Showing posts with label Somalia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Somalia. Show all posts

Saturday, April 4, 2015

Weekend Reading April 4-5 2015





The Strategist's Mission Statement

I would say that the answer to Maj Cavanaugh's good question on what makes a good strategist lies in the 39 words at the end of his piece. (e.g., secure ... desired policy outcomes)   He or she is someone who can not only devise a strategy of balanced and coherent ends, ways, and means but is someone who can "do" strategy which is an iterative process (requiring agility to adapt and adjust)  based on continuously assessing the conditions and situation and challenging assumptions in order to achieve the policy objectives established by our political leadership.  The why is the policy objective and the definition of success is meeting the policy objective(s) (while knowing full well that political leaders can change the policy objectives at any time, or multiple times).    Another way to describe success is to achieve the "desired state".  I was at a conference this week and some very smart people discussed the idea (that I embrace) that we can never really achieve an end state but we can seek to achieve a desired state because the "willed enemy," other participants,  and the political and security situation are all constantly evolving.  This also necessitates the need to be able to do strategy (as the National War College teaches) vice just writing a single strategy and trying to execute that strategy while hoping that the conditions remain the same throughout the execution of the strategy.

Excerpt:
These are fine statements and descriptions for bureaucratic documents.  But here's my problem with them. They miss one essential cornerstone of strategy - the existence of a living, willed opponent.  There is no strategy with no "other."  And without this point of reference, how do I know how well I've done?  There is no such thing as a "good" strategist, precisely because "good" is an objective condition.  The only thing that matters in strategy is whether I'm relatively better than my opponent.  Thus, the one-eyed strategist succeeds in the caliphate of the blind. 
There is also no mention of an ultimate objective.  Some (particularly BHL Hart) say we fight to achieve "a better peace." In the documentation, I can't seem to find any mention of why the strategist plies their trade - a series of important tasks without an ultimate purpose.   




By Major Matt Cavanaugh

White House officials  defend Somalia strategy  as counterterrorism model

They doth protest too much.  We should not be defending models.  We should be understanding how the enemy adapts and the conditions change and then adapting our strategy instead of defending it as a model.  Yes models have value but I think the way they are applied in the national security space can be counterproductive and most important they can stifle creativity and critical thinking when our political leadership is more intent on defending its model than on "doing" effective strategy.  As an example our prevailing national security "model" is based on the concept of the "small footprint." Perhaps instead of being so self-limiting we should be seeking the "right" footprint (assuming we need a footprint at all).  If the right footprint is not feasible then perhaps we should reconsider the strategy altogether because if the small footprint is not feasible, suitable, or acceptable then perhaps we should not employ it.

Excerpt:

By some measures, it has paid dividends. U.S. drones have killed several of the Islamist group’s leaders, including two top planners in just the past month, a senior administration official said Friday. African Union troops backed by the United States have forced al-Shabab fighters to flee huge swaths of territory.
But this week’s massacre of 148 people at Garissa University College, the deadliest terrorist attack on Kenyan soil in two decades, demonstrates the limits of the administration’s approach and the difficulty of producing lasting victories over resilient enemies.
But we also have to realize that in doing strategy sometimes that ugly strategic concept comes into play:  "Sh*t happens" and that is why we need to be able to "do"strategy. (apologies to the horse for continuing to beat him).


Time For US Strategy Review; Then Tackle Goldwater-Nichols


This will need to be done in the summer of 2017 and should be held at the National War Collage just as was done in 1953.  There are useful lessons fro history.  Excerpt:

The best model for such a review, Krepinevich says, would be President Eisenhower’s Project Solarium, a complex, focused and far-ranging strategic review performed in 1953. It included three different teams working from differing assumptions about US goals. They worked non-stop over six weeks, forcing participants to keep their eyes on the ball and lending impetus to the effort.

A useful overview of Solarium is at this link: http://www.eisenhowerinstitute.org/about/living_history/solarium_for_today.dot  

But such a project requires real leadership including leadership who will value the process and consider the recommendations.



FBI confirms death of suspect Marwan in ill-fated Philippines raid


China shutters golf courses, probes officials who play


Not all golf courses of course but an interesting perspective on China, the communist party and leadership views on corruption.


Life inside Islamic State’s Caliphate not all that it seems


Excerpt:

But peer through the spin and it is clear Islamic State is neither as powerful nor as omnipresent as it pretends. All the signs are the group has passed the high-water mark of its power. Airstrikes as well as resistance on the ground this week routed Islamic State ­forces in Tikrit, handing the anti-Islamic State coalition its first major victory over Baghdadi’s ­forces in Iraq. Islamic State’s army is overextended. Its supply lines are under threat. In January, it was defeated in the battle for Kobane, a Syrian town of no strategic importance but one whose capture had become a trophy for the group’s propaganda-obsessed leaders. It was the first time Islamic State squared off against a well-organised opposition backed by coalition air power. It lost badly.
“They’re very good at fighting and dying in a position, particularly in an urban environment,’’ says Jim Molan, a retired Australian army officer who from 2004 to 2005 was chief of operations for the coalition in Iraq. “But apart from that, you have to ask yourself, have they ever defeated a half-competent army? They stood and fought in Kobane and they were defeated at great cost to themselves.’’

Errant shell puts US military's lessons learned in Korea to the test


The 2002 history shaped the situation on the Korean peninsula in many ways.  It actually was the spark  for the OPCON transfer debacle (a waste of a decade plus of time and resources that could have been focused on effective alliance transformation and readiness), the Yongsan and 2d Infantry Division relocations plans, and a strain in the alliance that north Korea was able to exploit (and of course what really ignited the spark was Rumsfeld's desire to get US forces off the peninsula as those US forces were "wasted" because he could not use them in the war on terrorism).

The other mistake (and lesson to learn) is that the command did not listen to its experts who advised the command to take immediate action but instead approached the situation from a purely American perspective (to include a general officer saying that we would show then how a justice system works when the two soldiers were court martialed and then acquitted thus no one was held responsible for the death of the two school girls and that statement may have had as much influence on the outcome of the 2002 presidential election as any statement by a foreigner could have had).

It is good to see that the current US command knows how to respect Koreans and maintain the Alliance.  

Excerpts:

Although none of the more recent incidents has caused any deaths, the question remains: If another Yangju-type tragedy occurred, would the U.S. face the same severe backlash?
“There is such explosive power if the U.S. attitude ignores South Korean [opinion],” said Kim Joon-hyung, an international politics professor at Handong Global University in Pohang.
However, Kim and others don’t think the U.S. would make that mistake again.
“I really don’t think there would be a repeat of a 2002-type event,” said Moon Chung-in, a Yonsei University political science professor. “It was a total lack of sensitivity on the part of the U.S. command that fueled the discontent with American forces. American commanders in South Korea have been very attentive afterward.”



Russia outguns US in information war with record propaganda spending



Of course a dollar for dollar comparison is not really useful but it is an indicator of how important propaganda is to Russia and Putin.  They take it seriously and they achieve effects with specific target audiences.  We should not try to match them dollar for dollar but we should strive to make our psychological operations and strategic communications more effective with the target audiences we can affect.


APRIL 03, 2015 4:48 PM ET

The Iran Nuclear Deal, in 3 Charts


By eliminating 12,000 centrifuges and five bombs’ worth of low-enriched uranium, the accord extends the breakout timeline for Iran to produce the highly enriched uranium core of a bomb to one year. By requiring the reconfiguration of Iran’s planned plutonium-producing reactor at Arak, the accord essentially closes this door to a bomb. And by agreeing to establish a new mechanism that will allow unprecedented access for the International Atomic Energy Agency (
IAEA) to suspicious nuclear sites anywhere in Iran, the accord makes it much more difficult for Iran to cheat.


Thursday's framework agreement was a start, but there are hundreds of areas where a final deal could be derailed. 

Saudi Air War Over Yemen Leaves U.S. on Sidelines


Excerpts:

Washington shouldn’t feel left out, according to Anthony Zinni, the retired four-star Marine who headed U.S. Central Command, which oversees the region, from 1997 to 2000. “Ever since the first Gulf War in the early 1990s, we’ve been pushing to get some sort of alliance in the region,” he says. “We wanted them to come together and basically find a way where we could support them but not have to lead them all the time.”

Zinni says the Saudis have acted because they hate the Houthis, hate the Iranians, and hate the idea of an ungoverned state next door. “They will not tolerate a Houthis-led Yemen on their southern border,” he adds. “And they’re pissed that the Iranians support them.” Saudi Arabia has attacked the Houthis before, he notes, but never this extensively.

A Funny Thing Happened When These Military Officers and Academics Got Together


Excerpts:

This exercise suggests, first, the importance of building personal relationships earlier in a career. If this is left until they are full professors, general officers or assistant secretaries of defense, it is too late; they will have less time to learn and will tend to be more certain in their views. Second, it highlighted the importance of a safe learning environment where ignorance can be disclosed, questions asked and mistakes made. This can be done intensely through an immersion process over the course of a few days, but it requires personal, professional and intellectual commitment. And third, it revealed the importance of informal conversations based on mutual respect during the inevitable down times of a tabletop exercise. Trust and reliance seemed to follow in short order.
The limitations to this approach are important to note. It is built around small groups; it is labor intensive; and it requires civilian and military participants to devote some of their valuable professional time to it. But even with these limitations the effort is worthwhile. National defense is a team endeavor; it requires the trust, devotion, and expertise of military and civilian leaders at many levels to make it work.

The Obama Doctrine: Let the Mideast Fight Its Own Wars


Excerpts:

U.S. officials have also expressed concern about Saudi Arabia’s ability to operate with the kind of sophistication that avoids collateral damage, negative headlines and fodder for enemy recruitment. Despite nationalistic swagger, many allies who have fought with the U.S. admit that no other country can compare with its ability to perform command-and-control, to find targets and hit them precisely and to oversee battle spaces to ensure all parties are coordinated.
Inexperience with that kind of discretion is already beginning to show in Yemen, following reports Monday that an apparent airstrike killed 20 civilians at a United Nations refugee camp there. Iranian media also bragged Monday that Houthi rebels in Yemen were able to shoot down a Saudi F-15 fighter jet, forcing its crew to eject into the Gulf of Aden where American airmen rescued them in international waters. U.S. defense officials confirmed the mission, but would not say what caused the pilots to eject or why the plane went down.
A situation as complex as Yemen is rife with opportunities for misunderstanding. BBC Arabic tweetedthen later retracted reports that the elusive Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani had been photographed at a Yemeni market. The leader of Iran’s hyper-zealous Revolutionary Guard Quds Force was previously reported to have been in Tikrit overseeing Shiite militias fighting the Islamic State.
Were Saudi Arabia to attack and kill a high profile Iranian officer, even accidentally, it may provoke a some form of war of retribution.
Even if the U.S. can secure a nuclear deal with Iran, the cryptic Shiite nation’s desire to assert power in the Middle East, and its Sunni foes’ retaliation, all but guarantees conflicts in this region for many years.


The White House has pushed Arab nations to start securing their neighborhood on their own, but the U.S. might not like the result.

Thursday, October 10, 2013

FOLLOW-UP UPDATE: U.S. Special Operations Raids Quick in Execution, Years in Coordination

This is an updated version of the previous article I sent.  The only reason I agreed to do the interview was to get something like the statements in print (I said a little more than what is below but I hope the point is made).  The journalist agreed but then the editor dropped them (probably due to word count) but then the journalist to her credit went back to her editor and got them reinserted and the article updated.

Maxwell, who retired from the U.S. Army as a Special Forces colonel, said he has been frustrated to see anonymous government sources reportedly stating the names of the organizations that conducted the operations over the weekend, explaining that providing detailed information about the operations puts service members in those units as well as their family members in danger. While these operations have to be discussed, he said, and it is important for the public to understand that coordination and preparation goes into them, this information should not come out at the expense of military capability and service member safety.

“If I were king for a day, I would attribute these operations to U.S. military forces and I would leave it at that,” he said, explaining that in the case of the Somalia mission, discussion of rules of engagement and the way U.S. forces withdrew because of the high number of civilians “feeds the enemy for their future operations and discussions of specific tactics techniques and procedures.”*


U.S. Special Operations Raids Quick in Execution, Years in Coordination

By Catherine Cheney, on 09 Oct 2013Trend Lines

Over the weekend, members of special mission units under the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command carried out raids in Somalia and Libya, capturing a senior al-Qaida operative in the latter country.

While these attacks often come across as lightning strikes in the media, no detail is spared in terms of coordination and preparation. Trend Lines spoke with three experts about the disconnect between how these operations appear versus how they operate.

“The events this weekend were both significant and insignificant,” David Maxwell, associate director of the Center for Security Studies and the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, told Trend Lines. On one hand, he said, the capture in Libya of Nazih Abdul-Hamed al-Ruqai, also known as Abu Anas al-Libi, who has long been sought in connection with the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, was an important accomplishment on its own terms.

On the other hand, the nature of the operation was not a surprise; special operations forces have routinely carried out complex, coordinated raids like this one, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. “The U.S. possesses the capability to go where they need to go with military forces to achieve the effects our leadership wants to see achieved,” he said.

This includes the capability to conduct near-simultaneous operations thousands of miles apart from one another, which Maxwell said has become a matter of routine for the U.S. military in the so-called war on terror in terms of planning, rehearsing and execution.

In addition, Maxwell explained that the weekend raids demonstrate the increasing emphasis on interagency trust and coordination among the military, the CIA, the FBI and other organizations that has emerged only over the past decade, and that did not materialize right away even after 9/11.

“We shouldn’t look at any of these operations as purely special operations,” he said, explaining that the U.S. military presence around the world provides troops with “the agility and flexibility to be able to conduct these types of operations.”

Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and director of research for the Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institution, explained in an email interview that the hardest part of preparing for special operations is developing the intelligence.

“One must literally create elaborate charts showing relationships of different people to each other to understand the importance of each, as well as ideas on how to get information on them, and then you must be patient and lucky with all the tools of intelligence at your fingertips,” he said.

Intelligence assets, possibly including people on the ground to provide information while an operation is ongoing, must be in place before an operation like this weekend’s raids can even begin, O’Hanlon said.

Heather Hurlburt, executive director of the National Security Network, noted that other needed assets include surveillance capabilities, whether drones or satellites; as well as a base or ship from which the raid can be launched, reinforcements, rescue teams and equipment; and a place to go after the raid to care for the injured.

It is easiest to conduct these operations from the ocean, she said, explaining that urban environments are more difficult.

She added that the special operations teams go through years of training to prepare physically and mentally for these kinds of missions, including language and weapons training, learning about the target and location and practicing how to work together.

Other prerequisites for success are coordination with U.S. allies and partners, as well as policy guidance and legal clearance.

Over the past 12 years, it has become routine for government actors, such as embassy officials around the world, to assist in coordination, and that provides the military the best opportunities for access, said Maxwell.
(Continued at the link below)

Wednesday, October 9, 2013

U.S. Special Operations Raids Quick in Execution, Years in Coordination

My interview with World Politics Review today.
V/R
Dave

U.S. Special Operations Raids Quick in Execution, Years in Coordination

By Catherine Cheney, on 09 Oct 2013Trend Lines

Over the weekend, members of special mission units under the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command carried out raids in Somalia and Libya, capturing a senior al-Qaida operative in the latter country. 

While these attacks often come across as lightning strikes in the media, no detail is spared in terms of coordination and preparation. Trend Lines spoke with three experts about the disconnect between how these operations appear versus how they operate. 

“The events this weekend were both significant and insignificant,” David Maxwell, associate director of the Center for Security Studies and the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, told Trend Lines. On one hand, he said, the capture in Libya of Nazih Abdul-Hamed al-Ruqai, also known as Abu Anas al-Libi, who has long been sought in connection with the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, was an important accomplishment on its own terms. 

On the other hand, the nature of the operation was not a surprise; special operations forces have routinely carried out complex, coordinated raids like this one, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. “The U.S. possesses the capability to go where they need to go with military forces to achieve the effects our leadership wants to see achieved,” he said.

This includes the capability to conduct near-simultaneous operations thousands of miles apart from one another, which Maxwell said has become a matter of routine for the U.S. military in the so-called war on terror in terms of planning, rehearsing and execution.

In addition, Maxwell explained that the weekend raids demonstrate the increasing emphasis on interagency trust and coordination among the military, the CIA, the FBI and other organizations that has emerged only over the past decade, and that did not materialize right away even after 9/11. 

“We shouldn’t look at any of these operations as purely special operations,” he said, explaining that the U.S. military presence around the world provides troops with “the agility and flexibility to be able to be able to conduct these types of operations.” 

Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and director of research for the Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institution, explained in an email interview that the hardest part of preparing for special operations is developing the intelligence. 

“One must literally create elaborate charts showing relationships of different people to each other to understand the importance of each, as well as ideas on how to get information on them, and then you must be patient and lucky with all the tools of intelligence at your fingertips,” he said.

Intelligence assets, possibly including people on the ground to provide information while an operation is ongoing, must be in place before an operation like this weekend’s raids can even begin, O’Hanlon said. 

Heather Hurlburt, executive director of the National Security Network, noted that other needed assets include surveillance capabilities, whether drones or satellites; as well as a base or ship from which the raid can be launched, reinforcements, rescue teams and equipment; and a place to go after the raid to care for the injured. 

It is easiest to conduct these operations from the ocean, she said, explaining that urban environments are more difficult. 

She added that the special operations teams go through years of training to prepare physically and mentally for these kinds of missions, including language and weapons training, learning about the target and location and practicing how to work together. 

Other prerequisites for success are coordination with U.S. allies and partners, as well as policy guidance and legal clearance. 

Over the past 12 years, it has become routine for government actors, such as embassy officials around the world, to assist in coordination, and that provides the military the best opportunities for access, said Maxwell.

“From overflight permission to actually getting agreements to either stage forces or to conduct such operations on sovereign territory, all of those issues must be worked out,” he said. 
(Continued at the link below)

Tuesday, October 8, 2013

Examining The Special Ops 'Tool Kit'

Unfortunately I think we may be losing the ability to provide quiet solutions. Two relatively routine raids for the forces that conduct them and they have become talk of the town.  

But where there are problem areas, they are looked to to provide a quiet solution. 

I know that we are rediscovering our SOF (or more appropriately our SF roots)  and I guess partnership and partnering are the new terms of art but they are not without precedence in SOF and SF.  We really do need to look to our roots for a vision of the future.

ROBINSON: Well, what I think no country wants is a full-bore U.S. occupation or heavy footprint, as we've seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. Special Operations Forces get training in language. They spend a lot of time in these countries. So they're perceived to have the best cultural knowledge and the relationships to go in and work with these countries' forces.

ROBINSON: It is absolutely the future. And the special operations forces can't be everywhere, nor, of course, should they be everywhere. But where there are problem areas, they are looked to to provide a quiet solution. And I think that is not only the direction of U.S. policy, but I think that it has - is a formula that can work as long as they pay close attention to what that local government wants and needs, and not go in as the dominant occupying force.

I think Linda's second paragraph above is a recognition of the importance of Strategic Landpower and the conventional and special operations forces interdependence (especially Army, Marines, and SOF) outlined in the 2012 Army Capstone Concept (some 9 times I think it was mentioned). 

But I am very leery of establishing a formula for this type of work.  Every SOF activity has to be based on thorough and ongoing assessments (area study and area assessments to put them in SF terms) which I think is what Linda is getting at after she mentions formula)  and campaign plans developed and adapted based on those assessment with the recognition that each country, threat, and opportunity is unique and must be addressed accordingly.

As a start point I wish people would re-read the 1962 edition of Special Warfare magazine as well as BG Richard Stilwell's  71 page memo on "Army Activities in Underdeveloped Areas Short of Undeclared War" written in 1961.  https://db.tt/DONF7c8h 

We should also read the 1963 doctrine for US Army Counterinsurgency Forces – and look at the later establishment of the Special Action Force (8th SAF in Panama and SAFASIA in Okinawa).

What is old is new again and we should begin with reviewing our history if we want to conduct these types of missions in the future.
V/R
Dave

Examining The Special Ops 'Tool Kit'
October 08, 2013 4:00 AM

Renee Montagne talks to Linda Robinson about the raids by U.S. Special Operations Forces in Libya and Somalia over the weekend. Robinson is author of "One Hundred Victories: Special Ops and the Future of American Warfare. She says drones and raids are a key part of the game plan by Special Ops.
Copyright © 2013 NPR. For personal, noncommercial use only. See Terms of Use. For other uses, prior permission required.
RENEE MONTAGNE, HOST:
Two raids by U.S. Special Operations Forces days ago caught the world's attention. In Libya, U.S. operatives captured a man named Abu Anas al-Libi, thought to be the al-Qaida mastermind behind the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa.
STEVE INSKEEP, HOST:
In Somalia, Navy SEALs stormed the villa of a different man wanted by the United States, a Kenyan-born senior leader of the terrorist group al-Shabab. That raid was not successful. Meeting heavy resistance, the Special Forces were forced to withdraw.
MONTAGNE: The timing of the two raids, almost simultaneous, may suggest they were coordinated. Linda Robinson believes that's just a coincidence. Robinson has spent many years tracking U.S. Special Forces, and she's written about them in her new book, "One Hundred Victories." Linda Robinson says while we may be used to be hearing about drones taking out terrorist targets, raids - like those in Libya and Somalia - are a key part of what you might call the special ops toolkit.
LINDA ROBINSON: I think toolkit's a good word, and the Special Operations Forces use three basic modes of operating: the raid, drones, of course, and partner forces. And Africa has been a venue where all of them have been used. But there's a general transition to start focusing on the partner forces. However, in this case, in Somalia, where they feel they have to grab someone, the intelligence is right. And in the case of Libya, you had Abu al-Anas, who was already indicted in New York for the 1998 bombings.
MONTAGNE: When you say partner forces, in fact, in Somalia, officials there welcome this raid against al-Shabab. Libyans, on the other hand, had the opposite reaction, condemning the raid that netted this al-Qaida leader, calling it a violation of their sovereignty. So, it would seem that here was a situation where at least partner forces aren't anything anyone wants to be public about. So, will we see more of this: operations done in countries that at least say they were not part of it?
ROBINSON: I think it is important to separate the two cases. You do note, of course, that the Libyan government has protested, and I think this is something that the U.S. always tries to justify by saying our national interest - and in this case, our court system - allows us to go in this fashion. In the case of Somalia, that was a raid. There were, reportedly, U.S. SEALs involved, but they were also making use of the partner formula. This is a really interesting story. It's involved the African Union mission in Somalia getting together a number of countries in East Africa. The U.S. Special Operations Forces have played a role in training Kenyan and some of the other members of this coalition. You really have a collection of countries coming together to try to secure Somalia and have diminished the threat from Shabab. So we may be seeing now Shabab may be focused more on trying to launch attacks elsewhere.
(Continued at the link below)

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