Wednesday, March 6, 2013

A look at what NKorea vow to scrap armistice means


A useful summary below but as the article notes threatening the Armistice is not new.    At the link below is the last report from the Congressional Research Service on the history of north Korean provocations from 1950 to 2007.  (I have recommended that they update this but there have been other priorities of course.)  But this report is useful and I would urge the time from 1997-2007 be scanned to see what the north did during the Sunshine Policy period when the South tried to engage the north and change its behavior with kindness and aid.


V/R
Dave

Mar. 6, 2013 7:43 PM ET
A look at what NKorea vow to scrap armistice means

By FOSTER KLUG, HYUNG-JIN KIM and SAM KIM, Associated Press  

        

South Korean army soldiers patrol along a barbed-wire fence at the Imjingak Pavilion near the border village of Panmunjom, which has separated the two Koreas since the Korean War, in Paju, north of Seoul, South Korea, Wednesday, March 6, 2013. North Korea's military is vowing to cancel the 1953 cease-fire that ended the Korean War, straining already frayed ties between Washington and Pyongyang as the United Nations moves to impose punishing sanctions over the North's recent nuclear test. (AP Photo/Lee Jin-man)

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — The armistice that ended the Korean War in 1953 is, at best, a fragile thing: The countries overseeing it have formally accused each other of more than 1.2 million violations.

But North Korea's threat to scrap the cease-fire next Monday still matters because the armistice is the key document blocking hostilities on the Korean Peninsula, which technically has remained in a state of war for six decades.

If North Korea follows through on its threat to nullify the document that set up the heavily armed buffer zone between the Koreas, it could drive badly frayed relations even lower. The threat comes as diplomats at the U.N. negotiate sanctions aimed at punishing Pyongyang for its recent nuclear test and as allies Washington and Seoul plan massive war games set to start Monday.

Here's a look at what the North's threat could mean for the Korean Peninsula's fragile peace:

ON THE GROUND:

The armistice signed on July 27, 1953, set up an apparatus meant to govern a cease-fire ending the war. It can be seen most clearly at the Demilitarized Zone between North and South.
(Continued at the link below)

Seoul Warns That North Korea’s Leadership Could Be Target


Note this correction:

Correction: March 6, 2013
An earlier version of this article mischaracterized the possible targets suggested in a warning by the South Korean military that, if provoked, it would attack the North’s “command leadership.” The statement was not meant to include the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un among the possible targets.
Some have asked why  we don't cancel the ROK/US exercises since the north is making such dire threats and because the idea that our exercises could lead to conflict because the north might somehow act in "self defense" against the exercises that are perceived to threaten the regime?   My response:

It would be a catastrophic mistake to cancel the exercise.  All future diplomatic actions would be for naught as our credibility and legitimacy would be completely undermined.  We would see even greater rhetoric and provocations from the regime.  

We also should know that one thing the north will not do is attack into the face of a ready force (unless the regime's very survival is so threatened and there is no other choice but to execute its campaign plan to unify the peninsula under its control so as to assure regime survival - that is according to its own calculation - not mine!). But for the nKPA to conduct a successful attack it needs surprise and a superior correlation of forces which it cannot achieve as long as the ROK/US CFC is intact and certainly not during a readiness exercise. So in my opinion there is no need to cancel the exercise.  That said whether we have an exercise or if we cancel it,  provocation will not be deterred.  It is very possible that the north will commit a provocation regardless of our actions or non-actions but we should not assess that in the same way as an attack.

But if there is a significant provocation then we are likely to see a ROK response which will hopefully be a decisive tactical response at the time and place of the provocation.  It is a strategic response by the ROK against leadership targets that will cause the climb up the escalation ladder or worse a misreading of the situation by the regime who fears that a direct attack threatens the survival of the regime.  As the Chinese say we are in for some interesting times.
V/R
Dave


March 6, 2013

Seoul Warns That North Korea’s Leadership Could Be Target

SEOUL, South Korea — The South Korean military warned on Wednesday that if it was provoked by North Korea, it would strike the North’s “command leadership,” escalating a war of words and hinting at an attack on a North Korean headquarters.

The day before, the North Korean People’s Army threatened to attack the United States and its ally South Korea with “lighter and smaller nukes,” apparently in reaction to the United Nations Security Council’s consideration of new, tougher sanctions against the North over the nuclear test it conducted in February.

Bellicose statements from North Korea are nothing new, but their tone has grown bolder recently after apparently successful recent tests of a long-range rocket and a nuclear device, and especially in the past week, as the United States and South Korea began their annual joint military exercises.

South Korea usually does not respond to North Korean tongue-lashings, but it did on Wednesday, dismissing the North’s threat as mere propaganda.

Still, with officials and analysts here worried that North Korea might provoke a deadly skirmish sometime soon, to shake the new government of President Park Geun-hye in the South and to destabilize the region, the South Korean military called a news conference on Wednesday to deliver a categorical public warning.

“If North Korea attempts a provocation that threatens the lives and security of our people, our military will forcefully and decisively strike not only the origin of provocation and its supporting forces but also its command leadership,” said Maj. Gen. Kim Yong-hyun, chief operations officer at the military’s Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “We make it clear that we are all prepared.”
(Continued at the link below)

Drones, Covert Action, and Counterterrorism: Why UAV Strikes should be Exclusively Military


This should stir up some discussion.  I do not know how much experience Mr. Segalini has in the National Clandestine Service and whether he is qualified to make this analysis but it should provoke some debate and discussion.  But these two paragraphs are interesting:
None of this is to say that any particular program of direct strikes caused the CIA to miss catching the Arab Spring.  It these sorts of programs, however, that form a larger trend of the Agency adopting “traditional military actions and operations” to an unprecedented degree, and it has been to the detriment of the Agency’s unique function and competence.  The Agency’s agility may have critical in bringing military assets rapidly to bear in the dynamic days immediately after September 11, 2001.  Long term, however, these programs are largely unnecessary.  The military is perfectly capable of operating these programs effectively while maintaining their security.  It has been reported extensively that JSOC maintains its own capabilities to conduct such actions and maintain OPSEC.  Indeed, according to Col. Charles Beckwith in his book about the founding of Delta Force, the constituent units within JSOC were originally stood up to conduct precisely these kinds of operations, such as the direct action raid in Abbottobad now so famous, and they were always understood to be operating under military authorities.  It is somewhat puzzling that after 30 years, it appears that someone only recently realized many central JSOC activities apparently need to “borrow” authorities from CIA. 
Regardless of whether it is JSOC military activity under CIA authorities, or CIA seconding the military’s capabilities to conduct an operation, undoubtedly these practices have fueled the critics of the Agency who see it as becoming “too militarized”.  This is too clumsy a phrase to serve as effective critique.  The problem is really somewhat different. The war on terror has reportedly seen the CIA adopt a “plug and play” approach to its paramilitary operations, hiring large numbers of former military personnel of all stripes to do their job just as if they were still in uniform.  
But this statement illustrates an age old debate and the tension between unconventional warfare and direct action or special warfare and surgical strike. In the context of philosophy this should not be an either/or construct but rather a both/and relationship.  Instead of arguing one is better than the other we need a strategy that employs the right ways and means to accomplish our ends - rarely are the ways exclusive but instead should provide the right mix to be most effective. It could be a combination of both below and of course the right strategy may employ neither as well. The key is balance and coherency among ends, ways, and means to support our national policy and protect our interests.
Subversion, sabotage, psychological operations, the manipulation of our enemy’s perception of his world and even of his own organization, have all taken a back seat to kinetic strikes.  The results have been less than impressive, and the value added, arguably, has been nil.
V/R
Dave

Drones, Covert Action, and Counterterrorism: Why UAV Strikes should be Exclusively Military

Journal Article | March 6, 2013 - 3:30am

The recent confirmation hearings for John Brennan’s nomination as CIA director occasioned an extended discussion--and unusually a rather public one at that--on the role and organizational identity of the CIA.  Brennan’s predecessor General Petraeus was a military man, perhaps the consummate military man of the age in terms of bearing, demeanor and vision; but he was sent to run a place which has always held itself apart from the military in its conventions and mission.  Yet the tension between the proximity of the CIA to military matters, and its inherent “otherness” has given rise to a debate amongst practitioners and observers alike, and has adopted as shorthand for the CIA’s various roles the idea that paramilitary operations and covert action are the central matter in dispute.  The most visible manifestation of these activities are the activities surrounding counterterrorism, and the most visible example of those are a supposed program run by CIA to conduct UAV strikes against terrorist targets outside of active combat zones. 

So much more the case recently, as memoranda from the Department of Justice have reached media outlets, laying down the rationale behind the use of UAV strikes even against U.S. citizens, presumably in operations conducted by the Department of Defense, whose program is acknowledged.  But more than that has been the confirmation hearing for Brennan, a former CIA officer whom President Obama nominated to become the Agency’s 21st Director.  During the Senate confirmation hearings, many questions from the Senators had to do with the practice of targeted killings and other CIA activities that are essentially military in nature.  Mr. Brennan was very careful not to confirm or deny any supposed covert action operations, but the questions from the Senators on the Senate’s Select Intelligence Committee made it seem to the even the casual observer that they were talking about the alleged Drone program, and some of the very serious issues surrounding it.

One of the more interesting dimensions to this issue has been reported by both the Washington Post, several weeks ago, and more recently by Michael Hirsh of the National Journal on February 7, which is the notion that Brennan feels “the [drone] program has run its course as a CIA operation” and that moving such a program to the Defense Department is the way forward in the future.  If true, this would be an important idea worth exploring, not least because it comes to us from a career CIA man.  Such men are not known for being eager to give away programs to the Defense Department.  It is also worth exploring because when the whole matter is considered, Brennan’s position would absolutely be the right one.  Any program of UAV strikes against high value targets being run from CIA is bad for covert action, bad for the CIA, bad for counterterrorism operations, and none too good either for war policy or the Law.

It is important to acknowledge from the outset that some very relevant practical questions are involved.  Recent articles in the Washington Post and in syndicated wires reported that the CIA’s supposed use of UAV strikes is meant to be exempted for two years from new restrictions and procedures in the “Counterterrorism Playbook”. For the time being at least, it appears that policymakers are not willing to transfer the program.  The reasoning goes that such supposed operations are too expedient to be stopped now or transferred immediately to a more structured program with greater oversight.  It is an argument with powerful momentum.  It will be difficult to overcome.  It may also be the case that Brennan’s priorities upon assuming the Directorship of the CIA will not at first include laying the groundwork for such a transfer.  Directors who arrive at Langley with major shifts in mind about how the Agency does its business tend not to last very long.  Even those who do, often run up against great amounts of bureaucratic inertia in trying to accomplish their goals.  All that aside, however, Brennan did remark at his hearing that “The CIA should not be doing traditional military activities and operations”, so at least he appears to have the right intentions, and the goal of placing a UAV strike program entirely within Defense is entirely right and worth pursuing. 

Why such a program is bad Covert Action--Many writers have either defended or attacked the the idea of CIA UAV strikes based on their support (or not) for a “paramilitary CIA”, a “wartime Agency” or a “militarized CIA”, as if the CIA’s authorities to conduct covert action mean precisely UAV strikes.  In reality, equating Drone strikes with paramilitary operations or covert action (CA) is a fallacy.  Most people, a surprising number of whom work in intelligence and special operations, don’t know what covert action is, and no doubt this contributes to the poor reasoning.  Yet any examination of the history of covert action, or even of what the term means, would clearly show that a drone strike program would be so far removed from the law, spirit and tradition of covert action that it strains the idea to the very limit. 

Covert Action (CA) is defined in Executive Order 12333, the latest version of which was amended in 2008.  It is available in full online and I encourage anyone wishing to learn more about CA to read it.  The definition of covert action is as follows:
(B)Covert action  means an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include:
(1) Activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence, traditional counterintelligence activities, traditional activities to improve or maintain the operational security of United States Government programs, or administrative activities;
(2) Traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support to such activities;...
The definition goes on to list other exceptions, but what primarily concerns us are the main definition and the first two exemptions.  It is also noteworthy that only the CIA, unless during a time of declared war, or under jurisdiction The War Powers Act, can perform covert action. 
(Continued at the link below)
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/drones-covert-action-and-counterterrorism-why-uav-strikes-should-be-exclusively-military

Tuesday, March 5, 2013

The U.S. Rebalance to Asia - A One Year Assessment: Where Have We Been and Where Are We Going?

Below is the agenda for the conference with links to the recordings for each speaker and panel.

Also at this link are all the speaker biographies.

Agenda and Speaker biographies

V/R
Dave


The US Rebalance to Asia - A One Year Assessment: Where Have We Been and Where are We Going?

The Center for Security Studies, The Asian Studies Program, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, and The United States Studies Centre

Wednesday, February 27, 2013 from 8:00 AM to 4:00 PM (EST)

Washington, DC




Agenda
8:00-9:30 am: Registration

9:30-9:45 am: Welcome

9:45-10:00 am: Opening Address

10:00-11:00 am: Panel One - American Views of the Rebalance (Strategies and Resources)
David Berteau, Senior Vice President and Director of International Security Program, CSIS and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Center for Security Studies
Matthew HerrmannLegislative Director for Congresswoman Madeleine Z. Bordallo (D-Guam)
Chair: Michael GreenSenior Vice President and Japan ChairCSIS and Associate Professor, Georgetown Asian Studies Program

Panel One - American Views of the Rebalance https://gushare.georgetown.edu/PeaceAndSecurityStudies/CSS/WEBSITE/RebalanceToAsia/Panel%20One%20-%20American%20Views%20of%20the%20Rebalance.mp3

11:00-11:15 am: Break

11:15 am-12:15 pm: Panel Two - Rebalancing and U.S. Alliances
LTG Noboru YamaguchiJapan Ground Self-Defense Force (retired) and Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan
Kim ChangsuSenior Research Fellow and Director of the Center for Security and Strategy, Korean Institute for Defense Analyses
Russell TroodAdjunct Professor, United States Studies Centre
Chair: Victor ChaSenior Adviser and Korea ChairCSIS and Professor and Director, Georgetown Asian Studies Program


Panel Two - Rebalancing and U.S. Alliances
 https://gushare.georgetown.edu/PeaceAndSecurityStudies/CSS/WEBSITE/RebalanceToAsia/Panel%20Two%20-%20Rebalancing%20and%20U.S.%20Alliances.mp3

12:15-1:15 pm:  Lunch and Lunchtime Address

1:15-1:30 pm: Break

1:30-2:30 pm: Panel Three - Rebalancing and U.S.-China Relations
RADM Yang YiPeople's Liberation Army Navy (retired) and Former Director, Institute for Strategic Studies at the PLA National Defense University
Bates GillCEO, United States Studies Centre

2:30-2:45 pm: Break

2:45-3:45 pm: Panel Four - Service Perspectives
VADM Mark FoxDeputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans and Strategy (N3/N5)
Dr. Jamie Morin, Acting Under Secretary of the Air Force and Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Financial Management and Comptroller
MG Jeffrey SnowDirector of Strategy, Plans, and Policy, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff G3/5/7
Chair: Thomas McNaugherSenior Visiting Professor and Director of Studies, Georgetown Center for Security Studies


Panel Four - Service Perspectives
    https://gushare.georgetown.edu/PeaceAndSecurityStudies/CSS/WEBSITE/RebalanceToAsia/Panel%20Four%20-%20Service%20Perspectives.mp3

3:45-4:15 pm: Closing Remarks and Adjournment
The Honourable Robert Hill AC, Adjunct Professor, United States Studies Centre and Former Minister for Defence, Australia

Closing Remarks - Robert Hill
    https://gushare.georgetown.edu/PeaceAndSecurityStudies/CSS/WEBSITE/RebalanceToAsia/Closing%20Remarks%20-%20Robert%20Hill.mp3
Michael GreenSenior Vice President and Japan ChairCSIS and Associate Professor, Georgetown Asian Studies Program

Closing Remarks - Michael Green
  https://gushare.georgetown.edu/PeaceAndSecurityStudies/CSS/WEBSITE/RebalanceToAsia/Closing%20Remarks%20-%20Michael%20Green.mp3
David MaxwellAssociate Director, Georgetown Center for Security Studies

A Warrior Elite For the Dirty Jobs


Some more Special Forces history.  Despite the date below this is actually from Time Magazine in 1986.  (January 13, 1986 | Vol. 127 No. 2)  More deja vu all over again.
V/R
Dave


Tuesday, Jun. 21, 2005
A Warrior Elite For the Dirty Jobs
By Evan Thomas
In military jargon they are called "low-intensity conflicts." More commonly they are known as "dirty little wars." By any name they are the kinds of battles most likely to be fought by U.S. troops in a precarious nuclear age: rescuing hostages from terrorism, fighting guerrillas or teaching allies how to fight them, protecting disparate American interests in a variety of regions.

These unorthodox struggles require a special type of soldier: bold and resourceful, often trained in the black arts of stealth and sabotage, suitable for an elite unit that can vanish into alien territory or strike anywhere with speed and surprise. Recent events have underscored the need for such mobile, small-scale fighting units. As Americans abroad have become increasingly vulnerable to terrorist attacks like the Christmas-week atrocities in Rome and Vienna, Washington has recognized more than ever the utility of a quick and certain response. At the same time, the Reagan Administration has placed increased emphasis on a "new globalism" designed to assert U.S. interests abroad by providing covert and overt assistance to rebels fighting Soviet-backed regimes around the world.

Deciding just how the U.S. should go about organizing and deploying such Special Forces has provoked a fierce debate in the corridors of the Pentagon and in secret congressional hearings over the past few months. When he went West for New Year's, President Reagan took with him a secret report from the Holloway Commission, a White House task force set up six months ago to explore new ways of fighting terrorism. Next week the debate will spill into the open, as Secretary of State George Shultz and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger join more than 100 experts to discuss the future of low-intensity conflict at a symposium at Fort McNair in Washington.

Every U.S. President since John F. Kennedy has preferred, whenever possible, to use the scalpel of a Special Forces operation rather than the blunter tools of conventional warfare. The Reagan Administration has given top priority to building up Special Forces, increasing their budget from $441 million in 1982 to $1.2 billion this year, and the number of troops from 11,000 to nearly 15,000. At the very least, the Administration has rescued special operations from the post-Viet Nam era of neglect, which was so ignominiously exposed in the wreckage of Desert One during the failed Iranian hostage rescue mission of 1980.

The military command, however, has been a good deal less enthusiastic about this new breed of warrior. Special Forces are often regarded by the brass as unworthy of precious defense dollars and a bit too independent to boot. Disclosures last November that members of the supersecret Delta Force had been charged with skimming covert intelligence funds only heightened Pentagon suspicions that the Special Forces are a bunch of freebooters. Shrugged retired Army Brigadier General Donald Blackburn, an expert on unconventional warfare: "Special Forces have always been the bastards of the Army."

Partly as a result of this attitude, America's Special Forces are still woefully unprepared for the challenges they could face. Though it is far more likely that the U.S. would use its handful of quick-reaction shock troops rather than any of its 17 active Army divisions or 13 Navy carrier battle groups, special operations still receive less than 1% of the Pentagon's $300 billion budget. Warns Jeffrey Record, a respected expert on military affairs: "I have no doubt that low-intensity conflict is the sort of scenario we'll be fighting in coming decades. What I do doubt is that we'll be prepared."
(Continued at the link below)

Monday, March 4, 2013

ARMY'S SPECIAL FORCES TRY TO REBUILD IMAGE BY LINKING BRAINS AND BRAWN


I was doing some research and I came across this 1982 New York Times article.  A very interesting perspective and some "deja vu all over again."
V/R
Dave

ARMY'S SPECIAL FORCES TRY TO REBUILD IMAGE BY LINKING BRAINS AND BRAWN
By RICHARD HALLORAN, Special to the New York Times
Published: August 21, 1982

FORT BRAGG, N.C.— 
The Army's ability to fight guerrillas is being rebuilt at the Special Forces center on Smoke Bomb Hill here after an increase in insurgency and terrorism in Asia, Africa and especially Latin America.

Twenty years ago, President Kennedy made respectable what the military calls counterinsurgency, a mixture of political and military tactics to combat guerrillas flitting through the night to strike where least expected.

But a decade of struggle with meager success in the jungles of Vietnam gave counterinsurgency a bad name, and the Army's ability to do battle with insurgents nearly disappeared in the late 1970's.

Today the Special Forces, better known as Green Berets, are rebuilding with an emphasis on training foreign armies to cope with insurgents that threaten their nations. Although the Green Berets are capable of fighting, their primary responsibility is to devise strategies for other governments on how to defeat insurgents.

''We have a very viable mission today,'' said Brig. Gen. Joseph C. Lutz, the commanding officer here. ''We kind of feel we're on the upswing.'' Unit on the Upswing

That upswing is supported by the Reagan Administration, where the policy on unconventional warfare is laid out in the classified fiveyear plan called Defense Guidance. The document says, ''We must revitalize and enhance special operations forces to project United States power where the use of conventional forces would be premature, inappropriate, or infeasible.''

The Special Forces are made up of both experienced leaders and young, perceptive students of unconventional war. A Special Forces research unit has delved into the lessons of Vietnam and other insurgencies of the last 40 years to distill their causes, strategy and tactics and to devise basic principles for fighting them.

In the field, the Green Berets have gained fresh experience by training a battalion of Salvadorans here, a battalion of Liberians in their own country and other foreign armies as members of teams that teach the use of American weapons and equipment.

But that may be as far as their ability goes at this time. Whether the United States itself could mount a serious and effective counterinsurgency mission in, say, El Salvador, is open to question, according to military planners in Washington. 

''Too Much Macho''

The Green Berets are authorized to have 8,600 soldiers but are shy of officers and experienced sergeants. Also, many officers here said, they suffer from a poor image remaining from Vietnam. ''We're seen as either snake-eaters or mafia in uniform,'' said one officer. ''We've had too much macho.''
Moreover, according to officers in Washington, the Army emphasizes preparation for a massed land war in Europe and considers counterinsurgency out of the mainstream. Army officers normally receive little instruction in unconventional operations, and regular Army units get little training in the dispersed, small-unit tactics for fighting guerrillas.

Political constraints may be greater than military weaknesses. President Reagan and Congress may be reluctant to deploy the Green Berets in any sizable force for fear the move will be considered a prelude to the commitment of regular divisions, as in Vietnam, according to senior officers in Washington.
At bottom, Americans may not have the patience for fighting a guerrilla war. Military strategists from Sun Tzu in China, 2,500 years ago, to Vo Nguyen Giap in Vietnam in this century have proclaimed that insurgencies will almost always be protracted before they are successful. 

No 'Stomach for Long Wars'

''But Americans like neat, quick solutions and don't have much stomach for long, drawn-out wars,'' said an officer here. Douglas S. Blaufarb, a specialist in guerrilla war who is retired from the Central Intelligence Agency, may have put it best in his book ''The Counterinsurgency Era'' when he said that effective counterinsurgency ''is a complex and difficult manuever for which the United States has shown no talent.''

Even so, the Reagan Administration has begun to revive the Army's ability in counterinsurgency. Administration officials in Washington said that the Special Forces would be enlarged in the next few years, although by how much and in what units has not been decided. They said that more money would be spent on sophisticated but compact communications equipment, on air transport for infiltration, and especially on training, not only here but with similar units in the Navy and Air Force.
The Green Berets are also working on their image. ''One of my goals is to improve our image by our behavior,'' said General Lutz, a muscular, articulate man with a master's degree in human relations. ''We are demonstrating to the Army and the other services that we are, in fact, mature professional soldiers.'' 

Tactics

Maj. Thomas J. Kuster Jr. of the Bronx speaks fluent Spanish, has served with Special Forces in Panama and can quote from such insurgent strategists as the famous Ernesto (Che) Guevara of Cuba and the little-known Carlos Marighella of Brazil.

Major Kuster is among a dozen specialists inhabiting small offices on the sixth floor of the Institute for Military Assistance here, where they have scrutinized the guerrilla operations of the Vietcong of Vietnam, the Maquis of France in World War II, the Irgun in Israel, the Hukbakhalahaps of the Philippines, the Chinese in Malaysia, Fidel Castro in Cuba and guerrillas he has backed elsewhere in Latin America, and the ''wars of national liberation'' supported by the Soviet Union in Africa.

At their disposal is a flow of intelligence reports, analyses written by civilian specialists on guerrilla warfare and a library stocked with treatises on insurgency. Ho Chi Minh's thoughts are expressed in the book ''On Revolution'' and Che Guevara's in his ''Episodes of the Revolutionary War.''

From those sources, the analysts in camouflaged jungle uniforms have concluded that in countering an insurgency strategy and tactics must be fitted to the circumstances. ''There is no immediate, automatic response where you just plug in and go,'' Major Kuster said. 

Will of the Government

Before the United States offers to help counter an insurgency, General Lutz said, it is vital to determine the will of the government under attack. ''If that country doesn't have the will and wherewithal to meet the insurgency,'' he said, ''the United States cannot do it.''

Close behind that, Major Kuster said, is the need to catch the insurgency as early as possible. Then the insurgency must been seen in all of its political, economic, social and military parts. General Lutz quoted Mao Tse Tung: ''You must take care of the people.'' Major Kuster added: ''We just can't say, 'That man has military problems so he needs military help.' ''

To assess an insurgency and devise a counter, the Green Berets have adapted a five-phase scheme worked out by Brian Jenkins of the Rand Corporation in California, an authority on terrorism and insurgency. Unless the insurgency is stopped at one stage, this plan holds, it moves on to another and can then be beaten only with a greater, most costly effort.

In the first phase, insurgents often seek publicity, for example, by blowing up power stations or assassinating politicians. Stopping that is primarily a job for the police, but political aims of the insurgents must be battled with psychological and civic programs. 
Road Checks and Curfews
(Continued at the link below)

Sunday, March 3, 2013

Outside the paradigm of the regime: North Korea really is evolving


I do not believe that Kim Jong-un intends to truly open up the north and allow open access to information for the people.  But these two paragraphs are something to keep in mind both about how to view the north Korean people and the potential that the small acts of opening provide to support a major influence operations campaign.  Now is the time to really begin exploitation of Kim's actions.  We (as in the ROK/US Alliance) now more than ever should be executing an influence campaign to prepare the north Korean population for what comes after the Kim Family Regime.
The North Koreans that tourists see pretending to do things are not dumb. They know their situation -- they know they live in a repressive state, and that they are instructed to act in a certain way for a reason. An actor knows she is acting. Piracy of South Korean music and TV shows is rampant; iPads and smartphones are common; even skinny jeans are a popular fashion accessory. To reduce these people to stooges is not only to patronise, but to dehumanise.
That makes the move to open up 3G internet to tourists a brave one for the regime. Ordinary people might not get access to the web, but they can see something if you're standing next to them, holding it in your hand. Google Earth renders of Pyongyang saved to a MacBook were a big hit in 2010, as were the lyrics to Pulp's "Common People". Who knows what the they might think of Gangnam Style's tongue-in-cheek satire of nouveau riche South Koreans? The more people engage with North Koreans outside the paradigm of the regime, the more the illusions wavers. Nobody saw the fall of the Berlin Wall coming, but it had been coming, bit by bit by bit.
V/R
Dave
Outside the paradigm of the regime: North Korea really is evolving
02 March 13

In 2010, Wired.co.uk's Ian Steadman spent just over a week in North Korea. After the events of recent weeks -- such as Google's Eric Schmidt visiting the nation, and 3G being switched on -- he reflects on his trip, and how significant the North Korean regime's changes of stance could affect its people and our understanding of them.

You wait years for North Korea to open up a little, and it does so -- twice! -- in one week. You can now follow people Instagramming and Twittering from within the Hermit Kingdom as surely as they do so anywhere else, thanks to foreigners being granted 3G internet access.

That goes alongside the utterly bizarre sight of Kim Jong-Un sitting next to former NBA player (and notorious joker) Dennis Rodman, watching members of the Harlem Globetrotters face up against North Korean players in a game of "basketball diplomacy" for a Vice and HBO documentary.
One of these is a positive thing, the other, not so much.

North Korea elicits an understandable fascination in westerners for being a country apparently frozen in time. Most of the news we receive comes from the country's propaganda machine, or from whispers in neighbouring capitals. It's mysterious because we never know exactly what's going on. Unfiltered information, uploaded straight to the web (albeit perhaps with a sepia filter added for effect) is a sign that it's becoming a place less hard to picture. But let's not confuse a push for more tourists, with reported new hotels and attractions on the way, as some kind of concession to international law and better human rights -- visiting North Korea means giving money to a totalitarian regime that starves its children. The US State Department's press conference on Rodman's visit is an unsurprisingly tetchy example of that.

When I visited North Korea, more than anything it reminded me of being taken on a bus tour of the poorer parts of Cape Town. There is no justification for these township tours for wealthy western tourists -- they exist in the same way that wildlife safaris do, for the purpose of letting people gawp at things that are Other. The groups that run these tours often claim that they use the proceeds to fund charitable work, but if I wanted to have given to charity I could well have done so without sitting in a bus separated from other humans by glass just as surely as I'm separated from gorillas at the zoo. It is dehumanising in a fundamentally wrong way.
(Continued at the link below)

Giving Tuesday Recommendations

  Dear Friends,  I do not normally do this (except I did this last year and for the last few years now, too) and I certainly do not mean to ...