Showing posts with label Legitimacy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Legitimacy. Show all posts

Saturday, May 9, 2015

Seeking Legitimate Governance of the Korean Peninsula

Excerpts:

Focusing on legitimate governance, defined as governance for the well-being of all Koreans, addresses the root cause of the security threat. It provides an overarching principle that gives policymakers the foresight to plant diplomatic seeds that can be crucial later. It can create a pathway for the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor to initiate an investigation of the North Korean regime without a United Nations (UN) Security Council referral. It can establish that South Korea, not China, should govern North Korea in the event of its collapse. It acknowledges the reality that North Korea in its present state is highly unlikely to denuclearize. It maximizes the chances for a nuclear-free human rights-respecting outcome by eroding North Korea’s legitimacy. It also allows for the unlikely possibility that North Korea seeks to reform itself.
...
The well-being of the Korean people is the correct measure for what constitutes legitimate governance by both Eastern and Western standards. The Chinese concept known as the Mandate of Heaven requires a leader to be just and can be withdrawn from a ruler when his people deem his actions excessively abusive.[4]Western notions of the social contract also espouse the people as the source of a government’s legitimacy; extreme abuse by a government renders it illegitimate.[5] The UN Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and other UN treaties are grounded in the rights of each human being. So also is the Responsibility To Protect (R2P) doctrine, which assumes that the government has a responsibility to protect its own people from atrocities and if it fails to do so, other states should intervene to provide that protection.
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Perhaps the greatest value of a campaign to erode the DPRK’s legitimacy is the pressure it puts on the DPRK as it seeks to avoid any downgrading of its status. Similar to the effect of the COI’s report, such a campaign could prompt some change in the DPRK’s behavior. De-legitimization is significant also because it potentially allows the ICC Prosecutor to initiate an investigation of the DPRK with jurisdiction based on the fact that the ROK is a state party to the Rome Statute, which governs the ICC.[7] The ROK Constitution states that the ROK’s territory encompasses the entire Korean peninsula, not just the southern part. Thus de-legitimization of DPRK offers an alternative path to the ICC if the Security Council does not refer it, which is likely given the veto powers of China and Russia. The UNGA can provide political backing and possibly financial resources to the ICC Prosecutor in the form of what could be called “Uniting for Justice” resolutions, as a nod to the previous time the UNGA had to act on Korea due to the deadlock of the Security Council. ICC action is preferable to the creation of an ad hoc tribunal because the ICC Prosecutor acting motu proprio, ideally with UNGA support, avoids the extra time and resources necessary for creating an ad hoc tribunal. Time matters as victims die each day from torture and starvation.

Conclusion:
Perhaps the greatest value of a campaign to erode the DPRK’s legitimacy is the pressure it puts on the DPRK as it seeks to avoid any downgrading of its status. Similar to the effect of the COI’s report, such a campaign could prompt some change in the DPRK’s behavior. De-legitimization is significant also because it potentially allows the ICC Prosecutor to initiate an investigation of the DPRK with jurisdiction based on the fact that the ROK is a state party to the Rome Statute, which governs the ICC.[7] The ROK Constitution states that the ROK’s territory encompasses the entire Korean peninsula, not just the southern part. Thus de-legitimization of DPRK offers an alternative path to the ICC if the Security Council does not refer it, which is likely given the veto powers of China and Russia. The UNGA can provide political backing and possibly financial resources to the ICC Prosecutor in the form of what could be called “Uniting for Justice” resolutions, as a nod to the previous time the UNGA had to act on Korea due to the deadlock of the Security Council. ICC action is preferable to the creation of an ad hoc tribunal because the ICC Prosecutor acting motu proprio, ideally with UNGA support, avoids the extra time and resources necessary for creating an ad hoc tribunal. Time matters as victims die each day from torture and starvation.

Seeking Legitimate Governance of the Korean Peninsula


Seeking Legitimate Governance of the Korean Peninsula
The North and South Korean Border, Wikimedia Commons
By Grace M. Kang, Guest Columnist
North Korea’s heinous crimes against humanity deserve the same sustained attention its nuclear weapons get. The regime’s systematic categorization and control of its citizens, with the lowest category condemned to political prison camps similar to those of the Nazi and Soviet eras, produces totalitarian terror unlike anywhere else today. Yet denuclearization as the prerequisite for broader peace negotiations is the dominant goal driving international community efforts. This approach, however, has not produced an effective strategy for resolving either the nuclear threat or human rights catastrophe. The international community should instead target an end state that can organize tactics into a strategy for solving both the nuclear threat and atrocity crimes: the legitimate governance of the Korean peninsula.
Focusing on legitimate governance, defined as governance for the well-being of all Koreans, addresses the root cause of the security threat. It provides an overarching principle that gives policymakers the foresight to plant diplomatic seeds that can be crucial later. It can create a pathway for the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor to initiate an investigation of the North Korean regime without a United Nations (UN) Security Council referral. It can establish that South Korea, not China, should govern North Korea in the event of its collapse. It acknowledges the reality that North Korea in its present state is highly unlikely to denuclearize. It maximizes the chances for a nuclear-free human rights-respecting outcome by eroding North Korea’s legitimacy. It also allows for the unlikely possibility that North Korea seeks to reform itself.
The legitimate governance problem has eluded international efforts to resolve it since 1948, when elections for governance of the entire peninsula, as authorized by the UN, failed to occur.[1] This failure resulted in the creation of the rival North and South Koreas, devastating warfare, armistice instead of peace, and the on-going split of the peninsula. The North, called the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), relied on the Soviet Union and China to survive, while the South, the Republic of Korea (ROK), relied on the United States under the mandate of the UN. When North Korea attacked on June 25, 1950, UN action in the Security Council was possible because the veto-wielding Soviet Union was boycotting it briefly, and after its return, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) took action through its landmark “Uniting for Peace” Resolution.[2]
The Korean War was the Cold War gone hot and it has never been fully extinguished. Tensions flare at times with military attacks, such as the 2010 sinking of the Cheonan, killing 46 ROK sailors; nuclear provocations (notably nuclear weapons tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013); missile launches; and various incidents such as the 2008 killing of a South Korean tourist at the North’s Mount Kumgang and the abductions of thousands of people from at least 14 nationalities as of 2011. These flare-ups punctuate efforts toward better relations in the form of the “sunshine” policy, diplomatic negotiations on denuclearization, joint economic ventures, and family reunions. At the same time, the ROK’s powerhouse economy and democratic governance roar ahead as the DPRK proceeds on a path of criminality, not only committing crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes,[3] but also counterfeiting U.S. dollars, illicit drug-dealing, cyberattacks, and other crimes stemming from the failure to develop a legitimate economy. Every measure of ROK prosperity dwarfs that of the DPRK, with even the average South Korean being physically taller and healthier than the average North Korean, who is often stunted by malnutrition. The South, with its far greater respect of human rights and economic prosperity, has without doubt provided better governance to Koreans than the North.
(Continued at the link below)

Thursday, August 29, 2013

How an Insular Beltway Elite Makes Wars of Choice More Likely

What a beautiful photo of the Washington Monument below.

But I digress. This article is quite a critique on the Washington elite and something for all national security practitioners and thinks to consider:

I'd never claim to be a foreign-policy expert. But I know enough to scoff when The Weekly Standardgrants "expert" status to Karl Rove, and to discount the prognostication skills of everyone who urged American intervention in Iraq without the faintest idea of what would follow. But in D.C., expert status is never taken away for being repeatedly, catastrophically wrong.
"Legitimacy" in these circles is a matter of social standing and institutional affiliations, not knowledge or track record.
Then there are all the stories about how Obama's credibility depends on him striking Syria. Isn't that something? A president's credibility hinging on him doing something just 9 percent of Americans want him to do! It only makes sense if the unwritten thought is, "His credibility among people who matter." D.C. people, who inflate the importance of rhetoric and looking tough. If Obama doesn't intervene in Syria, his credibility among the American people won't suffer at all.
Washington elites are doing all they can to diminish the people's ability to exert pressure in foreign affairs. The Constitution vested the war power in the legislature so that decisions about war and peace would be debated by elected officials from every community in the country -- people easily reached by their constituents and not personally empowered by war. The legislature isn't nearly as enamored of executive-branch wisdom as executive-branch staffers are. 

V/R
Dave

How an Insular Beltway Elite Makes Wars of Choice More Likely

By Conor Friedersdorf

washington DC full.jpgReuters
Intervention in Syria is extremely, undeniably unpopular.

"Americans strongly oppose U.S. intervention and believe Washington should stay out of the conflict even if reports that Syria's government used deadly chemicals to attack civilians are confirmed," Lesley Wroughton of Reuters reported August 24. "About 60 percent of Americans surveyed said the United States should not intervene in Syria's civil war, while just 9 percent thought President Barack Obama should act." And if there were proof that Bashar al-Assad's forces used chemical weapons? Even then, just one in four Americans favors intervention.

The citizenry wants us to stay out of this conflict. And there is no legislative majority pushing for intervention. A declaration of war against Syria would almost certainly fail in Congress. Yet the consensus in the press is that President Obama faces tremendous pressure to intervene. In fact, the same Reuters reporter, Lesley Wroughton, co-bylined another piece last week that began:
With his international credibility seen increasingly on the line, President Barack Obama on Thursday faced growing calls at home and abroad for forceful action against the Syrian government over accusations it carried out a massive new deadly chemical weapons attack ...

If allegations of a large-scale chemical attack are verified -- Syria's government has denied them -- Obama will surely face calls to move more aggressively, possibly even with military force, in retaliation for repeated violations of U.S. "red lines." Obama's failure to confront Assad with the serious consequences he has long threatened would likely reinforce a global perception of a president preoccupied with domestic matters and unwilling to act decisively in the volatile Middle East, a picture already set by his mixed response to the crisis in Egypt.
Where is this pressure coming from? Strangely, that question doesn't even occur to a lot of news organizations. Take this CBS story. The very first sentence says, "The Obama administration faced new pressure Thursday to take action on Syria." New pressure from whom? The story proceeds as if it doesn't matter. How can readers judge how much weight the pressure should carry? Pressure from hundreds of thousands of citizens in the streets confers a certain degree of legitimacy. So does pressure from a just-passed House bill urging a certain course of action, or even unanimous pressure from all of the experts on a given subject. 
What I'd like is if news accounts on pressure to intervene in Syria made it clear that the "growing calls ... for forceful action" aren't coming from the people, or Congressional majorities, or an expert consensus. The pressure is being applied by a tiny, insular elite that mostly lives in Washington, D.C., and isn't bothered by the idea of committing America to military action that most Americans oppose. Nor are they bothered by the president launching a war of choice without Congressional approval, even though Obama declared as a candidate that such a step would be illegal. Some of them haven't even thought through the implications of the pressure they're applying.
Why is their pro-war pressure legitimized as the prevailing story line, despite the fact that they hold a minority position, even as pressure against intervention -- that is to say, the majority position --  is all but ignored? Consider a variation on the "pressure" story that isn't written, though it would be accurate:
(Continued at the link below)

Tuesday, January 29, 2013

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: A Contest for Political Legitimacy


Conclusion:
This helps explain why many successful revolutionaries make execrable founders and statesmen. After promising the world to win the sympathies of the people, the victor must deliver. Few do. George Washingtons — soldier-statesmen whose gifts span wartime and peacetime pursuits — are rare in history. Few would portray insurgent chieftains like Ho Chi Minh (and his successors) or Mao Zedong as praiseworthy state-builders. Lomperis and Wylie open a window into conflicts that rage where politics intersects with warfare, linear with nonlinear endeavors. Check 'em out.

It always seems easier to tear something down than to build it.
V/R
Dave

By James R. Holmes

January 28, 2013

Vietnam is important enough to U.S. diplomatic and military history to warrant a second post. Boiled down to its essence, insurgency and counterinsurgency is a contest for political legitimacy — a bareknuckles struggle for the acquiescence, the affections, and ultimately the allegiance of the populace. Popular approval cements the winner's rule.

Scholar Timothy Lomperis posits a three-layered model of legitimacy. A regime earns "interest"-level legitimacy by hoisting an umbrella under which people can fulfill their everyday needs. This is a transaction. The government supplies the basics — security, infrastructure, what have you — and the people assent to its rule. If the government stops holding up its end of the bargain, the people may stop holding up theirs. They may withdraw their support. And if the insurgent offers a better alternative, many will take the deal. Interest-based legitimacy is necessary but far from sufficient to perpetuate a regime for the long run.

The next level up is "opportunity." The regime that commands opportunity-based legitimacy makes stakeholders out of passive supporters. It makes land available to a broad swathe of the populace, opens civil-service jobs to all qualified comers, you name it. The regime entrenches itself through giving a critical mass of the people a stake in its success. If it falls, the fortunes of the people collapse with it.
Atop Lomperis's hierarchy perches "belief"-level legitimacy. The people affirm that such a regime rules by right, not just by delivering the goods. Belief-level legitimacy manifests itself in tokens such as the divine right of kings, the Mandate of Heaven, or the American Declaration of Independence. 

Convictions reinforce interest and opportunity, helping sustain the regime for the long haul. But legitimacy takes upkeep. The danger for rulers who enjoy belief-level legitimacy is apathy toward workaday functions — hey, if you rule by divine sanction, why bother with the peasants? — combined with some event that shatters the belief. Such a regime can lose its popular standing almost instantly.
(Continued at the link below)

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