Showing posts with label JSOTF-P. Show all posts
Showing posts with label JSOTF-P. Show all posts

Wednesday, September 27, 2017

ISIS in Mindanao: A Threat to the U.S.?

ISIS in Mindanao: A Threat to the U.S.?

Wednesday, September 27, 2017
We should be clear: Mindanao is not Syria, Iraq, or Afghanistan.  We cannot approach a province of our longest standing treaty ally the same way we do in Syria or any of the other 18 or so countries to which the ISIS virus as spread.
As ISIS nears defeat in Syria and Iraq it is trying to keep its ideology alive by spreading to other countries where it is taking advantage of conditions of political resistance that weaken governments and provide safe havens for training, recruiting, and eventual resurrection of its quest for the Caliphate.  This is what appears to have attracted ISIS to Mindanao.  The attraction  is mutual, as threat groups such as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Maute Group have embraced the ISIS ideology to enhance their legitimacy and gain recruits, resources, and respect.  
Does this phenomenon in the Philippines and its neighboring countries pose a significant security threat to the U.S. that requires a U.S. military response?
Appreciate the Context
While the ISIS presence makes the headlines, it is important to remember that the Philippines and its neighbors are sovereign nations that are established, relatively stable, and advanced  compared to Syria and other ISIS locales.  However, the Philippines face myriad threats that complicate the security situation.  These range from the external threat of China and the territorial dispute to the existential threat posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CCP) and the New Peoples Army (NPA) which seek to overthrow the government.  President Duterte's drug war also garners much of the headlines. 
In Mindanao, in addition to the NPA, there is the continued friction with rogue elements of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) despite the 1996 peace agreement that established the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao.  There are the terrorist groups of the ASG and the Indonesian based Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).  There are also clan conflicts (ridos) and sometimes-violent competition among local political groups.  Lastly, among the major threats, there is the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) that seeks return of its ancestral domain and has nearly reached a peace agreement with the government though it has not been fully implemented. 
These conflicts together pose a serious challenge to the central government and regional structures, and this leads to sanctuary within Mindanao that allows various groups to survive and thrive.  Although there is no unified resistance to the central government, the widespread but disparate political resistance creates a cauldron that breeds political violence that ISIS has begun to exploit.
Understand the Problem
The nature of the problem is not solely a security threat.  Although the Marawi siege with the Maute Group is a lightning rod that brings focus on ISIS, it is only a symptom of the underlying problem.  It is a Philippine problem and a problem that can only be solved in the long term by the Philippine government at the national, provincial, and local levels.
To illustrate this, I will share one anecdote.  In 2007, I participated in a meeting with US diplomats and MILF leadership in their headquarters in Cotobato.  The purpose of the meeting was to express US support of the ongoing peace process and inform the MILF that a peace agreement will bring US support to the MILF just as  USAID did in 1996 for the MNLF when it signed the peace agreement.  The MILF leadership was quite clear that while they appreciated all the development support the U.S. and the international community would provide, if their political problems were not addressed and solved by the Philippine government, their insurgency would continue.
This can be applied to most of the threats in Mindanao.  The political problems that exist, from the national to the province to the barangay or village level are exploited by groups who seek to use political resistance and political violence to develop their own political power. 
The U.S. executed Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) under the authority of the 2001 AUMF which limited U.S. support to the security forces only conducting operations against Al Qaeda-linked organizations which at the time were the ASG and the JI. As described, the problems in the Philippines go beyond AQ, just as they go beyond ISIS.  It is a problem when the U.S. myopically focuses on a narrow threat that is only in its interests and does not take a holistic approach to the broader challenges faced by its ally.
While ISIS does not pose a direct threat to the U.S. from Mindanao, the political and security problems of the Philippines can serve as an incubator to allow the ISIS threat and others to metastasize and spread throughout the region.  If left unchecked it could use Mindanao as a sanctuary to rest, refit, and train new recruits.  It could exploit the maritime routes to move extremists to new targets of opportunity when it is ready to strike again.  At the very least, ISIS can use Mindanao to keep its ideology alive so that it one day can regain strength to attempt to re-establish its Caliphate somewhere.
Develop an Approach
How should the U.S. respond to the emergence of the ISIS threat in Mindanao?
First, the Philippine government must request additional support.  Despite the end of OEF-P in 2015 the U.S. has continued to provide security assistance in the Philippines to include advice and assistance with the ongoing siege in Marawi. 
Second, just as in OEF-P in 2001 it must conduct a thorough assessment of the situation in complete coordination with the Philippine military that will lead to a combined campaign plan that will integrate US support to the security forces.  The assessment will assist the Philippine government in determining the acceptable durable political arrangement necessary to stabilize the region.  This will also ensure that Philippine and U.S. interests are sufficiently aligned.
Third, the American Embassy in 2006 coined the phrase "Diplomacy, Development, and Defense" (3D) and as in 2006 the effort needs to be holistic and led by the Chief of Mission to ensure full U.S. interagency support to the Philippines.  A military only or military led mission is insufficient.  The approach must focus on assisting the Philippines more broadly than simply combatting ISIS.  It must support Philippine development and political solutions as well as security.
Fourth, the U.S. should act as part of a coalition of friends, partners, and allies.  Recent reports indicate that Australia has made the largest financial commitment to the situation in Marawi, along with the U.S. Japan, Thailand, and the EU.  China has provided the fifth largest contribution with the bulk for medical support of soldiers wounded in Marawi.  Although there are complexities that come with this approach, working as part of a coalition will minimize the focus on the U.S. and allow for greater and more effective support to the Philippines rather than the U.S. being the sole focal point for political opponents.
Fifth, the U.S. must use the right tools and forces for the mission from the capabilities of USAID to the appropriate military advisory forces from across the spectrum to include civil affairs and psychological operations as well as special forces who have developed decades long relationships with members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.  These forces are well suited for operating "without being in charge" as they recognize that this is a Philippine problem and a Philippine fight.  This is not "leading from behind."  This is the appropriate understanding of the relationship between U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) and host nation forces in a sovereign nation.
A consideration for any support provided cannot be narrowly focused on ISIS and most certainly cannot use a similar approach as the U.S. has used in Syria and Iraq.  On the one hand, the challenges are bigger than ISIS, so the support to the Philippines must be broader.  On the other, a myopic focus on ISIS will enhance its legitimacy and provide fuel for growth.  It should be treated as a symptom and not the disease in the Philippines.  This must be an important theme in a supporting information and influence activities campaign.
In conclusion, ISIS is a growing global threat that is seeking to sustain itself for the long term even as it appears on the verge of defeat in Syria and Iraq.  It will exploit local political conditions in countries where it can find sanctuary so that it can live to fight another day.  However, in the Philippines, ISIS is only one security challenge.  The U.S., if requested, can provide advice and assistance to support a 3D approach  - diplomacy, development, and defense - that can reduce the ISIS threat by supporting Philippine political solutions.

Sunday, June 18, 2017

U.S. Special Operations Troops Advising Philippines Forces on Insurgents

U.S. Special Operations Troops Advising Philippines Forces on Insurgents

thecipherbrief.com · June 16, 2017
June 16, 2017 | COL David Maxwell


While Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte remains at odds with the United States, the armed forces of the two countries have maintained a close working relationship that dates to 1951 and the signing of a mutual defense treaty. In recent years the primary mission of U.S. forces in the Philippines has been Foreign Internal Defense operations against the country’s many insurgent groups. As Philippine government forces continue to fight Islamist militants in the city of Marawi, U.S. Special Forces have served as advisors and U.S. aircraft have provided intelligence and reconnaissance in support of Philippine airstrikes and operations. The Cipher Brief reached out to Col. (ret.) David Maxwell, former commander of the Joint Special Operations Task Forces Philippines, about the mission of United States Special Operations Forces in the Philippines and its involvement in the ongoing battle for Marawi.
The Cipher Brief: U.S. special operations troops have been deployed in the Philippines for many years. Historically, what has been their mission?
David Maxwell: The traditional mission has been Foreign Internal Defense (FID) which consists of activities by joint U.S. military forces and civilian government agencies to advise and assist friends, partners, and allies in internal defense and development programs so that they can defend themselves against lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, and terrorism. U.S. special operations forces, to include Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, SEALS, Marine Raiders, and Air Commandos as well as Special Forces (which has been the dominant force) have provided training, advice, and assistance for decades to assist the United States’ longest-standing treaty ally against a very complex combination of threats. They have helped the Armed Forces of the Philippines to develop a range of special operations skills from tactical counterterrorism operations, intelligence operations and civil military operations, to advanced aviation techniques to include night vision flying.
One of the unique aspects of the relationship is the U.S. special operations forces have always respected Philippines sovereignty and supported security forces through advice and assistance, while never conducting U.S. unilateral operations. The Philippines always remained in command, control, and in the lead on all operations.
TCB: What are some of the unique challenges to training against and combating the militant groups in the Philippines compared to other groups worldwide?
(Continued at the link below)

Thursday, December 29, 2016

The COIN Conundrum: The Future of Counterinsurgency and U.S. Land Power

The 95 page monograph can be downloaded directly at this link: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1336  I have pasted the summary below.  Although I am a little partial to the work that has been done in the Philippines I find his recommendations quite unusual and one I cannot completely agree with, namely that the Philippines provides the model for future COIN campaigns.

It could, instead, try to train two-speed soldiers capable of conducting conventional and unconventional operations; or, it could keep COIN as a core function of an enhanced SOCOM with the capability to train conventional forces in unconventional tactics should a large expeditionary COIN mission be deployed. This monograph concludes that the forth option best equips the Army for the contemporary security environment. It then makes specific recommendations for implementing this option and suggests the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF)-Philippines as the model for future COIN campaigns. Finally, the monograph maintains that an enhanced special operations forces (SOF) capability will not adversely affect preparation for conventional war-fighting. Improving the conventional forces’ tooth-to-tail ratio, continuing to develop labor-saving technologies, and relying on contractors to perform support functions can offset reallocation of personnel to SOCOM.

What I find incredible is that the author bases his recommendations on two sources (and Greg's is an excellent source but I would think the author would have turned to the recent comprehensive RAND study by Linda Robinson and her team (http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1236.html) :

83. Details on SOF support for Philippine military from Jim
Michaels, “Philippines a model for counterinsurgency,” USA
03-30-secretwar30_ST_N.htm, accessed on November 27, 2015.

84. Colonel Gregory Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN
Operation: OEF-PHILIPPINES and the Indirect Approach,” Military
Review: The Professional Journal of the U.S. Army, Vol. LXXXVI,
No. 6, November-December 2006, p. 6. 77

85. Ibid., pp. 7-8.

86. Michaels, “Philippines a model for counterinsurgency.”

I have long argued that OEF-P is not a model in itself.  It was suited for the conditions that existed there (political, cultural, and security).  I can sum up the lessons from OEF-P that are enduring that provide only basis for a model:  conduct a thorough assessment/estimate to gain as complete understanding of the situation as possible, develop and execute a campaign plan that supports US policy and national strategy and that is appropriate for the situation: one that supports a friend, partner, or ally in its internal defense and development programs to help them to defend themselves against lawless, subversion, insurgency, and terrorism in complete synchronization with the US country team while respecting and protecting host nation sovereignty.  That is the "model" in a nutshell.  

The COIN Conundrum: The Future of Counterinsurgency and U.S. Land Power

The COIN Conundrum: The Future... Cover Image








Brief Synopsis

View the Executive Summary

Counterinsurgency (COIN) continues to be a controversial subject among military leaders. Critics argue that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have made the U.S. military, particularly the Army, "COIN-centric." They maintain that equipping U.S. forces to combat insurgency has eroded their conventional war fighting capabilities. Those committed to preserving and even enhancing COIN capabilities, on the other hand, insist that doing so need not compromise the ability of the military to perform other tasks. They also point out that the likelihood of even a mid-level conventional war remains low while the probability of unconventional engagements is high. This monograph reviews the COIN debate, analyzes current force structure, and concludes that contrary to the more extreme positions taken by critics and proponents, the U.S. military has achieved a healthy balance between COIN and other capabilities.

SUMMARY
The debate over counterinsurgency (COIN), seemingly
dormant since the end of the Vietnam War, has
been rekindled by the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Since the 2006 publication of the U.S. Army/
Marine Corps Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency,
practitioners and scholars have argued over
the efficacy of COIN. Supporters insist that the new
approach outlined in the manual led to the creation of
a strategy that defeated the Iraqi insurgents between
2006-2009. Critics argue that the surge of 30,000 additional
troops, robust conventional operations, and the
end of the Shia uprising—not a new COIN strategy—
caused violence in Iraq to decline dramatically. They
point to the failure of the campaign in Afghanistan as
further evidence that COIN does not work. In an era
of declining Pentagon budgets, this debate has significant
implications for U.S. land forces.
This monograph considers the place of COIN in
U.S. Army doctrine, training, and resource allocation.
It begins with a brief overview of the U.S. military’s
historical experience combating insurgency before
considering the recent campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The monograph then examines in detail the contemporary,
scholarly, and professional debate over
the efficacy of COIN and its place in U.S. defense planning.
Recognizing that consideration of this important
issue must be grounded in an examination of the
contemporary security environment, the monograph
reviews official threat assessments. It then considers
the current U.S. military capacity for addressing identified
threats. That capacity includes force structure,
doctrine, and learning institutions.

Building on this analytical framework, this monograph
considers four options vis-à-vis COIN. The
Army could revert to the post-Vietnam Era approach,
focusing on conventional war and relegating COIN
to a small Special Operations Command (SOCOM).
It could reconfigure its force structure to focus on
unconventional threats. It could, instead, try to train
two-speed soldiers capable of conducting conventional
and unconventional operations; or, it could keep
COIN as a core function of an enhanced SOCOM with
the capability to train conventional forces in unconventional
tactics should a large expeditionary COIN
mission be deployed. This monograph concludes that
the forth option best equips the Army for the contemporary
security environment. It then makes specific
recommendations for implementing this option
and suggests the Joint Special Operations Task Force
(JSOTF)-Philippines as the model for future COIN
campaigns. Finally, the monograph maintains that an
enhanced special operations forces (SOF) capability
will not adversely affect preparation for conventional
war-fighting. Improving the conventional forces’
tooth-to-tail ratio, continuing to develop labor-saving
technologies, and relying on contractors to perform
support functions can offset reallocation of personnel
to SOCOM.

Wednesday, April 6, 2016

U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014


This excerpt can be summarized as Special Operations Forces simply doing their job by relying on their training, long term relationships with the host nation military, understanding of the operational environment because of continuous training in country for decades and most important employing the fundamental SOF doctrine as it existed at 9-11.

  • U.S. counterterrorism policy in recent years has sought to rely increasingly on indigenous forces. Some efforts have enjoyed greater success than others, including this Philippine example. The study found that key factors that contributed to success in this case were: 1) maintaining the sovereign government lead, which avoided U.S. dependency; 2) adjusting plans through regular assessments; 3) employing SOF and other capabilities in a synergistic way; and 4) creating and maintaining interagency coordination. These findings may be useful in developing policy options and plans for other long-term SOF and partner building missions.


U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014



This report examines the 14-year experience of U.S. special operations forces in the Philippines from 2001 through 2014. The objective of this case history is to document and evaluate the activities and effects of special operations capabilities employed to address terrorist threats in Operation Enduring Freedom — Philippines through (1) training and equipping Philippine security forces, (2) providing operational advice and assistance, and (3) conducting civil–military and information operations. The report evaluates the development, execution, and adaptation of the U.S. effort to enable the Philippine government to counter transnational terrorist groups.
An average of 500 to 600 U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps special operations units were employed continuously under the command of a joint special operations task force. They provided training, advice, and assistance during combat operations to both Philippine special operations units and selected air, ground, and naval conventional units; conducted civil–military and information operations on Basilan, in the Sulu archipelago, and elsewhere in Mindanao; provided intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, medical evacuation, and emergency care; aided planning and intelligence fusion at joint operational commands and force development at institutional headquarters; and coordinated their programs closely with the U.S. embassy country team. The authors conclude that Operation Enduring Freedom — Philippines contributed to the successful degradation of transnational terrorist threats in the Philippines and the improvement of its security forces, particularly special operations units. It identifies contributing and limiting factors, which could be relevant to the planning and implementation of future such efforts.

Research Questions

  1. What effect did U.S. special operations forces' activities have on the transnational terrorist threat?
  2. What effect did those activities have on the Philippine security forces' capabilities at the tactical, operational, and institutional levels?

Key Findings

U.S. Special Operations Forces' Activities in the Philippines Between 2001 and 2014 Contributed to a Reduced Transnational Terrorist Threat and Support for Threat Groups

  • The number of enemy-initiated attacks has dropped, the number of Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) militants has decreased, and polls show reduced support for the ASG and a substantial majority reporting satisfaction with Philippine security forces.

U.S. Special Operations Forces' Activities in the Philippines During That Period Also Increased Philippine Security Forces' Capabilities at the Tactical, Operational, and Institutional Levels

  • At the tactical level, U.S. special operations forces (SOF) provided training, advice, and assistance to conventional Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) units at all echelons throughout Mindanao, including Philippine Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force units. In the later years of Operation Enduring Freedom — Philippines, U.S. SOF also provided training, advice, and assistance to the PNP Special Action Forces. U.S. SOF interviewees judged that Philippine SOF are among the most proficient of those Asian SOF units with which they had worked.
  • At the operational level, U.S. SOF advised and assisted the AFP headquarters to improve its joint processes and integrate command and control, planning, and intelligence functions.
  • At the institutional level, U.S. SOF contributed somewhat to strategy, planning, and coordination at the AFP national headquarters, and they helped Western Mindanao Command develop its plans and intelligence analysis and fusion capabilities.

Activities During That Period Had Other Effects as Well

  • The activities enhanced the bilateral defense ties between the United States and the Philippines.

Recommendations

  • U.S. counterterrorism policy in recent years has sought to rely increasingly on indigenous forces. Some efforts have enjoyed greater success than others, including this Philippine example. The study found that key factors that contributed to success in this case were: 1) maintaining the sovereign government lead, which avoided U.S. dependency; 2) adjusting plans through regular assessments; 3) employing SOF and other capabilities in a synergistic way; and 4) creating and maintaining interagency coordination. These findings may be useful in developing policy options and plans for other long-term SOF and partner building missions.

Table of Contents

  • Chapter One
    Introduction
  • Chapter Two
    U.S.-Philippine Relations in Historical Perspective
  • Chapter Three
    2001–2004: The Initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom — Philippines
  • Chapter Four
    2005–2007: The Move to Jolo and Operation Ultimatum
  • Chapter Five
    2008–2010: Expansion of Effort
  • Chapter Six
    2010–2012: Transitioning Up
  • Chapter Seven
    2012–2014: Zamboanga Siege and Transitioning Out
  • Chapter Eight
    Conclusion
  • Appendix A
    Balikatan 02-1 Terms of Reference
  • Appendix B
    Plan Analysis Tool

Wednesday, December 23, 2015

CRS Report on Building Partnership Capacity

The entire report can be downloaded here:  http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44313.pdf

Interestingly the recent Philippines mission is not addressed in the case studies.  The Huk Rebellion is covered as is Colombia.  Not saying the current Philippines should be one of the case studies (and I do think that the Huk Rebellion case is an important case study and I am glad it is included).  But in case anyone is interested here are three charts that put the recent Philippines mission (OEF-P) in historical context and contemporary perspective (from the Foreign Internal Defense (FID)  point of view).  But I do think that the current Operation Enduring Freedom Philippines mission supports the very important conclusion highlighted in the excerpt below. 

Within the case studies explored, BPC was least effective as a tool for allowing the United States to extract itself from conflict (victory in war/war termination). However, it was most effective as a tool for building interpersonal and institutional linkages, and for alliance building."

It is interesting that FID is only mentioned twice in the report (excerpts below).  I think this is interesting because FID is a much broader mission than building partner capacity and security force assistance because by definition it is interagency and whole of government - training of foreign military forces is only one small part of FID - it consists of US government agencies support (advice and assistance) to a host nation's internal defense and development programs so that it can defend itself against lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, and terrorism.




CRS Report on Building Partnership Capacity

 
Extract: "Given that U.S. leaders often argue that a BPC effort could help accomplish more than one of the above goals, determining what constitutes the "primary" strategic objective for a given BPC effort required analytic judgment. CRS organized the cases according to public statements at the time, with particular attention paid to how leaders described the purpose of the BPC effort. Effectiveness was judged based on two criteria: whether the strategic goal was achieved, and whether the effort produced unintended consequences that were obviously and meaningfully damaging to U.S. national interests. Within the case studies explored, BPC was least effective as a tool for allowing the United States to extract itself from conflict (victory in war/war termination). However, it was most effective as a tool for building interpersonal and institutional linkages, and for alliance building."

...

The latter observation is borne out by the current manifestations of BPC across the DOD’s activities. Although the programs and authorities listed above are the focus of most analysis and discussion with respect to BPC, they do not capture the full extent of DOD’s activities and expenditures in this area. This is because DOD has integrated BPC—in its various guises and manifestations (security cooperation, assistance, foreign internal defense, security force assistance, and so on)—across a wide range of its operations and activities (see “DOD Activities That Build Partner Capacity”). In order to do so, different DOD components utilize a variety of funding sources. For example, according to a 2013 RAND study, rather than using DSCA earmarked funds for specific activities with partners, 

Most [BPC] programs are funded by other, less narrow [funding] sources, such as operations and maintenance funds. Examples include exercises overseen by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and military-to-military contacts, which are often (but not always) funded by Traditional COCOM Activity Authority. In each of these cases, DoD uses a specific authority to use its operations and maintenance funds for a given security cooperation activity. In some cases, these funds are then reimbursed, but more often than not, the security cooperation activity comes at the expense of another defense priority.20 

DSCA, with its relatively narrow mandate, oversees only a smaller subset of DOD’s overall BPC activities. This has financial oversight implications, as it is difficult to determine what, specifically, DOD spends on non-DSCA BPC programs. 

...

What Does “Building Partnership Capacity” or “Train and Equip” Mean on the Ground? Given that BPC is a term of art, a number of programs, capabilities, and activities fit under its umbrella. On the ground, this heterogeneity manifests itself in several different ways. The U.S Army, in its Field Manual 3-22: Army Support to Security Cooperation, outlines the main tasks that U.S. ground forces would use to conduct what it terms “security force assistance.” This is an operationalization of both DOD BPC efforts and congressionally authorized “1206 Train and Equip” programs. It also applies to more traditional forms of security cooperation, especially “Foreign Internal Defense” missions performed by Special Operations Forces. The mission to equip is often tailored to different situations in specific countries. 

Individual Training. In this task, U.S. forces train foreign security forces on “military occupational skills appropriate to their organization and equipment.” That is, U.S trainers provide individual members of partner nation security forces with basic instruction in how to shoot their weapons, move in a tactical environment, and communicate with members of their unit. This training may also involve instructing officers and leaders in principles of military leadership, as well as tactical mission planning and execution. 

Collective Training. In this task, U.S. forces train foreign security forces on “collective tasks at the battalion level and below.” That is, units (from a squad of approximately 10 individuals to a battalion of up to approximately 500 individuals) that perform the same type of missions (infantry, reconnaissance, logistics) learn to fight and conduct operations as a unit, increasing in complexity from squad patrolling to battalion-sized maneuvers. 

Staff Training. In this task, U.S. forces train the staffs of foreign security forces in their functions, encompassing “staff training from company level troop leading procedures through military decision-making at the task force level.” That is, staff officers and noncommissioned officers learn how to plan tactical operations and obtain decisions and guidance from commanding officers and noncommissioned officers in leadership positions. Such training could range from planning and synchronizing fires and movements in a platoon defense to coordinating company maneuver and artillery fire in a battalion-sized attack. 

Institutional Training. In this task, U.S. forces train the staff of a foreign nation’s “force generation structure and ministerial or departmental staff.” It may focus on force generation, budgeting, and oversight.30 While largely limited to Army and Marine Corps units (along with Special Operations Forces), the method of conducting basic military training and weapons training, moving along in complexity to unit training, is applicable to all military and security force “train and equip” programs.

Sunday, March 22, 2015

The American role in Mamasapano


This article is based on cherry picking from my 2012 testimony before the HASC Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities which can be accessed at this link:  http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=be69fdc5-4233-4507-840c-6c8023f94bf6

I will just take issue with this one excerpt as I think everyone reading this understands the proper application of foreign internal defense as well as the importance of the US not being in charge in operations such as those in the Philippines.:

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, America launched the global war against terrorism, specifically targeting the leaders of the al-Qaida network and its regional affiliate in Southeast Asia, the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). The Philippines became a theater in this American global campaign against terrorism after it was determined that the notorious Mindanao-based kidnap group Abu Sayyaf maintained close relations with leaders of the JI.

In a changed world environment, America decided it needed to recast its military presence in countries that were battling terrorism. New experiences were sought in the battle against this scourge. In the Philippines, Mindanao was chosen as a suitable laboratory in which new models of irregular warfare could be tested. Under “Operation Enduring Freedom,” America offered advice and assistance in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism to selected allies. A corollary of this campaign was the formation in several countries of missions called “Joint Special Operations Task Forces.” The Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) was organized in 2002, one of the first to be set up by the American global security state. (Interestingly, the JSOTF-P withdrew from Mindanao a month after the Mamasapano debacle.)

What I take exception issue with is that the Philippines became a laboratory in which new models of irregular warfare could be tested.  Nothing could be further from the truth.  In 2001-2002 US actions in the Philippines rested upon the foundation of already existing foreign internal defense doctrine, and the operations were based not only on long standing relationships between US and Filipino forces but were also conducted in the method and manner that US Special Forces and Joint special operations forces had been conducting operations for decades,  The only thing new and different was that after 9-11 there was the demand for these types of operations and the press and the public paid a little more attention to them (though not too much as they were way overshadowed by Afghanistan and Iraq which was actually a good thing for our operations in the Philippines as it prevented much of the effects of the 6000 mile screw driver).

The American role in 

Mamasapano

2:17 AM | Sunday, March 22nd, 2015

Hearing it from the US state department, one would think American security personnel played no more than a peripheral role in the Mamasapano encounter. Here’s how its spokesperson, Jen Psaki, put it at the department’s daily press briefing last March 18: “At the request of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, personnel serving in the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines responded to assist in the evacuation of casualties after the firefight. The operation was planned and executed by Philippine authorities.”
That’s also what most of us initially thought after seeing photos of wounded troopers and body bags being loaded onto waiting vehicles by brawny Caucasians sporting military haircuts. Can it be that they just happened to be in the neighborhood with their air ambulance when dead bodies needed to be retrieved from the battlefield? Sensing something disingenuous in this matter-of-fact portrayal of the US role in Mindanao, a reporter tried to probe:
QUESTION: And when you said that any US support was in accordance with the Philippine Government, in other words it was part—I’m not sure what that means.
PSAKI: Well, specifically, as I mentioned, we responded to assist in the evacuation of casualties after the firefight. That was the role.
QUESTION: After they asked?
PSAKI: Yes, mm-hmm. After the request of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.”
The reference to the Armed Forces is understandable. The legal umbrella that justifies and protects the presence of American troops on Philippine soil is the Visiting Forces Agreement, which is associated with the series of joint military exercises between American forces and the Philippine military. Today, it is being invoked as an all-purpose cover for a wide range of US security activities in the Philippines. There were six Americans at the Special Action Force’s Tactical Command Post who were monitoring the Jan. 25 Mamasapano mission in real time. I am aware that this is not an issue with many of our people. But, a little background on how this came about may help enrich our understanding of the American role in Mamasapano.
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, America launched the global war against terrorism, specifically targeting the leaders of the al-Qaida network and its regional affiliate in Southeast Asia, the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). The Philippines became a theater in this American global campaign against terrorism after it was determined that the notorious Mindanao-based kidnap group Abu Sayyaf maintained close relations with leaders of the JI.
In a changed world environment, America decided it needed to recast its military presence in countries that were battling terrorism. New experiences were sought in the battle against this scourge. In the Philippines, Mindanao was chosen as a suitable laboratory in which new models of irregular warfare could be tested. Under “Operation Enduring Freedom,” America offered advice and assistance in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism to selected allies. A corollary of this campaign was the formation in several countries of missions called “Joint Special Operations Task Forces.” The Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) was organized in 2002, one of the first to be set up by the American global security state. (Interestingly, the JSOTF-P withdrew from Mindanao a month after the Mamasapano debacle.)
A paper titled “Understanding Future Irregular Warfare Challenges,” presented as a testimony before the armed services committee of the US Congress by retired US colonel David S. Maxwell, discusses the key concept that governs the operationalization of the global antiterrorist campaign—“Foreign Internal Defense.” Maxwell was the commander of the JSOTF-P in Mindanao in 2006-2007.
I have been wondering how the Philippine National Police got involved in the counterterrorism campaign. Like counterinsurgency, this has been historically a function of the Philippine military. Perhaps, the answer is to be found in Maxwell’s paper: “Foreign internal defense is participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.”
I suspect that, after years of working with the Philippine military, the JSOTF-P found the PNP-SAF to be a better partner in getting the remaining high-value terrorists in Mindanao. Perhaps the JSOTF-P saw how the military had become so tightly bound to the ongoing peace process that it could no longer be relied upon to pursue new initiatives against targets in areas controlled by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the government’s peace partner.
The courage, zeal and heroism of the SAF commandos cannot be doubted. But Mamasapano proved to be unfamiliar terrain for many of them, and prolonged combat in the field was not what they were trained for. They were led to their death by false assurances. Still, despite the steep price paid, their handlers insist it was mission accomplished. The day after the assault, a severed finger was delivered to the American partners who had commissioned the killing of the terrorist to whom it belonged.
A sentence from Maxwell’s paper leapt out of the screen as I was reading it: “A problem that most US forces have is that they are so focused on mission accomplishment they often lack the patience to let the host nation operate in accordance with its own capabilities as well as customs and traditions.” How true!
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