Is the OSS Contribution to Special Forces a Result of Disinformation?
David Maxwell
It pained me to read the latest issue of the USASOC Historian Office's publication Veritas and it pains me even more to have to write these words. You might not be familiar with Veritas because it is not published on line, only in an expensive high gloss print publication. The specific article in the recent edition is “The OSS Influence on Special Forces.” The article can be downloaded HERE.
The author's thesis is that since only 14 members of the OSS actually served in Special Forces their contribution was not as great as has been described over the years. The author uses fashionable modern academic analysis focusing solely on data and numbers to reach this outrageous in this conclusion: “The result was concrete evidence of disinformation and exaggeration perpetuated by the active force and veteran associations.” The only “concrete evidence” the author cites is the number 14. (As an aside there were at least 15 members of the OSS who served in Special Forces from 1952 to 1954. His list fails to include Robert McDowell who served with the OSS in Yugoslavia.)
The author is trying to prove his thesis by relying on numbers. However, he undermines his argument with this statement:
Therefore, the five former OSS instructors in the SF Department, constituting approximately one-third of the instructor cadre from 1952-1954, are the ones who provided the most influence from their OSS experiences on the developing force. Because the five interacted with or impacted every soldier trained in the SF program at the school, they gave students undergoing instruction an exaggerated impression about the overall presence of former OSS veterans in SF.
What the author fails to recognize and appreciate is that the OSS was an organization known for two things: punching well above its weight, i.e., making outsize contributions from its small numbers; and for conducting effective influence operations. At its peak there were some 13,000 members with 7500 serving overseas which was less than one Army division while the Army fielded over 90 divisions in WWII. Its Morale Operations branch focused on “persuasion, penetration, and intimidation” to destabilize governments and mobilize indigenous resistance at the strategic and tactical level.
Rather than assess the numbers of OSS members in SF the author would do a great service by reminding readers that today’s SF assessment and selection, organization (especially the ODA), training, doctrine, and most important the foundational mission of SF, unconventional warfare, are directly related to and descended from the OSS. For those interested I recommend perusing the USASOC web site OSS Primer and Manuals accessed HERE. USASOC
Continued at Small Wars Journal here:
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