Here is a draft paper I am working on.
Information and Influence Campaign in north
Korea
When, Why, and How?
David S. Maxwell
"Deterrence works, until it doesn’t” Sir
Lawrence Freedman
“There are only two ways to approach planning for the collapse of North Korea: to be ill-prepared or to be really ill-prepared”
Dr. Kurt Campbell 1 May 1998
Sun Tzu - "never assume the enemy will not
attack, make yourself invincible." - The Collapse Corollary:
Never assume the KFR will not collapse - prepare now.
Strategic Planning and Preparation Paralysis arises from
a fear of what comes next - the War/Collapse Paradox
Unless we understand the following we will never be able to deal with north Korea.
1. The single vital national interest is survival of the Kim Family Regime (KFR), not the nation-state and not the Korean people living in the north.
2. The single strategic aim is reunification under the control of the north to ensure survival of the KFR.
3. The condition to achieve the strategic aim is the removal of US forces from the peninsula (splitting the ROK/US Alliance) the north will have superior correlation of forces to be able to execute its campaign plan to reunify the peninsula.
4. The foundation for the above strategy rests on blackmail diplomacy - the use of provocations to gain political and economic concessions and erode the ROK/US Alliance.
1. The single vital national interest is survival of the Kim Family Regime (KFR), not the nation-state and not the Korean people living in the north.
2. The single strategic aim is reunification under the control of the north to ensure survival of the KFR.
3. The condition to achieve the strategic aim is the removal of US forces from the peninsula (splitting the ROK/US Alliance) the north will have superior correlation of forces to be able to execute its campaign plan to reunify the peninsula.
4. The foundation for the above strategy rests on blackmail diplomacy - the use of provocations to gain political and economic concessions and erode the ROK/US Alliance.
The Korean peninsula, Northeast
Asia and the world are faced with five “big” scenarios that are going to have
to be addressed in the future. A holistic strategy is required for the “Big
Five:"
1. War - must deter, and if attacked defend, fight and win.
2. Regime Collapse - must prepare for the real possibility and understand it could lead to war and both war and regime collapse could result in resistance within the north.
3. Human Rights and Crimes Against Humanity - must focus on as it is a threat to the Kim Family Regime and undermines domestic legitimacy - and it is a moral imperative.
4. Asymmetric threats (provocations, nuclear program, missile, cyber and SOF) and global illicit activities.
5. Unification - the biggest challenge and the solution.
I will state my bias up front. I believe that the only way that we will see
an end to the north Korean nuclear program and the crimes against humanity
being committed against the Korean people living in the north by the mafia-like
crime family cult known as the Kim family Regime is through unification and the
establishment of a non-nuclear, economically vibrant peninsula with a liberal
constitutional form of government determined by the Korean people resulting in
a United Republic of Korea (UROK) a name which the Center for New American
Security proposed last December.
The challenge for the Republic of
Korea (ROK), the US, the regional powers, and the international community is
how to get from our current state to unification as the path most likely will
involve some level of conflict ranging from war to civil conflict and
potentially horrendous human suffering in the northern part of Korea. The ROK and its friends and allies face an
extraordinary security challenge because of the “Big Five.” War, regime collapse, and the nuclear and
missile programs pose an existential threat.
It is a moral imperative to work to relieve the suffering of the Korean
people who live in the worst human rights conditions in history. While unification is the desired and necessary
“end state,” achieving it will be costly in treasure for sure and blood as well
as there is likely no path to unification without some form of conflict, it may
only be a question of scale.
There are four paths to
unification. The ideal is peaceful
unification that comes as a result of respect, reconciliation, reform,
rebuilding, and reunification (R5).
Although this is unlikely to occur because of the nature of the Kim
Family Regime and its zero sum view of unification (whichever government
unifies the peninsula means the other government will be eliminated). Perhaps counterintuitive, this is the most
difficult path to plan for because it requires complete integration of the
political and economic systems, the security forces, and a complete overhaul of
the infrastructure in the northern part of Korea. However, planning for this most difficult
case will apply to any of the other paths to unification. People often are confounded by planning for
unification because they want to know in what way it will be achieved: through
peace, war, or regime collapse. Peaceful
unification planning requires the broadest range of planning that encompasses
every aspect of the Korea on the north and south side of the DMZ. The second path is through war. Of course we do not want to experience a war
but that will be decided by Kim Jong-un and his decision making process. Again it is counterintuitive that after a war
might be the easiest path to unification because the north Korean military will
be defeated, the economy completely destroyed, and the political system will no
longer exist, and the vast majority of the infrastructure will be irreparable
and require rebuilding from the ground up.
The third path is arguably the most complex because regime collapse will
lead to some form of conflict which could include war. Collapse is unlikely to be a benign event
resulting in absorption though if it does planning for peaceful unification
will have proven to be wise.
There is a fourth path that may be
considered an outlier. That is one in
which some form of internal resistance is able to gain power, eliminate the Kim
Family Regime and if prepared and properly support by the ROK, it might seek
peaceful unification in order to ensure survival of the Korean people living in
the north.
These paths and the contingencies
that we can expect are complex and require detailed planning and
preparation. Although they are related
each must be planned for in detail and each requires different forces and resources
and concepts of operation.
While these varied scenarios
require complex planning and preparation, there is one action that is common to
all scenarios: a comprehensive information campaign that will provide the
intellectual and emotional foundation for unification. While planning is important, the ROK and its
friends, partners, and allies can begin preparing now for unification through
an integrated, long term, focused, and fully resourced information campaign
plan.
The ROK and US Presidents need to
decide to execute a holistic information campaign to support unification.
Before we discuss an information campaign I would like to outline the eight
major contingencies, guiding principles and seven steps of preparation for
strategy and campaign planning.
Big 8
Contingencies
1. Provocations to
gain political and economic concessions.
2. nK Attack –
execution of the nK campaign plan to reunify the peninsula by force.
3. Civil
War/Chaos/Anarchy.
4. Refugee crisis.
5. Humanitarian
Assistance/Disaster relief.
6. WMD, loss of
control – seize and secure operations.
7. Resistance to
foreign intervention (e.g., insurgency).
8. How to handle
the nKPA during regime collapse short of war.
Guiding
Principles:
1. Defense
of ROK is paramount – all decisions must support defense of ROK against the
full range of threats from the north.
2. Must
provide options to national policy makers – early decisions required to
overcome the law of physics: time, distance, and space. Must have the
right capabilities in the right place for employment at the right time.
3.
Transparency is critical when dealing with the 5 Parties and international
community. Must have decisive and consistent themes and messages.
This is not the situation in which we should employ deception. Only through
clear articulation of alliance priorities and intent can we have a chance of
reducing the chance of conflict due to misunderstanding of intentions.
Examples for consideration (and these should be consistently expressed by the
ROK/US Alliance):
A. Defense and Security of ROK is the number one priority.
B. UNC and ROK/US CFC have the following priorities:
(1) Security of nuclear weapons, followed by chemical weapons and then the
biological program
(2) Security, health, and welfare of the Korean people living in
the north.
(3) UNC and ROK/US CFC desire to work with all interested nations to bring
security, stability and long term peace to the Korean peninsula and Northeast
Asia.
(4) UNC and ROK/US CFC will support the establishment of a unified peninsula –
a United Republic of Korea.
7 Steps
of Preparation
1. Shared vision –
a new durable political arrangement**
2. Roles &
Missions - national responsibilities for action
3. Organizational
Framework for operations (UNC/ROK/US CFC, independent operations, other)
4. Command,
Control, Coordination, and liaison processes & methods (including
information sharing)
5. Concept of
operations for deploying required forces (air, land, and sea)
6. Resource
commitment – which countries provide what
7. And
most important - information/psychological preparation of the
environment – a sophisticated and aggressive information and influence
activities campaign focused on the population to prepare then for the future
(e.g., unification) and the "2d tier leadership" by using a
combination of coercion and co-option. – An "exit strategy" for
2d tier military leaders and party members outside the core elite.
Such a campaign must be tasked at
the highest level of government, i.e., at the national security council level, with sustained
oversight of execution. From a ROK/US
Alliance perspective a combined strategic working group should be established
with permanent members from the ROK and US NSCs with the brief to prepare for
unification. This working group will be
responsible for providing the unification policy and strategy to executing
organizations who will develop methods to transmit themes and messages that
will begin the process of educating the Korean people in the north as to how
unification will occur and what roles they will play.
The first step is for the ROK to
develop comprehensive unification policies and plans that can be made
public. Of course there will be
classified intelligence and security plans but there must be a comprehensive
unification plan laid out to gain public support and to use to educate the
Korean people living in both the north and the South.
Outlining such policies and plans
is beyond the scope of this paper. What
follows are suggestions for specific themes, messages, and actions for an
information campaign.
Before a comprehensive plan can be
developed and executed a comprehensive survey of all organizations operating in
the information and influence sphere should be conducted to determine all the
actors, their objectives, and their strategy and methods of operation. We may learn that there are non-governmental
organizations working in this space than government resources. Although NGOs will never allow their work to
be orchestrated by governments it is important for government planners to know
and understand the NGOs and capitalize on the work they are doing. Once the information sphere is mapped
planners can begin development of a holistic strategy, a campaign plan and
lines of effort.
In addition, a complete assessment
of the human situation in the north must be conducted. Experts must analyze the culture, the
economy, the ideology, the methods of control, the political system, and every
aspect of the north in order to discern effective and ineffective
messages. Such analysis might reveal
that it is counter-productive to directly attack Kim Jong-un or Juche ideology
or other ideas that are ingrained into the psyche of the north Korean people.
The overall objective of an
information campaign should be on preparing the population and second tier leadership
for unification. We can assume that the core elite of the Kim Family Regime
will not support a United Republic of Korea.
However, there are senior officials outside the core elite who will
wield varying levels of power that can be exploited during the unification
process. They must be coerced or
co-opted to support unification. One
policy the ROK could implement would be to state that if a military commander
restrains the military forces under his command from attacking the ROK then he
would have a place in a Unified Republic of Korea. The transmission of such a message over time
may influence a senior military leader to take the right action in time of
crisis. This must be an established ROK
policy and there must be a sustained transmission of the message in various
forms through various media so that it has the chance of achieving the desired
effect.
While many will want to provide
information to foment resistance among the population, any overt attempt to do
so will likely undercut the legitimacy of the information campaign. Attempts to directly incite political and
popular resistance are likely to be met with resistance to such messages. The long term objective of unification must
be kept in the forefront of all planning efforts. In fact all officials should keep in mind a
guiding strategic question as they plan and implement an information
campaign. How will this policy,
strategy, plan, or program support unification?
However, if resistance is observed
among the Korean people livening in the north actions can be taken to directly
support them with information. However,
this must be done in a very careful way so as not to undercut the legitimacy of
the resistance or to cause it to be compromised when it is especially
vulnerable in the nascent stages. If
over zealous planners latch on to potential resistance and use it to attempt to
achieve information objectives it could result in the resistance being put
down.
The following are some
recommendations that a combined NSC strategy group should consider in directing
the execution of an information campaign to support unification.
1.
Adopt simple concepts that are
meaningful to the Korean people and support the idea of unification. One has been used throughout this paper and
that is eliminating the use of “north Koreans” and instead always talk about
the Korean people living in the north and South. Use of this will reinforce the idea of one
Korean people.
Rather than attacking Juche and the
Kim Family regime emphasize the sameness of the Korean people. A retired ROK navy Admiral once told me about
tow miracles in Korea. Of course I know
the Miracle on the Han – the story of the ROK rising from the ashes of the
Korean War going from a major aid recipient to a major donor nation and
developing economically, politically, militarily, and culturally in a great
middle power with one of the most vibrant populations and successful economies
in the world. However, he told me the
second miracle is the Miracle on the Taedong which is the river than runs
through Pyongyang just as the Han runs through Seoul. He said the miracle is that for more than six
decades the Korean people living in the north have suffered under one of the
most despotic and harsh regimes surviving war and human rights atrocities that
are among the worst in history. They
went straight from the Japanese Colonial period where the Korean culture and
identify were threatened by the occupiers and went straight into the oppression
of the Kim Family Regime in a political and economics system that enslaved
them. The miracle is that they have
survived. This is a message that should
form the basis of one Korean people. If
given the opportunity Korean will thrive.
The Koreans living in the South had the same history up until World War
II yet after the Korean War they took the independent spirit of Koreans, turn
entrepreneurial, and thrived. When
Koreans are faced with hardship they survive.
As different as the people on the north and South sides appear to be
their inner “Koreaness” remains common to both and this should be part of all
messaging.
2.
Focus on human rights violation
by the Kim Family Regime. This is
important for three purposes. First it
is the morally right thing to do.
Second, the Korean people living in the north must be made aware that
the Koreans in the South and the international community are concerned for
their welfare. Third, this undermines
the legitimacy of the regime. Over
focusing on the north’s nuclear program enhances regime legitimacy. Along with human rights, inform those in the
north that they will be able to establish truth and reconciliation processes
and play leading roles in reconciliation and the administration of justice.
3.
Focus on educating the people on
the unification process. The Korean
people will have to quickly learn about such things as property ownership and
market economics. It is important to
build on the gray market economy that has arisen after the failure of the
regime’s public distribution system.
Although still overseen by the regime and the people are vulnerable to
crackdowns at any time by the security services any free market activity will
have positive long term benefits.
4.
Emphasize local leaders in the
north during the unification process.
Since the Koreans in the north have been so thoroughly indoctrinated
with the notion that all outsiders, to include those from the South, are bad,
the ROK must emphasize that local leadership vice imported external leadership
will play the leading role in the unification process. The ROK should abandon plans to use people
who used to live in the north as new province governors and instead plan to
provide advisers to help local leaders guide the unification process.
5.
Identify and support key
communicators in the north. With
more and more contact between people in the north and South particularly with
the defector community, the focus should be on identifying Koreans who have
leadership potential and are able to influence their fellow Koreans. Support through covert funding,
communications, equipment, and when feasible training to help them develop
organizations that will be vital to support unification. If these organizations develop the means to
resist the regime then that could lead to the outlier path to unification
although it is admittedly a long shot.
Perhaps even more valuable than resistance to the current regime would
be organizations that are supported by the South that would NOT
resist unification. One of the biggest
challenges facing the ROK will be resistance among the 2d tier leaders, the
military and the Korean people in the north to unification. The “Guerrilla Ethos” as described by Adrian
Buzo will be a threat to unification. If
potential resistance can be co-opted before war, collapse, or peaceful
unification the effects of resistance could be mitigated. If there is war of regime collapse we should
not assume that any outsiders to include those Koreans from the South will be
welcomed with open arms. Certainly many
may welcome the outside relief but there is likely to be a significant amount
of resistance and this could make the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan pale
in comparison. Therefore, the more
Koreans in the north who can be influenced and educated about the benefits of
the unification process the less resistance we will encounter.
The above five planning
recommendations are not all inclusive.
They are provided merely as points of departure to consider in
developing an information plan. The
question is how do we operationalize the right themes and messages?
Defector organizations are sending
balloons with DVDs and thumb drives, leaflets and even cash to the north. They are using creative means to get
information into the north. NGOs and
government organizations do conduct broadcasts into the north with limited
access due to north Korean jamming and restrictions on receivers. Although currently the north’s access to the Internet
is severely restricted by the regime and the cell phone infrastructure is not
connected to the outside the internet and cell phones will eventually penetrate
throughout the north and we should plan now for that.
All of these actions can have some
effect and we know from anecdotal reporting that the Koreans in the north know
much more about the outside world. Some
of the anecdotes we hear from defectors is that South Korean dramas are very
popular in the north. Such popularity
could be exploited to help educate the Korean people about unification by
developing a concept of “Unification Dramas.”
The ROK should “operationalize” its
unification plans and policies by providing information to the Korean
entertainment industry and in return Korean companies can develop dramas that
will illustrate the unification process.
The storylines would be almost infinite.
Such dramas could focus on what happens during regime collapse and
follow a village or province from the time of the collapse of the Kim Family
Regime through liberation, to land ownership to political integration and
economic development. Dramas about the
north Korean military could show what happens to commanders and units who do
not attack the South and what happens to those who do. Other dramas could illustrate resistance
organizations and how they can prepare for unification. These stories could be filled with human
interest stories from tragedy to love stories to include relationships between
Koreans from the South and north. By
understanding the ROK government plans and policies for unification entertainment
companies can craft dramas that are entertain and profitable while subtly and
indirectly influencing the Korean people living in the north.
Korean unification is one of the
most complex strategic problems in Northeast Asia. It is the only outcome that will ensure
elimination of the north Korean nuclear program and the threat to the South,
the region and the international community.
It is also the only way to end the human rights atrocities being
perpetrated against the Korean people living in the north. We experience strategic planning paralysis
because of the complex scenarios and contingencies we are likely to face. However, regardless of the scenario or
contingency the one concrete effort we can take is to focus on an information
campaign to prepare the Korean people living in the north for unification. This must be a comprehensive, fully
resourced, and sustained campaign plan.
It must be based on ROK unification plans and policies. The
guiding principle for policy makers and strategist in the ROK and US is how
does this policy, strategy, plan, or program support achievement of Korean
unification?
