Wednesday, April 3, 2013

U.S. Dials Back on Korean Show of Force Administration 'Playbook' Outlined Publicized Exercises, but Officials Change Course Over Worries of North's Response


Damn.  A perception of weakness and potentially a perception of loss of resolve.  I think this is a mistake.  The north will think the red lines have moved even farther out there.  This will embolden them.  And combined with the White House spokesman's remarks on restraining the ROK from a unilateral response we are showing a potential crack in the Alliance.  We can and probably should dial back but we should not be explaining it this way.  If asked we should say we can deploy and redeploy assets at the time and place of our choosing just as we have demonstrated.  The reporting on internal deliberations and cautions and fears is unhelpful and those who are providing this information have undermined the actions of the last month.  
V/R
Dave
  • ASIA NEWS
  • Updated April 3, 2013, 9:15 p.m. ET
U.S. Dials Back on Korean Show of Force
Administration 'Playbook' Outlined Publicized Exercises, but Officials Change Course Over Worries of North's Response



Kurt Campbell, head of the Asia Group and former Asst. Sec of State for East Asia & Pacific, talks with WSJ's Jerry Seib and David Wessel about what's behind North Korea's recent actions and why has the U.S. responded with so much muscle.

WASHINGTON—After a high-visibility display of military power aimed at deterring North Korean provocations, the White House is dialing back the aggressive posture amid fears that it could inadvertently trigger an even deeper crisis, according to U.S. officials.

The U.S. is putting a pause to what several officials described as a step-by-step plan the Obama administration approved earlier this year, dubbed "the playbook," that laid out the sequence and publicity plans for U.S. shows of force during annual war games with South Korea. The playbook included well-publicized flights in recent weeks near North Korea by nuclear-capable B-52 and stealth B-2 bombers, as well as advanced F-22 warplanes.

The U.S. stepped back from the plans this week, as U.S. officials began to worry that the North, which has a small nuclear arsenal and an unpredictable new leader, may be more provoked than the U.S. had intended, the officials said.

"The concern was that we were heightening the prospect of misperceptions on the part of the North Koreans, and that that could lead to miscalculations," a senior administration official said.

Pyongyang's Nuclear Program
Milestones in North Korean nuclear-weapons development.


Officials said the U.S. didn't believe North Korea had any imminent plans to take military action in response to the exercises. Rather, the shift reflects concerns within the administration that the North, caught off guard, could do something rash, contrary to intelligence assessments showing that it is unlikely to respond militarily to the U.S. show of force.

The shift also came after the Navy confirmed reports on Monday that the U.S. had sent two guided-missile destroyers to the waters off South Korea—a deployment that the White House and Pentagon hadn't intended to publicize and wasn't part of the playbook, officials said.
(Continued at the link below)


Tell Me How This Starts: What war on the Korean Peninsula would look like.


After the White House spokesman's remarks about deploy US flexible deterrent options (e.g., B-52, B-2, and F-22) to restrain the ROK from unilateral action  today I am afraid this scenario becomes more likely:

It might calculate that a bold gesture would sow doubt and dissent in South Korea, drive a risk-averse United States to back down and restrain its eager ally, and hand China a fait accompli in which Beijing has no alternative to protecting its upstart neighbor.

This is an interesting scenario below but my assessment is that once the first major hostile attack by north Korea occurs (not a provocation but an attack such as artillery rounds falling on Seoul), the Alliance is going to execute its defense plan of the Republic of Korea which will rapidly transition to the complete destruction of the north Korean military and the regime.  There will be no time for such conspiring by the Chinese nor a negotiated settlement that allows for a weakened north Korea to remain.  Once  artillery falls on Seoul the ROK military will defend the country and complete execution of the war plan will take place.  There will be no time for secret missions to secure nukes (assuming they could be detected)  The fighting will be too intense for such missions, just as it will be in Pyongyang – even if the Chinese could somehow force a transition and install a pro-China leader it would be moot because by the time that could occur such a leader would have no command and control system and could not lead the military, let alone the nation.  Attack on Seoul leads to the complete destruction of the nKPA, period. And then the unification process will follow the post-conflict stability operations. 

But we should keep in mind a couple of things.  The north is unlikely to start a war unless it can achieve surprise and it believes it has the correlation of forces it believes it needs to be successful (which means no US forces on the Peninsula). The only reason for attacking without those two conditions will be if the regime is threatened and its only hope of survival is execution of its campaign plan.  The miscalculation will occur if Kim Jong-un thinks the regime is threatened with imminent destruction or collapse which is why all responses to provocations must take place immediately and decisively at the point of provocation.  Striking deep targets later after the provocation will likely be interpreted as a threat to the regime but a swift response at the point of provocation will not lead to war.  However, like artillery falling on Seoul, a long range missile toward Japan or Guam (or Hawaii or the the US mainland) cannot be treated as a mere provocation.  Such an act ail demand international action and in my opinion the plan for the defense of Korea will be executed.

I also believe that once it starts even China will want it finished and will be more than happy to turn over the north to the ROK to conduct unification with its only demands that it secure the northern boarder and that it honors the agreements regarding mineral resources it made with north Korea.  It will also attempt to co-opt or coerce the ROK into ensuring there are no foreign forces on the Korean Peninsula which is one its strategic objectives.

Again the bottom line is that once the north uses its artillery on Seoul or a long range missile fired at US interests the defense plan will be executed.  To do anything less will mean even more loss of blood and treasure over the long run.  Any half step or delay will allow the north to bring devastating fire on the ROK and a greater number of casualties (military and civilian) will occur if the defense plan is not fully executed.  I know that political leaders and strategists will want to contemplate and assess and try to "manage" the situation (like a SECDEF managing the flow of forces through approval of RFFs vice execution of the TPFDD).  The more management and the less execution of the plan that takes place the more blood and treasure will be sacrificed.  This is one situation where the Generals are going to have to be trusted to execute the very well constructed plan they have developed after the first blow is received from the north and not be second guessed by those who think they can finesse the situation.  Rapid and decisive execution of the defense plan is called for and must be supported by the political leadership.  We have to execute completely and seek rapid achievement of the strategic end state.
V/R
Dave


What war on the Korean Peninsula would look like.
BY PATRICK M. CRONIN | APRIL 3, 2013

The Korean Peninsula is on a knife's edge, one fateful step from war. While Koreans are accustomed to periodic spikes in tensions, the risk of renewed hostilities appears higher than at any time in the past 60 years, when American, North Korean, and Chinese generals signed an armistice agreement. Far more than 1 million people died in the Korean War, with at least that many troops and civilians injured over the course of the three-year campaign.

The exact leadership dynamics at play in Pyongyang remain mysterious, but the domestic survival of the Kim family dynasty appears to hinge on maintaining a credible nuclear and missile threat -- backed up by a local great power, China. To achieve the former, Kim Jong Un appears willing to risk the latter. His regime's unrelenting verbal threats are intended to rally domestic support, and its reckless brinksmanship is aimed at forcing the outside world to back down and back off. In the past days and weeks -- adding to the tension created by its recent nuclear and missile tests -- Pyongyang has severed a hotline with Seoul, renounced the 1953 armistice, conducted cyberattacks, and, against its own financial interests, closed down the Kaesong Industrial Complex, which is the only economic thread holding together relations with the South.

There is no single red line that, when crossed, would trigger war, but the potential for miscalculation and escalation is high. North Korea has a penchant for causing international incidents -- in 2010 alone it used a mini-submarine to sink the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan and shelled South Korea's Yeonpyeong Island. The brazen and unprovoked killing of military personnel and civilians shocked many South Koreans, some of whom faulted then-President Lee Myung Bak for a tepid response. The new president, Park Geun Hye (South Korea's "Iron Lady") is determined not to echo that weakness and has vowed a strong response to any direct provocation. Meanwhile, the United States, via the annual Foal Eagle and Key Resolve exercises, has many troops, ships, and planes on maneuvers in the region and, as an additional show of resolve, flew long-range B-2 stealth bombers from Missouri to Korea and dispatched F-22 fighter jets as well.

The desire to show strength, the fear of looking weak, and the presence of tons of hardware provides more than enough tinder that a spark could start a peninsula-wide conflagration. An accident -- such as a straying missile, an incident at sea or in the air, a shooting near the Northern Limit Line or the Demilitarized Zone -- could trigger an action-reaction cycle that could spiral out of control if Pyongyang, running out of threats or low-level provocations, were to gamble on a more daring move. It might calculate that a bold gesture would sow doubt and dissent in South Korea, drive a risk-averse United States to back down and restrain its eager ally, and hand China a fait accompli in which Beijing has no alternative to protecting its upstart neighbor. It might be very wrong.

Let's say that the North decides to fire its new mobile KN-08 intermediate-range ballistic missile, capable of reaching U.S. bases in Guam. An X-band radar based in Japan detects the launch, cueing missile defenses aboard Japanese and U.S. ships. The U.S.S. Stetham, an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer equipped with Aegis phased-array radars, fires its SM-3 missiles, which hit and shatter the KN-08 warhead as it begins its final descent. The successful intercept is immediately touted internationally as a victory, but, now desperate for tactical advantage that will allow it to preserve its nuclear and missile programs, the North Korean leadership orders an assault on South Korean patrol vessels and military fortifications built after the 2010 shelling incident.

The regime feels safe in striking out along the maritime boundary because the two sides have repeatedly skirmished in the area in the past 15 years. But President Park, determined to show backbone, dispatches on-alert F-15K fighter aircraft armed with AGM-84E SLAM-Expanded Response air-to-ground missiles to destroy the North Korean installations responsible for the latest assault. For good measure, they also bomb a North Korean mini-submarine pier as belated payback for the sinking of Cheonan. North Korean soldiers and military officers are killed in the attack. Pyongyang vows a merciless response and launches a risky salvo of rockets into downtown Seoul, in hope of shocking the Blue House into seeking an immediate cessation of fighting. But far from ending the tit-for-tat attacks, North Korean actions have now triggered the Second Korean War.

U.S. and ROK Combined Forces Command implements a pre-arranged plan -- perhaps using submarine-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles and Massive Ordnance Penetrator bombs dropped from a B-2 -- to eliminate North Korea's two major missile launch facilities: Tonghae in the northeast and Sohae in the northwest, both of which are fairly close to the Chinese border. North Korea responds with more rockets and Scud missiles, accompanied by North Korean Central News announcements suggesting that they could be armed with biological agents. China, seeking to restrain all sides, pours troops and materiel across the border to protect its interests and instigates a secret plan to replace Kim Jong Un with a senior general who understands the North's total dependence on its only ally. The resulting confusion leads to a belief that North Korea, and not just the Kim regime, is collapsing. Meanwhile, the United States quietly embarks on a secret mission to secure North Korea's nuclear weapons.

Even now, however, the Second Korean War has only just begun because, as conflict breaks out, all participants expand their strategic goals. South Korea -- which initially had hoped only to force North Korea to calm down enough to re-enter negotiations on nuclear weapons, expanded inter-Korean economic ties, and human rights -- now believes North Korea is going to collapse and starts to implement an assertive reunification policy. The U.S. policy of deterrence and strategic patience has failed, so Washington decides to pursue active denuclearization and regime change. It joins with Seoul in planning postwar reconstruction in which the peninsula is reunified.

China, which was slow to curb its ally's proliferation and never had a good handle on Kim Jong Un, seeks to ensure that the new leader of North Korea can restore stability. China also wants a new leader in Pyongyang to adopt a pro-China policy -- one which includes continued preferential access to North Korean mineral deposits for its state-owned enterprises. Russia supports China, and it is promised unfettered access to the warm-water port in the Rason Special Economic Zone in northeastern North Korea.
(Continued at the link below)

U.S. Seeks to Prevent Unilateral S.Korean Action


I wonder if the administration will try to walk back on this statement.  Reassurance is one thing – restraint is another.

"reduce pressure on Seoul to take unilateral action,"

To the regime this will appear to be a crack in the Alliance.  To political opposition in the South this could be interpreted as an infringement on ROK sovereignty and the continued reign of the "big brother" in the Alliance relationship rather than a mature relations of true Alliance partners.  We certainly wanted the north to think the ROK was capable of taking unilateral action in response to a north Korean provocation but most importantly this statement reduced the potential deterrent effect of the B-52's, B-2's, and F-22's and will be interpreted as a lack of resolve on the US' part – e.g., the US is more interested in restraining the ROK than in deterring the north – now the north may interpret that it can continue to push the limits because the US will restrain the ROK from reacting.
V/R
Dave

U.S. Seeks to Prevent Unilateral S.Korean Action

The U.S.' recent show of force around the Korean Peninsula was designed to send a warning to North Korea and "reduce pressure on Seoul to take unilateral action," White House spokesman Jay Carney told reporters Monday.

Carney was explaining why Washington recently announced the deployment in joint exercises with South Korea of hard-hitting weaponry such as B-52 bombers, B-2 stealth bombers, and F-22 fighter jets.

Carney appeared to hint that Washington does not want South Korea to respond in kind to any North Korean provocation.

"Of course, Washington is worried about provocations from Pyongyang. But it is also very worried about the possibility of South Korea taking unilateral action in response and of the situation escalating to the point that the U.S. can't control it," a diplomatic source in Washington said.
(Continued at the link below)

How does north Korea off ramp this cycle of rhetoric and provocation?

How does north Korea off ramp this cycle of rhetoric and provocation?

A friend mentioned that rather than the cycle of provocation that Andrei Lankov recently described, the north's provocation strategy is more like a Ponzi scheme and that got me thinking about the famed Linda Robinson question (used in another context of course - Iraq)  "Tell me how this ends?"

Ponzi scheme is a good one.  The problem now is that the north has a demonstrated (though nascent) nuclear capability (of which everyone seems deathly afraid) with a growing missile capability.  While up through Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il their capabilities were conventional and asymmetric in many ways, they really did not have a significant nuclear capability until the very end of Kim Jong-il's lifetime.  I would be less worried if Kim Jong-il were still alive because while we would still be seeing the same provocations and bellicosity I think he had a potentially better grip on reality and how far he could go (though of course he really pushed the limits in 2010 and this is the problem with the Ponzi framework  laid out - Kim Jong-un seemingly has to do something worse).

However, I think for now though the near term end game might be to try to solidify the north as a nuclear power (de facto).  I am leaning toward the scenario of a Musadan missile test launch around April 15 (Kim Il-sung's birthday) toward the end of the ROK/US joint exercises.  Then the propaganda narrative that because of the strength of the north Korean military and its nuclear might the ROK and US were forced to deploy their most sophisticated weapons systems to try to stand up to the north and and when they fired their Musadan missile it brought the Alliance to its knees and the ROK and US ended their provocative exercises.  It will be interesting to see if the combined counter-provocation plan will deter them somewhat from a direct "kinetic" provocation against ROK territory but of course that type of provocation remains a real possibility.  But the north is probably trying to assess what type of provocation they think will bring the US to the negotiating table and they are probably leaning toward a test vice a strike.  But they are going to come at us with negotiations for mutual disarmament or reduction talks now that they have a nuclear capability and they will not come to the table to solely negotiate about their nuclear program. 

V/R
Dave 

Tuesday, April 2, 2013

The Next Korean War Conflict With North Korea Could Go Nuclear -- But Washington Can Reduce the Risk


Somehow I do not think the COA 3 Chinese golden parachute and escape plan will entice the Kim Family regime in any way.  And of course COA 2 will very likely be perceived as a threat to the regime and we know where that leads.  But what is missing from this is the very real preparation for what comes after the Kim Family Regime.  Before we can determine a strategy for north Korea we really need to understand the nature of the Kim Family Regime.   As Stephen Bradner has written (and said so many times) the regime is a mafia-like crime family cult.  But it has interests and objectives which it has been pursuing since 1948.

Vital National Interest: Survival of the Kim Family Regime Strategic Aim:  
Reunification of the Peninsula under Regime control Strategic Objective: 
Recognition as a "World Power" (and since Kim Jong Il – a nuclear power)  
Required Condition to achieve the Strategic Aim: Removal of or neutralization of US forces on the Korean Peninsula

But I do not think that living in exile will satisfy the regime's vital national interest but even if it did we would have to deal with what is left behind and before we embark on a strategy below that hopefully would prevent war but could possibly lead to regime collapse (which of course with the implosion-explosion paradox could also lead to war) we had better prepare the environment and posture all the necessary forces and capabilities to deal with what comes next.  Any policy or strategy that does not take that into account will be on the same level as the "strategy" we had in March of 2003 for Iraq.

Unfortunately if we are unwilling to plan and "strategize" beyond the current crisis then the only course of action we are left with is to try to "manage" the situation and prevent it from getting worse which ironically the five major powers dealing with this situation have all tacitly understood for some decades.
V/R
Dave



The Next Korean War
Conflict With North Korea Could Go Nuclear -- But Washington Can Reduce the Risk
April 1, 2013


The view that nuclear weapons are merely political instruments -- suitable for sending signals, but not waging wars -- is now so common in the United States that it is hard to find anyone who disagrees. Yet that comforting assumption is not shared by leaders everywhere. North Korea, for example, does not test nuclear weapons to send messages, but to make sure that its ultimate deterrent will work. It would be tragic if the United States let misguided Kremlinology distract from the real challenges ahead.

Last December, the chubby and blubbering soon-to-be leader of the hermit kingdom seemed too inexperienced and unqualified to ever consolidate his rule. Today, Kim Jong Un is riding high, having become the first Korean to launch a domestically designed satellite into orbit on the back of a domestically designed rocket. North Korean society, though, is changing all around him, and lobbing missiles might not be enough to keep him in power.

As North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un issues increasingly over-the-top threats -- including intimations that he might launch nuclear strikes against the United States -- officials in Washington have sought to reassure the public and U.S. allies. North Korea, they say, may initiate cyberattacks or other limited provocations, but the leaders in Pyongyang wish to survive, so they are highly unlikely to do anything as foolhardy as using nuclear weapons.

Despite those assurances, however, the risk of nuclear war with North Korea is far from remote. Although Pyongyang’s tired threats are probably bluster, the current crisis has substantially increased the risk of a conventional conflict -- and any conventional war with North Korea is likely to go nuclear. Washington should continue its efforts to prevent war on the Korean Peninsula. But equally important, it must rapidly take steps -- including re-evaluating U.S. war plans -- to dampen the risks of nuclear escalation if conventional war erupts.

Ironically, the risk of North Korean nuclear war stems not from weakness on the part of the United States and South Korea but from their strength. If war erupted, the North Korean army, short on training and armed with decrepit equipment, would prove no match for the U.S.–South Korean Combined Forces Command. Make no mistake, Seoul would suffer some damage, but a conventional war would be a rout, and CFC forces would quickly cross the border and head north.
The risk of nuclear war with North Korea is far from remote.

At that point, North Korea’s inner circle would face a grave decision: how to avoid the terrible fates of such defeated leaders as Saddam Hussein and Muammar al-Qaddafi. Kim, his family, and his cronies could try to escape to China and plead for a comfortable, lifelong sanctuary there -- an increasingly dim prospect given Beijing’s growing frustration with Kim’s regime. Pyongyang’s only other option would be to try to force a cease-fire by playing its only trump card: nuclear escalation.
(Continued at the link below)

S.Korea, U.S. to Keep Combined Forces Command


If this is true this is good news.  The Alliance should take the opportunity to demonstrate to north Korea that one of the pillars of its strategy-  to split the ROK/US Alliance - has failed and that the result of its nuclear and missile development is that the Alliance has been made stronger and the chances of north Korea ever achieving the correlation of forces it needs to execute its military campaign plan to unify the Peninsula under its domination are slim to none.

Now the next question (assuming the report below is true) is who will be in command of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command in 2015?

V/R
Dave

S.Korea, U.S. to Keep Combined Forces Command
Seoul and Washington have decided to keep the Combined Forces Command after full control of South Korean forces has been handed back to Seoul, and develop it into a bigger joint command structure to strengthen cooperation.

Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin briefed President Park Geun-hye on the plan on Monday.

The heads of the South Korean and U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff are to outline the plan when they meet in Washington this month for annual consultations. The new command structure will then be officially adopted at the bilateral Security Consultative Meeting in October.

The CFC was originally to be dismantled when the U.S. hands back wartime operational control of South Korean troops to Seoul in 2015, but there were fears here that this could weaken South Korea's defenses. The change of heart comes amid increasingly belligerent rhetoric from North Korea.
(Continued at the link below)

Monday, April 1, 2013

N.K. leader may attack to save face: U.S. Lawmaker


Actually I think not, at least not a deliberate attack to execute its complete campaign plan to unify the Peninsula (but of course a miscalculation is always possible). He may of course conduct a provocation that may be a kinetic attack (e.g., naval battle or artillery attack such as at Y-P Do); however, based on the statements coming out of the Korean Workers Party meeting I think that the Kim Regime's face saving will be in the form of propaganda that will state that by ratcheting up tensions and engendering the response that it has, the north will claim that the international community is acknowledging that it is in fact a nuclear state.  It will say that only because of its nuclear weapons with the Alliance and the US respond as it did using its most advanced weapons systems as a show of force because it considers the north a nuclear power and thus a peer.  While this may in fact help Kim to save face and might be the off ramp that he needs to de-escalate the situation we must also expect that in the future the north will try to negotiate and deal with the international community as it perceives a nuclear state would.  Of course we should never acknowledge it as a nuclear power even a de facto one.  As Bruce Bennett has said it is a non-compliant, usage nuclear experimenter and nuclear proliferator.
V/R
Dave


N.K. leader may attack to save face: U.S. Lawmaker

Published : 2013-04-01 08:52
Updated : 2013-04-01 08:52
With North Korea churning out military threats, a key concern is that its young leader Kim Jong-un may reach a point of no return in provocative steps, a U.S. congressman said Sunday.

Rep. Peter King (R-NY), former chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, said North Korea's statements may not be an "empty threat."

"Kim Jong-un is trying to establish himself. He's trying to be the tough guy. He is 28, 29 years old, and he keeps going further and further out, and I don't know if he can get himself back in," he said in an interview with ABC News.

"So my concern would be that he may feel to save face he has to launch some sort of attack on South Korea, or some base in the Pacific," said King, who now sits on the House intelligence and homeland security committees. 

He described the North Korean regime as "more like an organized crime family running a territory."

North Korea has ratcheted up its threats to launch nuclear attacks on the U.S. and stage a war against South Korea. It also warned that it could shut down the inter-Korean industrial complex in Kaesong, just north of the border of the two sides.

The U.S. has responded with related calls for Pyongyang to calm down and by showing off its available firepower. 

The Pentagon dispatched Japan-based F-22 Raptor stealth fighters for the ongoing South Korea-U.S. joint military drills after sending B-52 Stratofortress and B-2 Spirit bombers, both of which are capable of carrying nuclear bombs, to the Korean Peninsula.
(Continued at the link below)

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