If the Kim Regime Falls in North Korea, Sustained Armed Resistance Could Follow

I am glad Steve is writing about this.  It is important that we recognize the likely resistance that will occur if the Kim Family Regime collapses (and very similar conditions will exist in post-conflict after the regime is destroyed).

My work on this can be found here:

"Unification Options and Scenarios: Assisting a Resistance" (2015)

https://www.dropbox.com/s/4ayhve3x9p8e44s/05_David%20S.%20Maxwell%20%283%29%20%281%29.pdf?dl=0

"Should The United States Support Korean Unification: And If So, How?" (2014)

http://icks.org/n/data/ijks/1482467285_add_file_7.pdf

"Thoughts on Irregular Threats for north Korea Post-Conflict and Post-Collapse: Understanding Them to Counter Them" (2010)

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/irregular-warfare-on-the-korean-peninsula

I would say this to Steve (and anyone else who cares about this):  The war, regime collapse, post-conflict, and post-collapse operations will be the biggest "by, with, and through" operation in which the US has ever participated.  We owe it to our blood ally (and to the American people) to help them lead their own unification process but not lead it ourselves.  north Korea is not Iraq and Afghanistan and the ROK military and ROK government is not the Afghan and Iraq military and government.  We cannot approach the north Korea problem the same way we have Afghanistan and Iraq even though the conditions, conflict, and resistance will likely be far worse in north Korea than anything we have encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan (or Syria - and there are lessons there to be learned with the great and medium power interventions).  We are going to have to enable and assist our much more capable partner and blood ally the ROK.  But we cannot occupy the north with US forces and we cannot take the lead in the stabilization and unification process.  If we do we will create a quagmire that will be far worse than the quagmire we have in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria and far worse than the one in which the ROK will find itself if they are leading and we are assisting (but it will be a quagmire nonetheless). 

If the Kim Regime Falls in North Korea, Sustained Armed Resistance Could Follow

Steven Metz Friday, Jan. 26, 2018

https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/24060/if-the-kim-regime-falls-in-north-korea-sustained-armed-resistance-could-follow

At some point, the brutal and parasitic Kim family dictatorship in North Korea must end, but it is impossible to tell whether it will happen sooner or later. Many predictions that the regime would fall have proven false, but it simply cannot last forever. Whether by internal conflict or by provoking a war with South Korea and the United States, the Kim regime eventually will go.

Stressing that “Korean unification is a Korean affair,” South Korean President Moon Jae-in is convinced that whenever reunification comes, it should be under the leadership of the democratic and economically vigorous south, rather than the decrepit, economically incompetent and brutal regime of Kim Jong Un in the north. Seoul has prepared extensively, establishing a National Unification Board in 1969 and later upgrading it to the Ministry of Unification, which has made substantial plans for a post-Kim stabilization of North Korea.

This would certainly be a good thing for everyone, except Kim loyalists. In addition to the Korean people, other nations, including the United States, would benefit from a unified, peaceful, democratic and prosperous Korean Peninsula. The problem is getting there: The Kim regime will not go easily, and even if it is gone, the job will have only just begun.

Today, South Korea recognizes that stabilizing, rebuilding and integrating North Korea will take a massive effort, but it also believes that it will be relatively peaceful. History has made Koreans leery of external intervention, but Seoul assumes most North Koreans will see South Koreans as fellow countrymen and therefore accept—even welcome—unification engineered by their southern brethren and immediately embrace democracy, the rule of law and the free market system. 

(Continued at the link below)

https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/24060/if-the-kim-regime-falls-in-north-korea-sustained-armed-resistance-could-follow

Remarks for Irregular Warfare Scholars and the Special Operations Campaign Artistry Program

Remarks for Irregular Warfare Scholars and the Special Operations Campaign Artistry Program (SOCAP) 

June 17, 2016

David S. Maxwell

Good morning.  Congratulations on your graduation from what I think is one of the most important programs in today’s military.  I wish that the Irregular Warfare Scholars and the Special Operations Campaign Artistry Programs had existed when I was in the Army. I would have fought to be part of these programs.  Perhaps you think it odd that I envy you but someday in the future you will be grateful for the education you have received and say you were fortunate to have been here at Ft Leavenworth which after all is the center of universe (or at least the other center when you are not at Fort Bragg). The late Colonel Ola Mize used to say that a Special Forces soldier should only want to be in two places during his career – overseas working with indigenous forces and back in the schoolhouse training and getting educated.

There are a few standard things that are said at all graduations.  Almost always you will hear speakers say that you will not remember what the graduation speaker said and everyone hopes the speaker will follow the rules of my mentor Bob Collins who told me long ago the three rules for briefing which are known as the “Three B’s”  -  “Be brief, be brilliant, be gone.”   Since no one can bat 1000 I am hoping for a 600 average and get two of three right; brief and gone, but in the end I know I will maintain a solid 300 by being gone at some point.

But I do remember some graduation speakers.  When I graduated from SAMS the former CSA General Sullivan was our speaker.  He had been our CGSC speaker the year before and gave a formal address as senior leaders must do.  However, when he spoke to us at SAMS after his retirement he gave an unforgettable speech as he started out telling us about the time he could now spend with his grandchildren and how he was able to read children’s books that he realized had strategic leadership relevance.  He proceeded with the rest of the speech telling us the leadership lessons from Dr. Seuss and while humorous and enjoyable it was actually quite brilliant. While in retirement he had a lot of time to engage with his grandchildren yet it was clear that he had not lost one of the most important traits of a senior leader; which is to be a lifelong learner and even as a former CSA he could still learn from Dr. Seuss.   I would offer one quote that that sums up the importance of being a lifelong learner:

"Education should implant a will and a facility for learning; it should produce not learned but learning people. In times of change, learners inherit the earth, while the learned find themselves equipped to deal with a world that no longer exists." – This is from Eric Hoffer, who is someone everyone in special operations should know as he wrote The True Believer.

I would ask everyone to reflect on those words not just today but throughout the rest of your careers.

I have had chance to listen to a lot of graduation speeches over the past 5 years at Georgetown.  Few are memorable but some, like last month’s, are quite provocative.  The graduate school had a Polish poet who was a human rights advocate in Mexico.  She proceeded to lecture us about how it is America’s fault that the Mexican people are oppressed.  She tried to make the argument that Mexican oppression was caused by American imperialism that began with the Monroe Doctrine and Manifest Destiny.  She told us that we should give California, New Mexico, Texas, Colorado, and even Arizona back to Mexico.  This was especially interesting because one of our graduating students was Lieutenant Jack McCain.  In the audience keeping a perfect poker face was Jack’s father, Senator John McCain. 

I will have to admit that I cannot offer anything as humorous or brilliant as General Sullivan and I hope not to be insulting and disrespectful of our students and guests here.

The second thing we hear at graduation is that at this point in time we have been at war for nearly 15 years. Of course I do not need to remind any of you of that as most of you have spent your entire careers up to this point fighting in this war.  Nor do we need to remind your family and friends.  And in the wake of San Bernadino and Orlando we may not need to remind the American people though I worry that for the public the memory that we are at war could soon fade as we return to going to the mall.

But after 15 years it is time to reflect on where we are and how we have arrived at this point in time with the threats we continue to face.  In the last 15 years there has been tremendous heroism and sacrifice.  There are heroes among you.  All of you have reached a level of technical and tactical expertise that is unmatched by any previous generation.  I am not ashamed to say that I was not anywhere near as competent as you when I was a Captain or a Major.  All of you have contributed to the tactical successes and important innovations that have been achieved,  from F3EAD – find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate to VSO – Village Stability Operations.  You are capable of bringing massive amounts of fire power to bear on the enemy or employing non-standard logistics to get people and equipment to remote locations to ensure sustained combat operations or exploiting intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems and processes that we only dreamed about before 9-11.

But we need to pause and reflect.  Where are we, how did we get here, and where are we going? All of you are at the proverbial inflection point in your career which I think could be a fancy name for a fork in the road – and of course when faced with a fork remember Yogi Berra who told us “when you come to a fork in the road, take it.”  While that used to be humorous and people would laugh, I interpret that in other perhaps non- humorous ways:  carpe diem or seize the day, be decisive and make a decision, whichever way you go make it work, reach down for Clausewitz’ coup d’oeil – that inward looking eye of military genius that allows you to make the right decision at the right time and right place despite the fog and friction of war – whether that war is characterized by conventional, irregular, hybrid, unconventional, or political warfare.

You are transitioning from the tactical to the operational and the strategic.  This is very important to consider.   We should ask why if we have been so successful tactically we continue to be faced with such a large number of complex and diverse threats around the world that require we expend so much blood and treasure?

People do not like to invoke Vietnam but there are still many lessons we can learn and many that have been learned by SOF – VSO is a reincarnation of the CIDG program – the civilian irregular defense group.  You can take the tactical tips from Detachment B-52 and see how they have evolved to the advanced operational techniques that you employ as a matter of routine today.  Your ability to employ fires from the air and indirect fires from the ground is a natural evolution from our brethren who came before us. 

But like Vietnam we made and continue to make mistakes.  We should recall Colonel Harry Summers speaking with his Vietnamese counterpart at the negotiating table in Paris when he said, “You know, we have never been defeated on the battlefield.”  And his Vietnamese counterpart replied, “That may be true, but it is irrelevant.” I hope you all have read Giap’s strategy of Dau Tranh as we are seeing a 21^st Century version of it.

Today we need to evaluate our policies, our political objectives, our strategy, and our campaign plans.  We need to look at our failures and our mistakes.  Take our recent efforts in Syria – should we be fighting a war with a program – a train and equip program?  Should we be supporting indigenous forces when our interests are not sufficiently aligned?  Should we be forcing our indigenous partners only fight for our interests and not theirs?  Or should we be campaigning which of course will include training and equipping as one part of the plan to support the strategy?  Most important, are we able to achieve the President’s strategic guidance of degrading and destroying ISIS or do we have an ends-ways mismatch in that we are not applying the ways and means to achieve the stated end? I suppose a generous assessment is that we are still in the degrade phase.

Of course I am being critical.  We seem to be doing somewhat better in Syria now that we are employing a mix of our special warfare and surgical strike forces and I truly hope we are employing the right forces for the right missions.  But we have a problem as a nation and a military.  I think that we are ineffective at strategy.  We are unable to achieve our political or policy objectives.  We do not “do strategy” well. 

One of the reasons that we do not do strategy well is that we do not understand our adversaries’ strategies.  (And we should remember that Sun Tzu not only said that it is the acme of skill to win without fighting, the true strategist must understand and be able to attack the enemy’s strategy). 

We do not understand the strategies because since 9-11 we have defined everything in terms of terrorism and in addition to terrorism, today we also define the major power threats in a neo-Cold War framework of great power competition. 

We are reaching for new terms to try to help us describe the phenomena we face – the popular new term is the Gray Zone.  I would characterize the threats we face in terms of the Gray Zone as a spectrum of cooperation, competition, and conflict in that space between peace and war.  We seek and desire cooperation, we have to be able to compete, and while we want to avoid conflict we must prepare for it.  One of the important forms of conflict can be described by revolution, resistance, and insurgency with our adversaries from AQ to ISIS to the Russian Little Green Men to the Iranian IRGC or China’s PLA all executing strategies of modern unconventional warfare, with their own unique characteristics, to exploit the conditions of revolution, resistance, and insurgency to achieve their strategic political objectives.

This is a complex environment.  As the late Sam Sarkasian said in 1993 in his seminal work, Unconventional Conflicts, we are seeing a strategic environment that can be described this way:

1.  Asymmetric conflicts: for the US these conflicts are limited and not considered a threat to survival or a matter of vital national interests; however, for the indigenous adversaries they are a matter of survival.  

2.  Protracted Conflict requires a long term commitment by the US, thus testing the national will, political resolve, and staying power of the US.

3.  Ambiguous and Ambivalent Conflicts:  It is difficult to identify the adversary, or assess the progress of the conflict; i.e., it is rarely obvious who is winning and losing.

4.  And finally, conflicts with Political-Social Milieu Center of Gravity – or in today’s parlance population centric warfare or war among the people.

So the question is how do we operate in this complex environment? How do we support the policies and achieve the political objectives established by our political leadership?

The answer is in large part you.  You are going to leave here and if the personnel system is going to evolve to effective talent management it will assign you now or in the near future to positions of great responsibility where you can contribute to campaigning.  While campaigning is not as sexy as kicking down a door or advising an indigenous force to capture or kill a high value target, it is incredibly important.  Frankly, we have great soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines who will accomplish any tactical mission we give them.  But they need to be given the right mission – the mission that will achieve or support the achievement of our political objectives.  We need men and women who can think critically and strategically: who can campaign.  When you are in these critical positions you are going to do a few basic things that will contribute to achieving our political objectives.  I will list seven.

            1.  Use design thinking to understand the challenges we face.  Must go beyond situational awareness to attain situational understanding – Make understanding a principle of war (Frank Hoffman)

            2.  Contribute to policy and strategy development – do not abdicate responsibility by saying this is the province of civilian political leaders – You have a responsibility to inform, educate, and when appropriate to advocate for the correct employment of the military instrument of power.

            3.  Develop campaign plans.

            4. Employ red team techniques.

            5. Assess and reassess continuously.

            6. Challenge assumptions constantly.

            7.  Ensure balance and coherency among ends, ways, and means with a recognition of threats, risks, and opportunities.  And to ensure balance and coherency you must not be afraid to recommend changes to the end state.

(And never forget the 12 SOF imperatives,* the SOF truths, and the SOF mission criteria.)

            These 7 tasks are fundamentals and not all inclusive, they are common sense, and they are really simple or at least simple to state and remember.  As Clausewitz reminds us, in war everything is simple but even the simplest thing is hard.  These 7 tasks are hard and it will take your intellectual ability and disciplined leadership to execute them effectively.  You have learned and know these 7 tasks and you are well equipped as Irregular Warfare Scholars to go forth and make important contributions to campaigns and strategy.

Let me tell one final story.  In my class at Georgetown, “Unconventional Warfare and Special Operations for Policy Makers and Strategists” I have a Navy SEAL Lieutenant.  I asked him why he was taking the course because as a SEAL he already is an expert special operator.  He described one of the weaknesses of the SEAL community and that is that it is very tactically focused.  He said that the commander of the Naval Special Warfare Command, RADM Brian Losey (who by coincidence is a National War College classmate of mine and someone I am proud to call a friend) has put out the message that SEAL officers have to learn how to campaign and must grow beyond the narrow tactical focus of direct action, counterterrorism, and surgical strike.  They have to be able to plan for and employ the entire joint special operations force.  Most important they have to be able to campaign to support strategy.  As they say, that SEAL and RADM Losey get it.  And so do you.

I have one recommendation for you.  This is really more of a request or even a heart felt plea.  Please write.  You have expertise and experience.  You have ideas.  You are critical thinkers.  Write.  Contribute knowledge to the profession of arms and to the national security dialogue.  Use the tools you found here and the intellectual gift you have.

You are Irregular Warfare Scholars and graduates of the SOF Campaign Artistry Program because you know how important it is to be able to campaign.  You came to the fork in the road here at Leavenworth and have taken it.   I expect that all of you will go on to make great contributions in many different ways which should be the goal for all of us:  To make a substantive contribution to our national security.  Be the quiet professional.  As we used to say in SAMS, be more than you appear.  Never forget the words of the late GEN Downing who adapted this from the SAS motto: who thinks, wins. 

I will close with the words of T.E. Lawrence that I think are the foundation of your education here: “Irregular warfare is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge.”  As I used to tell my Special Forces soldiers:  I know you can outfight any enemy but to win you must outthink him as well.  I know you are well prepared to outthink any enemy the United States will face.

I wish you the best.  Thank you and de oppresso liber.

*SOF Imperatives

• Understand the operational environment 
• Recognize political implications 
• Facilitate interagency activities 
• Engage the threat discriminately 
• Consider long-term effects 
• Ensure legitimacy and credibility of Special Operations 
• Anticipate and control psychological effects 
• Apply capabilities indirectly 
• Develop multiple options 
• Ensure long-term sustainment 
• Provide sufficient intelligence 
• Balance security and synchronization

            

Winning Irregular War: Conflict Geography

This might be a very useful resource.  The 685 page 10MB PDF can be downloaded at the link below.  Table of contents below;

Winning  Irregular War: Conflict Geography

by  Geoff Demerst

http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Winning-Insurgent-War/WIrW_2015.pdf

 QUICK START: HOW TO READ THIS BOOK
You can take a traditional approach, reading the sections in numerical
sequence; or you can read the author’s preface, the first seven-fifteen sections,
then the last several, then the middle (say 68-76), then skip around.
Going backwards from 144 to 1 will work, or you can peruse the Contents
and go to whatever sections interest you, which I hope will be all of them.
Some of the sections have expansive titles like Legitimacy or Human
Rights. They aren’t intended to encapsulate those subjects, but just tie those
themes to the book’s central assertions. Other titles, like Dogs and Mules,
or Forts and Walls, or Poop are less abstract, but relate to the same assertions.
Those assertions, or propositions, include:
• An impunity-based definition of State success;
• Attention to anonymity as a competitive emphasis;
• Inventorying as an indispensable knowledge activity;
• Withdrawal and pursuit as key operational and strategic concepts;
• Deception as a compulsory element of strategic thinking;
• Geography as the academic discipline of choice;
• Property analysis as tool for exposing the distribution of power;
• Distance as a key variable in the measurement of relative power;
• Civil engineering and construction as noble activities;
• Personal dignity and honor as key quantities of a durable victory;
• Adaptation of classic strategy as operational artistry; and
• Formal property regimes as a basis of peaceful social compacts.
‘Winning’ means not just neutralizing your enemies, but doing so
without creating more of them. It may also mean building places that do not
create enemies.
Building such places requires that ideology, political philosophy,
epistemology, engineering, and shooting all get along, so the book assumes
these things cannot be distanced one from another. Below each section is a
joke, quotation, or piece of poetry. They are interrelated in a way similar to
the text, and with the text. They are like the fins on a `60 Cadillac.

CONTENTS

DEDICATION ............................................................................ p. iii

QUICK START ........................................................................... p. v

FOREWORD ............................................................................. p. vii

AUTHORS PREFACE ............................................................... p. ix

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ....................................................... p. xiii

CONTENTS ............................................................................... p. xv

LIST OF MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS .............................. p. xxi

GLOSSARY ............................................................................ p. xxiii

RESTATEMENT ..................................................................... p. 567

SYNTHESIS ............................................................................ p. 569

APPENDIX: MISCELLANEOUS LISTS .............................. p. 573

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................... p. 585

ENDNOTES ............................................................................. p. 597 I

NDEX ..................................................................................... p. 621 A

BOUT THE AUTHOR ......................................................... p. 632 S

ECTIONS 1-144:

1, Impunity...executive strategy ......................................................... p. 1

2, Anonymity...operational art ........................................................... p. 4

3, The Domesday Book...executive strategy ....................................... p. 6

4, Defining Enemy...executive strategy ............................................ p. 11

5, Vocabulary of Classic Strategy...knowledge process .................... p. 14

6, The Operational Equation...operational art ................................. p. 19

7, Sanctuary...operational art ............................................................ p. 22

8, Linearity and the Line of Retreat...operational art ...................... p. 28

9, White Bird...historical vignette, Chief Joseph’s failed retreat ........... p. 31

10, Decisive Battle...operational art .................................................. p. 36

11, Protraction and Diligence...executive strategy .......................... p. 40

12, Commitment of the Reserve...operational art ........................... p. 44

13, Puthukkudiyirippu...historical vignette, Sri Lankan war .............. p. 46

14, Legitimacy...executive strategy ................................................... p. 52

15, NGOs, IOs, and Unions...environment ...................................... p. 56

16, Presence...operational art .......................................................... p. 62

17, Keeping Secrets...operational art ................................................ p. 65

18, Whole of Government...executive strategy ............................... p. 69

19, Mercatus...environment ............................................................. p. 73

20, Rule-of-Law...synthesis ............................................................. p. 79

21, Iximché…historical vignette, warfare in Guatemala circa 1982 ...... p. 83

22, Badassoftheweek.com…environment ....................................... p. 93

23, Mens Rea…environment ............................................................ p. 96

24, Ruthlessness and Resolve...environment ................................... p. 99

25, Why Humans Don’t Fight...environment ............................... p. 101

26, How Violent Groups Form...environment .............................. p. 105

27, ‘Nonviolent’ Action...operational art ........................................ p.110

28, Takeovers and Sieges...operational art ..................................... p. 116

29, Heavy Machines...executive strategy ....................................... p. 119

30, Control Technology...executive strategy .................................. p. 121

31, Holes in the Ground...operational art ...................................... p. 124

32, Land-use Planning...knowledge process .................................. p. 126

33, Engineers & Built Environment...environment ...................... p. 130

34, Urban or Rural...environment .................................................. p. 133

35, Comuna 13...historical vignette, a troubled borough in Medellín .. p. 137

36, The Denver Broncos...environment ......................................... p. 147

37, School Lunches...operational art .............................................. p. 151

38, Cultural Study for What?...knowledge process ........................ p. 153

39, Socioeconomic Causation...knowledge process ....................... p. 155

40, Popular Support...knowledge process ....................................... p. 159

41, Dear Westy...historical vignette, a letter to Gen. Westmoreland ... p. 163

42, Brigands...environment .......................................................... p. 170

43, Sam Spade’s Whereabouts...knowledge process ....................... p. 174

44, Political/Military/Administrative...executive strategy ............ p. 177

45, Police or Military...executive strategy ...................................... p. 180

46, Taxation and Debt...environment ............................................ p. 186

47, Why the County...knowledge process ...................................... p. 189

48, Grading the Social Compact...knowledge process ................... p. 192

49, Territorial Scrutiny...knowledge process ................................. p. 195

50, U.S. Persons...environment ...................................................... p. 200

51, Get Willy...historical vignette, manhunt in part of Colombia ........ p. 204

52, Sovereignty...knowledge process .............................................. p. 210

53, Hohfeldian Grievance Analysis...knowledge process .............. p. 215

54, Extortion...executive strategy ................................................... p. 220

55, Kidnapping...environment ........................................................ p. 223

56, Militias and Gun Control...executive strategy ......................... p. 225

57, Dogs and Mules...executive strategy ......................................... p. 231

58, Condottieri...executive strategy ................................................ p. 233

59, Spontaneity...environment ....................................................... p. 235

60, War Nouveau...historical vignette, the world circa 1900 ............. p. 239

61, The Geography of Dope...environment ................................... p. 248

62, Bank Robbery...environment ................................................... p. 255

63, Roadblocks and Checkpoints...operational art ........................ p. 258

64, Measuring Distance and Comparing Power ...knlg process . p. 262

65, Smuggling...environment ......................................................... p. 268

66, GIS...knowledge process ............................................................ p. 271

67, Points, Lines, Spaces...knowledge process ................................ p. 275

68, Scale...knowledge process ........................................................... p. 277

69, Measuring Effects of Actions on Enemies...knowledge process . p. 281

70, Measuring Effects of Actions on Structure..knowledge process p. 288

71, Jerusalem...historical vignette, the Zionists create a nation state ...... p. 293

72, Land Strategy...executive strategy ............................................... p. 300

73, Property and the Social Compact...ideology ............................. p. 306

74, Refugees and Displaced Persons...environment ......................... p. 313

75, The Price of Real Estate, and Tourism...knowledge process ...... p. 316

76, Gender...environment ................................................................. p. 319

77, Sex...environment ........................................................................ p. 322

78, Identity... knowledge process ..................................................... p. 326

79, Suicide... moral compass ............................................................ p. 330

80, Why You Should Like Geography...knowledge process ........... p. 333

81, What a Clergy Wants...environment .......................................... p. 336

82, Conflict Thresholds...knowledge process .................................... p. 339

83, Why Are Irregular Wars Lost?...synthesis ............................... p. 343

84, Cultures of Violence...environment .......................................... p. 345

85, Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck...historical vignette ............... p. 348

86, Shifting Covet-geographies....environment .............................. p. 354

87, Water Wars...environment ....................................................... p. 356

88, Escape Geography...operational art .......................................... p. 359

89, The Dot Game and Go...operational art .................................... p. 362

90, Prisons & Prisoners....operational art ....................................... p. 364

91, Forts and Walls….operational art ............................................. p. 366

92, Graves Registration...environment ........................................... p. 371

93, Diseases and Disasters...environment ....................................... p. 375

94, Poop...environment.................................................................... p. 379

95, Childhood...moral compass ..................................................... p. 381

96, Combatant Status...executive strategy ..................................... p. 384

97, Oviedo...historical vignette, start of Spanish Civil War ............ p. 386

98, Jorge Verstrynge and Pio Moa...ideology ................................ p. 395

99, Postmodern and Post-structural...ideology ............................. p. 399

100, What the Foucault?...ideology .............................................. p. 404

101, Magical Realism...knowledge process .................................... p. 408

102, Negotiations...executive strategy ........................................... p. 412

103, Amnesty...executive strategy ................................................. p. 415

104, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction...environment ............................ p. 419

105, Genocide Geography...knowledge process ............................ p. 422

106, Massacres...historical vignette, repugnancy ............................ p. 428

107, Guerre d'Algérie...historical vignette, Algerian War .............. p. 434

108, Common Knowledge...knowledge process ............................ p. 443

109, Your Staff Work Sucks...knowledge process ......................... p. 446

110, Knowledge Gaps...knowledge process ................................... p. 450

111, Knowledge Cultures...knowledge process ............................. p. 454

112, DIME and PMECII...knowledge process ............................... p. 460

113, Unrestricted Chi Whiz...executive strategy ........................... p. 465

114, R.V. Jones...knowledge process .............................................. p. 467

115, Academies...executive strategy .............................................. p. 469

116, Songs of Chu...operational art ................................................ p. 471

117, Strategic Communication...executive strategy....................... p. 473

118, Democracy...ideology ............................................................ p. 475

119, Declaration of Counterinsurgency...moral compass ............. p. 479

Montana circa 1878 ............................................................... p. 35

Sri Lanka circa 2006 ............................................................. p. 51

Bolivia, La Paz and El Alto .................................................. p. 61

Guatemalan Highlands circa 1982 ....................................... p. 92

Comuna 13, Medellín, Colombia circa 2002 ..................... p. 146

Hell with Limbo (Purgatory?) circa 1300 ......................... p. 188

Yoknapatawpha circa 1936 ................................................ p. 191

South-central Colombia circa 2012 .................................... p. 209

World Map circa 1900 ........................................................ p. 247

Palestine circa 1920 ............................................................. p. 299

East Africa circa 1914-1918 ................................................ p. 353

The Revolution of ’34 in Asturias ...................................... p. 394

Colombia, various locations ................................................ p. 433

French Algeria circa 1954-1962 ......................................... p. 442

Europe circa 1805 ................................................................ p. 490

Kansas-Missouri Border circa 1858................................... p. 508

The American role in Mamasapano

This article is based on cherry picking from my 2012 testimony before the HASC Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities which can be accessed at this link:  http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=be69fdc5-4233-4507-840c-6c8023f94bf6

I will just take issue with this one excerpt as I think everyone reading this understands the proper application of foreign internal defense as well as the importance of the US not being in charge in operations such as those in the Philippines.:

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, America launched the global war against terrorism, specifically targeting the leaders of the al-Qaida network and its regional affiliate in Southeast Asia, the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). The Philippines became a theater in this American global campaign against terrorism after it was determined that the notorious Mindanao-based kidnap group Abu Sayyaf maintained close relations with leaders of the JI.

In a changed world environment, America decided it needed to recast its military presence in countries that were battling terrorism. New experiences were sought in the battle against this scourge. In the Philippines, Mindanao was chosen as a suitable laboratory in which new models of irregular warfare could be tested. Under “Operation Enduring Freedom,” America offered advice and assistance in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism to selected allies. A corollary of this campaign was the formation in several countries of missions called “Joint Special Operations Task Forces.” The Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) was organized in 2002, one of the first to be set up by the American global security state. (Interestingly, the JSOTF-P withdrew from Mindanao a month after the Mamasapano debacle.)

What I take exception issue with is that the Philippines became a laboratory in which new models of irregular warfare could be tested.  Nothing could be further from the truth.  In 2001-2002 US actions in the Philippines rested upon the foundation of already existing foreign internal defense doctrine, and the operations were based not only on long standing relationships between US and Filipino forces but were also conducted in the method and manner that US Special Forces and Joint special operations forces had been conducting operations for decades,  The only thing new and different was that after 9-11 there was the demand for these types of operations and the press and the public paid a little more attention to them (though not too much as they were way overshadowed by Afghanistan and Iraq which was actually a good thing for our operations in the Philippines as it prevented much of the effects of the 6000 mile screw driver).

The American role in 

Mamasapano

http://opinion.inquirer.net/83507/the-american-role-in-mamasapano

2:17 AM | Sunday, March 22nd, 2015

Randy David

 

@inquirerdotnet

Philippine Daily Inquirer

Hearing it from the US state department, one would think American security personnel played no more than a peripheral role in the Mamasapano encounter. Here’s how its spokesperson, Jen Psaki, put it at the department’s daily press briefing last March 18: “At the request of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, personnel serving in the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines responded to assist in the evacuation of casualties after the firefight. The operation was planned and executed by Philippine authorities.”

That’s also what most of us initially thought after seeing photos of wounded troopers and body bags being loaded onto waiting vehicles by brawny Caucasians sporting military haircuts. Can it be that they just happened to be in the neighborhood with their air ambulance when dead bodies needed to be retrieved from the battlefield? Sensing something disingenuous in this matter-of-fact portrayal of the US role in Mindanao, a reporter tried to probe:

QUESTION: And when you said that any US support was in accordance with the Philippine Government, in other words it was part—I’m not sure what that means.

PSAKI: Well, specifically, as I mentioned, we responded to assist in the evacuation of casualties after the firefight. That was the role.

QUESTION: After they asked?

PSAKI: Yes, mm-hmm. After the request of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.”

The reference to the Armed Forces is understandable. The legal umbrella that justifies and protects the presence of American troops on Philippine soil is the Visiting Forces Agreement, which is associated with the series of joint military exercises between American forces and the Philippine military. Today, it is being invoked as an all-purpose cover for a wide range of US security activities in the Philippines. There were six Americans at the Special Action Force’s Tactical Command Post who were monitoring the Jan. 25 Mamasapano mission in real time. I am aware that this is not an issue with many of our people. But, a little background on how this came about may help enrich our understanding of the American role in Mamasapano.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, America launched the global war against terrorism, specifically targeting the leaders of the al-Qaida network and its regional affiliate in Southeast Asia, the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). The Philippines became a theater in this American global campaign against terrorism after it was determined that the notorious Mindanao-based kidnap group Abu Sayyaf maintained close relations with leaders of the JI.

In a changed world environment, America decided it needed to recast its military presence in countries that were battling terrorism. New experiences were sought in the battle against this scourge. In the Philippines, Mindanao was chosen as a suitable laboratory in which new models of irregular warfare could be tested. Under “Operation Enduring Freedom,” America offered advice and assistance in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism to selected allies. A corollary of this campaign was the formation in several countries of missions called “Joint Special Operations Task Forces.” The Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) was organized in 2002, one of the first to be set up by the American global security state. (Interestingly, the JSOTF-P withdrew from Mindanao a month after the Mamasapano debacle.)

A paper titled “Understanding Future Irregular Warfare Challenges,” presented as a testimony before the armed services committee of the US Congress by retired US colonel David S. Maxwell, discusses the key concept that governs the operationalization of the global antiterrorist campaign—“Foreign Internal Defense.” Maxwell was the commander of the JSOTF-P in Mindanao in 2006-2007.

I have been wondering how the Philippine National Police got involved in the counterterrorism campaign. Like counterinsurgency, this has been historically a function of the Philippine military. Perhaps, the answer is to be found in Maxwell’s paper: “Foreign internal defense is participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.”

I suspect that, after years of working with the Philippine military, the JSOTF-P found the PNP-SAF to be a better partner in getting the remaining high-value terrorists in Mindanao. Perhaps the JSOTF-P saw how the military had become so tightly bound to the ongoing peace process that it could no longer be relied upon to pursue new initiatives against targets in areas controlled by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the government’s peace partner.

The courage, zeal and heroism of the SAF commandos cannot be doubted. But Mamasapano proved to be unfamiliar terrain for many of them, and prolonged combat in the field was not what they were trained for. They were led to their death by false assurances. Still, despite the steep price paid, their handlers insist it was mission accomplished. The day after the assault, a severed finger was delivered to the American partners who had commissioned the killing of the terrorist to whom it belonged.

A sentence from Maxwell’s paper leapt out of the screen as I was reading it: “A problem that most US forces have is that they are so focused on mission accomplishment they often lack the patience to let the host nation operate in accordance with its own capabilities as well as customs and traditions.” How true!

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