Will be interesting when or if we can learn the real reasons behind such moves.  As noted General Kim had supposedly been "demoted" and sent from Pyongyang to command 4th Corps from their returned to Pyongyang after their successful 2010 provocations. (Recall our own history with General Petraeus going from CENTCOM to ISAF to CIA – although seemingly a "demotion" as perceived by some when a President asks you to do something you do it and it is not a demotion at all but a sign of trust and confidence and the need to have the right person in the right position regardless of the command structure or perception of a move up or down the military hierarchy – I do not mean to compare General's Kim and Petraeus or Kim Jong-un and President Obama at all – only to illustrate how our perceptions can sometimes be wrong about certain actions).  And now General Kim is supposedly ousted again.  Too soon to tell.  He may turn up somewhere else or he may really have been purged (remember that in north Korea there is on retirement system so they have to remain in uniform or they do not get their government support!)  Of course maybe they simply got a new protocol officer  who left just left General Kim's name off the lists by mistake! 

V/R

Dave

• 
  ASIA NEWS
• Updated October 10, 2013, 2:46 a.m. ET

North Korea Replaces Hard-Line Military Chief

Kim Jong Un Strengthening Own Position

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304066404579126492150777278.html#printMode

By 
• ALASTAIR GALE
 
• CONNECT

SEOUL—North Korea has appointed a new military chief, state media confirmed on Thursday, the latest reshuffle of its top brass that is widely seen as a continuing process by dictator Kim Jong Un to solidify power.

Ri Yong Gil was named as general staff of the Korean People's Army in a report from the state news agency about officials who visited the mausoleum of North Korea's former rulers on Wednesday night. General Ri replaces Kim Kyok Sik, who is believed to have directed two attacks on South Korea in 2010 that killed a total of 50 people.

Observers have since August suspected that Gen. Ri had replaced Gen. Kim after the latter's name stopped appearing in lists of senior officials attending public events and Gen. Ri was pictured with a new four-star insignia.

Analysts say Kim Jong Un has moved to replace an older generation of military leaders who served under his father, Kim Jong Il, as part of his efforts to stamp his own authority on the military and reduce its economic power.

South Korea's Unification Ministry says around 100 North Korean military, government and party officials have been replaced since Kim Jong Un took power in early 2012.

Gen. Kim was replaced as armed forces minister in May this year before reappearing as general staff of the military, the most senior post in the armed forces under Kim Jong Un.

(Continued at the link below)

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304066404579126492150777278.html#printMode

FOLLOW-UP UPDATE: U.S. Special Operations Raids Quick in Execution, Years in Coordination

This is an updated version of the previous article I sent.  The only reason I agreed to do the interview was to get something like the statements in print (I said a little more than what is below but I hope the point is made).  The journalist agreed but then the editor dropped them (probably due to word count) but then the journalist to her credit went back to her editor and got them reinserted and the article updated.

Maxwell, who retired from the U.S. Army as a Special Forces colonel, said he has been frustrated to see anonymous government sources reportedly stating the names of the organizations that conducted the operations over the weekend, explaining that providing detailed information about the operations puts service members in those units as well as their family members in danger. While these operations have to be discussed, he said, and it is important for the public to understand that coordination and preparation goes into them, this information should not come out at the expense of military capability and service member safety.

“If I were king for a day, I would attribute these operations to U.S. military forces and I would leave it at that,” he said, explaining that in the case of the Somalia mission, discussion of rules of engagement and the way U.S. forces withdrew because of the high number of civilians “feeds the enemy for their future operations and discussions of specific tactics techniques and procedures.”*

U.S. Special Operations Raids Quick in Execution, Years in Coordination

By Catherine Cheney, on 09 Oct 2013, Trend Lines

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/13289/u-s-special-operations-raids-quick-in-execution-years-in-coordination

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Over the weekend, members of special mission units under the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command carried out raids in Somalia and Libya, capturing a senior al-Qaida operative in the latter country.

While these attacks often come across as lightning strikes in the media, no detail is spared in terms of coordination and preparation. Trend Lines spoke with three experts about the disconnect between how these operations appear versus how they operate.

“The events this weekend were both significant and insignificant,” David Maxwell, associate director of the Center for Security Studies and the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, told Trend Lines. On one hand, he said, the capture in Libya of Nazih Abdul-Hamed al-Ruqai, also known as Abu Anas al-Libi, who has long been sought in connection with the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, was an important accomplishment on its own terms.

On the other hand, the nature of the operation was not a surprise; special operations forces have routinely carried out complex, coordinated raids like this one, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. “The U.S. possesses the capability to go where they need to go with military forces to achieve the effects our leadership wants to see achieved,” he said.

This includes the capability to conduct near-simultaneous operations thousands of miles apart from one another, which Maxwell said has become a matter of routine for the U.S. military in the so-called war on terror in terms of planning, rehearsing and execution.

In addition, Maxwell explained that the weekend raids demonstrate the increasing emphasis on interagency trust and coordination among the military, the CIA, the FBI and other organizations that has emerged only over the past decade, and that did not materialize right away even after 9/11.

“We shouldn’t look at any of these operations as purely special operations,” he said, explaining that the U.S. military presence around the world provides troops with “the agility and flexibility to be able to conduct these types of operations.”

Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and director of research for the Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institution, explained in an email interview that the hardest part of preparing for special operations is developing the intelligence.

“One must literally create elaborate charts showing relationships of different people to each other to understand the importance of each, as well as ideas on how to get information on them, and then you must be patient and lucky with all the tools of intelligence at your fingertips,” he said.

Intelligence assets, possibly including people on the ground to provide information while an operation is ongoing, must be in place before an operation like this weekend’s raids can even begin, O’Hanlon said.

Heather Hurlburt, executive director of the National Security Network, noted that other needed assets include surveillance capabilities, whether drones or satellites; as well as a base or ship from which the raid can be launched, reinforcements, rescue teams and equipment; and a place to go after the raid to care for the injured.

It is easiest to conduct these operations from the ocean, she said, explaining that urban environments are more difficult.

She added that the special operations teams go through years of training to prepare physically and mentally for these kinds of missions, including language and weapons training, learning about the target and location and practicing how to work together.

Other prerequisites for success are coordination with U.S. allies and partners, as well as policy guidance and legal clearance.

Over the past 12 years, it has become routine for government actors, such as embassy officials around the world, to assist in coordination, and that provides the military the best opportunities for access, said Maxwell.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/13289/u-s-special-operations-raids-quick-in-execution-years-in-coordination

My interview with World Politics Review today.
V/R
Dave

U.S. Special Operations Raids Quick in Execution, Years in Coordination

By Catherine Cheney, on 09 Oct 2013, Trend Lines

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/13289/u-s-special-operations-raids-quick-in-execution-years-in-coordination

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Over the weekend, members of special mission units under the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command carried out raids in Somalia and Libya, capturing a senior al-Qaida operative in the latter country. 

While these attacks often come across as lightning strikes in the media, no detail is spared in terms of coordination and preparation. Trend Lines spoke with three experts about the disconnect between how these operations appear versus how they operate. 

“The events this weekend were both significant and insignificant,” David Maxwell, associate director of the Center for Security Studies and the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, told Trend Lines. On one hand, he said, the capture in Libya of Nazih Abdul-Hamed al-Ruqai, also known as Abu Anas al-Libi, who has long been sought in connection with the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, was an important accomplishment on its own terms. 

On the other hand, the nature of the operation was not a surprise; special operations forces have routinely carried out complex, coordinated raids like this one, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. “The U.S. possesses the capability to go where they need to go with military forces to achieve the effects our leadership wants to see achieved,” he said.

This includes the capability to conduct near-simultaneous operations thousands of miles apart from one another, which Maxwell said has become a matter of routine for the U.S. military in the so-called war on terror in terms of planning, rehearsing and execution.

In addition, Maxwell explained that the weekend raids demonstrate the increasing emphasis on interagency trust and coordination among the military, the CIA, the FBI and other organizations that has emerged only over the past decade, and that did not materialize right away even after 9/11. 

“We shouldn’t look at any of these operations as purely special operations,” he said, explaining that the U.S. military presence around the world provides troops with “the agility and flexibility to be able to be able to conduct these types of operations.” 

Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and director of research for the Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institution, explained in an email interview that the hardest part of preparing for special operations is developing the intelligence. 

“One must literally create elaborate charts showing relationships of different people to each other to understand the importance of each, as well as ideas on how to get information on them, and then you must be patient and lucky with all the tools of intelligence at your fingertips,” he said.

Intelligence assets, possibly including people on the ground to provide information while an operation is ongoing, must be in place before an operation like this weekend’s raids can even begin, O’Hanlon said. 

Heather Hurlburt, executive director of the National Security Network, noted that other needed assets include surveillance capabilities, whether drones or satellites; as well as a base or ship from which the raid can be launched, reinforcements, rescue teams and equipment; and a place to go after the raid to care for the injured. 

It is easiest to conduct these operations from the ocean, she said, explaining that urban environments are more difficult. 

She added that the special operations teams go through years of training to prepare physically and mentally for these kinds of missions, including language and weapons training, learning about the target and location and practicing how to work together. 

Other prerequisites for success are coordination with U.S. allies and partners, as well as policy guidance and legal clearance. 

Over the past 12 years, it has become routine for government actors, such as embassy officials around the world, to assist in coordination, and that provides the military the best opportunities for access, said Maxwell.

“From overflight permission to actually getting agreements to either stage forces or to conduct such operations on sovereign territory, all of those issues must be worked out,” he said. 

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/13289/u-s-special-operations-raids-quick-in-execution-years-in-coordination

NIS: Kim Aims to Unify by Force

Again, this idea of reunification by force should not be a surprise though the statement by the NIS chief with a time estimate attached is unusual.

1. north Korean vital national interest:  Survival of the Kim Family Regime.

(Key to survival and key negotiating tool – nuclear weapons)

2. Strategic Aim: Unification of the peninsula under the Kim Family Regime (in order to ensure survival of the KFR)

3. Condition necessary for achieving the strategic aim: US forces off the peninsula (e.g., Split the ROK/US Alliance)

Foundational strategy:  Conduct provocations to gain political and economic concessions to ensure near term survival and contribute to splitting the ROK/US Alliance to support long term objectives.

NIS: Kim Aims to Unify by Force

By Lee Sang Yong [2013-10-09 15:33 ] http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=11058

Kim Jong Eun aims to “unify the two Koreas by force within the next three years,” South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) revealed yesterday. The remarks were made by NIS chief Nam Jae Joon at a National Assembly intelligence committee, according to Saenuri Party lawmaker and committee member Cho Won Jin. It was also claimed that, "More than 44% of North Korea’s military corps commanders have been replaced." Nam believes North Korea is showing signs it is preparing to engage in provocations by stationing 122-mm long range multi-barreled artillery in Gangwon Province. Rapid-fire rockets may have also been stationed in Paekryung Island in the West Sea, within range of Seoul and the five Northwest Islands. According to Nam, the North has reopened its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon in a bid to ensure its plutonium and enriched uranium capabilities, and long-distance missiles are being developed at a base in Dongchang-ri, North Pyongan Province. "North Korea is expending great effort in idolizing Kim Jong Eun to ensure the security of his rule. A grave site has been made for Ko Yong Hui, the third wife of Kim Jong Il (and mother of Kim Jong Eun). North Koreans are being forced to pay respects to her there,” Nam went on. In regards to the disappearance of Ri Sol Ju from the public eye and the alleged execution of a group of musicians, Nam said, "We have no information on Ri Sol Ju, but we are aware that ten members of the music group have been punished.” (Article is from the Daily NK at this link: http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=11058)

Examining The Special Ops 'Tool Kit'

Unfortunately I think we may be losing the ability to provide quiet solutions. Two relatively routine raids for the forces that conduct them and they have become talk of the town.  

But where there are problem areas, they are looked to to provide a quiet solution. 

I know that we are rediscovering our SOF (or more appropriately our SF roots)  and I guess partnership and partnering are the new terms of art but they are not without precedence in SOF and SF.  We really do need to look to our roots for a vision of the future.

ROBINSON: Well, what I think no country wants is a full-bore U.S. occupation or heavy footprint, as we've seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. Special Operations Forces get training in language. They spend a lot of time in these countries. So they're perceived to have the best cultural knowledge and the relationships to go in and work with these countries' forces.

ROBINSON: It is absolutely the future. And the special operations forces can't be everywhere, nor, of course, should they be everywhere. But where there are problem areas, they are looked to to provide a quiet solution. And I think that is not only the direction of U.S. policy, but I think that it has - is a formula that can work as long as they pay close attention to what that local government wants and needs, and not go in as the dominant occupying force.

I think Linda's second paragraph above is a recognition of the importance of Strategic Landpower and the conventional and special operations forces interdependence (especially Army, Marines, and SOF) outlined in the 2012 Army Capstone Concept (some 9 times I think it was mentioned). 

But I am very leery of establishing a formula for this type of work.  Every SOF activity has to be based on thorough and ongoing assessments (area study and area assessments to put them in SF terms) which I think is what Linda is getting at after she mentions formula)  and campaign plans developed and adapted based on those assessment with the recognition that each country, threat, and opportunity is unique and must be addressed accordingly.

As a start point I wish people would re-read the 1962 edition of Special Warfare magazine as well as BG Richard Stilwell's  71 page memo on "Army Activities in Underdeveloped Areas Short of Undeclared War" written in 1961.  https://db.tt/DONF7c8h 

We should also read the 1963 doctrine for US Army Counterinsurgency Forces – and look at the later establishment of the Special Action Force (8th SAF in Panama and SAFASIA in Okinawa).

What is old is new again and we should begin with reviewing our history if we want to conduct these types of missions in the future.

V/R

Dave

Examining The Special Ops 'Tool Kit'

October 08, 2013 4:00 AM

http://www.npr.org/2013/10/08/230356301/examining-the-special-ops-tool-kit

Renee Montagne talks to Linda Robinson about the raids by U.S. Special Operations Forces in Libya and Somalia over the weekend. Robinson is author of "One Hundred Victories: Special Ops and the Future of American Warfare. She says drones and raids are a key part of the game plan by Special Ops.

Copyright © 2013 NPR. For personal, noncommercial use only. See Terms of Use. For other uses, prior permission required.

RENEE MONTAGNE, HOST:

Two raids by U.S. Special Operations Forces days ago caught the world's attention. In Libya, U.S. operatives captured a man named Abu Anas al-Libi, thought to be the al-Qaida mastermind behind the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa.

STEVE INSKEEP, HOST:

In Somalia, Navy SEALs stormed the villa of a different man wanted by the United States, a Kenyan-born senior leader of the terrorist group al-Shabab. That raid was not successful. Meeting heavy resistance, the Special Forces were forced to withdraw.

MONTAGNE: The timing of the two raids, almost simultaneous, may suggest they were coordinated. Linda Robinson believes that's just a coincidence. Robinson has spent many years tracking U.S. Special Forces, and she's written about them in her new book, "One Hundred Victories." Linda Robinson says while we may be used to be hearing about drones taking out terrorist targets, raids - like those in Libya and Somalia - are a key part of what you might call the special ops toolkit.

LINDA ROBINSON: I think toolkit's a good word, and the Special Operations Forces use three basic modes of operating: the raid, drones, of course, and partner forces. And Africa has been a venue where all of them have been used. But there's a general transition to start focusing on the partner forces. However, in this case, in Somalia, where they feel they have to grab someone, the intelligence is right. And in the case of Libya, you had Abu al-Anas, who was already indicted in New York for the 1998 bombings.

MONTAGNE: When you say partner forces, in fact, in Somalia, officials there welcome this raid against al-Shabab. Libyans, on the other hand, had the opposite reaction, condemning the raid that netted this al-Qaida leader, calling it a violation of their sovereignty. So, it would seem that here was a situation where at least partner forces aren't anything anyone wants to be public about. So, will we see more of this: operations done in countries that at least say they were not part of it?

ROBINSON: I think it is important to separate the two cases. You do note, of course, that the Libyan government has protested, and I think this is something that the U.S. always tries to justify by saying our national interest - and in this case, our court system - allows us to go in this fashion. In the case of Somalia, that was a raid. There were, reportedly, U.S. SEALs involved, but they were also making use of the partner formula. This is a really interesting story. It's involved the African Union mission in Somalia getting together a number of countries in East Africa. The U.S. Special Operations Forces have played a role in training Kenyan and some of the other members of this coalition. You really have a collection of countries coming together to try to secure Somalia and have diminished the threat from Shabab. So we may be seeing now Shabab may be focused more on trying to launch attacks elsewhere.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.npr.org/2013/10/08/230356301/examining-the-special-ops-tool-kit

I wish Sydney had mentioned something about the Geographic Combatant Commander? Or the rest of the interagency team involved with these missions.  I think AFRICOM is the US organization responsible for all the work with AMISOM.  Sure there are SOF involved in the training but I think AFRICOM oversees the US military operations in Africa and likely the US Ambassadors have a role as well (and likely have authority over all US government personnel in their country).  Sydney paints a picture that 1) SOF is running around Africa like cowboys and 2) SOF can win the war singlehandedly.  These "I love me" or "SOF-chest pounding" articles do not help SOF (though I think Sydney is trying to paint SOF in a positive light).

But Sydney is absolutely right that all these approaches are not either/or but rather both/and.

Likewise, it’s too easy to describe “direct action” – drone strikes and commando raids – and the “indirect approach” – training and supporting local partners – as polar opposites. In fact they’re less black and white alternatives than they are yin and yang, each turning into the other in an endless cycle. Policymakers might prefer to restrict Americans to training roles and let local allies do the fighting alone when they can, rely on drone strikes when they can’t, and put US troops in combat only as a last resort. But all these activities – direct action and indirect, kinetic and non-kinetic, hard power and soft – are complementary.That’s a truth that even the slow-to-change US Army has begun to realize, not just SOCOM.

Somehow I do not think this quote highlighted in yellow is going to endear Sydney to his Army friends as he appears to be damning them with faint praise..

Somali Raid: The Long, Quiet Campaign Behind Friday’s SEAL Strike

By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR. on October 07, 2013 at 5:32 PM

http://breakingdefense.com/2013/10/07/somali-raid-the-long-quiet-campaign-behind-fridays-seal-strike/

US, Ugandan, Tanzanian, and Kenyan troops stand at attention during a joint exercise.

WASHINGTON: Friday’s Navy SEAL raid aimed at capturing the Somali terrorist known as Ikrimah is a glimpse at the future of American warfare, one where a small US combat presence is boosted by widescale support to local forces who bear the brunt of the fighting.

The raid itself came like a blitzkrieg from the blue to outsiders. But for the American military and its African allies the headline-grabbing attack was just one part of a low-profile, years-long effort. It’s a war the Pentagon’s top counterterrorist, assistant secretary of Defense Michael Sheehan, has publicly called a model for operations across Africa.

It’s an approach informed by Afghanistan and Iraq, especially the latter years of each campaign where the US increasingly let locals take the lead. But Adm. William McRaven, head of Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and his boss Barack Obama want to avoid that painful first step where US ground troops bear the brunt of the fighting and the dying. Instead, the new strategy emphasizes a “small footprint” with no American boots on the ground in the combat zone from the beginning – except for a few special occasions, like Friday, when SOCOM comes in fast and hard.

In Somalia, America’s first line of defense against al-Shabab isn’t American troops. The frontline force, day in, day out, is the multinational African Union Mission in Somalia, AMISOM. Even when the US takes direct action with its own troops, AMISOM helps prepare the ground.

US Special Operations forces “have helped train AMISOM member country forces including Kenya and Uganda,” wrote McRaven’s favorite thinktank scholar, Linda Robinson, in an email to me this morning. “The former were reportedly helpful in the weekend events in Somalia.”

“There will likely always be some threats that pose such a direct and immediate threat to US interests that drones or unilateral raids will be employed,” Robinson told me, “but the administration and SOF [Special Operations Forces] focus is moving toward emphasizing the reliance on partners.”

Most media reports have connected Kenya to Friday’s strike only in the context of al-Shabab’s murderous attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, for which the SEALs were said to be retaliating. But the jihadis hit the Kenyan capital in retaliation for Kenya’s US-supported war on them, most of it by Kenyan troops in Somalia. Kenya hosts the “International Peace Support Training Centre” where US military and contractor personnel train troops from multiple African nations in counterinsurgency, including lessons-learned from Afghanistan and Iraq. What’s more, it was Kenyan forces that kicked al-Shabab out of their main base, Kismayu, twelve months ago.

“The Kenya Defence Forces (KDF)….swept into Kismaayo in early October [2012] with three mechanized battalions, backed up by soldiers from the Somali National Army and a local militia called Ras Kamboni,” wrote James Verini in Foreign Policy after visiting the KDF base last year. (Ironically, Ras Kamboni started as a splinter group of al-Shabab). TheKenyans had first entered Somalia a year before – without informing AMISOM, which they only joined later – and poured 2,500 troops in for the Kismayu offensive. They were backed by heavy artillery, tanks, planes, and naval gunboats. After initial resistance, Al-Shabab retreated into the countryside to wage guerrilla war, pursued by AMISOM troops who are increasingly trained in US-style counterinsurgency.

Those African soldiers rely heavily on U.S. support. AMISOM soldiers don’t just get training from Americans, my friend and colleague James Kitfield wrote in National Journalafter his own visit to Kenya in February. “According to State Department sources, once they leave the school, many AMISOM troops fly into Somalia aboard U.S.-funded aircraft, where they will be equipped with U.S.-supplied armored personnel carriers, body armor, and night-vision equipment,” he wrote. “Once in-country, they fight alongside Somali National Army troops that draw a salary from Uncle Sam. If wounded, African Union troops will very likely be evacuated aboard US-funded medevac flights.”

The U.S. also provides AMISOM intelligence, including imagery from Raven and possibly Predator drones, trained the African intelligence analysts, and even donated the secure computer network those analysts use, Kitfield found.

Kitfield’s editors entitled his piece “Outsourcing the Fight Against Terrorism” but that isn’t entirely fair. The US conducts a small number of drone strikes in Somalia, up to nine as of August 2012, according to the British paper The Guardian. The US has also proven itself willing to put its people in harm’s way on Somali soil when necessary, with two previous SEAL raids in 2009 and 2012. The 2009 attack, in fact, hit the same al-Shabab base town, Barawe, as was struck Friday. (The 2012 raid was to rescue Danish hostages).

It’s also not fair to call the SEAL raid a “failure,” a term seen increasingly on the Internet in the last 48 hours. It’s true that the SEALs did not capture their target and probably didn’t kill him. They reportedly performed well under fire, fending off Shabab forces without taking casualties or killing large numbers of civilians as happened in the 1993 “Black Hawk Down” fiasco (Somali police report seven dead.) The raid certainly put the fear of Uncle Sam into al-Shabab, which has reportedly reinforced Barawe with about 200 fighters it sorely needs elsewhere.

(Continued at the link below)

http://breakingdefense.com/2013/10/07/somali-raid-the-long-quiet-campaign-behind-fridays-seal-strike/

Apologies to those who tire of Korea issues.  But Richard has written a very insightful piece that cannot go unanswered.  He has done am important service by identifying many of the key issues and while this gets at many of the issues and emotions (for some) regarding the alliance, I would like to point out a few troubling things from my perspective.  My response is not directed at Richard but is in response to some of the ideas in his article.

First of all the ROK-US Alliance and Japanese-US Alliance are different.  That should be obvious to most but there are many who say we should structure them similarly (which means with the militaries as separate organizations and not combined in any way).

Second, the above may not be feasible given that there is a much different threat to the South than there is to Japan and it may not make sense to organize into separate commands from a military effectiveness standpoint (and unity of command –assuming we still believe in that principle).

Third, we are kind of putting the cart before the horse in saying that the US mission in Korea has changed to one of regional contingencies.  That may be the desire, but it forgets one very important fact:  the nKPA and the Kim Family Regime still pose an existential threat to our treaty ally, the ROK.  While I applaud long term thinking and planning and force posturing, I think we need to be able to most effectively address the most likely and most dangerous threats we face in Northeast Asia and that comes from the north, at least for the foreseeable future.

Fourth, the tone of the article (which takes on the tone of those to whom Mr. Halloran spoke) is once again of a big brother-little brother relationship with unnamed officers chastising the ROK leadership for allegedly not wanted to take full responsibility for the ROK.  Perhaps if these same officers would view the alliance on a more partnership basis then we might be able to conduct a transformation that serves both nations' interests and is militarily acceptable (recognizing always that politics will trump military necessity in almost every -99.9% -  case).

Fifth, we should really try to understand the ROK fears of a declining US commitment.  Words can only go so far.  The ROK has seen a continuous decline in US military commitment since 1978.  GEN Thurman stemmed that tide with the return of the helicopter battalion which is really a return of a previously stationed unit so it is not in any way an increase in capability, just a return of what was taken for operations elsewhere.  But as noted in the article this unit's personnel will be in Korea on a rotational basis and the Koreans know full well that fiscal challenges in the US could easily put a halt to that rotation.  And with plans for other units to go to a rotational presence this contributes to the perception of a declining US military commitment.

The bottom line is that the Alliance should conduct a strategic assessment based on the current and future threats in Northeast Asia beginning with those on the Peninsula and then recommend to the national leadership the best way to organize its combined military forces and then split the costs equitably.  We should stop with the discussion of OPCON transfer and move to organizing the forces in the best way to conduct military operations to achieve Alliance interests (number one being the defense of the ROK).  The OPCON transfer and the move of US forces south was directed and not really open for input from the military forces (and not really open to input from the ROK military as the ROK side of the decision was made by a President who had little understanding of military operations or of the real threat posed by the north).   A thorough and objective strategic assessment (not one with preconceived outcomes)  should be the first task of the ROK-US joint working group.

V/R
Dave

The Rising East: U.S.-South Korea Alliance Troubled

By Richard Halloran 10/07/2013

http://www.civilbeat.com/posts/2013/10/07/20071-the-rising-east-us-south-korea-alliance-troubled/

Flickr: U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys, South Korea

Slicing through the pretty words and diplomatic rhetoric coming out of a meeting of the American and Republic of (South) Korea defense ministers in Seoul last week, it soon became evident that the U.S.-ROK alliance is troubled.

Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and Minister of National Defense Kim Kwan-jin, sought to paper over differences about who would be responsible for defending South Korea and who would pay for it. On the other hand, Hagel was forceful in confirming that the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” protected South Korea.

A basic issue was the transfer of operational control over South Korean forces in wartime. Today, an American general has, in military lingo, OPCON over both South Korean and U.S. forces should war break out. South Korea controls peacetime training and deployment of ROK forces.

The U.S. has long wanted to shed wartime OPCON, asserting that South Koreans should take full responsibility for their own defense. But ROK leaders have twice succeeded in putting off that transfer until late 2015, arguing that they were not ready and that North Korea would be tempted to attack after the change.

In a press conference, Kim said: “Secretary Hagel and I share an understanding on the condition-based OPCON transition.”

He added: “We have further agreed to create a ROK-U.S. joint working group to discuss these issues.”

Hagel said he was optimistic that they would agree and “we will get to where we need to be.”

Translation: We have agreed on nothing and will keep on talking.

Further, the U.S. wants to dismantle the Combined Forces Command in which American and South Korean officers share the planning and logistic support to U.S. and ROK forces. Both sides make the same argument as that with OPCON transfer.

The underlying fear of the South Koreans, which civilian officials and military officers express freely in private, is that the U.S. will withdraw forces from Korea despite repeated pledges that the U.S. was committed to the defense of South Korea.

In a communiqué, Hagel ”reiterated the firm and unwavering U.S. commitment to the defense of the ROK" not only with forces on the Korean Peninsula but from anywhere else in the world.

Actually, the U.S. has long been reducing its forces in Korea. The U.S. position, which the South Koreans don’t accept, has been that the presence of U.S. military forces is not necessary to confirm treaty and political commitments to the ROK.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.civilbeat.com/posts/2013/10/07/20071-the-rising-east-us-south-korea-alliance-troubled/