Winning Irregular War: Conflict Geography

This might be a very useful resource.  The 685 page 10MB PDF can be downloaded at the link below.  Table of contents below;

Winning  Irregular War: Conflict Geography

by  Geoff Demerst

http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Winning-Insurgent-War/WIrW_2015.pdf

 QUICK START: HOW TO READ THIS BOOK
You can take a traditional approach, reading the sections in numerical
sequence; or you can read the author’s preface, the first seven-fifteen sections,
then the last several, then the middle (say 68-76), then skip around.
Going backwards from 144 to 1 will work, or you can peruse the Contents
and go to whatever sections interest you, which I hope will be all of them.
Some of the sections have expansive titles like Legitimacy or Human
Rights. They aren’t intended to encapsulate those subjects, but just tie those
themes to the book’s central assertions. Other titles, like Dogs and Mules,
or Forts and Walls, or Poop are less abstract, but relate to the same assertions.
Those assertions, or propositions, include:
• An impunity-based definition of State success;
• Attention to anonymity as a competitive emphasis;
• Inventorying as an indispensable knowledge activity;
• Withdrawal and pursuit as key operational and strategic concepts;
• Deception as a compulsory element of strategic thinking;
• Geography as the academic discipline of choice;
• Property analysis as tool for exposing the distribution of power;
• Distance as a key variable in the measurement of relative power;
• Civil engineering and construction as noble activities;
• Personal dignity and honor as key quantities of a durable victory;
• Adaptation of classic strategy as operational artistry; and
• Formal property regimes as a basis of peaceful social compacts.
‘Winning’ means not just neutralizing your enemies, but doing so
without creating more of them. It may also mean building places that do not
create enemies.
Building such places requires that ideology, political philosophy,
epistemology, engineering, and shooting all get along, so the book assumes
these things cannot be distanced one from another. Below each section is a
joke, quotation, or piece of poetry. They are interrelated in a way similar to
the text, and with the text. They are like the fins on a `60 Cadillac.

CONTENTS

DEDICATION ............................................................................ p. iii

QUICK START ........................................................................... p. v

FOREWORD ............................................................................. p. vii

AUTHORS PREFACE ............................................................... p. ix

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ....................................................... p. xiii

CONTENTS ............................................................................... p. xv

LIST OF MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS .............................. p. xxi

GLOSSARY ............................................................................ p. xxiii

RESTATEMENT ..................................................................... p. 567

SYNTHESIS ............................................................................ p. 569

APPENDIX: MISCELLANEOUS LISTS .............................. p. 573

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................... p. 585

ENDNOTES ............................................................................. p. 597 I

NDEX ..................................................................................... p. 621 A

BOUT THE AUTHOR ......................................................... p. 632 S

ECTIONS 1-144:

1, Impunity...executive strategy ......................................................... p. 1

2, Anonymity...operational art ........................................................... p. 4

3, The Domesday Book...executive strategy ....................................... p. 6

4, Defining Enemy...executive strategy ............................................ p. 11

5, Vocabulary of Classic Strategy...knowledge process .................... p. 14

6, The Operational Equation...operational art ................................. p. 19

7, Sanctuary...operational art ............................................................ p. 22

8, Linearity and the Line of Retreat...operational art ...................... p. 28

9, White Bird...historical vignette, Chief Joseph’s failed retreat ........... p. 31

10, Decisive Battle...operational art .................................................. p. 36

11, Protraction and Diligence...executive strategy .......................... p. 40

12, Commitment of the Reserve...operational art ........................... p. 44

13, Puthukkudiyirippu...historical vignette, Sri Lankan war .............. p. 46

14, Legitimacy...executive strategy ................................................... p. 52

15, NGOs, IOs, and Unions...environment ...................................... p. 56

16, Presence...operational art .......................................................... p. 62

17, Keeping Secrets...operational art ................................................ p. 65

18, Whole of Government...executive strategy ............................... p. 69

19, Mercatus...environment ............................................................. p. 73

20, Rule-of-Law...synthesis ............................................................. p. 79

21, Iximché…historical vignette, warfare in Guatemala circa 1982 ...... p. 83

22, Badassoftheweek.com…environment ....................................... p. 93

23, Mens Rea…environment ............................................................ p. 96

24, Ruthlessness and Resolve...environment ................................... p. 99

25, Why Humans Don’t Fight...environment ............................... p. 101

26, How Violent Groups Form...environment .............................. p. 105

27, ‘Nonviolent’ Action...operational art ........................................ p.110

28, Takeovers and Sieges...operational art ..................................... p. 116

29, Heavy Machines...executive strategy ....................................... p. 119

30, Control Technology...executive strategy .................................. p. 121

31, Holes in the Ground...operational art ...................................... p. 124

32, Land-use Planning...knowledge process .................................. p. 126

33, Engineers & Built Environment...environment ...................... p. 130

34, Urban or Rural...environment .................................................. p. 133

35, Comuna 13...historical vignette, a troubled borough in Medellín .. p. 137

36, The Denver Broncos...environment ......................................... p. 147

37, School Lunches...operational art .............................................. p. 151

38, Cultural Study for What?...knowledge process ........................ p. 153

39, Socioeconomic Causation...knowledge process ....................... p. 155

40, Popular Support...knowledge process ....................................... p. 159

41, Dear Westy...historical vignette, a letter to Gen. Westmoreland ... p. 163

42, Brigands...environment .......................................................... p. 170

43, Sam Spade’s Whereabouts...knowledge process ....................... p. 174

44, Political/Military/Administrative...executive strategy ............ p. 177

45, Police or Military...executive strategy ...................................... p. 180

46, Taxation and Debt...environment ............................................ p. 186

47, Why the County...knowledge process ...................................... p. 189

48, Grading the Social Compact...knowledge process ................... p. 192

49, Territorial Scrutiny...knowledge process ................................. p. 195

50, U.S. Persons...environment ...................................................... p. 200

51, Get Willy...historical vignette, manhunt in part of Colombia ........ p. 204

52, Sovereignty...knowledge process .............................................. p. 210

53, Hohfeldian Grievance Analysis...knowledge process .............. p. 215

54, Extortion...executive strategy ................................................... p. 220

55, Kidnapping...environment ........................................................ p. 223

56, Militias and Gun Control...executive strategy ......................... p. 225

57, Dogs and Mules...executive strategy ......................................... p. 231

58, Condottieri...executive strategy ................................................ p. 233

59, Spontaneity...environment ....................................................... p. 235

60, War Nouveau...historical vignette, the world circa 1900 ............. p. 239

61, The Geography of Dope...environment ................................... p. 248

62, Bank Robbery...environment ................................................... p. 255

63, Roadblocks and Checkpoints...operational art ........................ p. 258

64, Measuring Distance and Comparing Power ...knlg process . p. 262

65, Smuggling...environment ......................................................... p. 268

66, GIS...knowledge process ............................................................ p. 271

67, Points, Lines, Spaces...knowledge process ................................ p. 275

68, Scale...knowledge process ........................................................... p. 277

69, Measuring Effects of Actions on Enemies...knowledge process . p. 281

70, Measuring Effects of Actions on Structure..knowledge process p. 288

71, Jerusalem...historical vignette, the Zionists create a nation state ...... p. 293

72, Land Strategy...executive strategy ............................................... p. 300

73, Property and the Social Compact...ideology ............................. p. 306

74, Refugees and Displaced Persons...environment ......................... p. 313

75, The Price of Real Estate, and Tourism...knowledge process ...... p. 316

76, Gender...environment ................................................................. p. 319

77, Sex...environment ........................................................................ p. 322

78, Identity... knowledge process ..................................................... p. 326

79, Suicide... moral compass ............................................................ p. 330

80, Why You Should Like Geography...knowledge process ........... p. 333

81, What a Clergy Wants...environment .......................................... p. 336

82, Conflict Thresholds...knowledge process .................................... p. 339

83, Why Are Irregular Wars Lost?...synthesis ............................... p. 343

84, Cultures of Violence...environment .......................................... p. 345

85, Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck...historical vignette ............... p. 348

86, Shifting Covet-geographies....environment .............................. p. 354

87, Water Wars...environment ....................................................... p. 356

88, Escape Geography...operational art .......................................... p. 359

89, The Dot Game and Go...operational art .................................... p. 362

90, Prisons & Prisoners....operational art ....................................... p. 364

91, Forts and Walls….operational art ............................................. p. 366

92, Graves Registration...environment ........................................... p. 371

93, Diseases and Disasters...environment ....................................... p. 375

94, Poop...environment.................................................................... p. 379

95, Childhood...moral compass ..................................................... p. 381

96, Combatant Status...executive strategy ..................................... p. 384

97, Oviedo...historical vignette, start of Spanish Civil War ............ p. 386

98, Jorge Verstrynge and Pio Moa...ideology ................................ p. 395

99, Postmodern and Post-structural...ideology ............................. p. 399

100, What the Foucault?...ideology .............................................. p. 404

101, Magical Realism...knowledge process .................................... p. 408

102, Negotiations...executive strategy ........................................... p. 412

103, Amnesty...executive strategy ................................................. p. 415

104, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction...environment ............................ p. 419

105, Genocide Geography...knowledge process ............................ p. 422

106, Massacres...historical vignette, repugnancy ............................ p. 428

107, Guerre d'Algérie...historical vignette, Algerian War .............. p. 434

108, Common Knowledge...knowledge process ............................ p. 443

109, Your Staff Work Sucks...knowledge process ......................... p. 446

110, Knowledge Gaps...knowledge process ................................... p. 450

111, Knowledge Cultures...knowledge process ............................. p. 454

112, DIME and PMECII...knowledge process ............................... p. 460

113, Unrestricted Chi Whiz...executive strategy ........................... p. 465

114, R.V. Jones...knowledge process .............................................. p. 467

115, Academies...executive strategy .............................................. p. 469

116, Songs of Chu...operational art ................................................ p. 471

117, Strategic Communication...executive strategy....................... p. 473

118, Democracy...ideology ............................................................ p. 475

119, Declaration of Counterinsurgency...moral compass ............. p. 479

Montana circa 1878 ............................................................... p. 35

Sri Lanka circa 2006 ............................................................. p. 51

Bolivia, La Paz and El Alto .................................................. p. 61

Guatemalan Highlands circa 1982 ....................................... p. 92

Comuna 13, Medellín, Colombia circa 2002 ..................... p. 146

Hell with Limbo (Purgatory?) circa 1300 ......................... p. 188

Yoknapatawpha circa 1936 ................................................ p. 191

South-central Colombia circa 2012 .................................... p. 209

World Map circa 1900 ........................................................ p. 247

Palestine circa 1920 ............................................................. p. 299

East Africa circa 1914-1918 ................................................ p. 353

The Revolution of ’34 in Asturias ...................................... p. 394

Colombia, various locations ................................................ p. 433

French Algeria circa 1954-1962 ......................................... p. 442

Europe circa 1805 ................................................................ p. 490

Kansas-Missouri Border circa 1858................................... p. 508

The Only Thing Worse than Misusing SOF is Policy Makers Misusing SOF Operational Methods as a Strategy

I have included the essay with the embedded hot links to the references that did not come through on the web page along with my original formatting.

The Only Thing Worse than Misusing SOF is Policy Makers Misusing SOF Operational Methods as a Strategy

by David S. Maxwell

Journal Article | June 17, 2015 - 8:27am

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-only-thing-worse-than-misusing-sof-is-policy-makers-misusing-sof-operational-methods-as

The Only Thing Worse than Misusing SOF is Policy Makers Misusing SOF Operational Methods as a Strategy

By David S. Maxwell

Special operations forces are a national grand-strategic asset: they are a tool of statecraft that can be employed quite surgically in support of diplomacy, of foreign assistance (of several kinds), as vital adjunct to regular military forces, or as an independent weapon.  Colin S. Gray[1]

For decades now Special Operations Forces have made numerous important contributions to the military services from equipment to tactics to actual operations.  From pioneering night vision flying to development of advanced weapons, body armor, personal equipment and advanced communications, much of the military equipment that is now service common was once SOF unique.  The room and building clearing techniques that are used by every Army and Marine squad and platoon were once classified tactics used by special mission units.

“Through, by and with,” was developed by Colonel Mark Boyatt to describe operations by Special Forces working with indigenous elements in Haiti was adopted by GEN Odierno in Iraq in his guidance to the force when the Iraqi military was to take the lead in operations.

USSOCOM has partnered with the Army and Marine Corps to ensure there is sufficient emphasis on the human domain in the full spectrum of war fighting.  The Army established the Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) that drew heavily from the active duty and retired SOF community and often shares SOF tactics, techniques and procedures with the Army and joint forces.

While the public is enamored with Special Operations conducted to capture or kill bin Laden in Pakistan and Abu Sayyef in Syria or rescue Captain Phillips in waters off the Horn of Africa policy makers have also become enamored with the possibility of using Special Operations methodologies on a larger scale and have a larger amount of non-SOF forces conduct operations using SOF methods. Without specifically saying so US national leadership seems to have based the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance on an operational methodology and techniques that are heavily influenced by SOF.  We should consider this paragraph from the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance:

“…, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.”

This is a description of some of the traditional SOF operational methods and seems like a sound way to operate in a fiscally constrained environment in which the President bases his strategy on not committing ground troops to overseas conflicts.  This is the essence of our strategic problem today:  we have an “ends – ways” mismatch between what we say and what we will order our military to do.  We have said our end is to degrade and destroy ISIL yet we have constrained our ways and instead are trying to employ a low-cost, low-risk course of action based on SOF methods that can be very effective when properly employed in support of an overall strategy but in the wrong situation can be counterproductive and even lead to mission failure.

However, the above quote is missing two very important words:  “whenever possible.”  I deliberately left them off because we seem to have forgotten them and now default to using these techniques and methods without consideration of what is feasible, acceptable, and suitable.  The problem is that we really do not think strategically and when it comes to SOF we do not appreciate how it can support policy and strategy with the operative word being support.  SOF does not win wars by itself.  Conducting operations “through, by, and with indigenous forces,” using a small footprint, advising and assisting and building partner capacity support strategy but cannot be the sole ways and means of strategy especially when trying to achieve an end such as the destruction of ISIL.  Despite success host nation forces in places such as Colombia, The Philippines, and Africa with SOF support through discreet operations by advising and assisting friends, partners, and allies in support of US strategy, employment of SOF and SOF methods alone is not a substitute for strategy.

We have built a strategy of words saying we will degrade and destroy ISIL but it rests on the foundational administration policies of "no boots on the ground," no nation building (not that I am advocating nation building at all - I believe the military can be used for stability operations but only the people of a nation can build a nation and its state - we cannot do it for them), do nothing that can be associated with Bush 43.  It also means that we can have no mission creep.  As an aside, this is really problematic for anyone who knows that strategy needs to be adaptive and iterative but any change to the strategy based on assessment and understanding of actual conditions, both military and political, is automatically deemed mission creep.  This means that strategists have to come up with the perfect strategy the first time and from then on it cannot be adapted. Use of air power is controlled from inside the Beltway and airmen are not allowed to use the full extent of their capabilities to maximize effectiveness (although administration officials and policy makers remain enamored with the Air Power and SOF lash up they observed in Afghanistan in 2001 – yet they will not allow it to be effectively employed).   Worst of all the military is told to destroy ISIL but it will only be able to outsource the fight to ineffective proxy forces in Iraq and Syria whose interests are not aligned with the US.  The situation in the Middle East also requires political solutions to achieve success but the US cannot force the necessary solutions upon the partner governments and organizations.  Perhaps the name of the mission in Iraq and Syria should be Mission Impossible and the Task Force should be called the Impossible Mission Task Force. 

We really have to get our  "WMD" right - word, message, and deed or as I like to think:  word, mind, and deed  -the words mean nothing to the mind of the target audience unless they are connected to the right deeds that back up the words.  The problem we have with ISIL is our ends-ways disconnect - degrade and destroy ISIL does not compute in the minds of ISIL, Syrian "moderate" resistance, Iraqi government and people, the international community, and the American public when it is not backed with the appropriate deeds.  The "deed" that is not appropriate, to reiterate, is contracting out the ways to inept proxy indigenous and host nation forces whose interests are not aligned with ours so that they will not be able to achieve our ends. 

One  of our strategic weaknesses is that we labor under the assumption that we can get people to like us (and even worse that we should try to make them like us).  We should consider Machiavelli who said it is better to be feared (or better said perhaps, respected) than loved.  We need to be able to act decisively in our interests and not apologize for trying to protect those interests as well as our values.  In fact we should consider focusing on protecting our values rather than projecting them.

Which brings us to the most important point.  We have been trying to define the nature of the conflicts we are experiencing around the world.  While we still see the full spectrum from peace to war what we are observing most are conflicts in the space between peace and war or between diplomacy and war where effective use of all the instruments of power to include some forms of military engagement and at times fighting are required.  While we can debate various names, i.e., "gray zone", "hybrid threats," "the missing middle," "asymmetric warfare,"  and more, what I fear our strategy is called is “politically correct warfare,” which is based on our fundamental strategic weakness above, namely our desire to be liked.  It also leads to another strategic weakness: risk averseness (risk to the forces, risk to the mission, and most of all risks to the political leadership) that constrains us from effectively using all the instruments of national power and again drives us toward the words from the 2012 Defense Strategic guidance:

“…, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.”

Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recognizes that the troops on the ground do not have the latitude necessary to accomplish the mission.  If you want the troops on the ground to be effective then you have to let them do their jobs.  The more constraints we place on them in the misguided belief that by doing so and by micromanaging them from inside the beltway that this will somehow prevent things from going wrong, the more we hinder mission accomplishment and the more we put the troops at risk.

In our risk (averse) analysis,  as previously stated, we have three risks: risk to mission, risk to force (people) and risk to political leadership.  Based on not giving the troops sufficient latitude to do their job we demonstrate that our risk analysis is only focused on one of the three risks.

We were of course “surprised” by the rise of ISIL, so much so that Brett McGurk now says we must get a handle on this on this and the CIA has had to reorganize to fight ISIL.  But our politically correct warfare has blinded us to the reality of the threats and we have spent the past 14 years trying to counter narratives and make people like us rather than protecting our interests and achieving the correct policy and strategic ends.

While all forces from both the conventional force and special operations must have advisory capabilities we are now developing these capabilities on an “industrial scale” which of course will conflict with both low cost and small footprint approaches.  Despite General Dempsey recognizing that operations are going to be long duration and we must have patience it appears that the view among some policy makers is if we can send more advisors and supporting forces of up to some 20,000 to 30,000 as John Nagl advocates then we can achieve results faster.  However, the 450 troops recently announced is a far cry from what Dr. Nagl and other analysts recommend.  As the old adage goes: “Cheap, fast, or good, pick two because you cannot have three.”  It appears we are going for cheap and fast vice good.

This is a problem caused by replacing strategy with special operations tactics, concepts, and operational methodology.  This choice should be understood by policy makers and strategists:  if you want a rapid and decisive victory employ conventional forces along with SOF and all the elements of national power in support of a strategy that can maximize the effectiveness of all elements.  If you want to constrain the footprint and restrain cost and only work through and with indigenous forces then employ SOF.  However, to do the latter you still must have a strategy that employs and orchestrates all the elements of national power with SOF in support and you must accept that it will take time and require patience to achieve the desired effect.  The strategy also cannot simply be based on training and equipping but must include effective advice and assistance on operations as well as the effective diplomatic efforts to influence the host nation government and other partners (i.e. resistance forces).  But we must be prepared to explain the reason for a long duration sustained effort and seek the support from the American public for a long term commitment using the U.S. military in a purely secondary and supporting role.

Continuing to add larger numbers of advisors, particularly from the conventional force will likely dis-incentivize host nation forces from fighting effectively.  It will also undercut our diplomacy to influence the host nation government to make the necessary domestic political changes to undercut the legitimacy of the enemy. 

But perhaps the grossest misunderstanding of SOF methodology was demonstrated in Brett McGurk’s other comments this weekend.  He stated what every SOF advisor has known from long experience.  Indigenous forces always perform better when US advisors accompany them on operations.  That is logical and borne out by history. But the problem becomes when the number of advisors becomes too large you create a dependent relationship and while their performance improves in the short run it may not be sustainable over time and after the departure of advisors which is perhaps a lesson we should learn from the eight years Operation Iraqi Freedom from 2003 to 2011.

Special operations and specifically special warfare, from which the expertise of advising and assisting is derived, is by nature long duration, requiring presence, patience, and persistence.  SOF in today’s Iraq mission cannot be the main effort or at the forefront of policy and in the public eye where immediate short-term results are demanded by the 24 hour news cycle.  They are by nature low visibility often discreet operations but of course this no longer the case with ISIL.  And conducting advisory operations on an industrial scale the way the U.S. military does it is not a small footprint or low cost especially with all the logistics support required.  And worse, the larger our advisory effort the more we take over operations and strategy and put the host nation in the back seat and as has been said, dis-incentivizing the host nation military forces because they know that U.S. forces will pick up all the slack.

Rather than conducting “politically correct warfare” perhaps we should consider a political warfare approach though it may well be too late to make this the foundation of an approach in Iraq.  In this case the US Army Special Operations Command SOF Support to Political Warfare White Paper published in March 2015 is instructive.

Quote:

“Political Warfare emerges from the premise that rather than a binary opposition between “war” and “peace,” the conduct of international relations is characterized by continuously evolving combinations of collaboration, conciliation, confrontation, and conflict.  As such, during times of interstate “peace,” the U.S. government must still confront adversaries aggressively and conclusively through all means of national power.  When those adversaries practice a form of Hybrid Warfare employing political, military, economic, and criminal tools below the threshold of conventional warfare, the U.S. must overmatch adversary efforts—though without large-scale, extended military operations that may be fiscally unsustainable and diplomatically costly.  Hence, the U.S. must embrace a form of sustainable “warfare” rather than “war,” through a strategy that closely integrates targeted political, economic, informational, and military initiatives in close collaboration with international partners.  Serving the goals of international stability and interstate peace, this strategy amounts to “Political Warfare.”  (Page 1)

The question we should be asking is whether ISIL has crossed the threshold of conventional war.  If not we may be able to develop an effective political warfare strategy.   And note these important caveats.  Political warfare is not a SOF strategy but instead plays an important roll in supporting it as is described in the USASOC White paper.  But if ISIL has crossed the threshold of conventional war then we really must re-evaluate our “end-ways” mismatch and determine the appropriate elements of the military instrument to employ, assuming we believe their conventional war fighting capabilities poses a threat to the US.  However, even if a larger US military force is required political warfare will still be able to play an important supporting role.

In summary, if you want to make SOF (or SOF methodologies) the lead (which I do not recommend) then look hard at a strategy based on political warfare and the orchestration all the instruments of national to achieve the ends.  But if immediate or near term (even 2-4 years) destruction of ISIL is the end state then you might have to consider a strategy that does not rely solely on proxies.  We cannot contract out the defense of our interests.  We can help friends; partners, or allies defend themselves against their threats but if the threat includes the U.S. then contracting out operations with proxies may not be the best course of action for the U.S.

This is the fundamental analysis we must conduct. If the threat is limited and not a direct threat to the U.S. then indirect means using a low cost, small footprint advisory approach (SOF methodologies) may be enough to achieve our objectives by following George Kennan’s definition of political warfare: “In broadest definition, …the employment of all the means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives.”  But if we determine the threat is a significant one to the U.S. then we must consider the use of all means necessary to protect the nation, to include conventional military forces in a decisive manner.  The bottom line is if we are at war then we need to go to war.

David S. Maxwell is the Associate Director of the Center for Security Studies in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University.  He is a retired US Army Special Forces Colonel with command and staff assignments in Korea, Japan, Germany, the Philippines, and CONUS, and served as a member of the military faculty teaching national security at the National War College.  He is a graduate of Miami University in Oxford, Ohio, the Command and General Staff College, the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth and the National War College, National Defense University.

---

[1] Colin S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy, Praeger, Westport, CT: 1996, p. 149.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-only-thing-worse-than-misusing-sof-is-policy-makers-misusing-sof-operational-methods-as

From one of our former students here at Georgetown from Finland.

The 101 page report can be downloaded directly at this link.  

http://www.fiia.fi/assets/publications/FIIAReport43.pdf

There is some very interesting perspectives in this report upon first scan.  I think some of the best information that has come out on Russia's strategy and operations has been from the Finns, Latvians and Poles.

Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine:
Breaking the Enemy’s Ability to Resist

http://www.fiia.fi/fi/publication/514/russia_s_hybrid_war_in_ukraine/

Julkaistu 16.6.2015

András Rácz
The Finnish Institute of International Affairs

Lataa PDF (405 Kb)

Since the change of power in Ukraine in February 2014, Russia has been swift to occupy and annex the Crimean peninsula. In April 2014, separatist riots broke out in Eastern Ukraine, following a very similar pattern to those in Crimea. These actions were accompanied by a strong and intensive, well-coordinated diplomatic, economic and media campaign both in Ukraine and abroad, also supported by pressure exerted by the large Russian military units lined up along the border with Ukraine. 

The form of warfare Russia employed in Ukraine in 2014, often called hybrid war, has been aimed at defeating the target country by breaking its ability to resist without actually launching a full-scale military attack. In line with contemporary Russian military thinking on ‘new generation warfare’, hybrid war is built on the combined use of military and non-military means, employing basically the whole spectrum of a state’s policy inventory, including diplomatic, economic, political, social, information and also military means. 

This report aims to seek answers to two main research questions. First, what are the main features and characteristics of Russia’s hybrid warfare as conducted in Ukraine? Derived from the first, the second research question is focused on the operational prerequisites for the Russian hybrid war. In other words, is the Russian hybrid war a universal warfare method deployable anywhere, or is it more country or region-specific?

Those of us who worked on collapse planning in the 1990's never ever predicted when the Kim Family Regime would collapse.  Only that if it does collapse it could be catastrophic so the ROK/US Alliance should plan and prepare for collapse.  We have done a lot of planning but very little significant preparation.

I have spent a little time thinking about this problem.  I do not ever remember briefing  Mr. Metzl.  The only person on the National Security Council who showed any interest in planning and preparing for the collapse of the Kim Family Regime was Len Hawley (who interestingly was the author of PDD 56 The Management of Complex Contingency Operations who understood the nature of the problem the ROK/US Alliance will face if and when the regime does collapse).

Here are links to a few papers I have worked on on the subject.  And again none of the real planners ever predicted when the regime would collapse.

Catastrophic Collapse of North Korea (1996) http://bit.ly/1MAPxS1

Beyond the Nuclear Crisis: A Strategy for the Korean Peninsula

​ ​

(2004) http://bit.ly/1CWA5vm

Should The United States Support Korean Unification And If So, How? (2014)  http://bit.ly/1IcFMGh

And this 2006 Atlantic article by Robert Kaplan:   When North Korea Falls  http://theatln.tc/1FgQvxj  (He interviews Robert Collins and gives an overview of the Seven Phases of Collapse which is the seminal work on understanding how the regime might collapse and the indications and warnings that will give us an idea of failure of the regime)

​But I would have to say that Mr. Metzl's conclusion here will only be good news and "a win-win for nearly everyone" if the ROK/US Alliance conducts the necessary preparations as well as planning for this very real potential reality.

The good news is that this collapse has the potential to be a win-win for nearly everyone. The North Korean people will end their terrible suffering, North and South Korea will be reunified under South Korean law, potentially following a UN-administered transitional period and referendum, the specter of a rogue nuclear nation at the heart of Asia will be removed, and China will gain a valuable trading partner in a unified Korea and access to Seoul’s high tech economy and northern Korea’s natural resources through high quality rail, road, and communications links. American troops could even be maintained below the 38th parallel to ease China’s fears of encirclement, with the long-term international relations of a unified Korea being up to the Korean people.

North Korea is a historical relic, destabilizing force, and human rights abomination. The Korean people and the world will be far better off without it.​

Doomsday: The Coming Collapse of North Korea

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/doomsday-the-coming-collapse-north-korea-13107

Those predicting North Korea's imminent collapse have continually been proven wrong. But today, the North Korean madness may well be nearing its endgame.

Jamie Metzl

June 14, 2015

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As a member of the U.S. National Security Council staff in the later 1990s, I worked with colleagues on plans for responding to the potential collapse of the North Korean government. As a self-induced famine ravaged the country, we considered what we might do when the regime finally succumbed to the inevitable consequence of its own insanity. Almost twenty years later, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is still there and those predicting its imminent collapse have continually been proven wrong. But today, the North Korean madness may well be nearing its endgame. I predict it will be gone within a decade.

The continued survival of North Korea’s government is based on its ability to harness absolute terror against its population, its possession of nuclear weapons, and its access to economic resources. Although North Korea requires all three of these to survive, contradictions between what it takes to secure each will make the regime’s demise all but inevitable over time.

(Continued at the link below)

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/doomsday-the-coming-collapse-north-korea-13107