Friday Morning Reading

Nice translation for the Ambassador's name:  Lippert = Report.  And it is nice that north Korea is on a first name basis with "Mark."  Guess they must have used the second or third string propagandists for this statement.

But it is the accusation of our madcap saber rattling that really hurts our feelings.

The recent case amid mounting anti-Americanism reflects the mindset of south Korean people censuring the U.S. for bringing the danger of a war to the Korean peninsula through the madcap saber-rattling.

calendar>>March 5. 2015 Juche 104

U.S. Ambassador Attacked by S. Korean  http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm

Pyongyang, March 5 (KCNA) -- Mark Report, U.S. Ambassador to south Korea, was attacked by a member of the south Korean civilian organization at the venue of a lecture sponsored by the people's council for national reconciliation and cooperation in Jongro District, Seoul on March 5. Good for Bangladesh.  I hope other nations will have the guts to enforce their laws and international law and crack down on the criminal illicit activity being conducted by north Korean diplomats. Bangladesh seizes $1.4 million in gold from North Korean diplomat DHAKA Fri Mar 6, 2015 2:15am EST http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/06/us-bangladesh-northkorea-diplomat-idUSKBN0M20JT20150306 I am sure there will be a response from Korea and China on this.  From a US perspective this seems very logical and should be a good thing for the Japan-US alliance as well as Japan's "most important neighboring country" but that country's domestic political constituency  can only view this through the lens of history. Japan to define collective self-defense as an SDF ‘primary mission’ http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/03/06/national/japan-define-collective-self-defense-sdf-primary-mission/#.VPmBGoHF_V2 I am certainly not well versed in the nuances of diplomatic language.   However, it seems to me that being "an important neighboring country" would seem to connote a lesser status than "our most important neighboring country."  I interpret this completely opposite of my Korean friends.  I look forward to being schooled in the differences (and of course it may be problematic due to the differences in English, Japanese, and Korean languages).  I would think that the sharing of values would be implied in being our most important neighboring country and do not need to be mentioned in every statement. On the MOFA’s website, Japan used to describe South Korea as “an important neighboring country that shares basic values with Japan such as freedom, democracy, and a market economy.” However, as of March 4, the description had changed to simply call South Korea Japan’s “most important neighboring country.” The ministry’s altered description matches Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s recent stance on South Korea. When Abe gave speeches in 2013 and 2014, he described South Korea exactly the MOFA’s website used to: as “our most important neighboring country with which we share fundamental values and interests.” Abe changed this formulation in his February speech to the Diet, saying simply that “the Republic of Korea (ROK) is our most important neighboring country.” Image Credit: White House photo by Pete Souza Did Japan Just Change Its Attitude Toward South Korea? A change in Japan’s official diplomatic language is causing a furor in South Korea. http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/did-japan-just-change-its-attitude-toward-south-korea/ U.S. Strategy in Iraq Increasingly Relies on Iran By HELENE COOPERMARCH 5, 2015 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/06/world/middleeast/us-strategy-in-iraq-increasingly-relies-on-iran.html?emc=edit_th_20150306&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=175827 Excerpt: The presence of Suleimani at the forefront of Iraqi forces’efforts to reclaim Tikrit from ISIS control underscores both the expanding influence of Iran on the central Iraqi government and the increasingly critical role that Shi’ite militiamen, thought to be operating under Quds command, are playing in the Iraqi fight against ISIS. Neither development brings pleasure to senior U.S. officials or lawmakers in Congress. Quds force leader, commanding Iraqi forces against ISIS, alarms Washington http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/03/05/iran-quds-force-leader-commanding-iraqi-forces-against-isis-alarms-americans/?intcmp=latestnews By James Rosen Published March 05, 2015 FoxNews.com k  I received the following comments from a very good friend with whom I have served for many years and who has also served in Korea and he provides some very important perspective: As you would recall anti-American demonstrations were at an all-time high the summer of 2001, we had fire-bombings at the main gate of Yongsan, riots near multiple gates every Saturday (except when it rained hard) a US doctor from 121 Hospital in Seoul while returning from volunteer work at an orphanage was stabbed to death in broad daylight in Itaewon on a Saturday afternoon by a man who proclaimed that the US caused the Korean War and a pair of US civilian dependents were attacked by Anti-US demonstrators and pushed to the ground all just prior to the attacks of 9/11.  Following the attacks on 9/11 40,000 ROK riot police in full military uniforms surrounded US bases in Korea, letters of condolence came flooding in to US commands and bases, groups of Korean citizens (many who were former KATUSAs) formed patrols to help “guard” Americans and for a very long time demonstrations against US bases did not happen.  US forces were restricted from going to entertainment districts like Itaewon for a long time following the attacks out of fear of follow-on terrorist attacks, when the restrictions came down, US forces implemented a courtesy patrol that included team of officers and NCOs (LTCs, MAJs, 1SGs, SGMs, SFCs) from USFK patrolling in groups of 4-6 along with MPs until closing time.   I can remember going up to Itaewon while on-duty and having shop keepers thank us and apologize for the behavior of the demonstrators and offer support in the war against Al Qaeda.  Way different environment than prior to the attacks. The Korean people are very proud and given the fact that North Korea made comments supporting the attack, it is likely that the South will feel additional pressure. David S. Maxwell Associate Director Center for Security Studies Georgetown University Office: 202-687-3834 Cell: 703-300-8263 email: david.maxwell@georgetown.edu  Alt email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com Twitter: @davidmaxwell161 Blog: http://maxoki161.blogspot.com/ ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: David Maxwell <David.Maxwell@georgetown.edu> Date: Thu, Mar 5, 2015 at 9:29 AM Subject: US Ambassador Mark Lippert Attacked at Breakfast Gathering To: From the Arirang Institute.  It will be interesting to read the cultural reaction to this and the national shame that Koreans will feel about this. This is something hard for people like us westerners to understand. CNN Anderson Cooper tried to call Ambassador Lippert a Navy SEAL but Barbara Starr corrected him and correctly described him as a Naval reserve intelligence officer who had support the SEALs. But even the most bad ass SEAL or Delta operator  (or Steven Seagal or Chuck Norris) probably could not have defended himself against a blind side attack like what happened to Ambassador Lippert unless his sixth sense was so finely turned like in the movies or he had developed eyes in the back of his head.  In a situation like this he is dependent on security procedures of the host nation and the event organizers (which obviously broke down on the Korean side since they let a known activist who had thrown a brick at the Japanese Ambassador in 2010 be seated at the table next to the Ambassador) and there are few if any Ambassadors who are given the close in protection that might have prevented this - and even then no one would have had a security detail that close to him while he is seated for breakfast - security was dependent on the Koreans vetting all the attendees but this event was probably not considered to be on a scale that needed the level of vetting required to prevent these incidents. The blowback on this is that this could really restrain the Ambassador's engagement activities (that have been very positively received by the Korean public) because the RSO security requirements for the Ambassador's participation at events will become prohibitive to event organizers (this will be the knee jerk US reaction).  The irony is that the collective Korean sense of national guilt over this incident will put tremendous pressure on Korean security forces and whatever the US asks for in terms of security will pale in comparison to what the Koreans will do for the Ambassador whenever he is in public from now on.  The Korean security reaction will be greater than the usual US knee jerk security reaction. ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Arirang Institute <admin@ariranginstitute.org> Date: Thu, Mar 5, 2015 at 11:32 AM Subject: American Ambassador to South Korea, Mark Lippert, Stabbed Facilitating dialogue in East Asia | Arirang Institute Insights View this email in your browser US Ambassador Mark Lippert Attacked at Breakfast Gathering

Lippert confirmed as new U.S. ambassador to S. Korea

2014/09/19 10:04

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2014/09/19/30/0301000000AEN20140919001000315F.html

By Chang Jae-soon

WASHINGTON, Sept. 18 (Yonhap) -- The Senate confirmed Mark Lippert as new U.S. ambassador to South Korea on Thursday, paving the way for the long-time adviser to President Barack Obama to take office, after months of delay, as the youngest person to become the American ambassador to Seoul.

Lippert, chief of staff to Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, was nominated in early May to replace Sung Kim as the top U.S. envoy to Seoul. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a confirmation hearing for him on June 18 and approved the nomination on June 24.

But his appointment has since been stuck in the Senate, along with dozens of others, due to a political impasse. Thursday's approval was a surprise because many had expected that confirmation of those nominations could be delayed until after November's midterm elections.

Lippert is one of Obama's longest and closest advisers on foreign policy. He is also known for his expertise on Korea and broader regional security issues, having worked as assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs from 2011 to 2012.

At age 41, he is also the youngest U.S. ambassador to South Korea ever.

Lippert assumes office at a time when Seoul and Washington have a string of sensitive issues to deal with in addition to the protracted standoff with North Korea over its nuclear program.

They include delaying the planned transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) of South Korean forces from Washington to Seoul, the U.S. plan to deploy a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense battery to South Korea and the U.S.-led fight against the Islamic State (IS).

South Korea handed over control of its forces to the U.S. during the 1950-53 Korean War to defend against invading troops from North Korea. Peacetime control of its forces was returned in 1994, and South Korea is currently scheduled to get back operational control in the event of war in December 2015.

But last year, Seoul asked for a delay in the OPCON transfer after North Korea conducted its third nuclear test, saying the security situation on the peninsula was markedly different from when the transfer was agreed upon a few years ago.

The THAAD deployment plan is also a sensitive issue because it is seen as U.S. pressure on Seoul to buy a THAAD system and could inflame tensions with China and Russia as they see the U.S. move as a threat to their national and security interests.

Lippert also takes office as Washington is trying to drum up international support for its fight against IS. The U.S. has classified South Korea as a humanitarian contributor, but speculation has grown that Washington could ask for a contribution beyond that.

jschang@yna.co.kr

(END)

US Senate set to hold hearing on nominee for ambassador to Seoul (and his prepared testimony)

His prepared testimony is pasted below.

The reason the Koreans are happy about this nomination is this excerpt (the first sentence anyway):

Lippert is a close aide of Obama and often telephones the president.

If confirmed, the 41-year-old would become the youngest U.S. ambassador to South Korea. It would also be unusual as Lippert is a non-career diplomat.

US Senate set to hold hearing on nominee for ambassador to Seoul http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2014/06/511_159251.html Mark Lippert, nominee to become the U.S. ambassador to South Korea, will testify this week at a Senate confirmation hearing, which would shed light on his views on the bilateral alliance and regional security issues. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations plans to open the session Tuesday afternoon to be presided over by Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD), according to its website. Lippert, currently Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel's chief of staff, will be joined by three other nominees at the hearing. In early May, President Barack Obama nominated Lippert as his new top envoy in Seoul to replace Sung Kim. Lippert is a close aide of Obama and often telephones the president. If confirmed, the 41-year-old would become the youngest U.S. ambassador to South Korea. It would also be unusual as Lippert is a non-career diplomat. He is also known for his expertise on Korea and broader regional security issues, having worked as assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs from April 2012 to May 2013. He previously worked as chief of staff for the White House National Security Council (NSC). (Yonhap)  Testimony of Mark Lippert Ambassador-Nominee to the Republic of Korea Senate Foreign Relations Committee Tuesday, June 17, 2014, 3 p.m. Chairman Cardin, Senator Rubio, distinguished Members of the Committee: I am deeply honored to appear before you as the President's nominee to serve as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea. I am humbled by the confidence the President and the Secretary of State have shown in putting me forward for this nomination. Having proudly served as a Personal Representative of the Member to this Committee, it is very meaningful to be back in this Committee room today. In large part through my service on Capitol Hill, which spanned nearly a decade, I am keenly aware that close partnership with Congress is critically important to success in diplomacy. And if confirmed, I pledge to always be a strong partner and friend to this committee. I would also like to thank my former boss, Senator Leahy, for his gracious introduction. I know just how busy he is juggling his many important responsibilities. Please let me also say a few words about my wife. As Senator Leahy mentioned, I met Robyn when we worked together on Capitol Hill. She has been the best partner that anyone could ask for and has patiently put up with years of military deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, long hours at the Pentagon and the National Security Council, and the intensity of work for the Senate Foreign Relations and Appropriations Committees. Members of the Committee, simply put: the alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea is one of the most important relationships that we have in the world. Through my many visits to the Republic of Korea, I have come to greatly respect the people and culture of the Republic of Korea. Our two countries share deeply held values of free markets, democracy, and respect for human rights and the rule of law. And we share a common history of fighting together to uphold these values and to defend our security. I am proud to say that the ties between our two countries have never been stronger. If confirmed, I pledge to work tirelessly, in close partnership with this Committee, to make our Alliance even stronger. As the former Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Asia-Pacific, I have had the opportunity to work closely with our South Korean allies, Commanding Generals of United States Forces Korea, and senior members of our diplomatic team. I have seen the enduring strength of this alliance firsthand. I continue to be vigilant about the stark threat that North Korea poses the U.S. homeland, to security on the peninsula, in the region, and around the world - including through its continued pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology, its worldwide proliferation activities, and egregious human rights violations against its own citizens. If confirmed, I will work closely with the leadership of the Republic of Korea to ensure we are fully aligned in our efforts to achieve the complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea and prevent proliferation of key technologies. I have built a good working relationship with General Scaparrotti, the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, and if confirmed, look forward to partnering closely with him and the Department of Defense as they work to strengthen our deterrence on the peninsula and ensure that the 28,500 U.S. troops stationed there are ready to "fight tonight," if necessary. Although our alliance was established with a mutual commitment to security, our nations have built deep and growing economic ties. The U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, or KORUS FTA, is now in its third year, and American and Korean consumers, businesses, and workers have benefited from it. Last year, the United States achieved a large investment surplus with the Republic of Korea, and U.S. goods exports are up 11.7 percent this year so far. That said, the full potential of the FTA has yet to be fully realized; more tariff cuts and additional provisions will come into force in the years to come. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the KORUS FTA is fully implemented so that American exporters, entrepreneurs, and workers can receive the benefits for which this Administration negotiated so hard. This alliance is also increasingly tackling global challenges as well. Our global partnership includes cooperation on everything from counter-terrorism and counter-piracy to climate change and development. The United States is also negotiating a successor 123 civil nuclear cooperation agreement with South Korea that will allow us to continue our cooperation in this field, while maintaining our strong non-proliferation standards. Finally, our strong people-to-people ties reinforce our shared values and interests. Each year, the Republic of Korea sends more university students to the United States per capita than any other major country. We have innovative exchange programs between our students and our science experts. If confirmed, I will make public diplomacy a top priority and work to foster these exchanges and bring more Korean education and tourism dollars to the United States. And if confirmed, I will be proud to also represent the over 1.7 million U.S. citizens that are of Korean descent and who contribute vitally to the deepening ties between our peoples. Our Embassy in Seoul has a talented team comprised of career diplomats, civil servants from a range of U.S. agencies, and local Korean staff who are dedicated to advancing U.S. interests every day. If confirmed, I will work to ensure my team has the resources, training, and guidance to strengthen and broaden our alliance with the Republic of Korea. Mr. Chairman, the U.S.-ROK alliance is the linchpin of security and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula, in the Asia-Pacific, and around the world. Being nominated to represent the United States in Seoul is the honor of my lifetime, and if confirmed I will work night and day to advance this critical relationship. Thank you very much for your consideration of my nomination, and I look forward to taking your questions.

Remarks by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs Mark Lippert At CSIS-Georgetown-U.S. Studies Center Conference The Rebalance: One Year Later

Remarks by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs Mark Lippert At CSIS-Georgetown-U.S. Studies Center Conference The Rebalance: One Year Later 27 February 2013 [as prepared] Thanks to Mike Green, Bates Gill, and David Maxwell. Thanks also to CSIS and Georgetown who are serving as key intellectual engines of the rebalance. I know that you have had some very productive panels this morning. What I want to provide a strategic overview of where we have been over the past year. To open few points right up front: First, the rebalance is a whole of government approach. Defense and security undergird peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific, but Defense is only one part of the U.S. approach. This perhaps best encapsulated by Sec. Clinton's article on the U.S. strategy in Asia where security is but one of six key prongs. We very much view our role at DOD as supporting the diplomatic, economic, development, and cultural pieces. Second, the rebalance is not zero-sum game with Beijing or a contain China strategy. In fact, a strong bilateral relationship with China is an important part of the rebalance. As you saw from Secretary Panetta's 2012 visit to China, the Defense Department is seeking additional ways to work with China on a range of mutual interests on the military to military front--- inviting them to the Rim of the Pacific Exercise, facilitating operational level talks, and increasing senior level engagement, including visits by the Secretary of Defense, the PACOM Commander, the Secretary of the Navy, and reciprocal trips by Chinese counterparts. We continue to have a constructive and frank dialogue with the Chinese military and view that engagement as an important part of the strategy. Third, the rebalance is an evolving, living strategy. The Defense Department is constantly working with and listening to allies and partners in the region to make sure the strategy, and our actions supporting it, are properly tailored and as effective as possible, providing enough security to be reassuring, but working hard to carefully manage regional perceptions to ensure that the rebalance is not seen as military-first strategy. I want to emphasize that that the President has made a strategic choice for a long-term, strategic commitment to the region. It will weather crises, budgets and political transitions at key cabinet posts. With that, let me turn to a discussion of the core elements of the rebalance. At the Shangri-La dialogue, Secretary Panetta outlined a conceptual framework for the Defense component of the rebalance. He described four pillars of the rebalance: partnerships, presence, power projection, and principles. So, since this is a speech on the rebalance a year later, what I thought I would do here today is to attempt to place a number of the notable accomplishments within the framework that Secretary Panetta outlined at Shangri-La. Turning to Secretary Panetta's speech, the first pillar I want to discuss is Partnerships. Working with our key partners and allies is one of the most important things we do each and every day at DOD. Of course our traditional allies including Australia, Japan and the Republic of Korea remain paramount in this strategy, and I will come to these in the next section, but I wanted to open with some of the more under-reported initiatives that can sometimes be overlooked. To that end, we are revitalizing and maturing our partnerships throughout the region- updating them to the meet the security challenges of the 21st century. Here are a few examples: We worked with our treaty ally Thailand to update the U.S.-Thailand Joint Vision Statement -the first revision in 50 years. The previous vision talked about keeping Thailand independent and fighting communism. It is safe to say we accomplished both of those tasks. The new vision directs the relationship in important areas such as improving readiness and interoperability and enhancing regional security in SE Asia and beyond, Building on the good work of the Clinton and Bush Administrations, we are working with our friends in India to deepen our Defense cooperation and trade relationship through the path-breaking Carter-Menon initiative. The Washington Declaration and subsequent policy changes concerning New Zealand ship visits to U.S. military ports and military staff talks have opened up exciting new avenues of defense cooperation with Wellington- that we have not seen for 25 years. In Burma, we resumed limited military to military relations. Working with Thailand, we invited Burmese military observers to the COBRA GOLD exercise, and we are in an important dialogue with Naypyidaw to ensure the armed forces' commitment to human rights and democracy. In Malaysia we have broadened our engagement as seen with the first-ever visit by a U.S. aircraft carrier to the South China Sea port of Kota Kinabalu. Concerning ASEAN, we have seen unprecedented amounts of senior level engagement with ASEN and the ADMM+. At the working level, we also announced that we will be sending a full time DOD employee to the US Mission to ASEAN to support our growing cooperation in this body. And, on the operational side, we will be deeply engaged Experts Working Group of the ADMM+ with Indonesia on Counter-terrorism-- building towards the first exercise later this year. And, we continue to have real innovation through trilaterals-- a mechanism to emphasize our regional approach to the Asia-Pacific. This includes successful ROK-Japan; AUS-Japan, India-Japan trilateral meetings. Further engagement with the Indonesian military, and a new MOU with Vietnam on the defense relationship are other examples, and I could go further, but in the interest of time I will turn to the next pillar. Let me turn to the second pillar: Forward Presence. It goes without saying that forward presence goes hand in glove with building partnerships. In many respects these two pillars are on a continuum. Accordingly a critical part of the rebalance is working with allies and friends to build a posture that is politically sustainable, geographically distributed and operationally resilient. We are in the process of modernizing and enhancing our forward presence with our critical allies in Northeast Asia. In Japan, we have seen strong momentum on the defense side over the last year- starting with Defense Minister Morimoto and continuing to forward with the new government, highlighted by the very successful visit by PM Abe last week. We are making steady progress on the Marine relocation; we made a key announcement of a second TPY -2 radar; we upgraded USMC aviation capabilities via the MV-22 deployment. And, I would be remiss if did not add the agreement on guidelines review and a re-energized Roles, Missions and Capabilities discussion. In Korea, we are on track to implement Strategic Alliance 2015 and continuing to build Alliance capability, especially C41SR, in support of OPCON transition. The major posture move to bring the vast majority of US forces south of the Han River has made significant progress and proceeds on schedule. On the policy side, we have also engaged in an innovative discussion on extended deterrence, and we continue our work on "Global Korea." And, in the coming months, we are looking forward to working closely with President Park to further deepen and strengthen the alliance. While we are updating and modernizing our alliances in Northeast Asia, we are also exploring innovative rotational presence options elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific, particularly Southeast Asia and Australia. Concerning Australia, 2012 saw the first company-sized rotation-- as a step towards a rotational presence of up to a full Marine Corps MAGTF in Darwin, and progress toward implementation of the initiatives announced by the President and Prime Minister. An example is the August 2012 US Air Force participation in Exercise PITCH BLACK with Royal Australian Air Force. At the Australia-U.S. Ministerial last year we advanced cooperation on new frontiers: the relocation of a C-Band radar, the advanced Space Situational Awareness Telescope, and deepening our military satellite communications partnership in Western Australia. We are in a full and equal partnership with Manila that is driving, over the long term, to enhance the capabilities of the Philippine Armed Forces, especially in the maritime domain. And, as part of that effort we are jointly examining new presence options that will serve our collective interests. In Singapore, the first Littoral Combat Ship rotation is slated to begin in April-providing a key capability to work bi- and multilaterally with partners in the region. These are just a few examples, and I should point out that this forward presence, along with our partnerships, help facilitate the third pillar: Power Projection. I would break down the power projection pillar into three sub-categories First, the rebalance means that a higher proportion of assets will be in the Pacific. This means 60% of our Navy fleet home-ported in the Pacific by 2020. An increase in Air Force (PACAF) tail numbers by 2017. More capacity from the ground forces: Army, USMC, as well as SOF --now that we are out of Iraq and drawing down in Afghanistan. Second, after a decade of rightly investing in counter-insurgency capabilities, the Pentagon has begun to shift our major investments into platforms and capabilities with direct applicability in the Asia-Pacific and is working to prioritize PACOM in receiving these capabilities. These include: Virginia class submarines; 5th Generation Fighters; P-8 aircraft; cruise missiles; ISR. Third, we are updating and improving our intellectual capacity that ties all of this together. Developing the Air Sea Battle concept; revitalizing our amphibious doctrine; updating plans; enhancing the role of our educational centers. Principles. Power Projection, Presence, and Partnerships are all driven by the final pillar: U.S. commitment to core principles and values. U.S. activities throughout the world-including in the Asia-Pacific-are based in key principles that we essential to building a secure, safe world where all can prosper: Free and open commerce, free access to the global commons, adherence to the rule of law, settling disputes by diplomatic means without coercion, supporting democracy, and protection of universal human rights. At DOD, we use these principles to guide formulation and practical application of our policies, in a range of real world situations: from engagement with the Burmese military to maritime disputes in the South China Sea. These core principles guide the decisions we make every day and connect our strategic rebalance to the values that are held dear here in the U.S. and throughout the world. Implementation. Before concluding, let me briefly address what we are doing to implement the rebalance and some of the challenges ahead: At DOD we are engaged in a number of steps at senior levels to ensure implementation of the rebalance. Secretary Panetta established a biweekly video conference between the Secretary and the PACOM Commander to ensure direct, unfiltered communications with the Combatant Commander responsible for the Asia Pacific; Deputy Secretary Carter manages a Deputy's Management Advisory Group-Asia Pacific process which brings all of the stakeholder Services, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense together to discuss key issues confronting the implementation of the rebalance; The Office of Management and Budget and the National Security Staff process ensures DOD is working in concert with the rest of the interagency- both in budgetary and policy terms to implement the rebalance; Senior level travel to region. Secretary Panetta made three trips last year, Deputy Secretary Carter made one, and Carter is likely to go again this spring. As far as Secretary Hagel- well, given that it is his first day on the job we haven't had that discussion yet. But, I was talking to John Chipman of IISS who noted that then Senator Hagel led the Congressional Delegation piece of the very first Shangri-la dialogue to which he added that Secretary Hagel was an "early rebalancer." And, in terms of what challenges we confront as we continue to rebalance. I'll be brief as a wrap up here - we can get into these in the Q&A: Managing tension and security threats in NE Asia Sequester Balancing resources between CENT COM and PACOM: as mentioned, I have both in my portfolio. South China Sea and maritime disputes Continuing to grow and mature a regional security architecture. Terrorism, cyber attacks, space, proliferation Unexpected natural disasters and disease I'll stop here in the interests of time and wrap up. Conclusion. To conclude, let me pose the question: so what is the rebalance all about? My answer is as follows: the rebalance is about maintaining a system- a system that the U.S., working with friends, partners, and allies, allowed peace and prosperity to flourish over the last several decades. This brought millions, if not billions, out of poverty, and led to unprecedented economic and cultural growth. And, we want this to continue: we want it to continue because it is good for our friends and allies in the region, but also because, selfishly, it is in our interests. The U.S. is a Pacific power and our fortunes are inextricably linked to the Pacific. That is precisely why the United States has been deeply engaged in the pacific for decades - Republican and Democratic Presidents, times of surplus and debt, partisan gridlock and comity, war and peace- and, it is precisely why that I know we will continue to be there for decades to come. (END OF OFFICIAL TEXT)