Two things about this from a rank and file ROK Army Special Forces soldier:

1) it is a very candid critique of the ROK Army, with an admission of racial bias.  Yes this exists.  But the important thing in this is that a former soldier recognizes this and is willing to write about it.  Although I cannot prove this it has been my experience over the past 3 decades of working in Korea that the US "after action review" process used in a combined environment has had an effect on the ROK military and has reduced some of the Confucian based mindset that often prevents self-criticism.  I have seen many ROK soldiers and officers critically evaluate performance during training exercises and I would bet this soldier experienced that.  That does not mean that the Confucian ethic still does not prevail; in many cases it still does. However, exposure to our AAR process over the past few decades has likely had a positive effect (again at least in my anecdotal experience)

2) Note his comments about assessment and preparation.  This will be especially important when dealing with north Korea in either a post-regime collapse or post-conflict situation.  Every ROK peacekeeping operation around the world will contribute in some way (some small and some large) to the ROK military's ability to prepare for what comes next in north Korea.

Ban Seok Choi: A Soldier’s Reflection on South Korea’s Contribution to Global Peacekeeping Operations

by Guest Blogger for Scott A. Snyder
June 24, 2014

http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2014/06/24/ban-seok-choi-a-soldiers-reflection-on-south-koreas-contribution-to-global-peacekeeping-operations/

United Nations peacekeepers from South Korea secure an airport in Bor on March 15, 2014 (Andreea Campeanu/Courtesy: Reuters).

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Ban Seok Choi served as part of the UN Peacekeeping Force in South Sudan with the South Korean military. He finished his military service—which is mandatory for South Korean men—earlier this month.

During my military service, I had ample opportunity to experience how South Korea contributes to global security by being dispatched as part of the UN Peacekeeping Force in South Sudan. The First Contingent of the Republic of Korea’s Horizontal Mechanical Engineering Company (ROK HMEC) was dispatched in March 2013 and returned to Korea in October the same year. It paved an amicable relationship between the two nations by launching civil-military cooperation. The unit has also provided medical treatment and has supported the country’s reconstruction by constructing flood-control conduits and reconstructing the local road system.

I was deployed with the Second Contingent. As an airborne paratrooper of the ROK Army Special Operations Command, I was dispatched as the force protection unit. Our main objective in the field was to secure our base and the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) compound in Bor, as well as to protect the ROK HMEC, which was tasked with reconstruction tasks by the UN.

The December 15, 2013 coup attempt organized by South Sudanese former vice president Riek Machar highlighted ROK HMEC’s ability to adapt to different situations. Handling crucial matters such as treating critically ill patients, supplying internally displaced persons (IDPs) with water and food, and handling the deceased in a quick, calm way demonstrates that the ROK military can contribute to peacekeeping activities in volatile situations. Moreover, provision of safe shelters for the United Nations Police, Military Liaison Officers, and other key members of the United Nations and the UNMISS within our compound is further proof of the safety within the boundaries of the Korean compound.

Despite successes in compound fortification and assistance to refugees and IDPs, some aspects of the ROK military activity in South Sudan should be discussed further. When foreigners were asked to evacuate the country, it was the ROK HMEC that facilitated most of the foreigner evacuation operation in the Bor area. However, I witnessed an incident regarding the issue of racial discrimination on the part of ROK soldiers who were evacuating the foreigners. While their manner of speaking English and style of dress differed from the other people, from the point of view of other South Korean soldiers the African Americans’ skin color caused them to blend with the other refugees and came to our compound, seeking protection. The South Korean forces were not friendly to them because their skin tone was similar with the domestic refugees. However, when they told us that they are Americans, we started to treat them differently from the Sudanese. We started by calling the U.S. embassy in Juba and even arranged a helicopter flight for them to evacuate. Witnessing all this as an interpreter and a primary source, I felt a little embarrassed that the ROK military is still closed-minded when it comes to race. Such a misunderstanding shows that the ROK military, if it continues to serve abroad in multiethnic settings, should be more respectful to other ethnic groups regardless of their national competitiveness.

The lack of preparedness is another area of concern about the ROK military. During the coup, the ROK HMEC lacked adequate ammunition and bulletproof vests for all personnel. Only the Force Protection Unit and some officers could outfit themselves with full gear. The Ministry of National Defense claimed that because the ROK HMEC’s primary task was to provide engineering support for reconstruction projects, rather than combat, full gear for all personnel was unnecessary. The Ministry of National Defense clearly did not expect that the operation area to which we would be deployed would face a coup. The ROK military still lacks complete ability to assess its operation area thoroughly. Moreover, because the Korean peninsula is still at war despite a long-standing armistice, ROK military’s failure to supply basic gears and dispatching an inadequately prepared contingent to a very unstable part of Africa gave me a sense of anxiety and mistrust while I was serving there. It also raises questions about South Korea’s crisis management ability of similar possible incidents on the Korean Peninsula.

The power generators are a final concern that demonstrates the inability of the ROK military to properly outfit its forces abroad. On one occasion, all three of the power generators at our compound had exploded and we were left with no power. Those power generators were made to be used indoors with a maximum sustainable temperature of 43 degrees Celsius. We—the soldiers and officers—had no trouble with the power generators during the First Contingent because it had been deployed during the rainy season. However, when the Second Contingent was deployed during the dry season, the generators could barely withstand the heat. Following the explosions of the power generators, the ROK soldiers became the victims of ROK military’s ill-preparedness, as we lost access to air conditioning and water pumps. Although we were able to purchase a new outdoor-use power generator, such poor supplies indicate the ROK military is unable to properly outfit its forces abroad.

South Korea has made the first strides to contribute to world stability. It is certainly impressive that the ROK is giving back the world despite facing war on its own northern border. However, for the South Korean contribution to global peacekeeping efforts to be effective, responsible, and safe, the ROK military must address shortcomings in supplies and assessment.

Posted in South Korea

After Iraq, Questions About Training Foreign Armies

We knew this was inevitable.  The pendulum could swing, although the author notes that it may not.

It is unlikely that the Iraq crisis will put a damper on partner-building initiatives, although critics will certainly try to make a case that the Iraq effort, like others, backfired on the United States, said John R. Deni, professor of national security studies at the U.S. Army War College. "Sometimes U.S. objectives for what we hope to see other countries achieve are not going to mesh up very well with what they want," Deni said. "But I still think security cooperation is going to be the primary means through which we exercise our military power over the next five to seven years."

...

Building partner capacity is the cornerstone of U.S. Special Operations Command's vision of its future. SOCOM Commander Adm. William McRaven has been a forceful advocate of partner-capacity building programs. 

Although the U.S. track record in this area is mixed — some countries take the tools and lessons the United States gives them and use them to subjugate their political competitors — the military is a strong believer in building up allies, Deni said. "Despite Iraq, I’m not ready to say this is a bad tool in the toolkit."

But I think people need to be realistic about training foreign forces.  It is not a silver bullet but many who have latched onto it since 9-11 really have no understanding of the complexities and risks.  

This is an interesting comment.  

In private discussions, SOCOM officials said the command's new "campaign plan" mirrors the Obama administration plan the president outlined May 30 in his West Point commencement speech. The problem with current efforts, a senior military official said during a recent industry gathering, is that they are short term. "We need persistent presence," the military official said. "We are hoping we will have the resources. We’ll see what happens with this budget."

The Iraq debacle could dampen the enthusiasm for training foreign armies, although the official pointed out that Iraq's special forces have been more effective because SOCOM made sure they had an equal balance of Sunnis, Shias and Kurds.

So the President has bought into the SOF Campaign Plan? (and campaign plan should not be in quotation marks above which implies to me the author thinks it is not real or a valid plan).  If there is an approved and resourced strategy and campaign plan then forces should be able to be deployed to have persistent presence.  However, persistent presence is not the end but only the start - it is all about what we can achieve with that persistent presence.

6/19/2014 After Iraq, Questions About Training Foreign Armies By Sandra I. Erwin  http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?List=7c996cd7-cbb4-4018-baf8-8825eada7aa2&ID=1538&RootFolder=%2Fblog%2FLists%2FPosts The collapse of the Iraqi army is likely to raise new questions about U.S. military plans to train foreign allies to help fight insurgencies and terrorist groups. Building "partner capacity" has been a hallmark of U.S. military strategy and is viewed as a key mission for American forces in the coming decades. President Obama last month asked Congress to approve a $5 billion "counterterrorism partnerships fund" that would be used to "train, build capacity and facilitate partner countries on the front lines." Members of Congress, many of whom have been longtime critics of security cooperation programs, see the situation in Iraq as another cautionary tale. During a June 18 hearing of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey defended the president's initiative and argued that the United States has no other choice but to build allied capacity to counter violent extremist organizations. This threat is "going to be with us for another, in my judgment, 25 to 30 years," said Dempsey. The U.S. military could not possibly do this on its own, he added, especially as extremist groups continue to expand their reach from Pakistan, across the Arab world, Middle East, North Africa and Western Africa. "We've got to find a way to address them regionally," said Dempsey. The United States needs "partners and capable allies. ... That's what this fund is all about," he said. "I don't think we have any choice, frankly, but to find more capable partners and in other cases build more capable partners because the thought of doing this all ourselves is a difficult one to grasp." Dempsey led the effort to train Iraqi security forces from 2005 to 2007. Untold billions of dollars and human resources were spent to train those forces to defend the country. What is happening today is a "bitter disappointment," Dempsey told the committee. "They simply lost faith that the central government in Iraq was dealing with the entire population in a fair, equitable way." A similar outcome now is feared in Afghanistan, where the United States also spent a decade building and training security forces. "I can't completely convince myself that the risk is zero, that that couldn't happen in Afghanistan," said Dempsey. Military training alone can only go so far, he added. "At the end of the day, a security force is only as good as the instrument that wields it, and that's the central government." Although Dempsey insisted that training foreign forces is central to U.S. military strategy, he acknowledged that the Iraq crisis will prompt some rethinking. "Clearly, we will look back on this and do what we always do, an after-action review and use that results to change the way we build partners." Military experts have praised the "light footprint" approach to counterterrorism that keeps U.S. forces from having to engage directly. "Assisting our friends and allies in developing their own security forces directly supports our national interests and world security," said retired Army Maj. Gen. Paul D. Eaton, senior advisor at the National Security Network. It is unlikely that the Iraq crisis will put a damper on partner-building initiatives, although critics will certainly try to make a case that the Iraq effort, like others, backfired on the United States, said John R. Deni, professor of national security studies at the U.S. Army War College. "Sometimes U.S. objectives for what we hope to see other countries achieve are not going to mesh up very well with what they want," Deni said. "But I still think security cooperation is going to be the primary means through which we exercise our military power over the next five to seven years." The military does not expect to be fighting major conflicts against nation-states in the foreseeable future, Deni noted. It does believe it will need to "shape the security environment through security cooperation." Building partner capacity is the cornerstone of U.S. Special Operations Command's vision of its future. SOCOM Commander Adm. William McRaven has been a forceful advocate of partner-capacity building programs. Although the U.S. track record in this area is mixed — some countries take the tools and lessons the United States gives them and use them to subjugate their political competitors — the military is a strong believer in building up allies, Deni said. "Despite Iraq, I’m not ready to say this is a bad tool in the toolkit." SOCOM has been in the vanguard of training African forces, for instance, said Deni. The command also has spent years strengthening its relationship with the State Department and other civilian agencies that oversee security cooperation. Although the Defense Department has a primary role in security cooperation efforts and owns most of the resources, the "train and equip" authority and funding is under Title 22 of the U.S. Code that governs foreign affairs. In private discussions, SOCOM officials said the command's new "campaign plan" mirrors the Obama administration plan the president outlined May 30 in his West Point commencement speech. The problem with current efforts, a senior military official said during a recent industry gathering, is that they are short term. "We need persistent presence," the military official said. "We are hoping we will have the resources. We’ll see what happens with this budget." The Iraq debacle could dampen the enthusiasm for training foreign armies, although the official pointed out that Iraq's special forces have been more effective because SOCOM made sure they had an equal balance of Sunnis, Shias and Kurds. Photo Credit: Defense Dept. Posted at 12:28 PM by Sandra Erwin | Permalink | Email this Post | Comments (0)

Obama to Overrule Military on Landmines?

Interesting timing on this.  

As an aside, I wonder if the north Koreans will get rid of the land mines on their side of the DMZ (some of which were emplaced to keep north Koreans from trying to defect to the South.  I remember being on the DMZ in the 1980's on Christmas on a rice patty dike across from Propaganda Village seeing north Korean anti-personnel mines detonate on the north Korean fence line.

And then of course this will not solve the problem of the massive numbers of land mines (and other ordnance) in and around the DMZ that were left over from the 1950-1953 and have been displaced due to flooding over the years.  It used to be quite common to find all kinds of ordnance piled on the side of the road next to rice fields while conducting training around the DMZ.  The farmers would find them in their fields and put them on the side of the road when US forces were in the area training because they knew they would get EOD to dispose of them.

June 20, 2014

Obama to Overrule Military on Landmines?

By Dustin Walker

http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2014/06/20/obama_to_overrule_military_on_landmines_107281-full.html?print=1

The Obama administration may be moving closer to banning landmines that U.S. military officials have said are critical to deterring aggression from North Korea.

The Wall Street Journal reports that President Obama is set next week to approve the Ottawa Treaty, an international treaty banning landmines, and position the Department of Defense to comply with the treaty.

However, a congressional source tells RealClearDefense that the timing of such an announcement is unclear and may be put off in the face of potential criticism from Congress, concerns from the South Korean government, and lingering reservations at the Pentagon.

The Ottawa Treaty officially closed for signature on March 1, 1999. But that doesn't prevent President Obama from symbolically signing and aligning U.S. practices with the treaty, effectively acceding to it. 

Yet one of the biggest potential sources of opposition to the treaty may be some of President Obama’s top military advisers who have defended the use of landmines as essential to fulfilling U.S. national defense needs.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Martin Dempsey testified before Congress in March of this year that he had rendered his military advice that landmines are “an important tool in the arsenal of the armed forces of the United States.” Dempsey emphasized that U.S. landmines can be set for specific times and are designed to self-destruct, thus posing less of a danger to civilians during and after conflicts.

Less than a month later, General Curtis Scaparrotti, the current commander U.S. commander in Korea, testified before Congress that landmines “are a critical element in the defense of the Republic of Korea and our interest there. And they're a critical element of our contingency plans, as well.”

A recent 30-page Joint Staff assessment detailed the dangers of a landmine ban with special concern for U.S. defense of South Korea, according to sources briefed on the report. However, the assessment remains classified.

The Ottawa Treaty aims to eliminate anti-personnel landmines, and has contributed to a dramatic decline in related casualties. Between 1999 and 2011, the number of reported new landmine casualties dropped by more than half, from 8,807 to 4,286. Most casualties occur in just a few countries – Afghanistan, Colombia, and Cambodia had the worst records during that twelve year period.

161 countries are currently parties to the treaty. In addition to the United States, non-signatories include China, Russia, North Korea, South Korea, Israel, India, and Pakistan.

Treaty advocates say landmines are of questionable military value in the modern age. “While in the past they may have protected borders and slowed advancing troops, now most armies are mobile and can get through a minefield in less than 30 minutes,” says the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. “Modern motion detection equipment, night detection technology and strategically placed guns can protect military installations, borders and other areas better than landmines.” Regardless, landmine opponents say the humanitarian costs of landmines far outweigh any conceivable military utility.

Opponents of signing the Ottawa Treaty say that it fails to distinguish between “dumb” and “smart” mines. Dumb mines, also called persistent mines, cannot self-destruct or self-deactivate. As a result, they can remain a danger to civilian populations decades after wars end.

In 2011, the United States completely ended the use of persistent landmines, completing a process started under the Bush administration in 2004 to remove all such mines from service.

But the United States has maintained the right to use smart mines designed to self-destruct – typically after a period of four hours, 48 hours, or 15 days. If the self-destruct mechanism fails, the landmine’s battery will go dead within 90 days, disarming the explosive.

Despite these advances in technology, smart anti-personnel mines are banned under the Ottawa Treaty.

A report by the National Research Council concluded that “the current inventory of self-destructing and self-deactivating U.S. [anti-personnel landmines] is militarily advantageous and safe. They achieve desired military objectives without endangering U.S. warfighters or noncombatants more than other weapons of war.” The report also pointed out that many alternatives that are compliant with the Ottawa Treaty “may be less humane than present U.S. self-destructing and self-deactivating landmines.”

In the past, the Department of Defense has reported to the Government Accountability Office that smart mines have a 99.99-percent self-destruct reliability rate.

Security and stability on the Korean Peninsula has loomed over the consideration of the Ottawa Treaty under the last three presidential administrations.

Millions of devices were deployed by both sides during the Korean War. In the decades after the war’s end, South Korea has refused to sign the Ottawa Treaty and has continued to lay new landmines along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) to deter North Korea’s million-man army from launching an invasion. In total, over one million landmines remain deployed by both sides along the DMZ.

The U.S. currently has a variety of mines stockpiled for a potential contingency in Korea, where 25,000 American troops are currently stationed. However, the U.S. does not maintain minefields anywhere in the world, including Korea.

During the Ottawa Treaty’s negotiation, the Clinton administration sought unsuccessfully to include an exception for landmines deployed in the DMZ between North and South Korea. This failure, combined with the lack of treaty-compliant alternatives to anti-personnel landmines, led President Clinton to leave the treaty unsigned when he left office.

The Bush administration defended the “valid and essential” role of landmines in military operations. In particular, administration policy emphasized the distinction between smart and dumb mines. Smart mines would allow the U.S. to address the humanitarian problems associated with landmines, while preserving needed military capability, the administration argued.

After conducting its own policy review, the Obama administration agreed with Bush administration and decided not to sign the treaty. “This administration undertook a policy review and we decided our landmine policy remains in effect,” State Department spokesman Ian Kelly said in November 2009. “We made our policy review and we determined that we would not be able to meet our national defense needs nor our security commitments to our friends and allies if we sign this convention.”

But in 2010, the Obama administration decided under intense political pressure to revisit the issue with a comprehensive review. The state of that review is unclear.

RealClearDefense reached out to the White House for clarification late last night, but had not received a response at the time this report was published.  

So what has changed that makes the signing the treaty a good idea now?

Not much, according to General Dempsey. At a March hearing before the House Armed Services Committee, Rep. Randy Forbes (R-VA) asked the chairman of the joint chiefs if “anything changed between 2009 and today that would render our use of those mines any less important than it was in 2009.” Dempsey responded, “My military judgment is actually [that] the tensions on the peninsula have increased.”

This has some on Capitol Hill concerned.

“President Clinton, President Bush, President Obama back in 2009, our allies in Northeast Asia, our senior military leaders in the Pentagon, and U.S. Forces Korea have all opposed signing this treaty,” one congressional source said. “If the White House is going to move ahead and comply with its provisions, they first need to explain just what has changed on the Korean Peninsula and along the DMZ in the last five years that suddenly makes removing these mines a good idea.”

Congressional opposition is already building to signing the Ottawa Treaty. During an appearance on Fox Business yesterday, Rep. Buck McKeon (R-CA), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee pledged support for the efforts of Rep. Forbes, who plans to introduce an amendment to the defense appropriations bill under consideration in the House that would prohibit funding to implement the convention. The amendment’s passage could set up a major partisan debate during the conference process on the appropriations measure. 

Dustin Walker is the Editor of RealClearDefense.

US Senate set to hold hearing on nominee for ambassador to Seoul (and his prepared testimony)

His prepared testimony is pasted below.

The reason the Koreans are happy about this nomination is this excerpt (the first sentence anyway):

Lippert is a close aide of Obama and often telephones the president.

If confirmed, the 41-year-old would become the youngest U.S. ambassador to South Korea. It would also be unusual as Lippert is a non-career diplomat.

US Senate set to hold hearing on nominee for ambassador to Seoul http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2014/06/511_159251.html Mark Lippert, nominee to become the U.S. ambassador to South Korea, will testify this week at a Senate confirmation hearing, which would shed light on his views on the bilateral alliance and regional security issues. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations plans to open the session Tuesday afternoon to be presided over by Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD), according to its website. Lippert, currently Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel's chief of staff, will be joined by three other nominees at the hearing. In early May, President Barack Obama nominated Lippert as his new top envoy in Seoul to replace Sung Kim. Lippert is a close aide of Obama and often telephones the president. If confirmed, the 41-year-old would become the youngest U.S. ambassador to South Korea. It would also be unusual as Lippert is a non-career diplomat. He is also known for his expertise on Korea and broader regional security issues, having worked as assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs from April 2012 to May 2013. He previously worked as chief of staff for the White House National Security Council (NSC). (Yonhap)  Testimony of Mark Lippert Ambassador-Nominee to the Republic of Korea Senate Foreign Relations Committee Tuesday, June 17, 2014, 3 p.m. Chairman Cardin, Senator Rubio, distinguished Members of the Committee: I am deeply honored to appear before you as the President's nominee to serve as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea. I am humbled by the confidence the President and the Secretary of State have shown in putting me forward for this nomination. Having proudly served as a Personal Representative of the Member to this Committee, it is very meaningful to be back in this Committee room today. In large part through my service on Capitol Hill, which spanned nearly a decade, I am keenly aware that close partnership with Congress is critically important to success in diplomacy. And if confirmed, I pledge to always be a strong partner and friend to this committee. I would also like to thank my former boss, Senator Leahy, for his gracious introduction. I know just how busy he is juggling his many important responsibilities. Please let me also say a few words about my wife. As Senator Leahy mentioned, I met Robyn when we worked together on Capitol Hill. She has been the best partner that anyone could ask for and has patiently put up with years of military deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, long hours at the Pentagon and the National Security Council, and the intensity of work for the Senate Foreign Relations and Appropriations Committees. Members of the Committee, simply put: the alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea is one of the most important relationships that we have in the world. Through my many visits to the Republic of Korea, I have come to greatly respect the people and culture of the Republic of Korea. Our two countries share deeply held values of free markets, democracy, and respect for human rights and the rule of law. And we share a common history of fighting together to uphold these values and to defend our security. I am proud to say that the ties between our two countries have never been stronger. If confirmed, I pledge to work tirelessly, in close partnership with this Committee, to make our Alliance even stronger. As the former Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Asia-Pacific, I have had the opportunity to work closely with our South Korean allies, Commanding Generals of United States Forces Korea, and senior members of our diplomatic team. I have seen the enduring strength of this alliance firsthand. I continue to be vigilant about the stark threat that North Korea poses the U.S. homeland, to security on the peninsula, in the region, and around the world - including through its continued pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology, its worldwide proliferation activities, and egregious human rights violations against its own citizens. If confirmed, I will work closely with the leadership of the Republic of Korea to ensure we are fully aligned in our efforts to achieve the complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea and prevent proliferation of key technologies. I have built a good working relationship with General Scaparrotti, the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, and if confirmed, look forward to partnering closely with him and the Department of Defense as they work to strengthen our deterrence on the peninsula and ensure that the 28,500 U.S. troops stationed there are ready to "fight tonight," if necessary. Although our alliance was established with a mutual commitment to security, our nations have built deep and growing economic ties. The U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, or KORUS FTA, is now in its third year, and American and Korean consumers, businesses, and workers have benefited from it. Last year, the United States achieved a large investment surplus with the Republic of Korea, and U.S. goods exports are up 11.7 percent this year so far. That said, the full potential of the FTA has yet to be fully realized; more tariff cuts and additional provisions will come into force in the years to come. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the KORUS FTA is fully implemented so that American exporters, entrepreneurs, and workers can receive the benefits for which this Administration negotiated so hard. This alliance is also increasingly tackling global challenges as well. Our global partnership includes cooperation on everything from counter-terrorism and counter-piracy to climate change and development. The United States is also negotiating a successor 123 civil nuclear cooperation agreement with South Korea that will allow us to continue our cooperation in this field, while maintaining our strong non-proliferation standards. Finally, our strong people-to-people ties reinforce our shared values and interests. Each year, the Republic of Korea sends more university students to the United States per capita than any other major country. We have innovative exchange programs between our students and our science experts. If confirmed, I will make public diplomacy a top priority and work to foster these exchanges and bring more Korean education and tourism dollars to the United States. And if confirmed, I will be proud to also represent the over 1.7 million U.S. citizens that are of Korean descent and who contribute vitally to the deepening ties between our peoples. Our Embassy in Seoul has a talented team comprised of career diplomats, civil servants from a range of U.S. agencies, and local Korean staff who are dedicated to advancing U.S. interests every day. If confirmed, I will work to ensure my team has the resources, training, and guidance to strengthen and broaden our alliance with the Republic of Korea. Mr. Chairman, the U.S.-ROK alliance is the linchpin of security and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula, in the Asia-Pacific, and around the world. Being nominated to represent the United States in Seoul is the honor of my lifetime, and if confirmed I will work night and day to advance this critical relationship. Thank you very much for your consideration of my nomination, and I look forward to taking your questions.

Interview with Lt. Gen. Charles Cleveland, USA, Commanding General, U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC)

BY JOHN D. GRESHAM - JUNE 16, 2014

HTTP://WWW.DEFENSEMEDIANETWORK.COM/STORIES/INTERVIEW-WITH-LT-GEN-CHARLES-CLEVELAND-USA-COMMANDING-GENERAL-U-S-ARMY-SPECIAL-OPERATIONS-COMMAND-USASOC/

Lt. Gen. Charles Cleveland, the commander of U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), checks his canopy after jumping from an MH-60 Black Hawk helicopter assigned to the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) during a rotary-wing airborne operation over Biscayne Bay near Homestead, Fla., Feb. 21, 2014. Cleveland was one of 15 paratroopers who took part in the overwater static-line jump. U.S. Department of Defense photo by Sgt. 1st Class Alex Licea

Lt. Gen. Charles T. Cleveland assumed command of U.S. Army Special Operations Command July 24, 2012. Previously, Cleveland was commanding general of Special Operations Command Central at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla., from 2008 to 2011. Cleveland commanded Special Operations Command South from 2005 to 2008, and from 2003 to 2005 he served U.S. Army Special Operations Command as the chief of staff and later the acting deputy commanding general.

Cleveland commanded 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) from 2001 to 2003 and served as commander, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-North, during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Cleveland served with the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) at Fort Carson, Colo., from 1995 to 1999 when he served as the group executive officer, group deputy commander and battalion commander of the 3rd Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne). From 1993 to 1995, he served as an action officer in the Special Operations Division on the Joint Staff at the Pentagon and later as the Special Forces field grade assignment officer.

A Special Forces officer, Cleveland served with the 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group, Fort Davis, Panama, in 1987, where he was a detachment commander, company commander, and battalion operations officer until 1990. Cleveland began his Special Operations career with an assignment with the 441st Military Intelligence Detachment, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne),Fort Devens, Mass.

John D. Gresham: What is the current status of USASOC, and what has been your personal focus since taking over from Lt. Gen. John F. Mulholland?

"As we transition into the post Iraq and Afghanistan environment, our mission must be clear. We are tasked with providing the nation with the world’s premier special operations units, capable of executing special warfare and surgical strike operations while simultaneously supporting joint force commanders worldwide."

First we need to address a key capability gap for “high-end” UW [unconventional warfare]. By “high-end” UW we mean the full range of conditions for unconventional warfare, such as where resistance movements are just beginning and operating clandestinely themselves, the occupying power is highly capable, limited safe havens exist, and/or where the degree of risk is exceptionally high.

Second, we needed to mature the Army SOF profession. For more than half of the 25 years USASOC has existed, we will have been engaged in constant combat, and what we are learning is that combat is a great accelerant for learning and maturation. We now have these increased roles and responsibilities, not at just the tactical level, which is what we have been very good at. In fact, we have been created to provide that to the nation – high-end formations that provided strategic effect. We now have matured into a role where we are providing campaign level effects, and that means that we have a presence now and there is a need for SOF thinking – what I would call SOF operational art – at the operational level, that thing that ties tactics to strategy. Now there are ties in there that are uniquely SOF that represent, in my view, an art form as to how we combine surgical strike capability and special warfare capability, and conventional capabilities. That is where the future is headed, and USASOC will help lead in that future.

(continued at the link below)

HTTP://WWW.DEFENSEMEDIANETWORK.COM/STORIES/INTERVIEW-WITH-LT-GEN-CHARLES-CLEVELAND-USA-COMMANDING-GENERAL-U-S-ARMY-SPECIAL-OPERATIONS-COMMAND-USASOC/
.

North Korea Infographic on the Gulags/Political Prison Camps

There should be no doubt that north Korea is committing crimes against humanity. 

This is from the Voice of Martyrs' Persecution Blog.

We should also think about the horrendous suffering of these prisoners.  We should consider how mush help these people will need when they are liberated.  The liberating forces should study the operations during WWII when concentration camps were taken by allied forces.  Those who think there is resistance potential in these camps have not read Ted Gurr and do not understand that the prisoners can only think about survival and that it will be a long time before they will be healthy enough to return to some semblance of a normal life.  But the Alliance will have responsibility for the well being of these prisoners in war or after the catastrophic collapse of the Kim Family Regime.

June 16, 2014

North Korea Infographic

http://www.persecutionblog.com/2014/06/north-korea-infographic.html

Using data compiled by the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the UN Commission of Inquiry, The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and The Bush Institute at the George W. Bush Presidential Center created this infographic to describe the plight of men, women, and children held captive in North Korea’s political prison camps without charges or trial.

VOM's June newsletter focuses on North Korea. VOM estimates that 30,000 Christians are held in prison camps.

Our hope today is that seeing these facts illustrated in this way will inspire you to pray more fervently for North Korea and for our Christian brothers and sisters there.

Posted by VOM_MediaDev on June 16, 2014 at 12:46 PM in Intercessory Prayer, North Korea | Permalink

Technorati Tags: North Korea

Excerpts:

To Linder, the art of special warfare is exactly that: an art. “Nobody is born with the natural skill for this art. It comes from years of study.” At Fort Bragg during the qualification course, operators are thrown into an exercise called Robin Sage. Their “survival” depends on their ability to influence a guerrilla chief who controls when and whether they eat, sleep and succeed at their objective. What makes special operators special, according to Linder, has nothing to do with high-tech gear. Linder tells his men, “You can win buck naked with a butter knife.”

...

Linder has appeared on every significant battleground of the last 30 years — Central and South America, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines and Africa. His military career parallels America’s deployment of Special Operations forces in the post-World War II era. Like many operators of his generation, Linder served in the jungles of Colombia, where he searched for Pablo Escobar, the cartel leader who walked out of his self-appointed luxury prison in 1992. “All the guard towers faced out,” Linder said with a smile.

..

In 2005 and 2006, Linder served as the commander of the Joint Special Operations Task Force — Philippines. His job was to root out the militant group Abu Sayyaf from the islands in the nation’s south. Linder, then a colonel, set up operations on an Abu Sayyaf-controlled island called Jolo. There was no how-to manual; he fought the enemy however he saw fit. Linder thrived in this jungle environment. He employed the methods he learned and taught at Fort Bragg. The emphasis, as it would later be in Africa, was on building relationships with local people. “This isn’t something that we learned in Afghanistan and Iraq,” he said. “That’s S.O.F. 101.”

...

Correction: June 13, 2014 

Because of an editing error, an earlier version of this article paraphrased incorrectly from comments by Edward Price, the assistant press secretary of the National Security Council. Responding to criticism about the lack of oversight of counterterrorism efforts in Africa, Mr. Price said that the White House — not the State Department — planned to put such checks in place.

Can General Linder’s Special Operations Forces Stop the Next Terrorist Threat?

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/15/magazine/can-general-linders-special-operations-forces-stop-the-next-terrorist-threat.html?_r=0

By ELIZA GRISWOLDJUNE 13, 2014

Photo

American Green Berets and Uganda People’s Defense Force soldiers at an airstrip in Obo, Central African Republic. CreditMichael Christopher Brown/Magnum, for The New York Times

“My job is to look at Africa and see where the threat to the United States is,” Linder said as he unfolded his map and traced circles around the territories where he knew extremist groups were operating. “I see Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the Libyan problem set, Al Shabab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia, Benghazi and Darna.”On a searing morning this spring, Brig. Gen. James B. Linder leaned against the red-webbing seats of a C-130 as it flew over the Sahara. On his camouflaged knee, he balanced two dog-eared Moleskine notebooks and a map of Africa. Linder, who is in his early 50s, commands the United States Special Operations forces in Africa. He was on his way to visit a detachment of 12 Army Green Berets training with African troops to fight Al Qaeda and its affiliates in Niger. Through the plane’s scratched plexiglass portholes, dunes crested like waves in an ocean of sand, and hot blasts of wind buffeted the fuselage. An hour’s flight to the south, his team of Special Forces was deployed along the Nigerian border, where the militant group Boko Haram was targeting children in its bid to establish an Islamic state.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/15/magazine/can-general-linders-special-operations-forces-stop-the-next-terrorist-threat.html?_r=0