Col David Maxwell Senior Fellow specializing in North Korea and East Asia Affairs, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Progress in nuclear dismantlement following the April Panmunjom Declarationand the June Singapore Summit is frustratingly slow for the Trump administration, though appropriately deliberate for the North Korean regime. The unconventional and experim
U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Sung Kim is leading the working level talks, but the problem is that Kim Jong Un has now met with President Trump directly, and that is who he wants to deal with. The Trump Administration would greatly benefit from a designated lead negotiator, who does not have other duties and can focus on getting the North Koreans to move more quickly to what they have seemingly agreed.
This is not to say that there is a complete lack of progress. Fifty-five possible remains of U.S. soldiers have been returned, North Korea’s Sohae launch facilityhas been partially dismantled, and Kim Jong Un says he is committed to working toward complete denuclearization of the entire Korean peninsula. Meanwhile, North and South Korean general officer military talks are under way, and the South is pushing for a declaration of the end of the war by year’s end. To encourage this progress, the ROK and U.S. suspended the “war games” this month – a concession that is not permanent, but certainly could help establish some good will.
Yet, there are still signs that Kim Jong Un is getting the better of Trump. From Kim’s perspective, his charm offensive is achieving success particularly among the South Korean people and he has boosted his legitimacy by meeting with Presidents Moon, Trump, and Xi. Moreover, he has not reduced his conventional military threats to the South, and there has been no real movement toward dismantlement of the North’s nuclear program. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo recently testified that fissile material continues to be produced, while recent intelligence reports indicate continued liquid fuel missile production at the facility outside Pyongyang.
For Kim, the biggest sticking point appears to be “denuclearization” of the entire Korean peninsula. Although President George H. W. Bush removed U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea in 1991, Kim Jong Un views the South as “nuclearized” because of the presence of U.S. forces and their access to nuclear to weapons. Indeed, as far as Kim is concerned, American strategic air and naval assets are nuclear capabilities. Because of this perceived threat from the South and the alliance, Kim Jong Un is likely unwilling to yield.
With the U.S. similarly unwilling to budge, Kim appears to have a three-pronged strategy to ensure security of North Korea and his regime.
