until 20 years ago, when a few elderly soldiers escaped, sneaking from the northern tip of North Korea into China and making their way back to South Korea. A few dozen more followed, and they described years of forced labor in coal mines. They said they were encouraged to marry North Korean wives, a means of assimilation. But under the North’s family-run police state, they were designated as members of the “hostile” social class — denied education and Workers’ Party membership, and sent to gulags for even minor slip-ups, such as talking favorably about the quality of South Korean rice.

When the war ended with a July 27, 1953, armistice agreement that divided the peninsula along the 38th parallel, about 80,000 South Korean soldiers were unaccounted for. A few, like Lee Jae-won, were presumed dead. Most were thought to be POWs. The two Koreas, as part of the armistice, agreed to swap those prisoners, but the North returned only 8,300.

The others became part of an intractable Cold War standoff, and the few POWs who have escaped say both Koreas are to blame. The South pressed the North about the POWs for several years after the war, but the issue faded from public consciousness — until the first successful escape of a POW, in 1994. The North, meanwhile, has said that anybody living in the country is there voluntarily.

South Korea took up the POW issue with greater force six years ago, as it became clear that a lengthy charm offensive — known as the Sunshine Policy — wasn’t leading the North to change its economic or humanitarian policies. During a 2000 summit with Kim Jong Il, South Korean President Kim Dae-jung didn’t even bring up the issue. But by 2007, the South was talking about the POWs in defense talks. And by 2008, under conservative President Lee Myung-bak, South Korea offered aid to win the prisoners’ release.

But with relations between the two governments badly frayed, the countries haven’t discussed the issue since military-to-military talks in February 2011.

“Time is chasing us,” said Lee Sang-chul, a one-star general at the South Korean Ministry of National Defense who is in charge of the POW issue.

But without North Korea’s cooperation, Lee said, the South has little recourse to retrieve its soldiers. Lee said that, realistically, the POWs have only one way to return home: They have to escape.

Hopes that withered

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/some-south-korean-pows-still-trapped-in-the-north-60-years-after-armistice/2013/07/13/0e094914-e54e-11e2-aef3-339619eab080_story.html

Which is the real Korea? Behind the North’s strange behavior and the South’s strange indifference is a still-unsettled war.

I just received a copy of the author's new book on Korea and it is well worth the read. I think it makes a very important contribution to Korean War and contemporary history and should be considered for use in Korean history studies.  But in answer to the rhetorical question of the title perhaps the questions is who are the real Korean people?  As I have recently written there are two Korean Miracles:  The one we all know about: "The Miracle on the Han: which is  the miraculous economic growth and transition to a vibrant democracy in South Korea.  The second is the "Miracle on the Taedong," which is the miracle that the north Korean people have survived their horrendous conditions living under the iron totalitarian rule of the Kim Family Regime.  The connection between the two is that both miracles rest on the traditional Korean culture that allows for survival in the face of extreme hardship as well as the creative, entrepreneurship of the people and the ability of the nation to survive and thrive as a "Shrimp among whales."  I think this theme is worth exploring for use in ROK PSYOP to help prepare the north Korean people for unification.  Although there are vast differences between north and South, the underlying fabric of traditional Korean culture may be useful in helping to bridge those differences and help facilitate the unification process. Credit for the idea of the Miracle on the Taedong goes to retired ROK Navy Admiral and Ambassador to Kuwait who mentioned it to me over lunch this week at a conference in Korea.

As far as the subtitle to this piece it is an important reminder of paragraph 60 of the 1953 Armistice that called for a meeting of ally he powers within 90 days of the signing to resolve the "Korea Question."  Such a meeting never took place but it does illustrate the unfinished war of 1950-1953 and recognized even then that the only solution to the Korea question is unification.

V/R

Dave

Which is the real Korea?

Behind the North’s strange behavior and the South’s strange indifference is a still-unsettled war.

By Sheila Miyoshi Jager |  GLOBE CORRESPONDENT     JUNE 30, 2013

HTTP://WWW.BOSTONGLOBE.COM/IDEAS/2013/06/29/WHICH-REAL-KOREA/QJSJGE9CGKTVX2CHOOEERO/STORY.HTML

WHAT DOES NORTH KOREA WANT? Internationally isolated, the North Korean regime has a long history of confrontation with the outside world, having threatened to engage South Korea and the United States in another war on numerous occasions. North Korea successfully tested its first nuclear device in 2006; most recently, its provocations have included a third nuclear test in February 2013 and a renewed threat to turn Seoul “into a sea of fire.” Stories from North Korean defectors reveal a life of desperate poverty and unimaginable repression. To Westerners, this belligerence and isolation in the context of such national suffering have often seemed baffling, even shocking. Guessing what motivates the regime, and what its inexperienced leader Kim Jong Un might do next, has become almost a parlor game.

To the south, meanwhile, sits a country where conditions could not be more different, and one where the threats of its neighbor to the north have been met with surprising calm, even indifference. “North Korea threatens to start a nuclear war, while South Korea dances to ‘Gangnam Style’,” observed German journalist Ullrich Fichtner about South Koreans’ reactions to North Korea’s rantings this spring. “War has never been this close, but Koreans in Seoul confront their fears by going about a bizarre version of everyday life, complete with truffle pasta and super-smart phones.” South Koreans even seem indifferent to the plight of the North Korean people themselves. Shin Dong-hyuk, who published a memoir in 2012 with journalist Blaine Harden about his early life spent entirely in a North Korean prison camp, bitterly suggested in a recent interview that “South Korea should be put on trial next to the North Korean regime for turning a blind eye” to North Korean human rights violations.

The strange contrast between the two Koreas—and the dynamic between them, one of total preoccupation from the North and apparent nonchalance from the South—is striking, a vexing clash of worldviews with major implications for the stability of East Asia and beyond. But it may not be as mysterious as it seems. The attitudes of the two nations can be understood as faces of the same coin, one that is a product of a war fought over 60 years ago in which neither side ever actually admitted defeat—and which North Korea continues to fight today.

For decades, the most important struggle for both of the Koreas has been the contest for legitimacy. The people of the South understand that this contest is decisively over, and now worry more about their own prosperity than the blusterings of their neighbor. The North, however, has so far refused to come to terms with its defeat. For us to navigate its continuing threats, we need to realize that the conventional explanations of the regime’s behavior—as recklessly seeking to maintain its hold on power and privilege, or as rationally responding to threats posed by hostile powers like the United States—miss something important. To North Korea, the main security threat is not the United States. It is the prosperity, wealth, and prestige of South Korea.

***

Which would become the legitimate Korea? As surprising as it may sound today, the answer at first appeared to be the North.

THE ORIGINS of the Korean conflict can formally be traced to the end of the Second World War, when the Korean peninsula was liberated from Japan and divided at the 38th parallel by the victorious United States and the Soviet Union. This new occupation—with the Soviets in the northern half and the Americans in the south—reinforced a divide that had already grown in Korea under the stresses of Japanese colonial occupation and created two partisan camps with the support of two rival patrons.

(Continued at the link below)

HTTP://WWW.BOSTONGLOBE.COM/IDEAS/2013/06/29/WHICH-REAL-KOREA/QJSJGE9CGKTVX2CHOOEERO/STORY.HTML

NightWatch For the night of 17 February 2013: South Korea, north Korea, China, Pakistan

Interesting admission by President Lee regarding Kim Jong-il asking for a summit.  We have heard this rumor previously.  But in regards to his commentary Kim Jong-un's style is different than his father's but in many ways he appears to be trying to emulate his grandfather.  Regardless of style, the Kim Family Regime's 60 year old playbook continues to provide  the course the Kim Jong-un is charting.

Allegedly the north has informed China of further tests.  This is probably what the north is going to try to negotiate away.  They will stop now in return for political and economic concessions.  

V/R

Dave 

NightWatch

For the night of 17 February 2013

South Korea-North Korea: Outgoing President Lee told the press that in late 2009 Kim Chong-il requested a third summit between the leaders of North and South Korea without conditions, such as demands for food grains. The invitation was transmitted through Chinese Premier Wen Jia-bao and some discussions were held in Singapore.

South Korea was prepared to accept and began discussing views about the venue. North Korea wanted it in Pyongyang. The talks broke down when the North demanded compensation for holding the summit.

Comment: The reasons Kim Chong-il wanted a summit remain unknown. However, President Lee's description of Kim Chong-il's invitation and the exchange via the Chinese is vintage Kim Chong-il. His tactic was always to re-negotiate the terms after a deal was accepted in principle to determine whether better terms could be obtained. Kim Jung Un's style is entirely different.

North Korea-China: According to an unidentified source who spoke withReuters, North Korea has informed China that it will conduct additional nuclear tests and missile launches this year. Preparations for a fourth nuclear test are said to be completed already.

The source said the tests will be conducted unless the US agrees to talks about signing a final peace treaty and abandons its plans to overthrow the North Korean regime.

Comment: North Korea prepared two tunnels for use in testing prior to the 12 February detonation. It used one on the 12th. That provides some prima facie support for the information provided by the source.

The bluntness of the new leadership's style is apparent in the message.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.kforcegov.com/Services/IS/NightWatch/NightWatch_13000044.aspx

Korea: a new great power?

A view from Russia.  Excerpts:

Summing up, despite a remarkable growth in its economic, political and military standing over the past several decades, South Korea falls short of a great power. This becomes clear if one compares the Republic of Korea with some second-tier great power, such as France. South Korea loses out to France on all key measures. Population-wise, there are 49 million South Koreans versus 66 million French. South Korea’s GDP of 1.6 trillion USD is overshadowed by France’s 2.2 trillion. In military-strategic terms, the crucial difference between Seoul and Paris is France’s ability to independently provide for its security, which is underpinned by the French nuclear arsenal.…
The reunification of the North and the South, both possessing formidable armed forces, will certainly increase Korea’s military-strategic weight. The most intriguing question is whether the new Korea keeps the DPRK’s nuclear legacy. 

Russia and Korea have never experienced bitter conflicts and disputes. The only thing Russia should be worried after the unification is the risk of losing up to 200,000 ethnic Koreans who now live in the country. Most of them are hard-working and entrepreneurial people. Their massive migration to their historical homeland would be a great loss to Russia. 

For a long time, Korea was a pawn, often a victim, caught in great powers’ rivalry. Now it has a chance to acquire a great power rank for itself. Whether this chance is realized depends partly on the other major powers, but largely on the Koreans themselves.

V/R

Dave

Korea: a new great power?

20 November 2012

Artyom Lukin, Associate Professor, Deputy Director for Research, School of Regional and International Studies, Far Eastern Federal University

http://ifl.wl.dvfu.ru/8998

Recently, I attended a banquet at the conclusion of a Russian-South Korean symposium. As usual, there were toasts, and I dared to propose my own: “Let Korea soon become a great power as Russia is”. My colleague, a Korea expert, whispered to me: “You have just offended the Koreans, because they already see themselves as a great power”. The Koreans’ unhappy faces left no doubt that my colleague was right.

This moment of embarrassment led me to ponder whether the Republic of Korea can actually claim a great power status. In order to answer this question, one needs to identify the essential qualities of a great power.

First, a state has to be able to defend its basic security and sovereignty without relying on other powers and/or international institutions. Sufficient military capability, perhaps including nuclear deterrent, is the key. By some estimates, South Korea has the best army in Asia¹. However, in the realm of national defense, Seoul still critically depends on the US. This is manifested in the US-Korea alliance, in which Seoul is obviously a junior partner.

Second, an aspiring great power must have a lot of hard power (basically, material and demographic resources) and soft power (an attractive image) in order to be able to project global influence. South Korea boasts the 13th biggest economy, with the rate of growth overshadowing that of the Western world. Korea’s soft power is yet to become a global force, although it is already quite noticeable internationally, as, for example, represented by the K-Pop phenomenon.

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http://ifl.wl.dvfu.ru/8998