Showing posts with label Asia Rebalance. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Asia Rebalance. Show all posts

Thursday, April 16, 2015

Reading for Thursday April 16, 2015





LEAD) USFK commander voices need for THAAD deployment to S. Korea

Excerpt:

Scaparrotti is the one who brought up the need for a THAAD battery in South Korea for the first time in June. The proposal has since become one of the most sensitive defense and political issues in Seoul as China and Russia have expressed strong opposition to such a deployment.
Supporters say the advanced missile defense unit is necessary to meet ever-growing missile and nuclear threats from North Korea, while opponents claim mid- and lower-altitude missile interceptors are enough as the North is unlikely to attack the South with such high-altitude missiles.
Regarding North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities, Scaparrotti said he assumes the communist nation has the capability to deliver a ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead.
"They claim to have a capability to deliver a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile. They paraded it and they've shown it to us. But they haven't tested it," he said."But I, as a commander, I have to be prudent and assume that they can deliver one and act on that basis."
What he did not say is that a good commander has to be prudent and ask for what he needs to accomplish the mission and defend his forces.  There should be no criticism of him or his requests to deploy THAAD.


Study pans use of '360-degree reviews'


Excerpt:

Some military officials said identifying toxic leaders is not the challenge at hand.
"Most people have worked for a toxic leader at some point, and it wasn't a secret. Everybody knew who was a jerk. The question is: What was done about it?" an unnamed official told Rand researchers. "You could find them; then what? What did we do about it? Doesn't the culture determine what happens at that point? Do we need 360 or do we know?"

A Nuclear Turning Point

Excerpt:

But on closer inspection, what is truly puzzling is that anyone supports the agreement at all. In striking this deal, the Obama administration abandoned a decades-old mainstay of U.S. nonproliferation policy, and opponents are right to reject it. The United States has always opposed the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies—uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing—to all states, including its own allies, and it is a mistake to make an exception for Iran.

Conclusion:
Defenders of the accord have argued that there was no viable alternative short of war. But this is not true. If the United States had given Iran a choice between, on the one hand, continued international isolation, increased economic sanctions, and, all else failing, military strikes on its nuclear facilities and, on the other hand, a zero-enrichment deal that lifted sanctions and provided other face-saving goodies, including nonsensitive nuclear technologies, Iran would have eventually chosen the latter.
Instead, we gave up the game. Iran out-negotiated us. We abandoned a clear international standard we had established in order to meet Iran halfway in its unreasonable demands. What we have to show for it is not a historic deal, but the death of a 70-year-old bipartisan pillar of American foreign policy.

The longstanding, bipartisan nonproliferation standard is dead.

Matthew Kroenig

April 20, 2015, Vol. 20, No. 30


So who are today's Adams and Mahan?

Four years later, in Realities of American Foreign Policy, Kennan wrote that the chief threat to the security of the United States was “the association of the dominant portion of the physical resources of Europe and Asia with a political power hostile to ourselves.” Such a threat to U.S. interests, he noted, could only emanate from certain regions of the globe “where major industrial power, enjoying adequate access to raw materials, is combined with large reserves of educated and technically skilled man-power.”
Such geopolitical reasoning, Kennan wrote in American Diplomacy, was scarce among Americans in 1898 when the U.S. went to war with Spain and as a result acquired the Philippine Islands. He credited two Americans of that time with understanding international realities: Brooks Adams and Alfred Thayer Mahan. Adams, Kennan noted, “sensed the ultimate importance of the distinction between sea power and land power” and grasped “the danger of political collaboration between Russia, Germany and China,” while Mahan, “was charting new paths . . . which led in the direction of a more profound appraisal of the sources of American security.” He called their efforts in this regard “an isolated spurt of intellectual activity against a background of general torpor and smugness in American thinking about foreign affairs.”
George Kennan’s Geopolitics of the Far East
U.S. Marines fighting in Seoul
Image Credit: U.S. Navy

George Kennan’s Geopolitics of the Far East

A worldview based on “unsentimental calculations of the balance of power” and an understanding of human nature.
By Francis P. Sempa
April 15, 2015


Top diplomats from S. Korea, U.S., Japan hold cooperation talks

Excerpt:

The meeting appears to reflect the urgency the U.S. sees in the need for improvement in Korea-Japan ties, which have been badly strained for years, due mainly to Tokyo's attempts to whitewash its wartime atrocities and colonial occupation, especially its sexual enslavement of women for its troops during World War II.


PACOM House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, Prepared Statement
Extensive overview of the situation and threats in PACOM.


Lippert doubts North’s sincerity

But what he could not diplomatically say is that he is not at all surprised by the regime's insincerity.

Also note his comments on Korea-Japan historical issues and the US "role."


The Politics of Rebalance: The Future of US Leadership In Asia


With the recent survey by the GOP that national security issues eclipse economic issues does that mean Asian issues will become an election issue?  Having some "contextual intelligence" would be a good thing for the next president.  But I wonder if we will ever hear the phrase contextual intelligence during the campaign - even if national security issues dominate I doubt contextual intelligence will resonate on a bumper sticker or in sound bites - e.g.,  "I have more contextual intelligence that candidate X"

Excerpt:

In crafting policy on Asia, the next U.S. president – Democrat or Republican – will require “contextual intelligence,” an essential presidential leadership skill Joseph Nye defines as “an intuitive diagnostic skill that helps a leader understand change, interpret the outside world, set objectives, and align strategies and tactics with objectives to create smart policies in a new situation.” Candidates’ level of contextual intelligence on four critical areas – Asian security, trade and investment, civil society, and China – as we previously posited in these pages may serve as a bellwether of whether pragmatic or ideological politics will drive the future of U.S. Asia policy.



How will U.S. presidential candidates frame the future of U.S. policy towards Asia?


The Iran Pact Is Not A Model For Dealing With Reclusive North Korea

Excerpts:

However, this is not the case. North Korea is very different from Iran, and is unlikely to fit in with such a plan.
The major difference is to be found in Iran’s political structure. Iran is clearly not a democracy in a strict sense, but it is still a country in which popular opinion actually matters. The Iranians can vote and their elections are generally free and fair, though participants have to act within certain established restrictions. There are competing political parties in Iran, and Iranians can protest against government policy at rallies, as well as creating political and social associations.
...
Unfortunately, the situation in North Korea is very different. To start with, North Korea is not a country in which popular opinions have any real significance. The country is run by a small group of hereditary elites. This elite group would probably not mind if its people were better off, but its ability to hold on to power does not depend on popular support. North Koreans do not vote, or rather vote in elections where the sole candidate always wins 100% of all votes. No independent political organizations exist. The media’s only interest is in the alleged greatness of the current government and its current policies. Participation in anti-government rallies is suicidal.




Tuesday, January 7, 2014

U.S. Adding 800 Troops for South Korea Citing Rebalance

I provided comments in an interview for the article below.
V/R
Dave

U.S. Adding 800 Troops for South Korea Citing Rebalance

By Tony Capaccio and Nicole Gaouette
January 07, 2014 7:52 PM EST
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The U.S. is sending 800 additional troops to South Korea with upgraded equipment, the Pentagon said, citing the Obama administration’s rebalance of forces to the Asia-Pacific region.
“There is no greater sign of the United States commitment to regional security than the 28,500 troops stationed in South Korea,” Secretary of State John Kerry said today inWashington in an appearance with South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung Se. “It’s clear the foundations of this relationship are built to endure.”
The small addition to those forces already stationed in South Korea “was long-planned and part of our enduring commitment to security on the Korean peninsula,” Army Colonel Steve Warren, a Defense Department spokesman, told reporters at the Pentagon today. “This gives commanders in Korea an additional capability.”
The U.S. and South Korean governments are watching the actions of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un after he ordered his uncle and second-in-command, Jang Song Thaek, executed on treason charges last month. The purge prompted South Korea to heighten combat readiness along its border with North Korea, and President Park Geun Hye has voiced worries that Kim may seek a provocation to consolidate his support.

North Korea Vote

In March, North Korea will hold its first parliamentary vote since Kim took power in 2011, the official Korean Central News Agency said today. The event, last held in 2009, was previously used to reaffirm his father Kim Jong Il’s power.
The added troops may be a reflection of concern about Kim, said Bruce Klingner, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, a Washington-based policy research group.
“Although he’s continuing the policies of his father and grandfather, he may be doing it in a more brutal and unpredictable level,” Klingner said in an interview. “We saw him willing to take tensions on the Korean peninsula to a dangerous level last year, and so there is concern about what may happen in 2014.’
The 1st Battalion of the 12th Cavalry Regiment, part of the U.S. Army’s 1st Cavalry Division based at Fort Hood, Texas, will be equipped with about 40 new M1A2 Abrams tanks and 40 of the latest model Bradley Fighting Vehicles, Warren said. The vehicles will stay in Korea after the personnel complete their nine-month rotation, he said.

Asia Shift

The regiment has prepared for possible action in Korea at the Army’s National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. Starting Feb. 1, the 1st Battalion will be stationed for the nine months at U.S. Camps Hovey and Stanley, north of Seoul and near the Demilitarized Zone that separates North and South Korea.
The deployment is part of a longer-term effort to change the U.S. military’s posture and presence in Asia, according to David Maxwell, associate director of the Center for Security Studies and the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University in Washington.
By sending the newest tanks, the military ‘‘is trying to undo the continuous decline of U.S. combat capabilities in the last decade,” Maxwell said in an interview.
The U.S. has kept troop levels in Korea at about 28,500 since an April 2008 agreement between the Bush administration and the South Korean government. The number had been been closer to 35,000 for years before that accord. South Korea is also set to take over wartime control of its 640,000 troops from the U.S. in December 2015.
One concern South Korea may have is that U.S. fiscal constraints could at some point prompt an end to troop rotations, Maxwell said. “There has to be a strong commitment to ensure there’s a strong rotational presence so there’s an adequate presence to defend against the North,” Maxwell said.
The U.S. and South Korea can best deter North Korea “by showing strength and resolve and then by deploying the right forces ready for contingencies, from war to collapse to provocation,” Maxwell said.
To contact the reporters on this story: Tony Capaccio in Washington at acapaccio@bloomberg.net; Nicole Gaouette in Washington at ngaouette@bloomberg.net
To contact the editor responsible for this story: John Walcott at jwalcott9@bloomberg.net

Friday, September 13, 2013

Balancing Acts: The U.S. Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Stability

From the Elliott School at George Washington University.  Download at the link below.
V/R
Dave

Balancing Acts: 
The U.S. Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Stability

Robert G. Sutter, Michael E. Brown, and Timothy J. A. Adamson,
with Mike M. Mochizuki and Deepa Ollapally August 2013

Contents
Executive Summary 
Origins and Evolution of the Rebalance
Elements of the Rebalance
Regional Responses to the Rebalance
Critiques and Rebuttals: The U.S. Policy Debate
Assessments, Recommendations, and Prospects for the Future

Appendices
I. Chronology
II. Suggestions for Further Reading
III. Regional Responses
China’s Response to the U.S. Rebalance, Timothy J.A. Adamson 
Japan’s Response to the U.S. Rebalance, Mike M. Mochizuki 
India’s Response to the U.S. Rebalance, Deepa Ollapally
IV. Biographies of the Authors

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
This paper analyzes the Obama administration’s “pivot” or “rebalance” in U.S. relations with the Asia-Pacific region. The paper analyzes the strategic rationale for this policy shift, the main elements of the new U.S. policy, regional responses to the new initiatives, and the prospects for U.S. policy toward the Asia-Pacific region.

ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE REBALANCE

Beginning in the fall of 2011, the Obama administration has issued a series of announcements and taken a series of steps to expand and intensify the already significant role of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. Explicitly identifying the Asia-Pacific region as a geostrategic priority for the United States, the Obama administration is paying a higher level of attention to the region across a wide range of issue areas. This represents a significant shift in U.S. policy.
However, the story of the rebalance is not a story of U.S. disengagement and then re-engagement in Asia. Instead, it is a matter of emphasis and priority, building on an elaborate foundation of U.S.-Asia relations that was already in place. The United States has had powerful national interests in the Asia-Pacific region since World War II and was deeply engaged in the region – militarily, economically, and diplomatically – throughout the Cold War. The post-Cold War administrations of presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush were actively engaged in Asia. 
The Obama administration’s policy toward the Asia-Pacific region has evolved over time and has gone through two distinct phases. When the policy was first rolled out in 2011-12, much of the emphasis was placed on military initiatives in the region. China disapproved of these initiatives, and Beijing took steps to demonstrate its power in maritime territorial disputes with U.S. allies. The Obama administration adjusted its approach in late 2012, playing down the significance of military initiatives, emphasizing economic and diplomatic elements, and calling for closer U.S. engagement with China.

STRATEGIC RATIONALE FOR THE REBALANCE
Although commentators in China and some observers elsewhere have suggested that the rebalance was designed to contain China, this is a simplistic (and, in the case of China, partially contrived) reading of the new policy. U.S. policymakers are certainly aware of China’s economic rise and its growing military power, but the rebalance has been driven by a much broader set of strategic, economic, and political considerations. Following more than a decade of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Obama administration has been trying to place more emphasis on Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia – parts of the world that will be of growing strategic and economic importance in the first half of the 21st century. In geostrategic terms, the rebalance is the Obama administration’s grand strategy for U.S. foreign policy. 
The new U.S. policy is also based on the need – widely felt throughout most of the Asia-Pacific region – for strategic reassurance in the face of a rising and increasingly assertive China. The rebalance is also driven by a desire to reassure U.S. allies, friends, and other countries in the region that the United States has not been exhausted after a decade of war, that it has not been weakened by economic and political problems at home, and that it is not going to disengage from Asia-Pacific affairs. 
The fundamental goals of the new U.S. policy are to broaden areas of cooperation beneficial to the United States with regional states and institutions; strengthen relations with American allies and partners, including great powers such as China and India as well as important regional powers such as Indonesia; and develop regional norms and rules compatible with the international security, economic, and political order long supported the United States. 

ELEMENTS OF THE REBALANCE
The rebalance is a region-wide, multidimensional policy initiative. In regional terms, the shift includes a stronger emphasis on Southeast Asia and South Asia to complement traditionally strong American attention to Northeast Asia. In policy terms, the rebalance entails three sets of initiatives – security, economic, and diplomatic elements. 
Changes in the U.S. military force structure are highly visible and have attracted much attention. The United States is shifting substantial military capacities from other theaters of operation to the Asia-Pacific and restructuring its regional security arrangements to generate more widely dispersed U.S. forces across the region. This has included high-profile new military deployments to Australia and the Philippines, and has been accompanied by expanded security arrangements with regional partners which emphasize greater military integration.
The rebalance also entails economic initiatives which aim to expand bilateral and multilateral economic cooperation between the United States and the region. Much of the discussion has focused on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a proposed free-trade agreement that presently involves the United States and 11 other countries, but does not currently include China. The Obama administration has also begun a process which will increase foreign assistance to the Asia-Pacific region by seven percent. 
Finally, the rebalance has seen a greatly intensified level of U.S. diplomatic engagement in the region. U.S. diplomatic activism has involved strengthening U.S. alliances; building deeper relationships with partners such as Singapore and India; deepening engagement with multilateral institutions; and managing the U.S.-China relationship. 

REGIONAL RESPONSES TO THE REBALANCE

China has reacted at two levels to the Obama administration’s rebalancing of U.S.-Asia relations. At the official level, Chinese government representatives and official media have leveled measured criticism of the new U.S. policy, especially its military aspects. Official sources have also criticized U.S. diplomatic activism seen in Beijing as U.S. support for American allies and associates that have maritime and territorial disputes with China. In China’s burgeoning non-official media, criticism of the rebalance and the United States has been vociferous. Some commentators have alleged that the United States is engaged in a conspiracy to develop a Cold War-style “containment” of China. 
Significantly, the run-up to the June 7-8, 2013 summit between President Obama and newly installed Chinese President Xi Jinping coincided with greater moderation in Chinese assessments, with Chinese officials telling foreign visitors there were “no fundamental, structural, or irreconcilable differences” between the two countries. Chinese military commanders have noted that, as the rebalance has evolved, Washington has been placing less emphasis on military initiatives and less emphasis on China as a focus of U.S. policy. While still wary of U.S. intentions, Chinese officials are now more positive toward U.S.-China military cooperation than at any time during the Obama administration.
Almost every other regional power in Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia holds to two positions. First, most regional powers have been publicly or privately pleased to see the stronger U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific region. Second, regional powers are also keen to avoid having to choose between the United States and China. They very much want to have good relationships with both countries. A few regional powers, including Indonesia, Thailand (a formal U..S. ally), and Malaysia, have been “straddling the fence” – avoiding any public sign of tilting toward either the United States or China. 
The Philippines, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore have been exceptions to the generally muted official reactions in the region; their support for a greater U.S. presence in the region has been quite explicit. It is not a coincidence that the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea are embroiled in territorial and security disputes. The Philippines and Japan have been engaged in protracted, intense disputes with China over maritime and territorial claims, with China exerting extraordinary coercive diplomatic, economic, and military power in both cases. A small and vulnerable city-state, Singapore has done more than many U.S. allies to embrace close strategic cooperation with what it sees as the stabilizing influence of the United States.
Australia and New Zealand also have warmly welcomed the U.S. rebalance, though both have taken pains to avoid upsetting China and their important economic ties with Beijing. Many other key countries in the region – including India, Vietnam and Burma – have taken significant steps to improve relations with the United States in recent years. Although governments in these countries have been careful to preserve their close economic ties with China and to avoid offending the region’s rising power, they have found it strategically reassuring to position themselves a few steps closer to the world’s preeminent superpower. In the face of a rising and increasingly assertive China, many countries in the Asia-Pacific region have drawn on classic balance-of-power thinking and “rebalanced” their positions closer to the non-threatening great power.
The many countries that have explicitly supported or quietly embraced the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific have probably been motivated more by concerns over China than by the intrinsic appeal of U.S. policies. Although many Chinese commentators accuse the United States of having a containment strategy, it might be more accurate to say that China is engaging in self-containing behavior. The regional votes are in, and they are generally favorable toward the new U.S. Policy.

ASSESSMENTS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

A Continuing Strategic ImperativeGiven the rise of Asia, the U.S. rebalance toward Asia is a reasonable reflection of changing geostrategic realities; it makes strategic sense. The rebalance has more promise for advancing U.S. interests, especially economic interests, than U.S. policy efforts in most other parts of the world. The Obama administration is committed to the rebalance, and this is likely to continue through the end of the president’s term in office. Given Asia’s continuing importance in the first half of the 21st century, U.S. grand strategy is likely to continue focusing on the Asia-Pacific region after President Obama leaves office. Nevertheless, the Obama administration continues to take care to reassure its European allies, Russia, and powers in the Middle East that the rebalance does not mean U.S disengagement from these regions. In particular, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has gone to extraordinary lengths to demonstrate deep American involvement in issues including Syria and the Middle East Peace Process, in moves welcomed by European and Middle Eastern powers.
An Affordable PolicyA near-term challenge for the Obama administration will be implementing the rebalance in the face of fiscal challenges, especially the budget cuts imposed by the sequestration process. Although the sequestration cuts are non-trivial, the Obama administration is making the rebalance a strategic priority, and it is likely to move ahead with successful implementation of its Asia-Pacific initiatives. U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel emphasized the U.S. commitment to the rebalance and the region in his June 1, 2013 address at a regional security gathering in Singapore: “The United States will continue to implement the rebalance and prioritize our posture, activities and investments in Asia-Pacific.” The rebalance also enjoys bipartisan support in the U.S. Congress, which is not the case in many other domestic and foreign policy areas. The U.S. capacity to implement the rebalance will be a key variable that merits continued attention.
The SummitPresident Obama and President Xi Jinping held an informal summit in California on June 7-8, 2013. This meeting provided an opportunity for the two presidents to focus on this important great power relationship, which had drifted somewhat in 2012 due to the presidential election in the United States and the leadership transition in China. The summit was successful in meeting its limited aims. It appears that both presidents succeeded at the summit in conveying their concerns. However, it is much too early to tell if the summit represents a turning point in a relationship that has growing structural tensions. 
A U.S. Balancing ActLooking farther ahead, a strategic challenge for the Obama administration and its successors will be finding the right balance between two competing sets of regional interests. On the one hand, many countries in the region want strategic reassurance from the United States, and they favor a robust, multidimensional U.S. presence in the region. On the other hand, a robust U.S. presence will be seen by many in Beijing as a U.S.-led containment strategy directed at China. The challenge for the United States is to provide strategic reassurance to allies, friends, and other regional powers without provoking a strategic backlash from China. 
A Regional Balancing ActMost regional powers will continue to want good relations with both China and the United States, and this will entail a second set of balancing acts. China will continue to be vitally important to many Asia-Pacific countries economically. The United States will continue to be important economically and as a provider of strategic reassurance. If Beijing continues or intensifies its assertive policies on maritime and territorial disputes, many countries in the region are likely to favor even closer ties with the United States. 
China’s Uncertain Balancing ActMuch will depend on Beijing. China’s military power will continue to grow in the years ahead, and this will inevitably make neighboring countries nervous. Chinese nationalism is also on the rise. China’s leadership has occasionally encouraged nationalistic impulses and it may do so again in the future, but it will find that rising, intensifying nationalism is very difficult to control. The trajectory of Chinese nationalism will be a key variable in the years ahead. China faces a delicate balancing act of its own: Beijing must maintain a robust rate of economic growth and it aspires to a greater role in Asia-Pacific affairs, but it must keep Chinese nationalism and Chinese regional actions from triggering an even stronger regional backlash. 
Prospects for U.S.-China Relations and the Asia-Pacific RegionA happy ending is possible but not guaranteed. Rising powers do not always clash with established powers. Great powers can coexist peacefully, if their strategic aspirations are compatible. If Beijing’s regional aspirations are non-hegemonic, then the strategic prerequisites for Asia-Pacific coexistence will be in place. Through constructive engagement with their Chinese counterparts, American leaders can demonstrate the long-term benefits Beijing would enjoy from a Chinese regional posture that eschews egregious pressure, intimidation, and zero-sum competition and embraces existing world norms that hold promise for uninterrupted Chinese development. 
To facilitate a positive outcome, it would be advisable to encourage China’s participation in the TPP. Economic interdependence is not a panacea, but it has conflict-dampening benefits. It would also be advisable to encourage China’s involvement in more military-to-military discussions and cooperative security endeavors. Transparency is not a panacea, but it too has conflict-dampening benefits. More generally, it will be advisable to encourage China’s integration into regional and global institutions as much as possible. U.S. leaders may also need to construct ways to show Chinese leaders the significant costs China will likely bear if it insists on using its greater coercive capabilities along narrowly nationalistic paths. 
The U.S. rebalance to Asia could provide the strategic impetus and some policy openings for a win-win outcome, but this is far from certain. The Asia-Pacific region is changing rapidly. In this dynamic context, the United, States, China, and regional powers are all – simultaneously – engaged in balancing acts, often involving both domestic and external calculations that will shape the prospects for Asia-Pacific stability in the years ahead.

Wednesday, September 11, 2013

Asia Ponders U.S. Role Amid Syria Strife

I am hearing from my friends in Asia that the feeling is the Asian Pivot is "dead"  is "no more" and "never was."  Some fairly consistent skeptical comments from friends in three different Asian countries.
V/R
Dave
  • September 10, 2013, 7:59 p.m. ET
ANALYSIS

Asia Ponders U.S. Role Amid Syria Strife

Doubts Rise in Asia Over U.S. Move to Rebalance Security Obligations Toward the Region


[image]Agence France Presse/Getty Images
Hillary Clinton, on the USS Fitzgerald in 2011, marked the anniversary of the Philippines-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty.

SINGAPORE—With the U.S. once again pushing to take military action in the Middle East, anxieties are building in Asia about Washington's commitment to the region under the much-touted "pivot."

Just two years ago, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared that with wars in Iraq and Afghanistan winding down, the U.S. "stands at a pivot point." Henceforth, she said, America would rebalance its diplomatic, economic and strategic commitments to the Asian-Pacific region to make the 21st century "America's Pacific Century." That foreign-policy grand strategy became widely known as the "pivot" to Asia.

The pivot infuriated China, which called it a Cold War-era policy of "containment." But it resonated with many Asian countries seeking U.S. security assurances to counter China's growing military power. China's territorial spats with Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam had created broad anxiety in a region that is heavily reliant on China for its economic prosperity, but is wary of its strategic intentions.

Yet even before this latest crisis in Syria dragged U.S. attention back to the Middle East, there was reason to question how much substance the pivot really contained.

Some skeptics in Asia and the U.S. viewed the whole idea as mostly a marketing job by the Obama administration intended to change the story line of a post-financial-crisis America in terminal decline—and a China that was unstoppably ascendant.

Mrs. Clinton's successor, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, added to doubts at his confirmation hearing in January when he noted the negative reaction from China, and suggested it might be time to change tack. "You know, the Chinese take a look at that and say, 'What's the United States doing? They trying to circle us? What's going on?' And so, you know, every action has its reaction," he said.

Many Asian analysts also have noted that, despite his military service in Vietnam, Mr. Kerry's foreign-policy interests and personal networks run more through the Middle East than Asia. That perception has been reinforced by his early efforts to jump-start a peace process between Israel and the Palestinians.

What is more, Pentagon spending cuts have raised questions about the military initiatives planned under the pivot. Many military analysts believe that if there is any rebalancing of U.S. forces to Asia, it may come simply because of drawdowns in the Middle East and Europe, rather than a buildup in Asia.

Barry Desker, the dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, said a consensus is building in Asia that "you're not going to have a significant shift of U.S. forces to this part of the world."

U.S. officials now protest that the pivot to Asia has been widely misunderstood: It was never conceived, they say, as a military buildup—and China was never the target.

They stress its nonmilitary initiatives, including the rapid advances that the U.S. has made to forge an ambitious new trade arrangement for the region within the Trans-Pacific Partnership. And they point to the diplomatic gains from the unprecedented air travel that Obama administration officials have logged on shuttle visits to Asia. For instance, in 2011 President Barack Obama became the first American president to attend the East Asia Summit, held that year in Bali, Indonesia.
(Continued at the link below)

Monday, March 11, 2013

Remarks By Tom Donilon, National Security Advisory to the President: "The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013" As Prepared for Delivery



Subject: EMBARGOED: Remarks By Tom Donilon, National Security Advisory to the President: "The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013" As Prepared for Delivery

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
EMBARGOED UNTIL 1:00 PM ET
March 11, 2013

Remarks by Tom Donilon, National Security Advisor to the President – As Prepared for Delivery
The Asia Society
New York, New York
Monday, March 11, 2013

“The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013”

As Prepared for Delivery –
Thank you, Henrietta, for that kind introduction and for your service, both in government and here at the Asia Society.  And thank you, Suzanne, for bringing us together today.  I am honored to be with you, especially in these beautiful surroundings.  For almost sixty years, this organization has connected cultures— Asian and American—our ideas, leaders and people. 

Of course, one of those people, a real presence here at the Asia Society, was your chairman and my friend of thirty years, Richard Holbrooke.  Richard was famous for his work from the Balkans to South Asia.  But he was also a real Asia hand as the youngest-ever Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia.   Richard dedicated himself to the idea that progress and peace was possible—a lesson we carry forward, not only in Southwest Asia, where he worked so hard, but across the Asia-Pacific.  I’ve come here today because this project has never been more consequential—the future of the United States has never been more closely linked to the economic, strategic and political order emerging in the Asia-Pacific.

Last November, I gave a speech in Washington outlining how the United States is rebalancing our global posture to reflect the growing importance of Asia.  As President Obama’s second term begins, I want to focus on some of the specific challenges that lay ahead. 

This is especially timely because this is a period of transition in Asia.  New leaders have taken office in Tokyo and Seoul.  In Beijing, China’s leadership transition will be completed this week. President Obama and those of us on his national security team have already had constructive conversations with each incoming leader.  We’ll be seeing elections in Malaysia, Australia and elsewhere.  These changes remind us of the importance of constant, persistent U.S. engagement in this dynamic region.

Why Rebalance Toward Asia

Let me begin by putting our rebalance to the Asia-Pacific in context.  Every Administration faces the challenge of ensuring that cascading crises do not crowd out the development of long-term strategies to deal with transcendent challenges and opportunities. 

After a decade defined by 9/11, two wars, and a financial crisis, President Obama took office determined to restore the foundation of the United States’ global leadership—our economic strength at home.  Since then the United States has put in place a set of policies that have put our economy on the path to recovery, and helped create six million U.S. jobs in the last thirty-five months. 

At the same time, renewing U.S. leadership has also meant focusing our efforts and resources not just on the challenges that make today’s headlines, but on the regions that will shape the global order in the decades ahead.  That’s why, from the outset—even before the President took office—he directed those of us on his national security team to engage in a strategic assessment, a truly global examination of our presence and priorities.  We asked what the U.S. footprint and face to the world was and what it ought to be.  We set out to identify the key national security interests that we needed to pursue.  We looked around the world and asked: where are we over-weighted?  Where are we underweighted?

That assessment resulted in a set of key determinations.  It was clear that there was an imbalance in the projection and focus of U.S. power.  It was the President’s judgment that we were over-weighted in some areas and regions, including our military actions in the Middle East.  At the same time, we were underweighted in other regions, such as the Asia-Pacific. Indeed, we believed this was our key geographic imbalance. 

On one level, this reflected a recognition of the critical role that the United States has played in Asia for decades, providing the stabilizing foundation for the region’s unprecedented social and economic development.  Beyond this, our guiding insight was that Asia’s future and the future of the United States are deeply and increasingly linked.  Economically, Asia already accounts for more than one-quarter of global GDP.  Over the next five years, nearly half of all growth outside the United States is expected to come from Asia.  This growth is fueling powerful geopolitical forces that are reshaping the region: China’s ascent, Japan’s resilience, and the rise of a “Global Korea,” an eastward-looking India and Southeast Asian nations more interconnected and prosperous than ever before. 

These changes are unfolding at a time when Asia’s economic, diplomatic and political rules of the road are still taking shape.  The stakes for people on both sides of the Pacific are profound.  And the U.S. rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific is also a response to the strong demand signal from leaders and publics across the region for U.S. leadership, economic engagement, sustained attention to regional institutions and defense of international rules and norms. 

What Rebalancing Is, and What It Isn’t

Against this backdrop, President Obama has been clear about the future that the United States seeks. And I would encourage anyone who has not already done so to read the President’s address to the Australian parliament in Canberra in 2011.  It is a definitive statement of U.S. policy in the region; a clarion call for freedom; and yet another example of how, when it comes to the Asia-Pacific, the United States is “all in.” 

As the President explained in Canberra, the overarching objective of the United States in the region is to sustain a stable security environment and a regional order rooted in economic openness, peaceful resolution of disputes, and respect for universal rights and freedoms. 

To pursue this vision, the United States is implementing a comprehensive, multidimensional strategy: strengthening alliances; deepening partnerships with emerging powers; building a stable, productive, and constructive relationship with China; empowering regional institutions; and helping to build a regional economic architecture that can sustain shared prosperity. 

These are the pillars of the U.S. strategy, and rebalancing means devoting the time, effort and resources necessary to get each one right.  Here’s what rebalancing doesnot mean.  It doesn’t mean diminishing ties to important partners in any other region.  It does not mean containing China or seeking to dictate terms to Asia.  And it isn’t just a matter of our military presence.  It is an effort that harnesses all elements of U.S. power—military, political, trade and investment, development and our values.

Perhaps most telling, this rebalance is reflected in the most valuable commodity in Washington: the President’s time.  It says a great deal, for instance, that President Obama made the determination that the United States would participate every year in the East Asia Summit at the Head of State level and hold U.S.-ASEAN summits; that he has met bilaterally with nearly every leader in Southeast Asia, either in the region or in Washington; and that he has engaged with China at an unprecedented pace, including twelve face-to-face meetings with Hu Jintao. 

Let me turn to each pillar of our strategy and several of the challenges we face in 2013. 

Alliances

First, we will continue to strengthen our alliances.  For all of the changes in Asia, this much is settled: our alliances in the region have been and will remain the foundation of our strategy.  I feel confident is saying that our alliances are stronger today than ever before. 

Our alliance with Japan remains a cornerstone of regional security and prosperity.  I am not sure American-Japanese friendship has ever been more powerfully manifest than it was two years ago today, on 3/11, after the tsunami and Fukishima nuclear crisis.  As allies and friends, Americans inside and outside government rushed to lend a hand to Japan’s disaster response and recovery. 

That same spirit of solidarity was evident when Japan’s new Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, became one of the first foreign leaders President Obama hosted in his second term.  They had excellent discussions on trade, expanding security cooperation, and the next steps toward realigning U.S. forces in Japan. Looking ahead, there is scarcely a regional or global challenge in the President’s second-term agenda where the United States does not look to Japan to play an important role.

With the Republic of Korea, the United States is building on our joint vision for a global alliance and deeper trading partnership.  I just returned from Seoul, where I attended the inauguration of President Park, Korea’s first woman president.  I was struck by how much our leaders have in common in terms of their priorities and vision.  When we met, I conveyed to President Park President Obama’s unwavering commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea, and President Park gave her full support to modernizing our alliance and continuing the effort to partner on a wide range of regional and global issues.  During my visit, President Park accepted President Obama’s invitation to visit Washington, and I can announce today that we look forward to welcoming her to the White House in May.

In Japan and South Korea, the United States can look to new leaders who are firmly committed to close security cooperation with the United States.  This is no accident and no surprise, because polls in both countries show public support for their alliance with the United States in the range of 80 percent.  At the same time, it is clear that, as we look forward, maintaining security in a dynamic region will demand greater trilateral coordination from Japan, Korea and the United States. 

With Australia—following the President’s visit and joint announcement with Prime Minister Gillard of the rotational deployment of U.S. Marines—we are bringing our militaries even closer.  Prime Minister Gillard has been an outstanding partner in our efforts to advance prosperity and security to the Asia-Pacific region.  The United States has reinvigorated longstanding alliances with Thailand and the Philippines to address counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.  Philippine President Aquino’s visit to Washington and President Obama’s visit to Thailand and meeting with Prime Minister Yingluck both speak to another key facet of our strategy—the United States is not only rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific, we are rebalancing within Asia to recognize the growing importance of Southeast Asia.  Just as we found that the United States was underweighted in East Asia, we found that the United States was especially underweighted in Southeast Asia.  And we are correcting that. 

In these difficult fiscal times, I know that some have questioned whether this rebalance is sustainable.  After a decade of war, it is only natural that the U.S. defense budget is being reduced.  But make no mistake:  President Obama has clearly stated that we will maintain our security presence and engagement in the Asia-Pacific.  Specifically, our defense spending and programs will continue to support our key priorities – from our enduring presence on the Korean Peninsula to our strategic presence in the western Pacific.

This means that in the coming years a higher proportion of our military assets will be in the Pacific. Sixty percent of our naval fleet will be based in the Pacific by 2020. Our Air Force is also shifting its weight to the Pacific over the next five years. We are adding capacity from both the Army and the Marines.  The Pentagon is working to prioritize the Pacific Command for our most modern capabilities – including submarines, Fifth-Generation Fighters such as F-22s and F-35s, and reconnaissance platforms.  And we are working with allies to make rapid progress in expanding radar and missile defense systems to protect against the most immediate threat facing our allies and the entire region: the dangerous, destabilizing behavior of North Korea.   

North Korea

Let me spend a few moments on North Korea. 

For sixty years, the United States has been committed to ensuring peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. This means deterring North Korean aggression and protecting our allies.  And it means the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.  The United States will not accept North Korea as a nuclear state; nor will we stand by while it seeks to develop a nuclear-armed missile that can target the United States.  The international community has made clear that there will be consequences for North Korea’s flagrant violation of its international obligations, as the UN Security Council did again unanimously just last week in approving new sanctions in response to the North’s recent provocative nuclear test.

U.S. policy toward North Korea rests on four key principles:

First, close and expanded cooperation with Japan and South Korea.  The unity that our three countries have forged in the face of North Korea’s provocations—unity reaffirmed by President Park and Prime Minister Abe —is as crucial to the search for a diplomatic solution as it is to deterrence.  The days when North Korea could exploit any seams between our three governments are over.

And let me add that the prospects for a peaceful resolution also will require close U.S. coordination with China’s new government.  We believe that no country, including China, should conduct “business as usual” with a North Korea that threatens its neighbors.  China’s interest in stability on the Korean Peninsula argues for a clear path to ending North Korea’s nuclear program.  We welcome China’s support at the UN Security Council and its continued insistence that North Korea completely, verifiably and irreversibly abandon its WMD and ballistic missile programs.

Second, the United States refuses to reward bad North Korean behavior.  The United States will not play the game of accepting empty promises or yielding to threats.  As former Secretary of Defense Bob Gates has said, we won’t buy the same horse twice.  We have made clear our openness to authentic negotiations with North Korea.  In return, however, we’ve only seen provocations and extreme rhetoric.  To get the assistance it desperately needs and the respect it claims it wants, North Korea will have to change course. Otherwise, the United States will continue to work with allies and partners to tighten national and international sanctions to impede North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs.  Today, the Treasury Department is announcing the imposition of U.S. sanctions against the Foreign Trade Bank of North Korea, the country’s primary foreign exchange bank, for its role in supporting North Korea’s WMD program. 

By now it is clear that the provocations, escalations and poor choices of North Korea’s leaders are not only making their country less secure – they are condemning their people to a level of poverty that stands in stark contrast not only to South Korea, but every other country in East Asia. 

Third, we unequivocally reaffirm that the United States is committed to the defense of our homeland and our allies.  Recently, North Korean officials have made some highly provocative statements.  North Korea’s claims may be hyperbolic – but as to the policy of the United States, there should be no doubt: we will draw upon the full range of our capabilities to protect against, and to respond to, the threat posed to us and to our allies by North Korea.  This includes not only any North Korean use of weapons of mass destruction—but also, as the President made clear, their transfer of nuclear weapons or nuclear materials to other states or non-state entities.  Such actions would be considered a grave threat to the United States and our allies and we will hold North Korea fully accountable for the consequences.

Finally, the United States will continue to encourage North Korea to choose a better path.  As he has said many times, President Obama came to office willing to offer his hand to those who would unclench their fists.  The United States is prepared to help North Korea develop its economy and feed its people—but it must change its current course.  The United States is prepared to sit down with North Korea to negotiate and to implement the commitments that they and the United States have made.  We ask only that Pyongyang prove its seriousness by taking meaningful steps to show it will abide by its commitments, honor its words, and respect international law. 

Anyone who doubts the President’s commitment needs look no further than Burma, where new leaders have begun a process of reform.  President Obama’s historic visit to Rangoon is proof of our readiness to start transforming a relationship marked by hostility into one of greater cooperation.  Burma has already received billions in debt forgiveness, large-scale development assistance, and an influx of new investment.  While the work of reform is ongoing, Burma has already broken out of isolation and opened the door to a far better future for its people in partnership with its neighbors and with the United States.  And, as President Obama said in his speech to the people of Burma, we will continue to stand with those who continue to support rights, democracy and reform.  So I urge North Korea’s leaders to reflect on Burma’s experience.  

Emerging Powers

Even as we keep our alliances strong to deal with challenges like North Korea, we continue to carry out a second pillar of our strategy for the Asia-Pacific:  forging deeper partnerships with emerging powers. 

To that end, the President considers U.S. relations with India—the world’s largest democracy—to be “one of the defining partnerships of the twenty-first century.”  From Prime Minister Singh’s visit in 2009 to the President’s trip to India in 2010, the United States has made clear at every turn that we don’t just accept India’s rise, we fervently support it. 

U.S. and Indian interests powerfully converge in the Asia-Pacific, where India has much to give and much to gain. Southeast Asia begins in Northeast India, and we welcome India’s efforts to “look East,” from supporting reforms in Burma to trilateral cooperation with Japan to promoting maritime security.  In the past year, for example, India-ASEAN trade increased by 37 percent to $80 billion. 

The United States has also worked hard to realize Indonesia’s potential as a global partner.  We have put in place a wide-ranging Comprehensive Partnership.  We have welcomed Indonesia’s vigorous participation in the region’s multilateral forums, including hosting APEC and promoting ASEAN unity.  We are also working with Indonesia and Brunei on a major new initiative to mobilize capital to help bring clean and sustainable energy to the Asia-Pacific. And, of course, no U.S. President has ever had closer personal ties to an Asia-Pacific nation than President Obama does with Indonesia—a warm relationship that was on full display in November 2010 when the President visited Jakarta.

China

The third pillar of our strategy is building a constructive relationship with China. The President places great importance on this relationship because there are few diplomatic, economic or security challenges in the world that can be addressed without China at the table and without a broad, productive, and constructive relationship between our countries.  And we have made substantial progress in building such a relationship over the past four years.

As China completes its leadership transition, the Administration is well positioned to build on our existing relationships with Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang and other top Chinese leaders. Taken together, China’s leadership transition and the President’s re-election mark a new phase in U.S.-China relations – with new opportunities.  

Of course, the U.S.-China relationship has and will continue to have elements of both cooperation and competition. Our consistent policy has been to improve the quality and quantity of our cooperation; promote healthy economic competition; and manage disagreements to ensure that U.S. interests are protected and that universal rights and values are respected.  As President Obama has made clear, the United States speaks up for universal values because history shows that nations that uphold the rights of their people are ultimately more successful, more prosperous and more stable.

As President Obama has said many times, the United States welcomes the rise of a peaceful, prosperous China.  We do not want our relationship to become defined by rivalry and confrontation.  And I disagree with the premise put forward by some historians and theorists that a rising power and an established power are somehow destined for conflict.  There is nothing preordained about such an outcome.  It is not a law of physics, but a series of choices by leaders that lead to great power confrontation.  Others have called for containment.  We reject that, too.  A better outcome is possible.  But it falls to both sides—the United States and China—to build a new model of relations between an existing power and an emerging one.  Xi Jinping and President Obama have both endorsed this goal. 

To build this new model, we must keep improving our channels of communication and demonstrate practical cooperation on issues that matter to both sides.

To that end, a deeper U.S.-China military-to-military dialogue is central to addressing many of the sources of insecurity and potential competition between us. This remains a necessary component of the new model we seek, and it is a critical deficiency in our current relationship. The Chinese military is modernizing its capabilities and expanding its presence in Asia, drawing our forces into closer contact and raising the risk that an accident or miscalculation could destabilize the broader relationship. We need open and reliable channels to address perceptions and tensions about our respective activities in the short-term and about our long-term presence and posture in the Western Pacific.

It is also critical that we strengthen the underpinnings of our extensive economic relationship, which is marked by increasing interdependence. We have been clear with Beijing that as China takes a seat at a growing number of international tables, it needs to assume responsibilities commensurate with its economic clout and national capabilities. As we engage with China’s new leaders, the United States will encourage them to move forward with the reforms outlined in the country’s twelfth Five Year Plan, including efforts to shift the country away from its dependence on exports toward a more balanced and sustainable consumer-oriented growth model.  The United States will urge a further opening of the Chinese market and a leveling of the playing field.  And the United States will seek to work together with China to promote international financial stability through the G-20 and to address global challenges such as climate change and energy security.

Another such issue is cyber-security, which has become a growing challenge to our economic relationship as well. Economies as large as the United States and China have a tremendous shared stake in ensuring that the Internet remains open, interoperable, secure, reliable, and stable.  Both countries face risks when it comes to protecting personal data and communications, financial transactions, critical infrastructure, or the intellectual property and trade secrets that are so vital to innovation and economic growth. 

It is in this last category that our concerns have moved to the forefront of our agenda. I am not talking about ordinary cybercrime or hacking.  And, this is not solely a national security concern or a concern of the U.S. government.  Increasingly, U.S. businesses are speaking out about their serious concerns about sophisticated, targeted theft of confidential business information and proprietary technologies through cyber intrusions emanating from China on an unprecedented scale.  The international community cannot afford to tolerate such activity from any country.  As the President said in the State of the Union, we will take action to protect our economy against cyber-threats.

From the President on down, this has become a key point of concern and discussion with China at all levels of our governments.  And it will continue to be.  The United States will do all it must to protect our national networks, critical infrastructure, and our valuable public and private sector property.  But, specifically with respect to the issue of cyber-enabled theft, we seek three things from the Chinese side.  First, we need a recognition of the urgency and scope of this problem and the risk it poses—to international trade, to the reputation of Chinese industry and to our overall relations.  Second, Beijing should take serious steps to investigate and put a stop to these activities.  Finally, we need China to engage with us in a constructive direct dialogue to establish acceptable norms of behavior in cyberspace.

We have worked hard to build a constructive bilateral relationship that allows us to engage forthrightly on priority issues of concern.  And the United States and China, the world’s two largest economies, both dependent on the Internet, must lead the way in addressing this problem. 


Regional Architecture

This leads to the fourth pillar of our strategy—strengthening regional institutions— which also reflects Asia’s urgent need for economic, diplomatic and security-related rules and understandings.

From the outset, the Obama Administration embarked on a concerted effort to develop and strengthen regional institutions—in other words, building out the architecture of Asia.  And the reasons are clear: an effective regional architecture lowers the barriers to collective action on shared challenges.  It creates dialogues and structures that encourage cooperation, maintain stability, resolve disputes through diplomacy and help ensure that countries can rise peacefully. 

There is no underestimating the strategic significance of this region.  The ten ASEAN countries, stretching across the Indian and Pacific Oceans, have a population of well over 600 million.  Impressive growth rates in countries like Thailand – and a 25-percent increase in international investment in 2011—suggest that ASEAN nations are only going to become more important, politically and economically.

Since taking office, the Obama Administration has signed ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and appointed the first resident U.S. Ambassador to ASEAN.  As I said, the President has traveled every year to meet with ASEAN’s leaders– and will continue to do so going forward.  The President also has made a decision to participate at the Head of State level every year at the East Asia Summit, consistent with the United States’ goal to elevate the EAS as the premier forum for dealing with political and security issues in Asia. 

Looking ahead, it is clear that territorial disputes in the resource-rich South and East China Seas will test the region’s political and security architecture.  These tensions challenge the peaceful underpinnings of Asia’s prosperity and they have already done damage to the global economy.  While the United States has no territorial claims there, and does not take a position on the claims of others, the United States is firmly opposed to coercion or the use of force to advance territorial claims.  Only peaceful, collaborative and diplomatic efforts, consistent with international law, can bring about lasting solutions that will serve the interests of all claimants and all countries in this vital region.  That includes China, whose growing place in the global economy comes with an increasing need for the public goods of maritime security and unimpeded lawful commerce, just as Chinese businessmen and women will depend on the public good of an open, secure Internet. 

Economic Architecture

Finally, the United States will continue to pursue the fifth element of our strategy: building an economic architecture that allows the people of the Asia-Pacific –including the American people--to reap the rewards of greater trade and growth.  It is our view –and I believe history demonstrates – that the economic order that will deliver the next phase of broad-based growth that the region needs is one that rests on economies that are open and transparent, and trade and investment that are free, fair and environmentally sustainable. U.S. economic vitality also depends on tapping into new markets and customers beyond our borders, especially in the fastest-growing regions. 

And so President Obama has worked with the region’s leaders to support growth-oriented, job-creating policies such as the U.S.- Korea Free Trade Agreement.  The Administration has also worked through APEC and bilaterally to lower economic barriers at and within borders, increase and protect investment, expand trade in key areas, and protect intellectual property. 

The centerpiece of our economic rebalancing is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)—a high-standard agreement the United States is crafting with Asia-Pacific economies from Chile and Peru to New Zealand and Singapore.  The TPP is built on its members’ shared commitment to high standards, eliminating market access barriers to goods and services, addressing new, 21st century trade issues and respect for a rules-based economic framework.  We always envisioned the TPP as a growing platform for regional economic integration.  Now, we are realizing that vision—growing the number of TPP partners from seven when President Obama took office to four more: Vietnam, Malaysia, Canada and Mexico.  Together, these eleven countries represent an annual trading relationship of $1.4 trillion.  The growing TPP is already a major step toward APEC’s vision of a region-wide Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific. 

The TPP is also attractive because it is ambitious but achievable.  We can get this done.  In fact, the United States is working hard with the other parties to complete negotiations by the end of 2013.  Let me add that the TPP is intended to be an open platform for additional countries to join – provided they are willing and able to meet the TPP’s high standards

The TPP is part of a global economic agenda that includes the new agreement we are pursuing with Europe—the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.  Transatlantic trade is nearly one trillion dollars each year, with $3.7 trillion in investments.  Even small improvements can yield substantial benefits for our people.  Taken together, these two agreements—from the Atlantic to the Pacific—and our existing Free Trade Agreements, around the world could account for over sixty percent of world trade.  But our goals are strategic as well as economic.  Many have argued that economic strength is the currency of power in the twenty-first century.  And across the Atlantic and Pacific, the United States will aim to build a network of economic partnerships as strong as our diplomatic and security alliances—all while strengthening the multilateral trading system.  The TPP is also an absolute statement of U.S. strategic commitment to be in the Asia-Pacific for the long haul.  And the growth arising from a U.S.-Europe agreement will help underwrite NATO, the most powerful alliance in history. 

Conclusion

In conclusion, I believe President Obama’s strategic focus on the Asia-Pacific is already a signature achievement.  But its full impact will require sustained commitment over the coming years.

I would leave you with a simple thought experiment that says a great deal about the role of the United States in shaping the way forward.  I think it’s fair to ask: without the stabilizing presence of U.S. engagement over the past seventy years, where would the Asia-Pacific be today? 

Without the U.S. guarantee of security and stability, would militarism have given way to peace in Northeast Asia?  Would safe sea lanes have fueled Pacific commerce?  Would South Korea have risen from aid recipient to trading powerhouse?  And would small nations be protected from domination by bigger neighbors?  I think the answer is obvious. 

Credit for the Asia-Pacific’s extraordinary progress in recent decades rightly belongs to the region’s hardworking and talented people.  At the same time, it is fair to say – and many leaders and people across the region would agree—the United States provided a critical foundation for Asia’s rise.

As such, the United States will continue to work to ensure that the Asia-Pacific grows into a place where the rise of new powers occurs peacefully; where the freedom to access the sea, air, space, and cyberspace empowers vibrant commerce; where multinational forums help promote shared interests; and where the universal rights of citizens, no matter where they live, are upheld. 

The Obama Administration has worked to make our rebalance to the Asia-Pacific a reality because the region’s success in the century ahead –and the United States’ security and prosperity in the 21st century—still depend on the presence and engagement of the United States in Asia.  We are a resident Pacific power, resilient and indispensable.  And in President Obama’s second term, this vital, dynamic region will continue to be a strategic priority. Thank you.

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