Conclusion:

What happens next? The immediate question is the depth and severity of the coming purge. It is likely that thousands of officials linked to Jang could face either dismissal or death. The prospect of a reign of terror within North Korea could trigger unforeseen consequences, either intimidating elites near the center power or undermining their loyalty to the system. The very logic of “a traitor in our midst” undermines the Kim clan’s repeated claims of political omniscience and omnipotence, revealing the depravity and deception that has been among the secrets of the regime’s longevity.

The possibility of a far reaching purge in a nuclear-armed state defined predominantly by hostility to the outside world is deeply disquieting. Amidst the uncertainties and dangers posed by Jang’s ouster and execution, there is an urgent need for all surrounding powers and the United States to consult closely to limit the risks of an even larger crisis.

While I agree that consultation is important I also think that we need to be prepared to do more than consult.  Some of the fundamental questions that should be asked is whether we sit and wait to see what happens and then react?  Are there specific preparations that could be implemented now that might mitigate the effects of the next provocation or a possible regime collapse?  And most fundamentally of all – do want to maintain the status quo (Kim Jong-un in power with his emerging nuclear and missile programs and 1.2 million man Army) or would we rather take our chances on what comes after Kim Jong-un?  Will the north's internal contradictions finally come to bear on the regime and if so what actions do we take now to deal with the consequences?

V/R
Dave

 

Jonathan D. Pollack | December 13, 2013 12:11pm

Is North Korea Imperiled?

http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/12/13-is-north-korea-imperiled-j-pollack?utm_source=Facebook&utm_medium=Social&utm_campaign=BrookingsFB1215&utm_content=BrookingsFB1215

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Yesterday’s brutal, abrupt execution of the second ranking ruler of North Korea, Jang Song-thaek, culminated a stunning week in Pyongyang, perhaps the world’s most isolated and repressive capital. For much of its history, North Korea has posed acute threats to the outside world. It is the most militarized regime on earth and in recent years has repeatedly threatened South Korea and persisted in the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, while sustaining a highly repressive course toward its own citizens.

However, the execution of Jang, by marriage a member of the ruling Kim dynasty, represents a very different threat to the system’s viability. For decades, North Korea (though mired in economic dysfunction and international isolation) has sought to maintain a façade of unity within its ruling elites. On Sunday, North Korea’s young leader, Kim Jong-un, presided over an enlarged session of the Party Politburo, where Jang was accused of a wide array of crimes, including the building of a “factional group” within the leadership and a variety of lesser sins. At the staged trial prior to his execution, Zhang was explicitly charged with plotting the overthrow of the Kim regime. Though Jang was not as close to Kim Jong-un over the past year, he seemed the indispensable fixer of the North Korean system, and among the handful of senior politicians who had meaningful international experience, most notably with China.

Jang’s humiliating disgrace at the Politburo meeting, where he was removed from his seat in full view of the country’s ruling elite, and his execution four days later revealed fissures within the political leadership that analysts had long suspected but could never prove. Kim Jong-un, the impetuous young son of Kim Jong-il, anointed as his father’s successor in the elder Kim’s waning months, was the decisive force in these events. Since Kim Jong-il’s death in December 2011, Kim Jong-un had moved quickly to dislodge elder leaders from power (including many senior military officers) and to establish a political and personal style that had much more in common with his grandfather, Kim Il-sung, who established the Kim dynasty in the 1940s and presided over North Korea for nearly a half century.

As a general rule, North Korean leaders have exited quietly from the scene, presumably enabling them to retain the privileges associated with their status in the system, though from time to time some were banished to the hinterlands. But Jang’s abrupt execution bears immediate comparison with events of the mid 1950s, when Kim Il-sung accused various political rivals of factionalism and illicit dealings with the Soviet Union and China.

The immediate questions—and ones that cannot yet be answered—is whether Kim Jong-un acted out of weakness or out of strength, and also whether Jang’s purge and execution will lead to larger reverberations within the system. To some analysts, Kim Jong-un was increasingly fearful that Jang’s extensive political and personal networks would ultimately enable Jang to undermine young Kim’s rule. Kim’s grandiose and impetuous style might very well have offended others within the system, where deference to elders has long been prized.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/12/13-is-north-korea-imperiled-j-pollack?utm_source=Facebook&utm_medium=Social&utm_campaign=BrookingsFB1215&utm_content=BrookingsFB1215

Analysis: Kim Jong-un’s agenda brutally clear after execution of his uncle

Analysis from the former UK ambassador to north Korea.

Almost all analysis revolves around Kim consolidating power or that there could be further instability.  

What I do not read about is whether there are any opportunities being created here or the fact that if there is further instability and the potential for regime collapse what are we doing now to prepare for the contingency to include preparations that might mitigate the effects of regime collapse. Are opportunities being presented to be able to influence what might come after Kim Jong-un (I deliberately use what vice who)?  Should the ROK government or the ROK/US Alliance be executing a comprehensive influence campaign now?  Should the Alliance be assessing whether there is growing resistance potential inside north Korea and determine how it could be exploited to achieve Alliance objectives?  But in every crisis there are opportunities that can be exploited and we should be observing for them.   Just as an aside here is the abstract from my 2004 research project at the National War College.  Note the last paragraph (recall also that in 2004 the ROK/US Alliance was not in very good shape).  As an aside I have waited a long time for such events as are taking place in north Korea.  But can they be exploited?

ABSTRACT

            This paper has as its thesis five propositions that will be discussed in detail:

• US and ROK policies are in turmoil are not coherent, and not synchronized.  There is no long term approach to the “Korea Question.”
• The ROK-US alliance is eroding rapidly due to actions by both governments and their respective populations.
• North Korea will continue to execute its strategy to protect its vital national interest: Survival of the Kim Family Regime (KFR) and any strategy devised must take this into account.
• To achieve a lasting peace on the peninsula, a combined ROK-US strategy that seeks to achieve a mutually agreed upon and acceptable end state must be developed and executed in an orchestrated and cooperative approach.
• Divergent ROK and US policies must be made compatible (e.g., Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine policy - and now the Roh Moo Hyun administration’s Peace and Prosperity policy - versus those in the US who want to focus on Regime Change).  Instead of causing regime change externally the ROK and US strategy must be to prepare for a post Kim Family Regime era that arises from internal regime change while at the same time managing the crises as they occur, identifying and exploiting opportunities as they arise, and preparing for the potential conflict that a post-KFR peninsula may trigger.

            This paper proposes a long term ROK-US combined security strategy to work toward resolution of the “Korea question”: Comprehensive Engagement with Strength: Partner and Prosper.  It establishes a long term end state toward which all efforts will focus.  It provides a framework that allows management of the current and future crises while simultaneously allowing the ROK and US to identify opportunities stemming from current and future emerging crises that will support achievement of the long term end state. 

Key Points:

·      Ensure that an effective defensive capability remains in place until the “Korea Question” is resolved

·      Method for developing a combined strategy

(1) Consultations at the political and military level between the ROKG and USG. 

(2) Increased high level contacts. 

(3) Establishment of a combined planning group (Korea Strategy Group (KSG)) with permanent NSC level members that meet on a rotating basis in Washington and Seoul.

• Repair the alliance: This will take a concerted effort by the President and senior US leadership.  Must come to agreement on the divergent ROK and US policies (sunshine policy versus regime change).  They are not mutually exclusive if you do not use the Iraq/Afghanistan models for regime change. 

• Proposed mutually acceptable strategic end state: A stable, secure, peaceful, economically vibrant, non-nuclear peninsula, reunified under a liberal constitutional form of government determined by the Korean people.

            This end state implies regime change.  But it must come from within.  Most importantly while the US desires regime change it has not prepared for it.  Fundamental to the strategy is that near term crises must be managed (and exploited for possible opportunities) while it prepares the foundation for a post Kim Family Regime era.

Analysis: Kim Jong-un’s agenda brutally clear after execution of his uncle

http://ww2.nationalpost.com/m/wp/blog.html?b=fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2013/12/14/analysis-kim-jong-uns-agenda-brutally-clear-after-execution-of-his-uncle

John Everard, The Daily Telegraph, National Post Wire Services
Saturday, Dec. 14, 2013

This photo released by Yonhap on Dec. 13, 2013 shows Jang Song-thaek being escorted in court on Dec. 12, 2013. North Korea has executed the uncle of its leader Kim Jong-un after a shock purge, state news agency KCNA announced. Yonhap/AFP/Getty Images

LONDON — Never before has North Korea purged someone so publicly as it has just eliminated Kim Jong-un’s uncle, Jang Song-thaek.

In the past, purges were usually conducted in secret. But this time not only has the detailed political indictment against Jang been published, but his actual eviction from a party meeting was broadcast on North Korean television.

Then, yesterday, came the announcement from state television that he had been executed for treason, branded “despicable human scum”.

In making this very public display of ruthlessness, Kim probably had three objectives.

First, nobody in North Korea can doubt now that he, and he alone, is in charge. Nor can anybody doubt that he is utterly ruthless in removing anybody who might, in the colourful language of the indictment, “dream different dreams”.

Related

• Uncle’s execution in Kim Jong-un’s ‘empire of horror’ stokes fear of further purges
• North Korea confirms purge of Kim Jong-un’s influential uncle and mentor for alleged gambling and ‘anti-state’ acts
• Purged Kim Jong-un uncle cut out of propaganda film rerun
• North Korean firing squads reportedly execute 80 for watching foreign films

If even the immensely powerful Jang can be brought so low and dispatched so swiftly, then nobody is safe.

Second, Kim has told his country – and the world – that not only Jang the man, but also the vision that he stood for, has been purged.

Jang seems to have argued for a less closed North Korea, one that embraced trade and sought inward investment. He was in charge of several (perhaps all) of its planned special economic zones (an experiment copied from the early days of China’s transformation) and was seen as a strong supporter of economic reform.

The indictment of which he was immediately found guilty accused Jang of “selling off precious resources of the country at cheap prices” and opposing the “development of the industries of Juche iron, Juche fertiliser and Juche vinalon”. This is Pyongyang-speak for the development of indigenous industries (vinalon is a uniquely North Korean – and uniquely uncomfortable – artificial fibre).

So Jang probably argued that North Korea should trade its abundant natural resources to secure the basic materials that it needs rather than try (inefficiently) to manufacture them itself. This heresy will have infuriated the ideologues and, apparently, Kim too. Jang’s purge probably signals a reverse perestroika – that North Korea is abandoning its timid attempts at structural economic reform.

Third, this is a slap in the face for China. Beijing is often described as North Korea’s only ally, but with every nuclear test and every provocative missile launch, the relationship has become more strained. After North Korea’s third nuclear test in February, China recalibrated its policy. It stopped giving Pyongyang cash aid. It changed the lead department on policy towards its awkward neighbour from the Communist Party, which has been generally kind, to the much sterner ministry of foreign affairs. It made public a long list of items whose delivery to North Korea its customs officials were instructed to prevent.

And – a particular sting – it banned top-level contacts. This has meant that Kim has been unable to visit Beijing, a big snub in Asian diplomacy. To rub salt in the wound, President Xi Jinping of China hosted a very successful state visit in June by Kim’s arch-rival, President Park Geun-hye of South Korea, and said last week that he hoped to visit South Korea himself.

Xi has neither visited Pyongyang nor shown any interest in doing so. All this will have alarmed and angered the regime, and Jang’s indictment and dismissal is probably, among other things, Kim’s answer to China. The sale of “precious resources” mentioned above was to China, so North Korea has come close to declaring much of its trade with that country illegitimate.

KNS/AFP/Getty Images; Jason Lee - Pool/Getty ImagesRelations have been strained between North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un and China's President Xi Jinping.

Beijing regarded Jang as its main friend at the court of Kim. Its stunned silence at the news of his removal, followed by a terse statement that this was North Korea’s internal affair, speaks volumes.

(Continued at the link below)

http://ww2.nationalpost.com/m/wp/blog.html?b=fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2013/12/14/analysis-kim-jong-uns-agenda-brutally-clear-after-execution-of-his-uncle

The concluding paragraph is incomplete:

Seoul handed over its operational command to the U.S.-led United Nations Command after the outbreak of the 1950-53 Korean War. It took over the peacetime operational control of its troops in 1994.

It should be followed with "and the ROK Government exercises wartime of OPCON of ROK military forces under the ROK/US Combined Forces Command through the Military Committee just as the US Government exercises wartime OPCON of US military forces under the ROK/US Combined Forces Command through the Military Committee."  Perhaps if we could get past the emotional issue of "OPCON transfer" we could get down to the real business of organizing the combined military  forces in the best way to achieve ROK and US strategic objectives.

V/R

Dave

S. Korea, U.S. discuss wartime control transfer

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/12/13/14/0301000000AEN20131213007800315F.html

2013/12/13 17:11

SEOUL, Dec. 13 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States ended two days of working-level talks Friday on the timing of the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) amid concerns of increasing military threats from North Korea, the defense ministry said.

The meeting in Seoul, the first of its kind, comes after defense chiefs of the allies agreed in October to reassess the 2015 deadline for Seoul's retaking of the wartime control of its troops from the U.S. in light of Pyongyang's third nuclear test in February.

During the meeting, Jang Hyuk, the South Korean defense ministry's senior policy director, and Amy Searight, the Pentagon's principal director for East Asia policy, evaluated the current security situation on the Korean Peninsula and agreed to continue consultations within the first half of next year, the ministry said in a press release.

The two sides agreed to take into consideration North Korea's weapons program and South Korean forces' deterrence and command capabilities in deciding the timing of the transition, ministry officials said.

(Continued at the link below)

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/12/13/14/0301000000AEN20131213007800315F.html

Excerpt form the CNN article below:

Depending on how you read the signs, the execution of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's uncle and formerly trusted regent, Jang Song Thaek, either shows a young leader further cementing his control, or the first death throes of a regime teetering on collapse.

Because of these questions I would like to offer a couple of things.  First is a definition of regime collapse.  Kim Jong-un will be faced with regime collapse when there is no longer central governing effectiveness and there is a loss of coherency and support of the military and security services.  So far there is no evidence that he has lost central governing effectiveness and the military and security services seem to be functioning "normally" (from a nK perspective) and in support of Kim Jong-un.

However, the only person to ever conduct a thorough and objective analysis of the process the regime might go through to collapse is Robert Collins who produced the seminal work of Patterns of Collapse which is also known as the Seven Phases of Collapse.  I would just like to provide the excerpts of possible scenarios of the phases 4 through 7 below so that we might see the process which could occur in the north if the current suppression phase is not successful (and so far I see no evidence yet that the suppression mechanisms are failing – by definition Jang's arrest and execution indicate the suppression system is working).

Excerpt from Patterns of Collapse (note this was written around 1995 thus the reference to Kim  Chong-il).  

Possible Scenarios in Phases 4 through 7.

d. Phase Four: Suppression - Both the incorporation of local internal security elements into independent activity and the activity itself are perceived as direct challenges to the authority of Kim Chong-il and the Core Group.  The Core Group will respond to such challenges in both indiscriminate and calculated manners.  This phase must be successful to prevent the further breakdown of the regime’s control.  The regime’s full energies will address whatever the regime itself perceives as threats.  nKorea’s track record at suppressing isolated incidents is well established.  Again, success here is paramount to the survival of the regime and world public opinion will not be an effective deterrent.

                        1/ Internal Security systems (even paramilitary units) will be mobilized to employ indiscriminate force to make examples of groups of citizens or entire sub-system(s). Entire sub-systems, such as collective farms deemed collectively guilty of independent (read politically disloyal) activity, will be instantly converted into political crime camps guarded by military or paramilitary units.

                        2/ Local active-duty company and battalion-level military units will be mobilized to employ indiscriminate violent force for the most severe cases.  A severe case would be organized demonstrations (of any kind, but food riots would be an eminent example) against the local or national government.

                       

                        3/ Suppression operations could be streamlined to improve overall effectiveness in dealing with dissidence and/or independent activity.  An example of this streamlining would be the establishment of local “civil order” commands which consolidate local internal security and military assets.  (Inter-agency sharing of information and planning is indeed uncommon to the nKorean political structure.  However, the severity of the situation most likely would be perceived as justification to consolidate.) This inter-agency cooperation would facilitate both detection of and response to increased dissidence and/or independent activity.  The command function could vary.  Two proto-types would be a local ministry of state security official obtaining operational control of a military quick reaction force provided by the local military commander for the purpose of immediate countermeasure.  A more likely proto-type would be the requirement for local security officials to report not only up their chain of command but laterally or even directly to the local military commander.  The commander then acts on this information and, armed with the authority of the “local civil order command,” orders his troops to suppress the reported dissidence with whatever force necessary. 

                        4/ Mass arrests and purges. nKorea has a long history of this activity.  Political reasons are invariably cited as justification, even when activity is clearly not political but civil crime.  The nKorean regime has already divided the nKorean populace into 51 distinct categories of loyalty or disloyalty.  Those arrested and their families are reclassified to disloyal categories.  Arrests and purges become indiscriminate when local authorities feel personally threatened when pyongyang’s intended impact is not delivered to the expected extent.  

                        5/ Show trials and public executions.  These are employed to demonstrate regime’s resolve and demand for adherence to political guidelines.

            e. Phase Five: Resistance - This phase presupposes that the supression phase failed to meet its intended goals.  Local groups, even new sub-systems evolving out of independent activity, will gain confidence in their ability not to succumb to the government’s suppression attempts either through open resistance or manipulation of reporting that forwards false data.

                        1/  Refusal to obey government directives.  These directives will be ignored because those that resist perceive enforcement is unlikely.

                        2/ Usurpation of government assets, such as storehouses or competing sub-systems.  This will enhance the power of local resistance activities, whether economically or politically based.

                        3/ Threats and violence employed against internal security representatives to either win their culpability or simple elimination.  Resistance groups will lose their fear of internal security forces and either eliminate them, beginning at the basic level, or incorporate them into their local sub-system to assist in their activity.

                        4/ The more successful local resistance becomes, the more likely a resource-denied sub-system (which is already a paramilitary unit within the nKorean social system) will begin to employ counter-force against the regime’s mobilized military units.  Such an incident will become a central issue dominating the attention of the Core Group.

                        5/ Successful armed resistance, though only at the sub-system level (company to battalion-sized paramilitary level) will lead the regime’s Core Group to employ combined arms operations against the resistance group.  Some military leaders receiving such orders will hesitate to employ maximum indiscriminate force against local citizens and will immediately be relieved if not executed on the spot.  Other leaders will execute the executioner.  The depth of the resistance phase can be measured by the rank of the officer who does not obey orders from Pyongyang.

                        6/ Low echelon border units, along both the northern border and the DMZ, will cross the border and the MDL while senior echelons are preoccupied with resistance suppression.   Platoon commanders will be capable of initiating a platoon level crossing of the border or DMZ for the purpose of avoiding punishment, chaos, or worse.  After eliminating the company’s single political officer, a company commander would be capable of taking a whole company across the DMZ.  The senior battalion commander would be forced to call for artillery fires into the DMZ or beyond to halt the platoon or company-sized defections across the DMZ.  He would do this knowing that he would probably be immediately executed for permitting it to happen in the first place.  This process would not likely end until the division or corps level.

            f. Phase Six: Fracture - This phase is the most unpredictable.  The current regime and its Core Group members must see the success of the suppression phase as critical to their survival.  Failure of the suppression phase likely results in a quick transition through the resistance phase to the fracture phase.  Fracture will likely result in violence.  The types of fracture are calculable but where the fissures begin is not.  This phase will be characterized by the following:

                        1/ Internal Security systems (regional or national)  will be unable to comply with directives due to ineffectiveness.

                        2/ Core Group members or sub-group(s) openly (as opposed to private consultation) oppose Core Group directives.

                        3/ Division-sized military unit commanders ignore Core Group orders.  They perceive the orders extraordinary and do not believe them or are so appalled (through Korean perception) by the orders they make a conscious decision not to obey.

                        4/ Public execution employed against core-group member or members.  This is an indication of severe disagreement within the Core Group.  However, successful execution of one of these Core Group members is also an indication of containment to a limited degree.

                        5/ Division-sized military unit commanders who oppose Core Group orders ally with one another to oppose counter actions.  This amounts to civil war.  If Kim Chong-il and the Core Group wait to this point before initiating a nKorean attack against the Republic of Korea (as

a means to put an end to resistance energies), it may be too late.  As other dictators have in the past, a wartime footing provides the opportunity for internal security apparati to eliminate military commanders previously perceived by the regime to as supporters of resistance.

                        6/ Internal security officers executed or neutralized within entire systems or numerous adjacent sub-systems.

            g. Phase Seven: Realignment: This will be the most straight forward of the seven phases because the implications of previous actions or non-actions have played themselves out.

                        1/ Pre-identification of a nKorean individual or a oligarchic group as successor to the leadership of Kim Chong-il is extremely difficult to predict.  However, centuries-old historical korean patterns of political realignment indicate the nKorean military maintains the only power to actually replace the previous regime, resist internal security apparati, and  maintain public stability.  This process will be simplified if internal security procedures have been streamlined to include consolidation of control.

                       

                        2/ This military group will be shaped by an associational bond such as common military class, common military training, or regional background.  The overwhelmingly dominant common associational bond in existence now is graduation from the Mangyongdae Revolutionary School.  Service/duty in the organizational guidance department of the Korean Workers’ Party, whether military or civilian, is also a common associational bond among real power holders.  However, this department is so strongly associated with Kim Chong-il that its influence will evaporate with Kim Chong-il’s downfall.

                        3/ This or any other associational bond is likely to search for solutions/methods which enable them to hold onto power in nKorea for themselves.  This groups’ announcement of its intention to reform economically is more likely than an announcement supporting the concept of immediate peninsular unification.

                        4/ A new Core Group will move to protect its own interests and new domination of power. The new Core Group will attempt to ensure nKorean sovereignty through international efforts at the United Nations and other world bodies.  Because they view it as a method of cementing their new-found control, the new Core Group will seek immediate humanitarian relief for the nKorean populace and will seek assistance in improving the nKorean economic infrastructure.

This is another graphic depiction of the uncertainty and complexity we might face given regime collapse.

North Korean execution raises more question than answers

By Peter Shadbolt, CNN

http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/13/world/asia/north-korea-uncle-analysis/

updated 4:37 AM EST, Fri December 13, 2013

Some analysts believe Kim Jong Un's purge will consolidate his grip on power, others that it has seriously weakened it.

STORY HIGHLIGHTS

• Execution of Jong Song Thaek reveals glimpse into closed world of the North Korean regime
• Some analysts say it shows Kim Jong Un consolidating power over a politburo gerontocracy
• Others say it reveals a regime in meltdown as Kim battles military hardliners within the party

(CNN) -- Take one part Shakespeare's "Hamlet," two parts Machiavelli's "The Prince" and an even larger measure of guesswork and North Korea's latest political drama could seem like a Cold War thriller.

For North Korea watchers, the all too real political theater playing out in Pyongyang may offer another tantalizing glimpse behind the opaque curtain of the North Korean regime, but raises more questions than answers.

Depending on how you read the signs, the execution of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's uncle and formerly trusted regent, Jang Song Thaek, either shows a young leader further cementing his control, or the first death throes of a regime teetering on collapse.

In the absence of any independently verifiable information, and in a regime where paranoid rhetoric is the normal register of almost all diplomatic language, any conjecture is likely to be as accurate as it is to be wide of the mark.

North Korea: Leader's 'traitor' uncle executed

For Jasper Kim, the founder of the Asia-Pacific Global Research Group, North Korea remains for analysts a "Rubik's Cube that no one can solve."

North Korea leader's uncle executed

Chang: Regime like Richard III with nukes

North Korea: 'Unprecedented development'

He said North Korea is a master at carefully choreographing the way it releases news events to cloak its real intentions. Nevertheless, he said a careful reading between the lines of North Korean new agency KCNA sometimes reveals glimpses of the state of the regime.

He said that far from asserting the leadership of Kim, recent events suggest that his position has been seriously eroded by the execution of his uncle.

"My guess is that these events happened some time ago and they are only now being released," Kim told CNN. "The fact is that we don't know what's going on in North Korea but what we are seeing coming through on KCNA is very concerning.

"When you look at the language used in these KCNA reports it is particularly hawkish and it's much more reflective of the military than it is of Kim Jong Un.

"Basically we are seeing the hardline faction reassert itself. For Kim Jong Un, Jang Song Thaek was the bridge between him and his father, and now he will have very little protection."

He said that North Korea, famous for tightly controlling the drip feed of real information coming out of the country, was now sending out violently mixed messages.

"The recent release of the prisoner (Merrill Newman) and this execution couldn't be more at odds; what this indicates is that it's a chaotic situation in there," he added. "What this points to in terms of regime change is that it's a question of 'when' rather than 'if.'

"What history tells us is that when it does happen it will be unexpected and extreme and everyone must be prepared for the worst case scenario."

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/13/world/asia/north-korea-uncle-analysis/

NightWatch For the night of 12 December 2013: north Korea, Syria

Mr. McCreary provides excerpts of the north's bizarre statements on the charges against Jang Song-taek.  It is too early to speculate what may happen though I think we have to be concerned with the internal regime stability.  On the one hand if the allegations are true then it appears that Jang may have formed a credible faction, credible enough to have either scared or pissed off Kim Jong-un enough to take this seemingly drastic action.  The paradox is that it is very possible that there is significant friction with the regime as evidenced by Jang's alleged actions, yet the nature of the system provides protection to the system (i.e. the system being the reign of the Kim Family Regime) and this may be able to crush any such opposition despite any weakness (perceived or actual) of Kim Jong-un.  The question is will this seemingly drastic action serve to deter any remaining followers of Jang or will resistance develop further among the elite (I still do not think we are likely to see any popular or grass roots resistance yet).  I think the other thing that we should be concerned about is that these alleged actions by Kim seem to confirm some of the rumors we have heard about analysts saying that he has psychopathic tendencies.  We recall the execution of a senior leader last winter in which mortars were used to destroy him.  Some of the charges are bizarre such as failing to stand and clap enthusiastically enough for Kim (and I think the whole list of charges may be warnings to all north Koreans and remind everyone of how they have to pay homage to the cult leadership of the Kim Family Regime). I heard a report (unconfirmed) on Korean television last evening that Jang was executed using machine guns – not your typical firing squad execution.  

There is of course another partial possible explanation for all this and that is the usual Korea "royal" soap opera like intrigue (must like the historical Korean movie and TV dramas).  One report I read said that the final approval for the execution was made by Jang's wife, Kim Jong-un's aunt.  I wonder if a part of all this is Kim Kyong Hui's jealousy or anger with Jang's womanizing (which of course was one of the charges against him).

But the bottom line is we do not know what is going on inside the regime.  Kim may have quashed any remaining resistance.  I think he may truly be operating on his own (and he may have been "insulted" to have Jang and his aunt referred to as his "regents" overseeing him).  But given what may be Kim's potential personality disorder, along with his inexperience, and likely paranoia caused by Jang's alleged actions we are likely to see miscalculations by Kim that could have significant and dangerous consequences.  The ROk/US Alliance as well as China will need to be vigilant.

In Syria, alleged "coup" took place by jihadist rebels against Free Syria opposition leader causing the general to flee.  Things do not look good for the Syrian opposition.

V/R
Dave

NightWatch

For the night of 12 December 2013

North Korea: North Korea announced that Chang Sung-taek, uncle and former regent for Kim Jong Un, was tried on 12 December by a military tribunal at which he confessed to treason, was sentenced to death and was executed on 13 December.

The Korean Central News Agency published an explanation of Chang's crimes and the events leading to his execution. Excerpts follow.

"Upon hearing the report on the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, the service personnel and people throughout the country broke into angry shouts that a stern judgment of the revolution should be meted out to the anti-party, counter-revolutionary factional elements."

"Against the backdrop of these shouts rocking the country, a special military tribunal of the DPRK Ministry of State Security was held on 12 December against traitor for all ages Jang Song Thaek."

"The accused Jang brought together undesirable forces and formed a faction as the boss of a modern day factional group for a long time and thus committed such hideous crime as attempting to overthrow the state by all sorts of intrigues and despicable methods with a wild ambition to grab the supreme power of our party and state."

"The tribunal examined Jang's crimes. All the crimes committed by the accused were proved in the course of hearing and were admitted by him."

"A decision of the special military tribunal of the Ministry of State Security of the DPRK was read out at the trial.

Every sentence of the decision served as sledge-hammer blow brought down by our angry service personnel and people on the head of Jang, an anti-party, counter-revolutionary factional element and despicable political careerist and trickster."

"The accused is a traitor to the nation for all ages who perpetrated anti-party, counter-revolutionary factional acts in a bid to overthrow the leadership of our party and state and the socialist system. Jang was appointed to responsible posts of the party and state thanks to the deep political trust of President Kim Il Sung and leader Kim Jong Il and received benevolence from them more than any others from long ago."

"He held higher posts than before and received deeper trust from supreme leader Kim Jong Un, in particular.

The political trust and benevolence shown by the peerlessly great men of Mt. Paektu were something he hardly deserved."

"It is an elementary obligation of a human being to repay trust with sense of obligation and benevolence with loyalty. However, despicable human scum Jang, who was worse than a dog, perpetrated thrice-cursed acts of treachery in betrayal of such profound trust and warmest paternal love shown by the party and the leader for him…."

"Jang committed such an unpardonable thrice-cursed treason as overtly and covertly standing in the way of settling the issue of succession to the leadership with an axe to grind when a very important issue was under discussion to hold respected Kim Jong Un in high esteem as the only successor to Kim Jong Il in reflection of the unanimous desire and will of the entire party and army and all people…."

"Jang confessed that he behaved so at that time as a knee-jerk reaction as he thought that if Kim Jong Un's base and system for leading the army were consolidated, this would lay a stumbling block in the way of grabbing the power of the party and state. "

"When Kim Jong Il passed away so suddenly and untimely to our sorrow, he began working in real earnest to realize its long-cherished greed for power."

"In a bid to rally a group of reactionaries to be used by him for toppling the leadership of the party and state, he let the undesirable and alien elements including those who had been dismissed and relieved of their posts after being severely punished for disobeying the instructions of Kim Jong Il and kowtowing to him work in a department of the Central Committee of the WPK and organs under it in a crafty manner."

"Jang did serious harm to the youth movement in our country, being part of the group of renegades and traitors in the field of youth work bribed by enemies. Even after they were disclosed and purged by the resolute measure of the party, he patronized those cat's paws and let them hold important posts of the party and state. "

Comment: Chang's ultimate crime was treason in that he supposedly plotted to overthrow the leadership. The report contains a jumble of accusations that date to the time of Kim Chong-il. Chang had a reputation for wheeling and dealing in capitalist-style with Chinese and South Korean investors, among others, but none of that merited execution. He always rebounded and was promoted to positions of high trust.

Some of the more curious accusations describe his efforts to build a following from those dismissed by Kim Chong-il and by Kim Jong Un. That implies that discontent with the current leadership runs wide and deep. It does not imply that the alleged plotters would be any less Stalinist or ruthless or less hostile to the US.

The swift execution of Chang deprives the government of any additional information about plotting or schemes. That is not the usual North Korean practice. The government behavior indicates it is afraid that Chang's supporters might stage an uprising were he allowed to remain alive. This situation is unstable and dangerous.

Chang was friendly with the Chinese when Kim Chong-il was not. Chang kept the lines of communication open. The leaders in Beijing have lost a sympathetic interlocutor at a pivotal time when they require stability. Chinese relations with the North are likely to be strained and less stable. That means China will have less diplomatic influence on North Korea than usual.

The North Koreans will not care, officially. They will fall back on their national doctrine of "chuche" (self-reliance) as they customarily do in times of stress. They will be dangerous and require extra vigilance by the allies because the upheaval in North Korea does not appear to have ended.

Syria: A Free Syrian Army officer alleged that the jihadist Islamic Front staged a coup this week against moderate General Salim Idris and his staff. That is why the general fled. Other battlefield reports indicate the jihadists executed six commanders of the Free Syrian Army for collaboration with the Syrian government forces in northern Syria.

Meanwhile, the general denied fleeing. He told the press he was trying to organize the resistance by holding talks in Qatar between moderate forces and jihadists. Reportedly he returned to Turkey, but not Syria.

The Kurds beat back another attempt by jihadists affiliated with al-Qaida to take capture a town in northeastern Syria.

Comment: Cumulatively the battlefield reports suggest this week the jihadists attempted to seize control of the opposition through executions, clashes and decapitation of the moderate leadership. They did not succeed, but the opposition is even more fragmented. Fighting continues, but opposition exertions show no signs of contributing to a campaign or overall strategy.

End of NightWatch for 12 December.

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