Tuesday, August 2, 2016

U.S. Army Special Operations Command Primer on Russian Unconventional Warfare in Ukraine 2013-2014



U.S. Army Special Operations Command Primer on Russian Unconventional Warfare in Ukraine 2013-2014



Page Count: 78 pages
Date: June 2015
Restriction: None
Originating Organization: U.S. Army Special Operations Command
File Type: pdf
File Size: 8,767,432 bytes
File Hash (SHA-256):2F98D69E0550FB86FB8820C6C936948C0B6B0E3B81C788C4B061A2B6244D93AA

 Download the full PDF file (~8mb) here: https://publicintelligence.net/usasoc-little-green-men/


This document is intended as a primer—a brief, informative treatment—concerning the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. It is an unclassified expansion of an earlier classified version that drew from numerous classified and unclassified sources, including key US Department of State diplomatic cables. For this version, the authors drew from open source articles, journals, and books. Because the primer examines a very recent conflict, it does not reflect a comprehensive historiography, nor does it achieve in-depth analysis. Instead, it is intended to acquaint the reader with the essential background to and course of the Russian intervention in Ukraine from the onset of the crisis in late 2013 through the end of 2014. The document’s key points are summarized below.

PART I. CONTEXT AND THEORY OF RUSSIAN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
·         Key Principles
o    Strategy to deal with states and regions on the periphery of the Russian Federation
o    Primacy of nonmilitary factors: politics, diplomacy, economics, finance, information, and intelligence
o    Primacy of the information domain: use of cyberwarfare, propaganda, and deception, especially toward the Russian-speaking populace
o    Persistent (rather than plausible) denial of Russian operations
o    Use of unidentified local and Russian agents
o    Use of intimidation, bribery, assassination, and agitation
o    Start of military activity without war declaration; actions appear to be spontaneous actions of local troops/militias
o    Use of armed civilian proxies, self-defense militias, and imported paramilitary units (e.g., Cossacks, Vostok Battalion) instead of, or in advance of, regular troops
o    Asymmetric, nonlinear actions
·         For the purpose of clarity and uniformity within this study, the authors use the term unconventional warfare to embrace the wide variety of military, informational, political, diplomatic, economic, financial, cultural, and religious activities Russia employed in Ukraine.
·         Evolution of Russian unconventional warfare. Russian intervention in Ukraine has featured refined and modernized techniques evolved through observation and analysis of Western methods (the color revolutions, Arab Spring) and Russian experiences since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Specifically, they drew lessons from interventions in:
o    Lithuania, 1991
o    Transnistria, 1990–1992
o    Chechnya (and Dagestan), 1994–1996 (1999–2009)
o    Georgia, 2008
·         Russian information warfare has emerged as a key component of Russian strategy. Igor Panarin and Alexandr Dugin are the primary theorists.
·         Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov’s model for interstate conflict reflects the growing importance of nonkinetic factors in Russian strategy.
PART II. RUSSIAN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN UKRAINE, 2013–2014
·         Historical Context
o    Ukraine’s historical, cultural, religious, and economic ties to Russia make it a vital interest to Moscow.
o    Western encroachment into the Russian sphere of influence, primarily through North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion and European Union (EU) economic ties, stimulated a reactionary movement among Russian conservatives to stop the loss of peripheral states to the West.
o    The Crimean peninsula, with a majority of ethnic Russians, includes Russia’s Black Sea naval base of Sevastopol and is a vital interest to Moscow.
o    The Maidan movement is viewed as a product of Western—especially American—conspiracy.
o    Vladimir Putin has boosted his popularity by portraying himself as the defender of Russian nationalism and Russian Orthodoxy in Ukraine.
·         Russian Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures in Ukraine, 2013–2014
o    Political organization within the conflict region to create and sustain pro-Russian political parties, unions, and paramilitary groups
o    Recruitment and support of regional SPETSNAZ
o    Importation of “little green men”—unidentified Russian agents (usually SPETSNAZ) to organize and lead protests and paramilitary operations
o    Importation of Cossack, Chechen, Serbian, and Russian paramilitary “volunteers”
o    Persistent (rather than plausible) denial of Russian operations, even in the face of photographic evidence and firsthand testimonials
o    Domination of television, radio, and social media through the use of highly trained operatives, including “hacktivists” and seemingly independent bloggers; use of Russia Today television as a highly effective propaganda tool; use of professional actors who portray themselves as pro-Russian Ukrainians
o    Use of blackmail, bribery, intimidation, assassination, and kidnapping against regional political opponents and government officials, including police and military officials
o    Use of “relief columns” to import weapons, soldiers, equipment, and supplies to pro-Russian forces
o    Small-scale invasion and precision operations by conventional Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) based along the Russian border
o    Issuing Russian passports to pro-Russian populations and touting Moscow’s need to defend the Russian diaspora against alleged abuses
CONCLUSION
·         Driven by a desire to roll back Western encroachment into the Russian sphere of influence, the current generation of Russian leaders has crafted a multidisciplinary art and science of unconventional warfare. Capitalizing on deception, psychological manipulation, and domination of the information domain, their approach represents a notable threat to Western security.
·         The new forms of Russian unconventional warfare challenge the structure of the NATO Charter, because they obviate the appearance of “armed invasion.”

Tuesday, July 26, 2016

Who is the real enemy: Republicans, Democrats, or Russians?

Given the hack of the DNC, who is the real enemy?

No matter how much we criticize our political process and the candidates we have nominated we should remember that it is our political process and they are our candidates and we should allow no one from the outside to meddle in our political affairs.  

I think it might be useful to understand "Political Warfare" from the Russian context.  The following is an excerpt from a report from the Latvian Defense Ministry (page 5, link below) that I think is very much worth perusing whether you are a Republican, Democrat, or Independent (like me). We should pay close attention to how the Russians are thinking about the future of war and warfare, to include political warfare.

While we argue, debate, and spew all kinds of rhetoric (and dislike - I hope we can simply dislike and not hate) at each other over our choices for president we should be united in the idea that we are the only ones who get to participate in the process and the Russians do not get a vote.  Please give some thought to the analysis below and ask if the Russians are executing their form of political warfare?  More importantly as Republicans face off with Democrats and Democrats face off with Republicans neither should view the other as the enemy - just someone with a different world view - the real enemy is the one who is attacking our political system and trying to manipulate the American public.



As a result, it follows that the main guidelines for developing Russian military capabilities by 2020 are:
i. From direct destruction to direct influence;
ii. from direct annihilation of the opponent to its inner decay;
iii. from a war with weapons and technology to a culture war;
iv. from a war with conventional forces to specially prepared forces and commercial irregular groupings;
v. from the traditional (3D) battleground to information/psychological warfare and war of perceptions;
vi. from direct clash to contactless war;
vii. from a superficial and compartmented war to a total war, including the enemy’s internal side and base;
viii. from war in the physical environment to a war in the human consciousness and in cyberspace;
ix. from symmetric to asymmetric warfare by a combination of political, economic, information,
technological, and ecological campaigns;
x. From war in a defined period of time to a state of permanent war as the natural condition in national life.

Thus, the Russian view of modern warfare is based on the idea that the main battlespace is the mind and, as a result, new-generation wars are to be dominated by information and psychological warfare, in order to achieve superiority in troops and weapons control, morally and psychologically depressing the enemy’s armed forces personnel and civil population. The main objective is to reduce the necessity for deploying hard military power to the minimum necessary, making the opponent’s military and civil population support the attacker to the detriment of their own government and country. It is interesting to note the notion of permanent war, since it denotes a permanent enemy. In the current geopolitical structure, the clear enemy is Western civilization, its values, culture, political system, and ideology.

RUSSIA’S NEW GENERATION WARFARE IN UKRAINE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR LATVIAN DEFENSE POLICY

Thursday, July 14, 2016

Call for Papers 2016 Annual Special Operations Reserach Association Symposium

I hope people will contribute and participate in this especially those in the National Capital Region.

Call for Papers
2016 Annual SORA Symposium
http://www.specopsjournal.org/symposium.html


The Special Operations Research Association is pleased to announce the 2016 Annual Symposium, 28-29 October 2016, in Old Town Alexandria, VA. Events will be held at the Embassy Suites. 

The theme of this year’s conference is Special Operations at the Crossroads.  Special operations forces have never been more popular as instruments of national policy.  This popularity is reflected in the growth of special operations organizations and their budgets, as well as the willingness to deploy them. Is this short-term trend merely a fad that will be reversed or will special operations perhaps become a "sixth armed service" to address hybrid threats and “gray zone” challenges?

The primary focus of this conference is on the exchange of ideas through scholarly presentations by researchers, policy makers, and operators on the broad range of issues facing the SOF community today and in the future.
We invite papers across the full range of issues related to special operations, both historically and contemporary and unilaterally or multilaterally. We encourage submissions from a diverse population of those with expertise and interests in special operations, including scholars and researchers from different academic disciplines, military practitioners and strategists, and policy makers and analysts.

Potential topics include:
• Special Operations and State Actors
• Policy and Strategy Implications of Special Operations
• Special Operations as Instruments of National Security
• Small State and Coalition Considerations of Special Operations
• Special Operations: The Fourth Offset?
• Special Operations and Gray Zone Challenges
• Special Operations: Realist, Liberal, and Constructivist Perspectives
• Special Operations, Deterrence, and “Compellence”
• Economic and Social Aspects of Special Operations
• Organizational and Cultural Aspects of SOF
• The Legal and Ethical Dimensions of Special Operations

Paper proposals should consist of a title, abstract (150-300 words), contact information (name, affiliation, address, phone, email), and 1-page CV. Along with your proposal, please indicate if you would be willing to serve as a panel chair or discussant at the conference.

Panels consist of a panel chair/discussant, and 3-4 paper presenters. Panel submissions must provide all of the following information: title/theme of panel; contact information (name, affiliation, address, phone, email), and 1-page CV for chair, discussant, and all presenters; and paper proposals for all presenters on the panel (title and 150-300 word abstract).

Roundtable proposals should consist of a title/theme; brief summary of why topic is important and what questions will be addressed by the roundtable (150-300 words); and 1-page CV and contact information for all proposed roundtable members (name, affiliation, address, phone, email).

Submissions  This year we are using a rolling acceptance policy, meaning we will try to get your paper accepted within 1-2 weeks of submission, if not sooner. This will allow people to make the necessary plans to participate at the conference. All proposals should be submitted via email to editor@specopsjournal.org. More information is available at our website at www.specopsjournal.org

Thursday, July 7, 2016

Video: Korea Conference 2016: Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

At the link below are the videos from the four panels from our recent Korea security conference.  Also below is the complete speaker's list for each panel.


  • Korea Conference 2016

The Annual Conference
of
The International Council on Korean Studies
and
The Council on Korea-U.S. Security Studies
Co-sponsored by
Korea Institute for National Unification,
Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy,
The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea,
The Korea Economic Institute of America,
The One Korea Foundation, The Korea Foundation,
The Hwajong Peace Foundation & Institute 21C for Peace Studies,
The Dong-A Ilbo, and Delta Air Agency, Korea
and
The Center for Security Studies, Georgetown University
Partially funded through generosity of the
Philip and Patricia Bilden Asian Security Studies Fund
June 29-30, 2016
Georgetown University
Copley Formal Lounge, 37th  and O Street NW, Washington, DC 20007

SECURITY CHALLENGES ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA IN 2016:
ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES

June 29, 2016, Wednesday
08:15 AM        Registration
08:45 – 09:15 AM    Opening Remarks
    Speakers    General Jae-Chang Kim, ROKA (Retired), Co-Chairman
                         Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies (ROK Council)
            General John H. Tilelli, Jr., USA (Retired), Co-Chairman
                         Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies (U.S. Council)
            Dr. Jinwook Choi, President
                Korean Institute for National Unification
            Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr., President
                International Council of Korean Studies and Angelo State University
            Professor David S. Maxwell, Associate Director,
                Center for Security Studies, Georgetown University
09:15 – 11:15 AM    Panel I. Four Power Relations on the Korean Peninsula
    Moderator    Dr. Seo-Hang Lee, Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy
    Papers:     
 "Japan’s Role in Korean Security Issues"
            Mr. James F. Durand, International Council on Korean Studies
            "Will China Allow North Korea to Collapse?"
            Mr. Gordon Chang, Nuclear Showdown
            "Strength and Consistency: A Key to North Korean Nuke Sanction"        
   Dr. Taewoo Kim, Konyang University
    Discussants    Dr. Andrew Scobell, Senior Fellow, RAND Corporation Washington
            Dr. Ki-Young Sung, Korea Institute for National Unification
            Dr. Daesung Song, Kunkuk University
11:30 AM – 12:45 PM  Luncheon and Luncheon Speech
    Speaker        “Security and Unification Issues on the Korean Peninsula”
            To be announced
    Introducer    General John H. Tilelli, Jr., USA (Retired), Co-Chairman
            Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies (U.S. Council)

1:00 – 3:00 PM    Panel II: The Political Economy of the Two Koreas
    Moderator    Mr. Robert M. Collins, U.S. Committee for Human Rights for North Korea
    Papers     
 “The North Korean Economic System: Challenges and Issues"
            Mr. Bradley Babson, US-Korea Institute
            “U.S.-Korea Economic Relations and the Next U.S. Administration?”                 
 Mr. Troy Stangarone, Korea Economic Institute of America
     “North Korea and Economic Security”
             Dr. Sang Sin Lee, Korea Institute for National Unification
    Discussants    Dr. Tara O, Pacific Forum CSIS
            Dr. Soon Paik, Washington University of Virginia and ICKS
            Dr. Namsung Huh, Council on Korea-US Security Studies

3:00 – 5:00 PM    Panel III:  The US-Korea Security Alliance
    Moderator    General John H. Tilelli, Jr., USA (Retired), Co-Chairman
            Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies (U.S. Council)
    Papers    
 "North Korea’s Fourth Nuclear Test and the U.S.-ROK Alliance"
            Mr. Yonho Kim, US-Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins University
            "The ROK-US Alliance and Third Offset Strategy"
            Dr. Patrick M. Cronin and Mr. Seongwon Lee
             The Center for New American Security
            "North Korea's nuclear Threats and Counter-Strategies?”
            Dr. Samman Chung, Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy
    Discussant    Mr. Mark Tokola, Korea Economic Institute of America
            Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., Angelo State University
            Dr. Ilhwa Jung, Council on Korea-US Security Studies
June 30, 2016, Thursday
9:30 – 11:30 AM    Panel IV: Korean Unification and Human Rights
    Moderator     Lieutenant General Raymond P. Ayres Jr., USMC (Retired)
            Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies (U.S. Council)
    Papers      
"Romanian Reflections on Korean Unification"
            Mr. Greg Scarlatoiu, Exe. Director, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea
            “US-ROK Alliance: Issues and Opportunities for Korean Unification.”
            Dr. Jai P. Ryu, President, One Korea Foundation 
            “ROK’s Wishful Thinking of Peaceful Reunification”
            Dr. Ryang Kang, Korea Institute for National Security Studies
    Discussants    David Maxwell, Ass. Director, Center for Security Studies, Georgetown Univ.
            Dr. Hugo Kim, Washington University of Virginia and ICKS
            Dr. Jae-Kap Ryoo, Council on Korea-US Security Studies
11:45 – 12:00 PM    Closing Remarks
    Speakers    General Jae-Chang Kim, ROKA (Retired), Co-Chairman
                Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies (ROK Council)
            General John H. Tilelli, Jr., USA (Retired), Co-Chairman
                Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies (U.S. Council)
            Dr. Jinwook Choi, President
                Korean Institute for National Unification
            Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr., President
                International Council of Korean Studies and Angelo State University
            Professor David Maxwell, Associate Director
                Center for Security Studies, Georgetown University
12:00 PM        End of the Conference

Sunday, June 26, 2016

Ban Animal Use in Military Medical Training (says PETA and the NY Times)

The dateline for this editorial is June 25 which as we all know is the anniversary of the start of the Korean War.  How fitting that the NY Times would publish this to recommend banning live tissue training which is arguably training that has saved more American lives on the battlefield than any other training.  While the military is searching hard for simulations to replace it there is nothing that has been developed that can provide equal training benefits that will save lives on the battlefield.  

And it is ironic that they chose to use the metaphor that PETA has been waging a guerrilla war against this training since the force that has pioneered this training and executes it most extensively is Special Forces which is the force that is singularly organized, trained, educated, equipped, and optimized to support and/or conduct guerrilla warfare. 

And just as an aside, although animals are used for this training, the handling of these animals is done in an extraordinarily humane way and they are treated with dignity and respect especially because SF medics have spent so much time raising and caring for them before they are used in the final training scenarios. 

We should also remember that Doctors conduct live tissue training on humans in hospitals as part of their medical training.  Although SF medics do conduct training in hospitals they are not allowed to conduct the same type of procedures in hospitals that they must perform on the battlefield and the only way they can get that training to become the outstanding medical practitioners that they become is through live tissue training on animals.  As one Doctor used to say, SF medics should be called "wilderness doctors" because they are trained to be as proficient in the field outside of a hospital as any doctor with the same field medical kit can be (and many doctors will admit that in the field SF medics are in many ways more proficient than many doctors).

And as one of our great SF Sergeants Major once said, the first time that a medic puts his hands in the bleeding guts of a fellow soldier should not be on the actual battlefield.  But that is what this ban will cause and many American soldiers will die because of it.  I urge everyone to support the counter-guerrilla war against PETA's efforts.

I hope cooler heads will prevail in Congress and we will not put the lives of American soldiers at risk needlessly. 

PETA please find another cause for your work.

Ban Animal Use in Military Medical Training

By THE EDITORIAL BOARDJUNE 25, 2016

For years, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals has been waging a guerrilla war against the Pentagon over its use of live goats and pigs to train combat medics. Their primary tactic: obtaining footage of training sessionsto expose the barbarity of a practice that’s cruel and unnecessary.
The Pentagon has taken steps to phase out live-tissue training, as the practice is called, by using human-shaped simulators. But military officials have refused to do away with using animals entirely, arguing that doing so could result in more battlefield deaths.
Photo
Army flight medics train using a high-fidelity mannequin. CreditSmiley N. Pool/Houston Chronicle, via Associated Press
Until relatively recently, PETA’s cause got relatively little sympathy on Capitol Hill. Representative Hank Johnson, a Georgia Democrat,introduced a bill in 2013 seeking to abolish the practice, but it hasn’t come close to passing. In recent months, though, PETA has gone on the offensive, and last week, 71 members of Congress, including 16 Republicans and 10 veterans, sent a letter to the secretary of defense, Ashton Carter, seeking detailed information about the use of animals in medic training and urging the department to hasten its adoption of simulators. The letter noted that military medical experts concluded in a 2014 study that using live animals offers no advantage over using simulators.
Representative Joe Heck, a Republican from Nevada and one of the two sponsors of the letter, has helped broaden support for the cause. Mr. Heck, a doctor, was medical director of the Casualty Care Research Center at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences from 1998 to 2003. He has served in the Army Reserve since 1991 and ran an emergency room combat hospital in Baghdad during one of his deployments. The letter’s other sponsor was Representative Jackie Speier, a California Democrat.
Separately, several medical associations — including the National Medical Association and the American Medical Student Association — have recently endorsed Mr. Johnson’s bill, which would require the Pentagon to stop using animals for medic training by 2020.
It shouldn’t take an act of Congress for the Pentagon to give up this practice. Among the 28 members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 22 have banned the use of animals for medic training. The vast majority of programs in the United States that train civilian medical workers in trauma care use simulators exclusively. There’s no reason the Pentagon should continue inflicting cruelty on animals.
A version of this editorial appears in print on June 26, 2016, on page SR10 o

Giving Tuesday Recommendations

  Dear Friends,  I do not normally do this (except I did this last year and for the last few years now, too) and I certainly do not mean to ...