Advice from SOF on the Use of SOF for the Next Administration

I was fortunate to be able to participate in the event and contribute to the discussion.  

The 18 page report can be downloaded from my dropbox at this link: https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/6891151/CNA_Advice%20from%20SOF%20for%20the%20Next%20Administration.pdf

Executive summary and table of contents are excerpted below.

Advice from SOF on the Use of SOF for the Next Administration

Rapporteur: Alexander Powell

October 2016 Executive Summary  On October 14, 2016, CNA convened a half-day meeting of experts to discuss the use of special operations forces (SOF) by the next administration. Our speakers consisted of a former Assistant Secretary of Defense and six former SOF Commanders whose rank at retirement ranged from one to four stars. Our audience of approximately 50 attendees consisted largely of active duty SOF and their civilian equivalents. The conversation was held under the Chatham House Rule of non-attribution. The overarching themes of that discussion included the following:  • The sanctity of SOF. SOF are a limited resource that are most effective when given clear policies and permissive rules of engagement (ROE), when employed and supported in accordance with the “SOF Truths,” and when allowed to have a strong voice in the decisions and policies governing their employment. Our attendees recommended that policymakers and conventional military commanders should:  o Educate themselves—and seek SOF input—on the relative strengths and weaknesses of SOF, and when they should and should not be used.  o Set policy and ROE, and trust that SOF will accomplish the mission, given their flexibility, adaptability, and record of success.  o Recognize that SOF are fully committed and continuing at the present pace of deployments risks burning out the force. Preservation of the force requires growth or relieving SOF of some of its currently assigned missions.  • Preparation of the policy environment. In strategic policy and resource discussions, SOF are often reliant on non-SOF experts to represent their capabilities and interests. Our attendees recommended that SOF leaders should: o Proactively engage influential civilians inside and outside of government in order to educate them on SOF capabilities, limitations, and requirements.  o Seek a more active voice when the use of SOF is considered as a policy option, for example by placing a flag or general officer on the National Security Council Staff.  o Clearly articulate the SOF narrative. For public audiences, this should include who SOF are, what they do, and why—while not revealing methods. For policy audiences, this should include a framework for how to think about SOF using past successes as examples.  • Balancing the future force. Countering terrorism will initially be a priority for the next administration and SOF will play a central role in this mission. But the U.S. is also facing increasing threats from China and Russia, among others. For SOF to play a role in shaping near-peer adversaries that is commensurate with their core competencies, some rebalancing of the force is required. Our attendees recommended that policymakers and SOF leaders should: o Recognize the role that SOF can—and should—play in shaping the environment around rising and resurgent near-peer adversaries. Give SOF greater space, authorities, and resources to act clandestinely in this role.  o Re-examine the balance between surgical strike and special warfare capabilities, personnel, and resources.  o Increase the diversity of the force via greater recruitment of minorities and women, and place an emphasis on their development, mentorship, and retention. Also increase emphasis on language and micro-regional studies.  o Develop SOF’s operational level capabilities, by codifying lessons from the Special Operations Joint Task Forces, resourcing USSOCOM to source and sustain them, and developing planners for SOF-centric campaigns.  • SOF as a source of innovation. SOF have pioneered numerous technologies and tactics that have benefitted the conventional military. The reasons behind SOF’s ability to innovate include a willingness to rapidly experiment and foster freedom of thought—these should be imitated and reinforced. Our attendees recommended that policymakers and military leaders should: o Shift the military service schoolhouses away from teaching mostly conventional war doctrine and “what to think,” to a balance of conventional and unconventional approaches and an emphasis on “how to think.”  o Adjust military service manpower policies to enable non-traditional career paths, new ways of developing leaders, and lateral transfers into service.  o Create a robust intellectual hub at USSOCOM to foster, develop, and transition new technologies and tactics to SOF and the conventional force.  The next administration will face a multitude of challenges and SOF will continue to play a central role in many of them. The recommendations above will help ensure SOF are as successful for the next administration as they have been for the last one.  Contents  Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1  Setting the stage for SOF ..................................................................................................... 1  Key themes ............................................................................................................................. 3  The sanctity of SOF ............................................................................................................... 3  Preparation of the policy environment ............................................................................. 4  Balancing the future force ................................................................................................... 5  SOF as a source of innovation ............................................................................................ 7  Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 9

An Information Based Strategy to Reduce Korea’s Increasing Threat

This report is authored by Commander Skip Vincenzo, (US Navy SEAL), who is among the longest serving uniformed officers in Korea in the past two decades.  He assembled a group of Korea hands (page 13 of the report) to work on this project this summer.

Co-published with CNAS, USKI-SAIS, and NDU our Georgetown Security Studies Review.

The report can be accessed directly in PDF at this link: http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/An-Information-Based-Strategy-to-Reduce-North-Koreas-Increasing-Threat.pdf

Special Issue: An Information Based Strategy to Reduce Korea’s Increasing Threat

 Oct 17, 2016  GSSR  Special Issues, The Review  0

http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2016/10/17/special-issue-an-information-based-strategy-to-reduce-koreas-increasing-threat/

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In cooperation with the Center for a New American Security, National Defense University, and the US-Korea Institute at SAIS, Georgetown University’s Center for Security Studies and the Georgetown Security Studies Review present a new special report available for download here.

Executive Summary

“Deterrence works, until it doesn’t.”—Sir Lawrence Freedman

The United States’ current approach to North Korea does not fundamentally resolve the risks of its belligerent behavior nor halt the development of its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. As these capabilities are improved, there is greater potential that Kim Jong-un, the leader of North Korea— confident he can deter a regime-threatening reaction—will attempt a violent provocation to achieve political objectives but in doing so miscalculates and instead sparks a crisis which escalates disastrously. While the United States has contingency plans for a wide range of conflict scenarios, executing them would be extraordinarily costly—the military capabilities Pyongyang has now amassed would inflict catastrophic damage.

James Clapper, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, has repeatedly warned that Pyongyang is “committed to developing a long-range, nuclear-armed missile that is capable of posing a direct threat to the United States…” and that “North Korea has already taken initial steps toward fielding this system…”1 With such a capability, Kim is attempting force the international community to accommodate him to avoid conflict. However, he could underestimate U.S. resolve, which in turn would ignite conflict. If the Kim regime falls, a nuclear-armed, fragmented military could strike the United States.

To avert this, the United States should work with South Korea to develop an information campaign designed to reduce the risks of conflict or regime collapse by convincing regime elites that their best options in these circumstances would be to support ROK-U.S. Alliance efforts. This would require five key elements:

• Enhance our ability to de-escalate a crisis by ensuring that the regime’s elites fully understand the consequences of a war by continually demonstrating the U.S.-ROK Alliance’s advanced military capabilities.

• Reduce the potential for violence by formulating policies that provide credible assurances of amnesty to regime elites and, if they act in ways which support alliance efforts, a beneficial role after the Kim regime collapses or a conflict is resolved on Alliance terms.

• Reduce the humanitarian costs by formulating policies that inform ordinary North Koreans what to expect in a contingency and how to act.

• Reduce civil and military resistance by formulating policies that guarantee North Koreans full rights as citizens of South Korea.

• Mitigate collapse of the civil infrastructure by incentivizing bureaucrats, technicians, and local commanders to protect and maintain critical facilities.

Reducing the wartime damage the North could inflict and lessening the potential chaos of collapse would provide renewed leverage for the U.S.-ROK Alliance to de-escalate a crisis before it erupts. However, if crisis does occur, this strategy would enable a more favorable and less costly conclusion.

NSCITF Report on Countering Violent Extremism

The 38 page report can be accessed directly at think link.

http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/NSCITF-Report-on-Countering-Violent-Extremism.pdf

NSCITF Report on Countering Violent Extremism

 Oct 11, 2016  GSSR  The Forum  0

http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2016/10/11/nscitf-report-on-countering-violent-extremism/

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The 2016 edition of the National Security Critical Issues Task Force (NSCITF) Report is now available for download here.

The 2016 NSCITF Report on Countering Violent Extremism analyzes issues underlying activities that prevent individuals from radicalizing, adopting violent extremist ideologies, and engaging in terrorist activities. In the report, the Task Force proposes a new framework for conceptualizing and implementing CVE, and identifies recommendations for policymakers to consider for national level CVE efforts in the United States.

Media inquiries and permission requests should be directed to the Georgetown Security Studies ReviewEditor-in-Chief at GSSR@georgetown.edu.