Interesting thesis:  We have been saved from a class of civilizations by geopolitics.  

Huntington's Clash  was mandatory reading at Leavenworth in 1994.  I wonder if it still is.

V/R

Dave

How Geopolitics Doomed the Clash of Civilizations

By  Zachary Keck

http://thediplomat.com/the-editor/2013/09/07/how-geopolitics-doomed-the-clash-of-civilizations/

September 7, 2013

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Foreign Affairs has published a new ebook to mark the 20th anniversary of the publication of Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” essay.

I have mixed feelings about the Clash of Civilizations. On the one hand, it was an important essay that has helped frame the debate on the post-Cold War era which reflects on the genius and importance of Huntington himself. On the other hand, the popularity of the essay outside of academia has meant that it has come to completely overshadow Huntington’s more impressive works, like The Solider and the State and Political Order in Changing Societies. It’s a shame, in some sense, that Huntington’s legacy won’t be defined by his best works.

Make no mistake, although Clash of Civilizations has been popular, Huntington’s bold thesis has not proven correct. Back in 2010 Richard Betts argued that three books more than any others have shaped the debate about the post-Cold War era: Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations, Fukuyama’s End of History and the Last Man Standing, and John Mearsheimer’s Tragedy of Great Power Politics. It seems indisputable that Huntington’s has been the least accurate, and will be in the decades to come. 

No universal ideological challenge has been put forth to challenge liberal democracy, and even the most illiberal states in the world still adopt aspects of liberal democracy like (unfair) elections to enhance their legitimacy. Similarly, while the U.S. has failed to act as an offshore balancer during unipolarity, there are already myriad signs that China’s rise will mark a return to the tragedy of great power politics (Mearsheimer’s updating the book to include a new concluding chapter on China’s rise).

While Huntington’s thesis may have seemed prescient in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, that was an illusion. Al-Qaeda was always more a battle within a civilization than one between them, and the dozen years since 9/11 have made that unmistakably clear. This is not to say that nothing from the “Clash of Civilizations” has come to pass. Recent events in Libya and Syria have demonstrated that the West and the rest often come out on different ends on the question of whether sovereignty is absolute or can be trumped by human rights abuses.

 More notably, Huntington’s acknowledgment that none of the conflicts in the post-Cold War era at the time of his writing had constituted a “full-scale war between civilizations, but each involved some elements of civilization rallying,” has often continued to hold true. Still, the clash of civilization has not dominated world politics in the post-Cold War world and the fault lines between civilizations have not been the battle lines of the era, nor do they appear likely to be in the future.

So why was Huntington’s thesis so off-mark? A number of factors had an impact. For instance, the spread of communicative technology has resulted more in the decentralization of power than in the centralization Huntington foresaw, and upon which a theory of civilization required.  

But one factor more than any other doomed the clash of civilizations: geopolitics.

The old scourge of geopolitics has not been retired to the dustbin of history but rather has remained a central if not the central feature of contemporary international relations and, in many cases, domestic relations. For all the talk of globalization, people’s principal interactions continue to be with people in their own societies as well as neighboring ones. As thinkers like Rousseau understood so well, but which so many liberal philosophers have refused to accept, interaction and interdependence form the basis of conflict or at least the potential for it. That is because people who interact and depend on each other inevitably compete, and as most generally accept, competition of some sort is what usually leads to conflict.

Thus, many of the battle lines in the post-Cold War era have been within societies where different groups were competing for political and economic power. These different groups were sometimes defined by their ethnicity, such as in Rwanda and Bosnia, sometimes by religion, such as in Syria, Nigeria, and Myanmar today, and sometimes by a combination of ethnicity and religion like in Iraq where Sunnis, Shi’as, and Kurds battled for power. Some have been based on ideological or political terms, such as Muslim countries where a battle for political power is ensuing between the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists on the one hand, and fellow Muslims who support monarchy, military rule, or liberal democracy on the other.  Others have been more nakedly about resources, such as the diamond conflicts in Africa. In reality, all are about political and economic power with the actually dividing lines important in determining how intractable the conflicts will be (as Huntington would expect).

(Continued at the link below)

http://thediplomat.com/the-editor/2013/09/07/how-geopolitics-doomed-the-clash-of-civilizations/

A little history for students of joint operations.  Changed for THE good or changed for good?  Seems like we are returning to some inter-service (internecine) rivalry and conflict.

V/R

Dave

How Grenada reshaped the US military

Three decades ago, a tiny war changed the armed services for good.

http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2013/09/08/how-grenada-reshaped-military/IZDvWwlt9Ed1chAJufkrvJ/story.html

By Phil Kukielski

 |   

  SEPTEMBER 08, 2013

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PETER CARRETTE ARCHIVE/GETTY IMAGES

American troops disembarked at the start of the invasion of Grenada on October 25, 1983.

ON OCT. 25, 1983, the United States invaded the tiny Caribbean island republic of Grenada, a military mismatch analogous to a Goliath doing battle with a David—only with no sharp stones in the shepherd’s pouch.

Hostilities on the island were declared over within a week. The invasion is remembered today in America, if at all, as a brushfire war where the US military won a restorative victory in its first full-fledged combat since the ignominious end of the Vietnam War a decade earlier.

In subsequent years, the American military would march on to victory in Panama and in Kuwait, and then deploy for larger, much longer wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. But 30 years after the invasion of Grenada, hindsight suggests that this little war turned out in the long run to have a disproportionately large effect on the American military.

UPI

US Army medical personnel helped a wounded soldier to a helicopter at St George's University School of Medicine in Grenada.

The victory took longer to achieve and was more costly in American casualties than it should have been because of serious flaws in how the four uniformed branches performed together in joint combat. And in key respects, how the Pentagon is structured today—how military combat commands are organized and led, how officers get to be admirals or generals, and how the military relates to the news media on the battlefield—is because of the embarrassing lessons it learned in Grenada.

A Marine officer later told an official military historian that he was more afraid of being shot at by the 82nd Airborne than he was of the Grenadian Army.

Today the military has a new set of experiences under its belt. And with defense cuts looming again, it faces what many believe will be similar challenges to those of that time: how to adapt for new kinds of engagements, and ensure that all the military services, indeed all branches of government, work effectively together to plan and fight the inevitable next war. The example of Grenada suggests that productive change can, indeed, come to even a resistant, entrenched bureaucracy—but it also offers a vivid warning about what can happen when you wait to make these changes until after the shooting starts.

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FOR MOST OF its modern history, Grenada’s principal claim to fame—besides wide, sandy beaches and a gentle climate—has been as a leading world exporter of spices, especially nutmeg. An island microstate located 100 miles off the coast of Venezuela, it has a population comparable to the city of Cambridge, Mass., and a land area equal to Philadelphia’s.

But after the nation gained its full independence from Great Britain in 1974, the tiny state played host to very volatile domestic politics. On Oct. 19, 1983, Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, three of his cabinet ministers, and seven of his close supporters were executed by Grenadian soldiers on the orders of a hard-line faction within Bishop’s own Communist-style party. The killings plunged the country into governmental chaos, raising fears for the safety of about 1,000 Americans living on the island, including 600 US students attending St. George’s University School of Medicine.

Even before the killings, the Reagan administration had been concerned about the growing influence of Cuba and the Soviet Union on the island’s leftist government, especially the potential military uses of a new 9,000-foot commercial runway then nearing completion on Grenada by Cuban construction workers.

ASSOCIATED PRESS

A solider posed with students from the school after the invasion.

When the bloody coup occurred in 1983, a US Navy aircraft carrier group and a Marine amphibious unit happened to be in the Atlantic in route to the Mediterranean. The battle-ready force of 11 ships was diverted south to Grenada. A secret American-led invasion was hastily organized and launched.

An American force of more than 6,000 that included elite troops from all four uniform services was dispatched to the island. The resistance they faced was a poorly trained Grenadian Army of about 700 front-rank soldiers supported by 650 military-trained Cuban construction workers and 43 Cuban and Soviet military advisers.

In charge of the American force was Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, a three-star admiral with the US Navy. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, then a two-star general in command of a Georgia-based Army division, was picked by the Pentagon to be the Army’s top liaison to Metcalf. In his autobiography, Schwarzkopf recalled feeling “about as welcome as a case of the mumps” when he reported for duty with the Navy. That feeling foretold a great deal.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2013/09/08/how-grenada-reshaped-military/IZDvWwlt9Ed1chAJufkrvJ/story.html

U.S. Special Forces Operator in Fight (Afghanistan 2001 - 2003)

This is a review of a scale model of a Special Forces Soldier.  I am not a modeler but this caught my eye.But what is fascinating is the reviewer's description of not only CIA-SOF operations in Afghanistan following September 11th but the detailed description of the Soldier's equipment used in the model and even a discussion of the "tightening of grooming standards in 2002.

In-Box Review 1⁄35 US Special Forces Afghanistan U.S. Special Forces Operator in Fight (Afghanistan 2001 - 2003)

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by: Rob Harvey [ AFV_ROB ]

http://www.armorama.com/modules.php?req=showcontent&op=modload&name=Reviews&file=index&id=9422

introduction

Following the al Qaeda orchestrated attacks on September 11th, the Afghan Taliban where give an ultimatum by the United States to hand over high level al Qaeda individuals (widely known to having been harboured in the Islamic Republic). Combat operations officially started on the 6th October following the Taliban’s refusal to cooperate, although CIA Special Activities Division (SAD) personal had arrived in country days earlier to link up with the Northern Alliance and facilitate the insertion of Army Special Forces detachments.

Army Special Forces, among other US Special Forces units, would go on to play a key role in the initial stages of the ensuing Operation Enduring Freedom. ODA teams (Operational Detachment Alpha) of 5th Special Forces Group formed part JSTOF-N (Joint Special Operations Task Force- North) or ‘Task Force Dagger’. Operating alongside the 160th SOAR, they arrived in country in mid-October to link up with CIA elements and Northern Alliance warlords. They were instrumental in coordinating air-strikes on Al Qaeda and Taliban positions, as well as numerous other activities such as ‘pshyops’ and the capture of on main urban centers such as Mazar-e-Sharif in November.

As the war progressed ODA teams went on the engage in operations around Tora Bora and the 2002 Operation Anaconda. 5th SF Group left Afghanistan in 2002 to prepare for upcoming operations in Iraq, leaving other Special Forces units to continue the fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

review

As some of you may choose to skim read my review, I’ll start with the most important bit. This figure is quite simply stunning. The quality of the sculpting and level of intricate detail displayed here is synonymous with a style of sculpting coming out of Russia at present which is at the forefront of the miniature figure market.

Cast in fine grey resin and sculpted by the highly talented Sergey Traviansky, the figure is broken down into seven parts, packaged in the distinctive Evolution Miniatures cardboard box. The casting is totally flawless without any imperfections present on the parts. An even more impressive feat is the almost total absence of any mold lines, one only needs to remove fairly minimal casting blocks from the separate parts, which thankfully have quite limited contact points.

The basic breakdown of the figure is main body; separate lower right leg; 2x arms; main weapon with integrally cast hands, radio and side arm.

The figure itself depicts a Special Forces Operator in Afghanistan circa 2001-2003, and is most likely based on the appearance and attire of a member of a 5th Special Forces Group ODA team during summer op’s prior to the tightening of grooming standards (in late 2002). ODA Operators working alongside the Northern Alliance and locally recruited Afghan Militia Forces (AMF), adopted full beards and often wore the traditional Afghan pakol, both to blend in and as a mark of respect and cultural awareness.

Like many Operators at the time, this figure wears an ad hoc combination of equipment and clothing, very much selected on a mission specific basis. His basic attire consists of civilian vest, the ubiquitous standard issue 3-tone desert pattern BDU trousers and desert boots. Secured to his right thigh is a drop leg harness with Safariland Tactical Holster. The lower leg attaches just below the harness, with a flawless fit and the clothing creases matching up.

On his upper torso he wears a Ceradyne SPEAR (Special Operations Forces Equipment Advanced Requirements) BALCS (Body Armor/Load Carriage System) vest. Manufactured from 2000 onwards, these vests featured soft fragmentation protective armor and could also carry two SAPI plates. On the front and rear are vertical and horizontal rows of PALS webbing for pouch attachment. Slung across his chest is a Blackhawk Industries chest rig, with four M4 magazine pouches and two larger utility pouches. Just visible attached to the SPEAR vest above the chest rig and partially obscured by the figures shemagh is an M9 magazine pouch and attached to the rear is a Camelback MOLLE hydration system with drinking tube across the shoulder. Molded separately is an AN/PRC-148 Multiband Inter/Intra Team Radio (MBITR), for affixing onto the Camelback.

The head is cast integrally with the main body and is a work of art. The detail is mind blowing with plenty of character and a superb likeness to the now famous bearded ODA Operators. He wears M44 style U.S. military ‘sun, wind & dust goggles’, and Tactical Assault Spec-Ops Communication Headset (TASC-1), the modeler just having to fashion a microphone from fine wire.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.armorama.com/modules.php?req=showcontent&op=modload&name=Reviews&file=index&id=9422

PUSHBACK: COUNTERING THE IRAN ACTION NETWORK by Scott Modell, Dr. David Asher

I recommend reading this report and although the authors never use the phrase, we should think of this Iran Action Network from the perspective of  Unconventional Warfare. 

I also wonder if many of the anti-SOF antibodies that have built up over the concept of the Global SOF Network are from a kind of mirror imaging on these hostile networks that exist.  There may be fear in the now well worn adage "it takes a network to defeat a network" that has resulted in pushback for the Global SOF Network because of the (very incorrect) perception that US SOF might operate in the same manner as the Iran Action Network.

But we should recall that the current US doctrinal definition of UW was meant to also describe non-US conduct of UW and I think this report illustrates the fact that the Iranians are conducting a form of UW.

But rather than a GSN and "a network to defeat a network" what I think should be added to the policy recommendations that begin on page 23 is that we must be able to develop and execute a comprehensive and holistic counter-Unconventional Warfare Strategy.  There are many pieces and parts of one in the recommendations but we really need to recognize that the Iranians are conducting UW and pose a UW threat to the US and our friends, partners, and allies.  Therefore we must devise a counter-UW strategy with supporting campaign plans that will  protect our interests.  As the policy recommendations illustrate countering an enemy UW threat requires much more than SOF or the military (just as conducting UW does).

You can download the 5.5MB 40 page report at this link: http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Pushback_ModellAsher.pdf

V/R

Dave

PUSHBACK: COUNTERING THE IRAN ACTION NETWORK

Authors: Scott Modell, Dr. David Asher
Type of Publication: Report
Date: 09/05/2013

http://www.cnas.org/pushback

Download the full report (PDF)

In focusing on the challenges posed by Iran’s nuclear ambitions, U.S. policymakers have overlooked the threat posed by Tehran’s global revolutionary network argue Scott Modell and David Asher in Pushback: Countering the Iran Action Network.  Scott Modell, a Non-Resident Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Dr. David Asher, an Adjunct Senior Fellow at CNAS, report that for more than 30 years, Iran has utilized a network of government and non-government organizations to promote the Islamic revolution abroad. They call upon Washington to “conduct an active pushback campaign to combat Iran’s regional and global influence” that includes improving government coordination and information sharing and creating an illicit finance czar at the Treasury Department. 

Like Father Like Son? Determining North Korea’s Crisis Management Strategy

A few key points worth keeping in mind.  North Korean crisis action decision making is really the key to stability.  For effective deterrence the north's crisis action decision making must be understood.   Mr. Kim provides some important warnings about Kim Jong-un.

Immune to North Korea’s saber-rattling after years of such rhetoric, no one in South Korea really expected a war would erupt. Yet we must avoid the trap of thinking Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un are one and the same.

While it certainly seems that Kim Jong Eun has inherited the strategic and tactical aspects of North Korea’s foreign policy from his father, it does not appear as if he will maintain the same semblance of stability. 

…

Yet the actions of Kim Jong Eun this year have crossed all of the lines Kim Jong Il drew in the sand from 1995 to 2011. The young leader does not appear to understand the significance of this nor has he the ability to control the outcome. There is already a collective feeling spreading amongst South Koreans of a need to respond decisively to North Korean provocations, and it is hard to predict what direction things will go in the event that South Korea pushes back against the power-hungry Kim Jong Eun.

…

In an effort to show that he is an even more dignified, strong and fearsome leader than his father, Kim Jong Eun could well take this dangerous gamble. Even if the possibility of a full-scale war remains small, it is important for South Korea to prepare for any eventuality.

V/R
Dave 

Like Father Like Son? Determining North Korea’s Crisis Management Strategy  [Kim Young Hwan Files 4]http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk03600&num=10932

By Kim Young Hwan, Zeitgeist [2013-09-06 11:27 ]

Has North Korea’s ability to control military tensions and manage potential crises significantly decreased? Kim Jong Il ratcheted tensions between the two Koreas for a variety of reasons; keeping South Korea at arm’s length, diverting attention away from the nuclear issue, and increasing the regime’s power over the military and citizenry.  However, North Korea has produced unnecessary levels of over-the-top rhetoric. Several exit opportunities were presented but all were ignored. Then suddenly, and without justification, the rhetorical onslaught abruptly stopped. While the seriousness of these threats has since been questioned, tensions may well have escalated into a conflict had the intense rhetoric continued. Moreover, North Korea appeared to have taken this risk in the absence of any well-thought-out strategy or tactics.  Doubts also remain as to Kim Jong Eun’s ability to effectively manage the issue of the Kaesong Industrial Complex . Some argue that it was North Korea’s intention to completely shut down the complex from the beginning. While the income North Korea receives from the complex is not insignificant, the North Korean economy has gradually been improving due to increasing Sino-North Korean trade. For this reason, it is argued, the regime felt it pertinent to shut the complex due to the ideological contamination of North Korean laborers by their South Korean employers. Yet something is amiss here. Why would the regime be so concerned about the workers in Kaesong, who are under 24-hour supervision, when 80,000 North Koreans a year are sent to China where they are exposed to relatively more information from the outside world? If the complex really presented such a danger, Kim Jong Il would not have let it run for as long as it did. Even during the war of words that broke out during the Lee Myung Bak administration, Kim Jong Il still allowed its operation. This may be read as a sign that Kim Jong Il intended the complex to remain open following his death. While it remains unclear as to why the regime decided to disrupt the complex’s operations, it does not seem plausible that the regime made any advance decision to enforce a closure. Instead, this move was initiated with the purpose of raising tensions on the peninsula, but then soon got out of hand when the regime misjudged its timing in exiting the crisis.  Regardless of any underlying motivations, the closure of a project like Kaesong would be major disaster for any country in the early stages of economic development. International investors will get the impression that the country is unable to follow the basic rules of a market economy. This perception is unlikely to disappear even in the event of a re-start. Moreover, North Korea’s approach has been nothing short of sloppy. One minute war threats are issued, the next minute basketball star Dennis Rodman is welcomed in Pyongyang with open arms. On March 18, in the midst of the highest tensions in recent memory, North Korea held a “National Light Industry Conference.” While such a conference is certainly needed, it occurred at the worst possible time. Additionally, their relationship with the United States was jeopardized after North Korea launched a rocket not even two months after assuring the Americans they wouldn't. Immune to North Korea’s saber-rattling after years of such rhetoric, no one in South Korea really expected a war would erupt. Yet we must avoid the trap of thinking Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un are one and the same. (Continued at the link below) http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk03600&num=10932

Army War College Research Resources

The U.S. Army War College Library is pleased to announce the publication of

three new bibliographies:

AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY

The purpose of this bibliography is to introduce some of the resources

readily available in our Library's collection on American Military History.

Topics include the importance of history, doctrine, strategy, and tactics, lessons

learned, rules of engagement and law of war, transformation and reform, and

pathways to additional historical information.

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/library/bibs/american_military_history.pdf

CYBERSPACE

Contains resources discussing cyber acts of war, the battlespace of the

fifth domain, governance, jurisdiction, policy, security, strategy, and

technology that is currently being employed.

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/library/bibs/Cyberspace2013.pdf

OFFICERSHIP AND THE PROFESSION

Includes references for readings on career path, education, civil-military

relations, mentorship, and other topics directly related to the study of

Officership and the Profession.

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/library/bibs/Officership2013.pdf

These bibliographies and others compiled by our research librarians are

available online through the Library's home page at

http://usawc.libguides.com/bibliographies

Feel free to disseminate widely and post to appropriate websites. In fact,

we would love to know if you do post our bibliographies somewhere - it helps us

 to assess their value and relevance.

Greta Andrusyszyn, MLS, Compiler

Research Librarian

U. S. Army War College Library

122 Forbes Avenue

Carlisle, PA 17013-5220

717.245.3660 / 717.245.3720 (fax)

greta.andrusyszyn@us.army.mil

Is anyone surprised?  When I think about Snowden I am reminded of this quote:

A nation can survive its fools, and even the ambitious. But it cannot survive treason from within. An enemy at the gates is less formidable, for he is known and carries his banner openly. But the traitor moves amongst those within the gate freely, his sly whispers rustling through all the alleys, heard in the very halls of government itself. For the traitor appears not a traitor; he speaks in accents familiar to his victims, and he wears their face and their arguments, he appeals to the baseness that lies deep in the hearts of all men. He rots the soul of a nation, he works secretly and unknown in the night to undermine the pillars of the city, he infects the body politic so that it can no longer resist. A murder is less to fear.

- Cicero Marcus Tullius, Born on January 3, 106 BC and was murdered on December 7, 43 BC.

I think Snowden had much more sinister designs from the very beginning other than just trying to protect the privacy rights of American citizens.

V/R

Dave

• 
  RUSSIA NEWS
• September 4, 2013, 9:21 p.m. ET

Putin Admits Early Snowden Contact

By 
• LUKAS I. ALPERT

• http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323623304579054890606102138.html#printMode

MOSCOW—President Vladimir Putin conceded that Edward Snowden contacted Russian diplomats in Hong Kong a few days before boarding a plane to Moscow, but said that no agreement was reached to shelter him and that the former U.S. National Security Agency contractor decided on his own to come to Russia.

Mr. Putin had previously said that Mr. Snowden's arrival at Moscow's Sheremetyevo airport on June 23 was a "complete surprise."

But in an interview with Russia's Channel One and the Associated Press, released on Wednesday, he acknowledged that he had some prior knowledge that the fugitive might be headed Russia's way.

"Mr. Snowden first appeared in Hong Kong and met with our diplomatic representatives," Mr. Putin said. "It was reported to me that there was such an employee, an employee of the security services. I asked, 'What does he want?' He fights for human rights, for freedom of information and challenges violations of human rights and violations of the law in the United States. I said, 'So what?' "

Itar-Tass/Zuma Press

President Vladimir Putin on Wednesday at the Kremlin in Moscow.

He said he had been willing to allow Mr. Snowden to come to Russia, but only if he stopped leaking highly classified details of U.S. intelligence programs.

"If he wants to stay with us, please, he can stay with us, but only if he stops any activity that could destroy Russian-American relations," Mr. Putin said. "We are not an NGO, we have the interests of the state and we do not want to damage our relations with the U.S. He was told about it and he replied 'I am a fighter for human rights and I urge you to fight with me.' I said 'No, we won't fight, you are on your own.' And he left."

The Russian leader said the next time he heard about Mr. Snowden was two hours before the Aeroflot flight that brought him to Moscow was due to land. Mr. Snowden had initially planned to connect with a flight to Cuba and ultimately to Ecuador where he had been promised asylum, but he was stopped in his tracks when the U.S. voided his passport.

Mr. Putin, who was in the KGB during the Soviet era, criticized that decision as poor tradecraft, as it stranded Mr. Snowden in Russia where U.S. agents would be unable to get to him.

"Representatives of the American special services—and I hope they won't be angry—but they could have been more professional, and the diplomats as well," Mr. Putin said. "After they found out that he was flying to us, and that he was flying as a transit passenger, there was pressure from all sides—from the Americans, from the Europeans—instead of just letting him go to a country where they could operate easily."

Mr. Putin said Russia wouldn't consider returning Mr. Snowden to the U.S. to face trial as the two countries do not have an extradition treaty.

More

• Putin Warns West Against Attacking Syria

"We do not protect Snowden. We are protecting certain norms of reciprocal relations between two countries," he said, while raising the possibility that an agreement could be reached. "It's clear we will not give him up, he can feel safe here. But what's next?" Mr. Putin said. "Maybe some compromises will be found in this case."

Mr. Putin said he didn't fully understand Mr. Snowden's thinking, and called him "a strange guy."

"This is his destiny, but he chose it. He believes this is noble, that this is justified and such sacrifices are necessary. That is his choice," he said.

Mr. Snowden's lawyer in Russia didn't respond to requests to comment.

(Continued at the link below)

• http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323623304579054890606102138.html#printMode