People often ask me about the unconventional warfare approach. Someone sent me this article from 2006 (thus the old definition of UW is used). Controversy over CrossFIt philosophy aside, I am heartened to see how the guys at Torii Station used UW principles to conduct their insurgency. The entire article can be downloaded in PDF at this link: http://library.crossfit.
The CrossFit Insurgency
By Scott Satterlee
In LEO/Mil
July 01, 2006
This is the story of how a small group of soldiers used “unconventional warfare” (UW) to bring CrossFit to 1st Battalion 1st Special Force Group, Torii Station, Japan.
Insurgency is a condition of subversive political activity, civil rebellion, revolt, or insurrection against a duly constituted government or occupying power wherein irregular forces are formed and engage in actions, which may include guerrilla warfare, that are designed to weaken and overthrow that government or occupying power.
Unconventional warfare is a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration and conducted predominantly by indigenous or surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct-offensive low-visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape (E&E).
Unconventional warfare is a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration and conducted predominantly by indigenous or surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct-offensive low-visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape (E&E).
There are three prerequisites that must exist for an insurgency to be successful. The first is a vulnerable population. The second is a leadership element that can direct the frustrations of a dissatisfied populace along the lines drawn by the overall insurgent strategy. And the third is a real or perceived lack of government control. The greater control the government has over the situation, the lower the chances for insurgent success. The opposite is also true: the less control the government has, the greater the likelihood of insurgent success.
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