North Korea Infographic on the Gulags/Political Prison Camps

There should be no doubt that north Korea is committing crimes against humanity. 

This is from the Voice of Martyrs' Persecution Blog.

We should also think about the horrendous suffering of these prisoners.  We should consider how mush help these people will need when they are liberated.  The liberating forces should study the operations during WWII when concentration camps were taken by allied forces.  Those who think there is resistance potential in these camps have not read Ted Gurr and do not understand that the prisoners can only think about survival and that it will be a long time before they will be healthy enough to return to some semblance of a normal life.  But the Alliance will have responsibility for the well being of these prisoners in war or after the catastrophic collapse of the Kim Family Regime.

June 16, 2014

North Korea Infographic

http://www.persecutionblog.com/2014/06/north-korea-infographic.html

Using data compiled by the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the UN Commission of Inquiry, The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and The Bush Institute at the George W. Bush Presidential Center created this infographic to describe the plight of men, women, and children held captive in North Korea’s political prison camps without charges or trial.

VOM's June newsletter focuses on North Korea. VOM estimates that 30,000 Christians are held in prison camps.

Our hope today is that seeing these facts illustrated in this way will inspire you to pray more fervently for North Korea and for our Christian brothers and sisters there.

Posted by VOM_MediaDev on June 16, 2014 at 12:46 PM in Intercessory Prayer, North Korea | Permalink

Technorati Tags: North Korea

Excerpts:

To Linder, the art of special warfare is exactly that: an art. “Nobody is born with the natural skill for this art. It comes from years of study.” At Fort Bragg during the qualification course, operators are thrown into an exercise called Robin Sage. Their “survival” depends on their ability to influence a guerrilla chief who controls when and whether they eat, sleep and succeed at their objective. What makes special operators special, according to Linder, has nothing to do with high-tech gear. Linder tells his men, “You can win buck naked with a butter knife.”

...

Linder has appeared on every significant battleground of the last 30 years — Central and South America, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines and Africa. His military career parallels America’s deployment of Special Operations forces in the post-World War II era. Like many operators of his generation, Linder served in the jungles of Colombia, where he searched for Pablo Escobar, the cartel leader who walked out of his self-appointed luxury prison in 1992. “All the guard towers faced out,” Linder said with a smile.

..

In 2005 and 2006, Linder served as the commander of the Joint Special Operations Task Force — Philippines. His job was to root out the militant group Abu Sayyaf from the islands in the nation’s south. Linder, then a colonel, set up operations on an Abu Sayyaf-controlled island called Jolo. There was no how-to manual; he fought the enemy however he saw fit. Linder thrived in this jungle environment. He employed the methods he learned and taught at Fort Bragg. The emphasis, as it would later be in Africa, was on building relationships with local people. “This isn’t something that we learned in Afghanistan and Iraq,” he said. “That’s S.O.F. 101.”

...

Correction: June 13, 2014 

Because of an editing error, an earlier version of this article paraphrased incorrectly from comments by Edward Price, the assistant press secretary of the National Security Council. Responding to criticism about the lack of oversight of counterterrorism efforts in Africa, Mr. Price said that the White House — not the State Department — planned to put such checks in place.

Can General Linder’s Special Operations Forces Stop the Next Terrorist Threat?

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/15/magazine/can-general-linders-special-operations-forces-stop-the-next-terrorist-threat.html?_r=0

By ELIZA GRISWOLDJUNE 13, 2014

Photo

American Green Berets and Uganda People’s Defense Force soldiers at an airstrip in Obo, Central African Republic. CreditMichael Christopher Brown/Magnum, for The New York Times

“My job is to look at Africa and see where the threat to the United States is,” Linder said as he unfolded his map and traced circles around the territories where he knew extremist groups were operating. “I see Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the Libyan problem set, Al Shabab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia, Benghazi and Darna.”On a searing morning this spring, Brig. Gen. James B. Linder leaned against the red-webbing seats of a C-130 as it flew over the Sahara. On his camouflaged knee, he balanced two dog-eared Moleskine notebooks and a map of Africa. Linder, who is in his early 50s, commands the United States Special Operations forces in Africa. He was on his way to visit a detachment of 12 Army Green Berets training with African troops to fight Al Qaeda and its affiliates in Niger. Through the plane’s scratched plexiglass portholes, dunes crested like waves in an ocean of sand, and hot blasts of wind buffeted the fuselage. An hour’s flight to the south, his team of Special Forces was deployed along the Nigerian border, where the militant group Boko Haram was targeting children in its bid to establish an Islamic state.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/15/magazine/can-general-linders-special-operations-forces-stop-the-next-terrorist-threat.html?_r=0

George Kennan's 1948 Policy Planning Staff Memorandum - The inauguration of organized political warfare.

I really think a review of this memorandum is useful because I think many of our adversaries have adopted various methods from this document (with their own characteristics of course).  Although this was written as a US centric description; like the current Unconventional Warfare definition in Joint Pub 1-02 it does not have to be US centric and in fact explains and describes what is happening around the world such as in Crimea and Ukraine but also by others  such as the Chinese and their “Three Warfares,”  Iran in Syria and other operations by the Quds force, and even Al Qaeda – using terrorism as part of its UW strategy in an attempt to coerce and disrupt and in some cases overthrow governments.

Although we might shy away from conducting organized political warfare, many other nations and groups do not.  It is best for us to understand it.

http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/65ciafounding3.htm

269. Policy Planning Staff Memorandum 
Washington, May 4, 1948.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council,
NSC 10/2. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. An earlier, similar version, April 30,
is ibid., RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff Files 1944-47: Lot 64 D 563, Box
11. The Policy Planning Staff minutes for May 3 state: "There was a discussion of the Planning Staff
Memorandum of April 30, 1948 on the inauguration of organized political warfare. This paper was generally
approved and Mr. Kennan will present it tomorrow for discussion at a meeting of NSC consultants." (Ibid., Box
32)

The Problem

The inauguration of organized political warfare.

Analysis

1. Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz's doctrine in time of peace. In broadest definition,
political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national
objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (as ERP--the Marshall Plan), and "white" propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of "friendly" foreign elements, "black" psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.

2. The creation, success, and survival of the British Empire has been due in part to the British understanding and application of the principles of political warfare. Lenin so synthesized the teachings of Marx and Clausewitz that the Kremlin's conduct of political warfare has become the most refined and effective of any in history. We have been handicapped however by a popular attachment to the concept of a basic difference between peace and war, by a tendency to view war as a sort of sporting context outside of all political context, by a national tendency to seek for a political cure-all, and by a reluctance to recognize the realities of international relations--the perpetual rhythm of struggle, in and out of war.

3. This Government has, of course, in part consciously and in part unconsciously, been conducting political
warfare. Aggressive Soviet political warfare has driven us overtly first to the Truman Doctrine, next to ERP, then to sponsorship of Western Union [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. This was all political warfare
and should be recognized as such.

4. Understanding the concept of political warfare, we should also recognize that there are two major types of
political warfare--one overt and the other covert. Both, from their basic nature, should be directed and
coordinated by the Department of State. Overt operations are, of course, the traditional policy activities of any
foreign office enjoying positive leadership, whether or not they are recognized as political warfare. Covert
operations are traditional in many European chancelleries but are relatively unfamiliar to this Government.

5. Having assumed greater international responsibilities than ever before in our history and having been engaged by the full might of the Kremlin's political warfare, we cannot afford to leave unmobilized our resources for covert political warfare. We cannot afford in the future, in perhaps more serious political crises, to scramble into impromptu covert operations [1 line of source text not declassified].

6. It was with all of the foregoing in mind that the Policy Planning Staff began some three months ago/2/ a
consideration of specific projects in the field of covert operations, where they should be fitted into the structure
of this Government, and how the Department of State should exercise direction and coordination.

/2/Although the following page of the source text indicates that 3 lines were missing from the bottom of the
previous page, a comparison with the April 30 version of the memorandum cited in the source note above finds that no words were missing.

7. There are listed below projects which have been or are now being suggested by the Staff:

a. Liberation Committees.

Purpose: To encourage the formation of a public American organization which will sponsor selected political
refugee committees so that they may (a) act as foci of national hope and revive a sense of purpose among
political refugees from the Soviet World; (b) provide an inspiration for continuing popular resistance within the
countries of the Soviet World; and (c) serve as a potential nucleus for all-out liberation movements in the event
of war.

Description: This is primarily an overt operation which, however, should receive covert guidance and possibly
assistance from the Government. It is proposed that trusted private American citizens be encouraged to establish a public committee which would give support and guidance in U.S. interests to national movements (many of them now in existence) publicly led by outstanding political refugees from the Soviet World, such as Mikolajczyk and Nagy [of Poland and Hungary, respectively]. The American Committee should be so selected and organized as to cooperate closely with this Government. The functions of the American Committee should be limited to enabling selected refugee leaders [to keep alive as public figures with access to printing presses and microphones. It should not engage in underground activities.]/3/

/3/The words in brackets were taken from the April 30 version; see footnote 1 above.

What is proposed here is an operation in the traditional American form: organized public support of resistance to tyranny in foreign countries. Throughout our history, private American citizens have banded together to champion the cause of freedom for people suffering under oppression. (The Communists and Zionists have exploited this tradition to the extreme, to their own ends and to our national detriment, as witness the Abraham Lincoln brigade during the Spanish Civil War and the current illegal Zionist activities.) Our proposal is that this tradition be revived specifically to further American national interests in the present crisis.

[1 heading and 2 paragraphs (21-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

c. Support of Indigenous Anti-Communist Elements in Threatened Countries of the Free World.

Purpose: To strengthen indigenous forces combating communism in countries where Soviet political warfare is a threat to our national security.

Description: This is a covert operation again utilizing private intermediaries. To insure cover, the private
American organizations conducting the operation should be separate from the organizations mentioned in
previous projects. [3 lines of source text not declassified] This project is a matter of urgency because the
communists are reported to be planning the disruption of ERP through labor disturbances in France. [2 lines of
source text not declassified]

d. Preventive Direct Action in Free Countries.

Purpose: Only in cases of critical necessity, to resort to direct action to prevent vital installations, other material, or personnel from being (1) sabotaged or liquidated or (2) captured intact by Kremlin agents or agencies.

Description: This covert operation involves, for example, (1) control over anti-sabotage activities in the
Venezuelan oil fields, (2) American sabotage of Near Eastern oil installations on the verge of Soviet capture, and (3) designation of key individuals threatened by the Kremlin who should be protected or removed elsewhere.

8. It would seem that the time is now fully ripe for the creation of a covert political warfare operations directorate within the Government. If we are to engage in such operations, they must be under unified direction. One man must be boss. And he must, as those responsible for the overt phases of political warfare, be answerable to the Secretary of State, who directs the whole in coordination.

9. [6-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

10. The National Security Council Secretariat would seem to provide the best possible cover for such a
directorate. Such cover would also permit a direct chain of command from the Secretary of State and be a
natural meeting ground for close collaboration with the military establishment.

Recommendations 
11. There should promptly be established, under the cover of the National Security Council Secretariat, a
directorate of political warfare operations to be known as the Consultative (or Evaluation) Board of the National Security Council.

12. The Director should be designated by the Secretary of State and should be responsible to him.

13. The Director should have initially a staff of 4 officers designated by the Department of State and 4 officers
designated by the Secretary of National Defense.

14. The Board should have complete authority over covert political warfare operations conducted by this
Government. It should have the authority to initiate new operations and to bring under its control or abolish
existing covert political warfare activities.

15. Specifically, (a) the four projects mentioned in paragraph 7 above should be activated by the Board and (b) covert political warfare now under CIA and theater commanders abroad should be brought under the authority of the Board.

16. The coordination of the above covert operations with the overt conduct of foreign policy should, of course,
be accomplished through the offices of the Secretary and Under Secretary of State. 

From Small Unit Leaders to Rugged Diplomats

On the one hand I am heartened to read a former Armor officer calling for Foreign Internal Defense.  Had this logic been applied years ago we might never had to kill so many trees developing the nearly redundant mission of Security Force Assistance.

The model that American policy makers should look to for appropriate engagement of foreign governments in conflict zones is the Foreign Internal Defense and irregular warfare conducted by American special operations forces. The ability to gain the trust of local leaders, build their capability and capacity, and provide them with the tools to govern their own spaces with a modicum of justice is the hallmark of American Special Forces. Unfortunately, SOF operates on a limited scope and scale. And American policymakers too often assume that once American conventional forces are deployed en masse, the arrival Jeffersonian democracy is simply a matter of time. Rather, it requires living day-to-day under conditions of significant hardship to forge relationships of trust in order to influence the governance and development models of war-torn nations. This is the kind of mission small unit leaders from Afghanistan and Iraq are well-suited to carry out.

On the other hand I am discouraged in the belief that any US military force, SOF or conventional forces, can bring Jeffersonian democracy to another country.  This is our fundamental problem in that we think we can impose our way of life or values or system of government on another country.  If we truly understand our ideals we would realize that a fundamental American value is respect for self determination of government and we should support that rather than trying to create another country in our image.  This is why the FID mission is a good model: US government (military and civilian) provide advice and assistance to friends, partners, or allies in support of their internal defense and development programs so they can defend themselves against  lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, and terrorism.  We have to cease believing that we can build nations and instead provide support (perhaps stability operations which is one of the five activities of  US irregular warfare operations in accordance with DODI 3000.07) to allow  indigenous people to build their own nation.

But I do like the Elvis Presley theory of foreign policy:

As former Army Sergeant Elvis Presley once said: “We’re caught in a trap. I can’t walk out, because I love you too much baby.” Strategic thinkers and tactical implementers need each other in order to successfully address thorny American foreign policy issues with feasible recommendations from a holistic perspective.

June 3, 2014

From Small Unit Leaders to Rugged Diplomats

http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2014/06/03/overcoming_the_tactical-strategic_divide_107252.html

Overcoming the Tactical-Strategic Divide in U.S. Foreign Policy

By Steve Thomas

American foreign policy and its current generation of practitioners suffer from an almost complete lack of understanding of the critical concept of “feasibility” as it relates to statecraft in conflict zones. Broadly speaking, the people who shape foreign policy are highly educated, can speak the languages associated with their area of expertise, and have spent many years living abroad. Unfortunately, in state-building scenarios such as Iraq and Afghanistan, the professional experience of most policymakers is limited to brief tours in the Green Zone or Bagram. These places, while technically in-country, have absolutely no resemblance to the larger situation on the ground.

The problem, stated simply, is a massive disconnect between the tactical reality and the strategic objective. From my perspective in Afghanistan in 2010, there were some really fine foreign policy ideas being promulgated down to the tactical level. Unfortunately, no one had bothered to ask about the feasibility of implementation.

An example of such an effort is the District Reinforcement Program in Khost Province, Afghanistan. This is a great idea in theory: place USAID and State Department representatives on the ground for 72 hours to walk local Afghan officials through bureaucratic processes in order to facilitate governance and development. Setting aside the fact that the processes put in place were opaque and wholly alien to most sub-governors and district officials, the program was doomed because State and USAID weren’t invested in its success at the tactical level. With only one State Department and one USAID representative, the onus for conducting these operations was left to the person who has become the face of American statecraft the last ten years: the 23-year old platoon leader.

The platoon leader is not formally trained in international development, except for perhaps a short brief on Commanders Emergency Relief Program (CERP) funds. Unless his degree is in political science, he’s not initially prepared to have in-depth conversations about any of the governmental challenges facing the district either. Yet, for a decade or more, local officials in Iraq and Afghanistan have looked to these leaders and their experienced platoon sergeants for justice, arbitration, and advice on how to rule in lawless lands. Company Commanders have hosted large shuras and met with sheikhs to resolve disputes. Through a brief evolution, Fire Support Officers became the de facto non-lethal targeting gurus of the military, seeking opportunities to exploit development projects to win the loyalty of the local populace. With the formal training to marry with their experiences, junior officers and senior NCOs can be formidable allies for established policymakers, providing real on-ground insight into questions of feasibility.

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have produced a small cohort of men and women who have spent their professional lives immersed in the practice of statecraft. Lacking advanced degrees and or political appointments, this cadre has practiced and enforced American foreign policy in a way few others have.

Now is the time for policymakers to try to really understand their value and put them to work solving problems that demand a stringent test of feasibility.

The model that American policy makers should look to for appropriate engagement of foreign governments in conflict zones is the Foreign Internal Defense and irregular warfare conducted by American special operations forces. The ability to gain the trust of local leaders, build their capability and capacity, and provide them with the tools to govern their own spaces with a modicum of justice is the hallmark of American Special Forces. Unfortunately, SOF operates on a limited scope and scale. And American policymakers too often assume that once American conventional forces are deployed en masse, the arrival Jeffersonian democracy is simply a matter of time. Rather, it requires living day-to-day under conditions of significant hardship to forge relationships of trust in order to influence the governance and development models of war-torn nations. This is the kind of mission small unit leaders from Afghanistan and Iraq are well-suited to carry out.

A typical response to these thoughts is that small unit leaders only have a soda-straw view of the world, myopic and perhaps simplistic. They are not experts because they have not studied the topics of governance and development, and because they have not defended a thesis they cannot be trusted to provide sound advice on complex issues. They have, perhaps, negotiated with local leaders to ensure a successful harvest in return for security concessions on the border with Waziristan, but they’ve never published in the Wall Street Journal. To this view, I respond that we need those smart folks with extra letters after their names to guide, to interpret data and ask hard questions. They have a wealth of cultural, historical and political expertise that the local executor of policy does not possess.

But they need to be aware of their own limitations – their own soda-straw. Namely, they typically won’t step foot on the ground that they ask other Americans to secure. Think tanks, policymakers, and professors need the tactical practitioner of American foreign policy – the small unit leader – to tell them with candor whether or not their policy recommendations can be successful in light of the situation on the ground.

As former Army Sergeant Elvis Presley once said: “We’re caught in a trap. I can’t walk out, because I love you too much baby.” Strategic thinkers and tactical implementers need each other in order to successfully address thorny American foreign policy issues with feasible recommendations from a holistic perspective.

Experts in Washington profess to know what’s best in Syria, Crimea, and Somalia. But they don’t seem to understand the actual, visceral consequences to of their policy. At times, it seems they don’t really understand that someone will be sent out at four in the morning to secure a police station, set up a polling station, and try to bring free and fair elections to a place that has never known much freedom or much fairness.

But there is a small group of junior officers and senior NCOs who realize what American foreign policy looks like on the ground. They’re proficient in building relationships, making deals, and incorporating them into a larger operational picture. And it’s time to give these men and women a new assignment.

If the world we live in is one that requires American presence around the globe, we will need civilians in the State Department and USAID who understand the full spectrum of operations, from the strategic to the tactical and who are not afraid to gather ground truth themselves. It is time to build corps of rugged diplomats composed of those with actual experience in wartime statecraft alongside those who have spent their lives in the academic study of these topics. They can form a cohesive team that can link reality and theory, which will result in well-reasoned and rigorously debated policy decisions.

If we can’t overcome the divide between those who write policy and those who execute it, we will forever have a foreign policy that reflects the world as we would like to see it rather than as it really is.

Steve Thomas served as an Armor officer in the 101st Airborne for four years, including a deployment to Khost Province, Afghanistan from 2010-2011 as a Scout Platoon Leader. He is currently a consultant for Booz Allen Hamilton.

Adapt or Die: Special Operations in Uncertainty

This is a research paper by COL Bob Wilson (soon to be commander of 3d Special Forces Group) while a student at the The Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy National Defense University. It can be downloaded at this link: https://db.tt/wtbHJki1

This should contribute to and inform the debate on the future of special operations.

Excerpts from the introduction are below.

AY 2013-2014
Research Fellowship Paper

Adapt or Die: Special Operations in 
Uncertainty 

Robert L. Wilson
Colonel, U. S. Army
April 27, 2014

Introduction

Special operations Forces, or SOF, play a growing role in the United States’

pursuit of its interests abroad. Special operations unit capabilities have increased

considerably in the past decade, as have their formations and budgets.1 Funding and

personnel growth aside, however, SOF have continued to exhibit one inherent, critical

trait in the modern security environment, an attribute that will grow increasingly more

important as the US approaches future challenges: adaptability. Special operations forces

can rapidly adapt to a broad range of emerging challenges, many of which are altogether

unanticipated, and provide effective ways and means for the US to confront them. SOF

have proven multiple times that they respond to strategic and operational change much

faster than other military elements or government agencies. And much like enemies the

US has faced over the past two decades, SOF have proven adept at transforming

themselves, iteratively at times, to achieve strategic effects.

Adaptability is recognized as an increasingly important trait of the US foreign

policy establishment, particularly in the Department of Defense, though DOD’s inability

to rapidly adapt and innovate has been particularly apparent of late. After he left the

Pentagon, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates remarked that when it came to

identifying future threats and resourcing requirements, the United States “has never once

gotten it right”, and often fails to appropriately prepare for future conflicts.2 A recent

Defense Science Board study also concluded that the Department of Defense lacks the

capacity to foresee change and respond effectively to it.3

Predicting the future is very difficult. Likewise, the failure to respond to change

can lead to strategic deficiencies and excessive cost, since the nation must either abandon

objectives or ultimately invest in the appropriate resources to achieve them after

shortfalls become apparent. Thus, although the ability to project power and mass effects

are critical to national defense, the ability to rapidly adapt to the environment is

increasingly important.

While the United States has faced challenges responding to change, many of the

adversaries the US has faced over the past decade have been extremely adaptable, and

have proven adept at rapidly changing strategies, tactics and even their very structure to

considerable advantage. Al Qaeda attacks in New York and Washington were low cost

and forsook expensive technology. Nonetheless, in executing their attack, the terrorist

organization achieved significant effects against the country with the world’s highest

defense budget, driving it to spend trillions more over the next decade in conflicts around

the world and on domestic security here. The threat of Islamic terror organizations

continued to evolve yet further, becoming even more difficult to detect and deter; the

most recent terrorist attack in the US was planned by two legal immigrants in their

Cambridge, Massachusetts apartment.4

...

Unlike many other military units and government agencies, special operations

forces have demonstrated considerable adaptability in the preceding twelve years. SOF’s

ability to innovate tactically is often the most visible manifestation of this trait. Prior to

the invasion in Afghanistan, special operations units staged aboard an aircraft carrier and

from there directed the actions of personnel on the ground, a decidedly unconventional

command and control platform.16 Those special operations forces on the ground fought

alongside Afghan militias while mounted on horseback, often guiding high tech fires to

decisive effect against the Taliban in an unorthodox mix of 19th and 21st century tactics.

Special operations forces also honed their ability to identify and target threat networks,

and dealt impressive damage to al Qaeda as well as the insurgencies in Iraq and

Afghanistan. Later, SOF units dramatically changed their approach and even their

organizational structure to more effectively combat insurgent and terrorist networks

during the course of the war.17 Finally, a decade into the Afghan war, SOF units proved

adept at operating in austere rural areas, effectively combining security, governance and

development operations via their village stability operations model.18

Recent experience and future projections indicate that adaptability and flexibility

will remain critical components of our national security. The Secretary of Defense, noting

this, placed a priority on ensuring that the military has “ the maximum possible flexibility

to deal with the widest possible range of scenarios and conflicts."19 However, as

discussed, adaptability is not an inherent trait of the defense establishment, and no major

initiatives are underway to increase its ability to respond to change. Additionally, while

the Department of Defense has developed some new doctrinal approaches to employing

joint forces, much of the Defense Department’s efforts are instead on focused upon

budgets and narrow debates about force structure requirements.20 Air Sea Battle has been

the most ambitious operational concept proposed in the post 9/11 military, and most

would argue it is not a dramatic advancement of previous military thought. Ground

forces, emerging after carrying the lion’s share of the burden Iraq and Afghanistan, have

not proffered a new paradigm for more effective future employment; if anything, their

efforts have largely been defensive, attempting to demonstrate relevance in their efforts

to maintain force structure.21

Conversely, special operations forces are advantageously poised to achieve

decisive effects in an uncertain future. The force’s culture, size, networked structure,

personnel force and leadership lend it to be much more adaptable than service

counterparts. Moreover, some of its recent, dramatic successes have increased policy

makers’ confidence in the force, and endeared it with the American Public.22 If there

were ever a time for United States Special Operations Command and its advocates to

present a bold vision for the future, one that increases the national security

establishment’s ability to anticipate change and respond to or preempt emerging threats

altogether, this is it. A highly adaptive, globally networked special operations capability

would dramatically enhance the United States’ ability to anticipate and respond to threats;

it would have, at times the potential to diminish the requirement for costly, large scale

military conflicts, or obviate them altogether.

However, while the current force is highly capable, there are shortfalls that must

be addressed for SOF to truly achieve the vision outlined above. Special operations

leaders will need greater control over personnel policies, and they will also have to

address organizational challenges that impede the force’s effectiveness. Additionally,

many current USSOCOM initiatives designed to increase the force’s capabilities will also

have to overcome bureaucratic and political obstacles as well.

This paper will explore special operations’ current initiatives, suggest structural

and policy changes, and argue how such change will enhance the ability of SOF to

respond to complex, adaptive threats. It will also look at tradeoffs and risks associated

with many of the suggested organizational changes. In arguing to enhance the capabilities

of SOF, it will also suggest how the force can play a more useful role in the future as a

policy tool. It will also explore some of the forms SOF evolution may take in the future.

Overall, this paper will explore how bold investments and innovation today will make

special operations forces invaluable during the uncertainty ahead.

Obama's counterterrorism doctrine: Let locals lead the fight

Excerpts:

But critics say America's past efforts to train local security forces have had mixed results. Washington has a poor track record of applying the long-term resources, funding and attention needed to carry out such efforts successfully.

In Libya, training by U.S. Special Forces soldiers was suspended after a local militia stole a cache of American-provided weapons. In Mali, American-trained military officers carried out a coup. And in Afghanistan, the United States failed to mount a major training effort until nine years after the fall of the Taliban.

...

Bruce Hoffman, an expert on terrorism and Georgetown University professor, said a cardinal failing of the American counterterrorism effort since 2001 has been its haphazard nature. Hoffman said the United States focused its effort on Afghanistan in 2001, shifted to Iraq in 2003, returned to Afghanistan in 2009. Now, Obama announced a shift from Afghanistan to Syria.

“It continues our pathology,” Hoffman said. “Our attention has shifted from one trouble spot to another with disastrous results.”

...

    Peter Bergen, a terrorism expert at the New America Foundation think tank, praised Obama’s address and approach. In the Philippines, he said, local commandos trained by American forces had severely weakened the Abu Sayyaf militant movement. Over the long term, training locals was far cheaper and more politically sustainable than deploying large numbers of American troops, he argued.

    "It’s pennies on the dollar,” he said. “It’s less than one percent of the defense budget.”

I find it quite amusing that Bergen cites the Philippines (and others will cite Colombia as well) because I doubt that he knows much about the Foreign Internal Defense mission conducted there.  But now it will be touted as the "model."  But people should remember that that mission started during the Bush administration (initial assessment conducted in October 2001 and campaign plan completed in November) and was built on relationships and operations from well before 9-11 and it has been conducted in accordance with basic Special Operations doctrine on to how advise and assist a friend, partner, or ally (in this case the US's longest standing treaty ally) with its internal defense and development programs to defend itself against lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, and terrorism.   All the current administration has done is allow it to continue (and it continued for such a long time with little visibility because everyone has been distracted with Afghanistan and Iraq and people like Bergen ignored it - which was a good thing for the mission).  The mission in the Philippines is nothing new and missions like it have been conducted around the world and well before 9-11.  But it is also not appropriate for every situation and the decision to conduct missions like it needs to be based on a strategy that supports US interests and requires a thorough (and continuous) assessment of the entire situation that leads to an integrated, synchronized campaign plan to support a strategy with balance and coherency among ends, ways, and means.

People like Bergen will contribute to the pathology that Bruce Hoffman outlines in which we will want to just try to apply this "model" (and the Colombian one) going from one trouble spot to another with no real strategy except to do more with less, with a small footprint and spend "pennies on the dollar" (which of course makes it sound attractive.)

The real lessons from the Philippines needs to be an understanding that the military (in particular special operations forces), the country team, to include State, Justice, the FBI, and USAID), and the IC all did their jobs in accordance with and their established roles and responsibilities and in the case of the military, its doctrine, and synchronized the actions of diplomacy, development and defense (and as an aside the so-called 3-D's was "coined" by an Ambassador, and not the military, well before it became a popular term of art).

That said the biggest and most important lesson from the Philippines (and Colombia) is the one in the title of the article: "let the locals fight."  What the Philippines and Colombia show is that we do have military forces and interagency elements that know how to operate with the host nation being in charge of their defense and not take over and dominate operations with US forces.  That is why the FID mission is the most appropriate and important mission for the future because it provides the joint and interagency framework to conduct these types of missions with the correct focus and from the right perspective; e..g., without the mission being dominated by a US presence.  Yes this is all new to people like Bergen and the administration but it is a traditional mission that has been used to good effective in history around the world (but it is not always been effective - it is NOT a silver bullet and the administration would do well not to think of it as one - but of course it is only natural to do so as that is the American way - we will always search for the silver bullet and holy grail rather than realize that such problems require synchronized and integrated campaigns to support effective strategy and presence, patience, and persistence).

Obama's counterterrorism doctrine: Let locals lead the fight

Sat, May 31 21:29 PM IST

http://in.mobile.reuters.com/article/idINKBN0EB0FL20140531?irpc=932

By David Rhode

NEW YORK (Reuters) - In a foreign policy address this week, U.S. President Barack Obama gave his clearest outline yet of his counterterrorism strategy. Al Qaeda splinter groups remain the largest threat to the United States, he said, but Washington must respond to it in a new way: by training local security forces, not deploying American ground troops.

   “We have to develop a strategy that matches this diffuse threat - one that expands our reach without sending forces that stretch our military too thin, or stir up local resentments,” Obama said. “We need partners to fight terrorists alongside us.”

But critics say America's past efforts to train local security forces have had mixed results. Washington has a poor track record of applying the long-term resources, funding and attention needed to carry out such efforts successfully.

In Libya, training by U.S. Special Forces soldiers was suspended after a local militia stole a cache of American-provided weapons. In Mali, American-trained military officers carried out a coup. And in Afghanistan, the United States failed to mount a major training effort until nine years after the fall of the Taliban.

Finding the effective partners Obama described has proven challenging as well. For years, the United States has struggled to get Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey to coordinate their support to Syria’s panoply of rebel factions. And the kidnapping of 200 Nigerian school girls in April exposed the inability of American officials to get the Nigerian government to address the endemic corruption that helps fuel the al Qaeda splinter group Boko Haram.

Bruce Hoffman, an expert on terrorism and Georgetown University professor, said a cardinal failing of the American counterterrorism effort since 2001 has been its haphazard nature. Hoffman said the United States focused its effort on Afghanistan in 2001, shifted to Iraq in 2003, returned to Afghanistan in 2009. Now, Obama announced a shift from Afghanistan to Syria.

“It continues our pathology,” Hoffman said. “Our attention has shifted from one trouble spot to another with disastrous results.”

In his address on Wednesday, Obama unveiled a $5 billion “Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund” to train local forces in the Middle East and Africa and voiced support for increasing American training and assistance to “moderate” Syrian rebels. "A strategy that involves invading every country that harbors terrorist networks is naïve and unsustainable," he said.

Obama said the new fund would allow the United States to expand training of security forces in Yemen fighting al Qaeda, support a multinational force trying to stabilize Somalia, and work with European allies training local forces in Libya and Mali. Citing the 2012 attack on the American consulate in Benghazi and last September's attack on a shopping mall in Nairobi, he said the United States faced a different type of threat.

“Today’s principal threat no longer comes from a centralized al Qaeda leadership,” he said. “Instead, it comes from decentralized al Qaeda affiliates and extremists, many with agendas focused in the countries where they operate.”

    Peter Bergen, a terrorism expert at the New America Foundation think tank, praised Obama’s address and approach. In the Philippines, he said, local commandos trained by American forces had severely weakened the Abu Sayyaf militant movement. Over the long term, training locals was far cheaper and more politically sustainable than deploying large numbers of American troops, he argued.

    "It’s pennies on the dollar,” he said. “It’s less than one percent of the defense budget.”

AFGHANISTAN AS AN EXAMPLE

In his speech, Obama cited the training of “hundreds of thousands” of Afghan soldiers and police officers as a success. Afghan forces secured the country’s recent presidential election, he said, and set the stage for the first peaceful transfer of power in the country’s history later this year.

   But Graeme Smith, an Afghanistan-based analyst for the International Crisis Group, said Obama’s pullout would destabilize the country. He said a planned cut in American and foreign military aid will result in a rapid reduction in the size of the Afghan security forces.

    “If they quickly implement the plan to reduce Afghan security forces from roughly 370,000 to 228,000, we will have a serious problem in this country,” Smith said in an email. “You can't axe the personnel roster that dramatically without destabilizing many districts.”

    At the same time, according to Smith, Taliban attacks are rising and the broad direction of the conflict is escalation.

    Obama said a critical focus of the new training effort would be moderate rebel groups in Syria. Reversing his past opposition to large-scale American arming and training of Syrian rebels, Obama said that strengthened moderate rebel groups could serve as a counterweight to radical Islamist groups.

    Analysts say the proposed effort is too small to have any serious impact. Noah Bonsey, the Syria analyst for the International Crisis Group, said that moderates – groups he defined as “largely non-ideological or mildly Islamist” – have gained strength recently but overall remain military weak.

    “We have seen in the last few months that increases in funding, weapons and training to certain non-ideological rebel groups have strengthened their relative power within the rebel spectrum,” Bonsey said in an email from Turkey. “Thus far however, the levels of support provided - and apparently under consideration within the US administration - are not sufficient to meaningfully shift the balance of power between the opposition and the regime.”

   

 Bergen was more optimistic about Obama’s approach. He said future presidents could increase American force levels in Afghanistan, if needed, and aiding Syria’s rebels was a step forward. He argued that training local forces was the only approach that was politically acceptable to Americans and foreigners alike.

    “You buy yourself influence without a large footprint,” Bergen said. “It’s the only sensible model on all sorts of levels.”

Hoffman agreed that ground invasions were a mistake, but he said the American counterterrorism effort must be more consistent. Otherwise, Washington appears to be a fickle ally to those it is asking to fight al Qaeda splinter groups.

(Editing by David Storey and Frances Kerry)

If we had paid to the last Security Consultative Meeting this would not be a surprise.  The ROK and US established a joint task force to do a thorough assessment of the issue and make recommendations on the way ahead (something that should have been done as early as 2002 but of course the politics did not allow it to happen at that time and instead we have wasted more than 12 years on the mythical OPCON transfer and devising plans for the dissolution of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command when we could have been focusing on how best to evolve the ROK/US CFC to best achieve the strategic objectives of the alliance.  When the history of this last 12 years is written it will reveal the danger of decisions being made by senior leaders based on emotion and not on strategy).

Yonhap News Agency May 31, 2014 5:03am

S. Korea, U.S. agree to decide on OPCON transfer timing by Oct.

http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/yonhap-news-agency/140531/s-korea-us-agree-decide-opcon-transfer-timing-oct

SEOUL, May 31 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States agreed Saturday to fix the timing of and conditions for the transfer of wartime control of South Korean troops from Washington to Seoul by October, officials here said Saturday.

During the bilateral talks in Singapore earlier in the day, Seoul's defense minister Kim Kwan-jin and his U.S. counterpart, Chuck Hagel, agreed upon the work plan that specifies the timetable to decide when and under what conditions the South will regain the wartime operational control (OPCON) of its troops from Washington.

"By October when the allies are scheduled to hold their annual Security Consultative Meeting in Washington, the two sides will have set the appropriate timing and conditions for the OPCON transfer," a defense ministry official said, requesting anonymity.

South Korea handed over control of its forces to the U.S. during the 1950-53 Korean War to defend against invading troops from North Korea. Peacetime control of its forces was returned in 1994, and South Korea is scheduled to get back the wartime control in December 2015.

But last year, Seoul asked for a delay after the communist country conducted its third nuclear test, and South Korean President Park Geun-hye and U.S. President Barack Obama agreed in April to reconsider the timing of the OPCON transfer amid the Pyongyang's threat to carry out yet another nuclear test.

This is the first time that Seoul and Washington agreed upon a detailed schedule for the transfer, the official said, adding the two agreed to set up a permanent consultative body to be led by assistant secretary-level officials for in-depth discussions.

The allies are also planning to expand their joint task force in charge of the coordination efforts to include more entities related to the matter such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the official added.

Experts and officials say chances are high for the two sides to push back the timing for about five to seven years, setting the year of transfer in early 2020.

South and North Korea are still technically at war after the 1950-53 Korean War ended in a truce without a peace treaty. About 28,500 American troops are stationed in South Korea to help defend the Asian ally from threats from the communist nation.

During the Saturday talks, Kim and Hagel also agreed to continue to strengthen their deterrence against North Korea over its nuclear and conventional weapons threats, and to cooperate further in a way to boost their joint defense capabilities, according to the ministry.

The two defense chiefs sat down for talks on the sidelines of the 13th Asia Security Summit, also known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, which began on Friday for a three-day run.

Later in the day, the two chiefs are scheduled to join their Japanese counterpart for trilateral talks expected to center on sharing military intelligence to deter North Korea.

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