George Kennan's 1948 Policy Planning Staff Memorandum - The inauguration of organized political warfare.

I really think a review of this memorandum is useful because I think many of our adversaries have adopted various methods from this document (with their own characteristics of course).  Although this was written as a US centric description; like the current Unconventional Warfare definition in Joint Pub 1-02 it does not have to be US centric and in fact explains and describes what is happening around the world such as in Crimea and Ukraine but also by others  such as the Chinese and their “Three Warfares,”  Iran in Syria and other operations by the Quds force, and even Al Qaeda – using terrorism as part of its UW strategy in an attempt to coerce and disrupt and in some cases overthrow governments.

Although we might shy away from conducting organized political warfare, many other nations and groups do not.  It is best for us to understand it.

http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/65ciafounding3.htm

269. Policy Planning Staff Memorandum 
Washington, May 4, 1948.

//Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council,
NSC 10/2. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. An earlier, similar version, April 30,
is ibid., RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff Files 1944-47: Lot 64 D 563, Box
11. The Policy Planning Staff minutes for May 3 state: "There was a discussion of the Planning Staff
Memorandum of April 30, 1948 on the inauguration of organized political warfare. This paper was generally
approved and Mr. Kennan will present it tomorrow for discussion at a meeting of NSC consultants." (Ibid., Box
32)

The Problem

The inauguration of organized political warfare.

Analysis

1. Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz's doctrine in time of peace. In broadest definition,
political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national
objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (as ERP--the Marshall Plan), and "white" propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of "friendly" foreign elements, "black" psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.

2. The creation, success, and survival of the British Empire has been due in part to the British understanding and application of the principles of political warfare. Lenin so synthesized the teachings of Marx and Clausewitz that the Kremlin's conduct of political warfare has become the most refined and effective of any in history. We have been handicapped however by a popular attachment to the concept of a basic difference between peace and war, by a tendency to view war as a sort of sporting context outside of all political context, by a national tendency to seek for a political cure-all, and by a reluctance to recognize the realities of international relations--the perpetual rhythm of struggle, in and out of war.

3. This Government has, of course, in part consciously and in part unconsciously, been conducting political
warfare. Aggressive Soviet political warfare has driven us overtly first to the Truman Doctrine, next to ERP, then to sponsorship of Western Union [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. This was all political warfare
and should be recognized as such.

4. Understanding the concept of political warfare, we should also recognize that there are two major types of
political warfare--one overt and the other covert. Both, from their basic nature, should be directed and
coordinated by the Department of State. Overt operations are, of course, the traditional policy activities of any
foreign office enjoying positive leadership, whether or not they are recognized as political warfare. Covert
operations are traditional in many European chancelleries but are relatively unfamiliar to this Government.

5. Having assumed greater international responsibilities than ever before in our history and having been engaged by the full might of the Kremlin's political warfare, we cannot afford to leave unmobilized our resources for covert political warfare. We cannot afford in the future, in perhaps more serious political crises, to scramble into impromptu covert operations [1 line of source text not declassified].

6. It was with all of the foregoing in mind that the Policy Planning Staff began some three months ago/2/ a
consideration of specific projects in the field of covert operations, where they should be fitted into the structure
of this Government, and how the Department of State should exercise direction and coordination.

/2/Although the following page of the source text indicates that 3 lines were missing from the bottom of the
previous page, a comparison with the April 30 version of the memorandum cited in the source note above finds that no words were missing.

7. There are listed below projects which have been or are now being suggested by the Staff:

a. Liberation Committees.

Purpose: To encourage the formation of a public American organization which will sponsor selected political
refugee committees so that they may (a) act as foci of national hope and revive a sense of purpose among
political refugees from the Soviet World; (b) provide an inspiration for continuing popular resistance within the
countries of the Soviet World; and (c) serve as a potential nucleus for all-out liberation movements in the event
of war.

Description: This is primarily an overt operation which, however, should receive covert guidance and possibly
assistance from the Government. It is proposed that trusted private American citizens be encouraged to establish a public committee which would give support and guidance in U.S. interests to national movements (many of them now in existence) publicly led by outstanding political refugees from the Soviet World, such as Mikolajczyk and Nagy [of Poland and Hungary, respectively]. The American Committee should be so selected and organized as to cooperate closely with this Government. The functions of the American Committee should be limited to enabling selected refugee leaders [to keep alive as public figures with access to printing presses and microphones. It should not engage in underground activities.]/3/

/3/The words in brackets were taken from the April 30 version; see footnote 1 above.

What is proposed here is an operation in the traditional American form: organized public support of resistance to tyranny in foreign countries. Throughout our history, private American citizens have banded together to champion the cause of freedom for people suffering under oppression. (The Communists and Zionists have exploited this tradition to the extreme, to their own ends and to our national detriment, as witness the Abraham Lincoln brigade during the Spanish Civil War and the current illegal Zionist activities.) Our proposal is that this tradition be revived specifically to further American national interests in the present crisis.

[1 heading and 2 paragraphs (21-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

c. Support of Indigenous Anti-Communist Elements in Threatened Countries of the Free World.

Purpose: To strengthen indigenous forces combating communism in countries where Soviet political warfare is a threat to our national security.

Description: This is a covert operation again utilizing private intermediaries. To insure cover, the private
American organizations conducting the operation should be separate from the organizations mentioned in
previous projects. [3 lines of source text not declassified] This project is a matter of urgency because the
communists are reported to be planning the disruption of ERP through labor disturbances in France. [2 lines of
source text not declassified]

d. Preventive Direct Action in Free Countries.

Purpose: Only in cases of critical necessity, to resort to direct action to prevent vital installations, other material, or personnel from being (1) sabotaged or liquidated or (2) captured intact by Kremlin agents or agencies.

Description: This covert operation involves, for example, (1) control over anti-sabotage activities in the
Venezuelan oil fields, (2) American sabotage of Near Eastern oil installations on the verge of Soviet capture, and (3) designation of key individuals threatened by the Kremlin who should be protected or removed elsewhere.

8. It would seem that the time is now fully ripe for the creation of a covert political warfare operations directorate within the Government. If we are to engage in such operations, they must be under unified direction. One man must be boss. And he must, as those responsible for the overt phases of political warfare, be answerable to the Secretary of State, who directs the whole in coordination.

9. [6-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

10. The National Security Council Secretariat would seem to provide the best possible cover for such a
directorate. Such cover would also permit a direct chain of command from the Secretary of State and be a
natural meeting ground for close collaboration with the military establishment.

Recommendations 
11. There should promptly be established, under the cover of the National Security Council Secretariat, a
directorate of political warfare operations to be known as the Consultative (or Evaluation) Board of the National Security Council.

12. The Director should be designated by the Secretary of State and should be responsible to him.

13. The Director should have initially a staff of 4 officers designated by the Department of State and 4 officers
designated by the Secretary of National Defense.

14. The Board should have complete authority over covert political warfare operations conducted by this
Government. It should have the authority to initiate new operations and to bring under its control or abolish
existing covert political warfare activities.

15. Specifically, (a) the four projects mentioned in paragraph 7 above should be activated by the Board and (b) covert political warfare now under CIA and theater commanders abroad should be brought under the authority of the Board.

16. The coordination of the above covert operations with the overt conduct of foreign policy should, of course,
be accomplished through the offices of the Secretary and Under Secretary of State. 

The Myths of America's Shadow War

Loch Johnson will be speaking at the Center for Security Studies Covert Action conference at Georgetown on FEB 7.
V/R
Dave

The Myths of America's Shadow War

Loch K. Johnson | Jan 31, 2013

http://m.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/01/the-myths-of-americas-shadow-war/272712/

Taking covert action is far less clean -- and much more complex -- than many assume.

Mohammad Ismail/Reuters

The United States faces a world of constantly shifting circumstances, as underscored by the Arab Spring uprisings. To shield the nation in a global setting where uncertainty and hostilities are commonplace, officials in Washington have crafted a range of responses to international events that includes diplomacy and the use of armed force. The most hidden and least understood of these responses is covert action -- a tightly held operational secret in the U.S. government. This secrecy has yielded several myths that have misled the American people about a controversial, and sometimes lethal, approach to foreign policy.

MYTH #1: The meaning of covert action is clearly delineated.

With the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991, the government did craft a formal statutory definition of covert action as "an activity or activities of the United States government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United State Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly." Put simply, covert action attempts to influence world events through the secret use of propaganda, political, economic, and paramilitary activities. The concept of "secret influence" is spongy, though, and can blur the distinction between activities carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or by the military. Take the training of foreign covert forces by U.S. Special Operations Forces. The SOF consists of soldiers out of uniform, acting on an unacknowledged basis -- precisely the kind of operation engaged in by the CIA. By calling such activities "traditional military operations," the Pentagon is able to sidestep the legal procedures for reporting covert actions to Congress.

MYTH #2: Covert action offers a quiet approach to America's foreign relations .

An appealing aspect of covert action is the promise that it may allow the United States to address vexing problems overseas in a quiet manner. Indeed, one of the euphemisms for covert action is "the quiet option." Yet consider such CIA operations as the failed attempt in 1961 to overthrow the Castro regime with an invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs; or the use of mines to blow up shipping in Nicaraguan harbors during the Reagan administration. Nothing quiet about these "secret" activities. Today drones can fly silently, but there is nothing quiet about the explosions of Hellfire missiles as they strike targets on the ground.

MYTH #3: Covert action presents an attractive alternative to reliance on diplomats or Marines. 

In between diplomatic negotiations and sending in the Marines lies the "Third Option" -- another euphemism for covert action. As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger once put it: "We need an intelligence community that, in certain complicated situations, can defend the American national interest in the gray areas where military operations are not suitable and diplomacy cannot operate." Framing foreign policy options in this tripartite manner, however, sets up a false set of options that too often carries the United States toward the use of covert action, while slighting other foreign policy approaches that might merit greater consideration -- such as the use of trade inducements or development assistance.

MYTH #4: Covert actions undergo rigorous government review before they are implemented.

The Church Committee, led by Senator Frank Church (D, Idaho), discovered in 1975 that only about 14 percent of all covert actions from 1961 to 1975 had been authorized by the National Security Council. The Committee concluded that "these ambiguous arrangements were intentional, designed to protect the president and to blur accountability" -- the infamous doctrine of plausible deniability, whereby unelected bureaucrats decided when and where covert actions would occur, all in the name of keeping the president's hands clean. Today the review of covert action proposals is far more thorough. Nonetheless, full accountability is often lacking and one of the chief culprits is use of "generic findings." The word "finding" refers to the president's formal approval of a covert action. The expectation in Congress is that a finding will be reported to lawmakers with a reasonably fulsome statement about the operation, so that the oversight committees can evaluate its appropriateness. With generic findings, however, specificity is abandoned, say, by providing authority "to fight global terrorism." For CIA operatives, this broad language could be interpreted to mean almost anything.

MYTH #5: The covert action approval process is cumbersome and ineffective.

Some intelligence officials long for the days before the establishment of a findings process, as required by the Hughes-Ryan Act of 1974. Better the simple telephone call from the CIA Director to the national security adviser than the hurdles posed by presidential review and congressional notification. The end result of this "micromanagement," according to this nostalgic perspective, is to slow down the CIA as it tries to thwart dangers to the United States. "What we need is horsepower, not brakes!" said an exasperated senior CIA officer to me soon after the Church Committee recommended tighter supervision of covert actions. In fact, though, today's approval procedures can move with alacrity when necessary, thanks to a link-up of secure telephones that allows quick communication among the president, intelligence managers, and other key players responsible for green-lighting an operation.

MYTH #6: Covert action has the virtue of allowing the United States to act alone in foreign affairs.

Covert action seems to offer an opportunity for unilateral action: the United States moving with secrecy and dispatch. In reality, though, rarely can the CIA operate alone in carrying out covert actions of any consequence, particularly paramilitary endeavors. Indeed, a fundamental tenet of covert action success is having a competent ally within the target nation. One of the most successful covert actions was the routing of the Taliban and Al Qaeda from Afghanistan in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. A sine qua non for the victory was the internal assistance of the Northern Alliance, a tribe of Afghans who also opposed the Taliban. Covert actions require partnerships; they are rarely a quick and easy solution.

(Continued at the link below)

http://m.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/01/the-myths-of-americas-shadow-war/272712/