If you eliminate the north's rhetoric and tone there is something to agree with in these statements.  The north is paying attention to the debate.

It added that the combined control structure that Seoul and Washington agreed to create to replace the CFC effectively is no different in its goal, and nullifies the rational for the OPCON transfer.

…

The paper monitored in Seoul said creating another command structure fielded by officers from the two allies aims to deceive the public into thinking change has taken place.

"Just because there is a change in the name and a South Korean officer is placed at the head of the command does not alter the fact that the U.S. will provide intelligence and exercise real wartime operational control," the Rodong Sinmun said.

We should keep in mind that a key part of the north's strategy is taken right out of The Sun Tzu, e.g., to split the alliance:

It then argued that a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula would play a critical role in enhancing global peace and stability, and remove any cause for future conflict.

If the current "OPCON Transfer" plan is executed as planned with a ROK only warfighting command and the US in a separate supporting command the north will assume its plan is working and it will be gaining the advantage since the alliance will no longer have unity of command.

Unfortunately north Korean apologists who would advocate the above course of action do not understand that the exact opposite would occur – the north would believe it has the correlation of forces to successfully execute its campaign plan to reunify the peninsula under the north's control thus ensuring survival of the Kim Family Regime.  The only way to hope to prevent future conflict on the peninsula is for the Kim Family regime to be eliminated.

But if a ROK/US combined command is maintained there should be no daylight in the alliance and thus no opportunity for the north to execute its plans; therefore, the most important mission of the alliance will be accomplished:  deterrence of an attack on the ROK.

But the north's statements should be considered by the ROK/US task force that is studying the OPCON transfer.  It should be very clear that the north wants the OPCON transfer because it realizes its advantage and that OPCON transfer supports its plans.

The complete Rodong Sinmun article is also pasted below.

V/R

Dave

N. Korea slams plan to create new joint S. Korea-U.S. military command

http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/yonhap-news-agency/131107/n-korea-slams-plan-create-new-joint-s-korea-us-military-comm

SEOUL, Nov. 8 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Friday slammed a plan to create a new joint South Korea-U.S. military command after Seoul reclaims wartime operation command (OPCON) of its troops.

In an article carried by the Rodong Sinmun, an organ of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea, the North claimed that the Combined Forces Command (CFC) that has been in existence for 35 years is nothing more than a criminal organization designed to carry out an invasion of the communist country.

It added that the combined control structure that Seoul and Washington agreed to create to replace the CFC effectively is no different in its goal, and nullifies the rational for the OPCON transfer.

The two allies are currently engaged in talks to push back the deadline for the transfer of OPCON, due to heightened regional tensions triggered by Pyongyang's unwillingness to give up its buildup of weapons of mass destruction. Originally, Seoul is set to regain operational control in late 2015 that will give its generals primary responsibility for defending the country with the United States military playing the supporting role.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/yonhap-news-agency/131107/n-korea-slams-plan-create-new-joint-s-korea-us-military-comm

Rodong Sinmun Demands Immediate Dismantlement of Mechanism for Invading DPRK http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm

Pyongyang, November 8 (KCNA) -- Mechanism for a war of aggression such as the south Korea-U.S. "combined forces command" should be dismantled immediately and the U.S. occupation and domination over south Korea be terminated at an early date, says Rodong Sinmun Friday in an article. The article goes on: The command is a criminal military mechanism for the U.S. colonial domination over south Korea and for the provocation of a war against the north. During the past several decades, the command worked out, supplemented and rounded off various war scenarios aimed to make a preemptive attack upon the DPRK and supervised military drills and arms buildup to help U.S. and south Korean forces get familiar with those scenarios. The U.S. and the south Korean puppet forces are blatantly challenging the nation's aspiration and the demand of the era for the improved inter-Korean relations and the peace on the Korean Peninsula. What should not be overlooked is that the U.S. and the south Korean puppet warmongers are seeking to organize a new command instead of dismantling the "combined forces command" under the pretext of the "transfer of the right to control wartime operations." The above-mentioned action is nothing but a ploy to nullify the "transfer of the right to command wartime operations" and deceive public opinion at home and abroad. As a matter of fact, the U.S. is contemplating the conversion of this defunct mechanism into one for combined operations for invading the DPRK by letting member countries of the "UN Command" take part in the joint military drills including Key Resolve and Foal Eagle being staged in south Korea and its vicinity. This is little short of a scenario to create a hotbed of a war on the peninsula and bring a root cause of threatening and disturbing peace and security in Northeast Asia and other parts of the world. With no rhetoric can the U.S. justify the existence of the above-said mechanism or vindicate the presence of its forces in south Korea.

I am not clear if the title is correct or if the first paragraph is correct; e.g., will the task force look at OPCON transfer or will it study Seoul's ability to respond to nK provocations?

But I hope the task force puts aside the OPCON transfer issue and gets at two real questions:

How should the ROK and US military forces be organized to achieve the strategic objectives of the Alliance? (not merely respond to nK provocations though that is an important consideration but one of many)

As part of that issue this question needs to be answered:  Should the ROK/US Combined Forces Command be dissolved?

The answers to those questions, based on a comprehensive strategic assessment of all the issues on the Peninsula and in Northeast Asia should guide the future organization of the ROK/US Military Alliance and rather than ill-consider decisions that were made based on emotional reactions vice strategic considerations by senior leaders in both countries.

And with the establishment of this task force maybe the pundits and politicians can leave the OPCON issue alone for the next year and wait for the task force to do its job and provide its results.

V/R
Dave

US-South Korea task force to examine OPCON handover

http://www.stripes.com/news/us-south-korea-task-force-to-examine-opcon-handover-1.247190

A U.S. soldier walks forward while a South Korean soldier stands ready as three North Korean soldiers approach the demarcation line at the Joint Security Area, South Korea, July 27, 2013. Both U.S. and South Korean soldiers are United Nations Command Security Battalion members.
ARMANDO R. LIMON/STARS AND STRIPES

By Ashley Rowland and Yoo Kyong Chang

Stars and Stripes

Published: October 15, 201

SEOUL — A joint U.S.-South Korean task force will study Seoul’s ability to respond to possible North Korean provocations as officials consider whether to delay transferring U.S. wartime control of allied troops to South Korea, according to the Ministry of National Defense.

The task force will start work next month, and a decision on a delay is expected by the middle of 2014, an MND spokesman said Tuesday, speaking on customary condition of anonymity.

South Korean Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin told lawmakers last week that the planned OPCON transfer date of December 2015 is “inappropriate” in light of North Korean provocations earlier this year, including Pyongyang’s third nuclear test in February.

“North Korea is different from the past. Considering the third nuclear test and the situations from March to May, the December 2015 deadline is not appropriate,” he said.

The top U.S. commander would now lead both U.S. and South Korean forces if war broke out on the peninsula. That responsibility would fall to the top South Korean commander after the transfer of operational control takes place.

A Pentagon-commissioned study last year suggested the U.S. military take a number of steps to cover for perceived shortcomings in the South’s ability to defend itself, including delaying the OPCON transfer.

The transfer was initially supposed to happen in 2007, but was postponed until 2012. In 2010, that target date was pushed forward again, to 2015, in the wake of criticism of the South’s response to North Korea’s sinking of one of its warships earlier that year that left 46 sailors dead.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.stripes.com/news/us-south-korea-task-force-to-examine-opcon-handover-1.247190

Hopefully we will tire of the discussion of OPCON transfer over the next year, we will conduct a thorough strategic analysis of how to best organize our combined military forces to achieve our alliance strategic objectives and when the plan is announced at next October's Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) it will not be controversial and will illustrate the proper evolution of the alliance as it adapts to changing conditions while always keep the alliance strategic objectives and threat in the forefront.

V/R

Dave

Yonhap News AgencyOctober 14, 2013 00:47

S. Korea, U.S. to decide timing of OPCON transfer next year

http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/yonhap-news-agency/131014/s-korea-us-decide-timing-opcon-transfer-next-year

By Kim Eun-jung

SEOUL, Oct. 14 (Yonhap) -- Seoul and Washington have agreed to reset the timing of the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) next year after reviewing North Korean threat and the South Korean forces capabilities to deal with it, the defense ministry here said Monday.

The issue of the OPCON transfer to Seoul surfaced as the major issue in this year's parliamentary audit on the defense ministry, which in May proposed the U.S. government to reconsider the December 2015 deadline in light of the rising North Korean nuclear and missile threat.

In a bilateral defense summit earlier this month, the two nations agreed to form a task force team to discuss conditions for the right timing and draw a conclusion in the first half of next year, the defense ministry said in a report.

South Korean Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin stressed the importance of the allies' combined surveillance capabilities to detect movments by the North Korean military, pledging to bolster his military's own capabilities to deter the present danger and potential threat.

"The South Korea-U.S. combined forces are critical in making command decisions, while South Korean forces have enough strike capabilities," Kim said during the parliamentary defense meeting. "The South Korean forces are currently preparing to cope with the North Korean threat, while preparing for potential threat in the future. We will consider mid- and long-term measures to bolster capabilities against potential threat."

South Korea is scheduled to take over the wartime operational command of all troops on the peninsula in December 2015, a timeline that had already been pushed back from the previous deadline of 2012, but rising threat from the communist rival fueled concerns over the planned transition.

In light of the heightened tension with Pyongyang's near-daily war threats against South Korea and the U.S. for their joint military drills in spring, Kim said he suggested that President Park Geun-hye reconsider the timing of the planned transition.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/yonhap-news-agency/131014/s-korea-us-decide-timing-opcon-transfer-next-year

This debate comes back to OPCON transfer and can the ROK military defend their own country.  First let me state up front that it is my belief that if the ROK and north Korea were to have a war without outside intervention or assistance the ROK would win and in the end win decisively.  But both north and South would be devastated at the end and in fact things might look a lot like 1953 especially between Seoul and Pyongyang.  And of course it is unrealistic to think that there could ever be an isolated conflict not the Peninsula, that does not spillover into other parts of Northeast Asia and does not have a crippling global economic impact.  But if anyone can envision an isolated conflict then by all means plan accordingly.

However, I think the issue, for the US, should be about what is in the best interests of the US.  I would submit that it is in US interests both to deter such a catastrophic conflict but if such a catastrophic conflict occurs (whether the result of war or collapse) it is in US interests to both end the conflict as rapidly as possible, minimize destruction on the peninsula and in the region (to include Japan as well though that pains many on the mainland to hear), ensure a successful outcome of such conflict and then achieve the strategic end state of the Alliance (stated in 2009 and reaffirmed by both Presidents in May 2013) and that is the unification of the Korean Peninsula (ideally peacefully but of course north Korea has a say in that condition).  Working backward from that goal should guide the analysis as to how to best organize the combined military forces to achieve that end state.

Rather than make comments that belittle our alliance (which also betray a lack of understanding of both the alliance and the regional threat and context) we in the US should focus on what is in the best interests of the United States.  If we decide that it is not in the best interests of the United States to ever contribute to achieving "a stable, secure, peaceful, economically vibrant, non-nuclear peninsula, reunified under a liberal constitutional form of government determined by the Korean people" then perhaps we need to completely re-evaluate our commitment to the Alliance.  Talking about OPCON transfer is counter-productive and a distraction from the real issues which should be how best to organize the complementary military capabilities of the ROK and US to optimize their strengths and mitigate their weaknesses (yes the US military has weaknesses too when it comes to fighting on the Korean Peninsula) so that the military forces can most effectively contribute to achieving the alliance strategic end state.

V/R

Dave

South Korean official: Allied transfer of control in 2015 'inappropriate'

http://www.stripes.com/news/south-korean-official-allied-transfer-of-control-in-2015-inappropriate-1.246483

Passengers walk through Seoul Station on Tuesday evening, shortly after North Korea announced that foreigners should leave the country for their safety in case of war. Many in South Korea, accustomed to hearing threats from the North, have shown little serious concern about a possible military confrontation with Pyongyang.
ASHLEY ROWLAND/STARS AND STRIPES

By Ashley Rowland

Stars and Stripes

Published: October 11, 2013

In this photo released by the South Korean Unification Ministry, Kim Song Hye, center, the head of North Korea's delegation, shakes hands with an unidentified South Korean officer before crossing a military demarcation line, which has separated the two Koreas since the Korean War, for a meeting with South Korean delegates at Panmunjom in Paju, north of Seoul, South Korea, Sunday, June 9, 2013. Government delegates from North and South Korea began preparatory talks Sunday at the "truce village" on their heavily armed border aimed at setting ground rules for a higher-level discussion on easing animosity and restoring stalled rapprochement projects.

SOUTH KOREAN UNIFICATION MINISTRY

SEOUL — South Korea’s defense minister says the planned transfer of wartime control of allied troops to Seoul in 2015 is “inappropriate” in light of North Korean provocations earlier this year.

“North Korea is different from the past. Considering the third nuclear test and the situations from March to May, the December 2015 deadline is not appropriate,” Kim Kwan-jin told lawmakers during a defense committee meeting Tuesday. Videos of his remarks were posted on the National Assembly’s website.

North Korea issued a series of threats after the February nuclear test, which monitors indicated was its most powerful so far. Bolstered by a successful test of a three-stage rocket last December, it claimed it could hit U.S. targets, though experts say they think Pyongyang has not yet crafted a bomb small enough to fit in a warhead.

Kim said Pyongyang’s ongoing threats over joint U.S.-South Korean military exercises contributed to Seoul’s decision, backed by President Park Geun-hye, to seek a delay.

If war broke out on the peninsula today, the commander of U.S. forces would lead both U.S. and South Korean forces. After the OPCON transfer, the top South Korean general would assume that responsibility.

The transfer was initially supposed to take place in 2007 but was postponed until 2012. After the North’s sinking of a South Korean warship in 2010, the date was pushed forward again to 2015 amid questions about whether the South’s military was ready for the job.

U.S. Forces Korea commander Gen. Curtis “Mike” Scaparrotti, who assumed command last week, told the Senate Armed Services Committee in July that the OPCON transfer is “a good plan...and I think we should move forward with it.” He added that Seoul had to meet a variety of benchmarks before the transfer takes place.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.stripes.com/news/south-korean-official-allied-transfer-of-control-in-2015-inappropriate-1.246483

U.S.-ROK transfer delay inevitable

It is interesting that the ROK press is not talking at all about the proposed Combined Theater Command with a Korean general in charge that was put forth this past spring.  I think it is also interesting that no one is talking about the other potential reason that many ROK officers and senior government officials are willing to request the postponement.  I think given the US fiscal constraints and the proposal to rotate ground forces there could be a very real fear that the US commitment to the alliance may be reduced over time if the US does not remain in command of CFC.  And of course we should always, always keep in mind that a key part of north Korean strategy has been to split the alliance and we have been contributing to that since 1978 with the continuous decline in US commitment under nearly every US administration both Republican and Democrat.  Perhaps the senior ROK officials are trying to save us from ourselves.

But finally there is a press article that recognizes the Military Committee and at least somewhat explains its important role:

To see why this is not necessarily so, we need to understand that since 1978, the Combined Forces Command has been accountable to a joint military committee that gets its authority from both U.S. and South Korean national command authorities. 

The Korean units assigned to the CFC are designated by the Korean side and can be withdrawn at any time upon notification. The American CFC commander cannot refuse such notification. All he can do is point out the impact it may have on the performance of his overall mission.

This is why there is no real soverignty issue and that OPCON trasnfer is a myth.  What happens in 2015 is the dissolution of the combined warfighting command the loss of unity of command.

And of course this is a very signifcant issue.  The costs to both nations goes up if we have to maintain two independent warfighting commands.

 

  But the ROK has been unable to get sufficient public and government support to invest in all the necessary capabilities.

According to a credible rumor, when the wartime OpCon handover was agreed to during the Roh administration, Korean leaders learned of the high costs of the technologies they would have to master, which has since diminished their eagerness to be in charge. 

 

V/R
Dave 

U.S.-ROK transfer delay inevitable

http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2975274

Surprisingly, perhaps, most Korean officers seem quite comfortable with the current arrangement.

July 30,2013

This latest request from South Korea to the United States to postpone once again the transfer of wartime operational control of combined forces to South Korea reminds me of some of the peculiar characteristics of Korean politics. For example, one may wonder if some South Korean politicians find it advantageous to allow the public to remain ignorant of the evolving complexities of the U.S.-ROK relationship. It seems advantageous for politicians to tacitly give the impression to their constituents that they have less power than they actually do. After all, being “under the thumb of Big Brother” gives politicians a plausible rationale to suggest they have no other choice but to do what might be unpopular.

Of course, this potential misleading of the public brings with it the possibility that Koreans at times will jump to the wrong conclusion, sometimes leading to populist movements - such as last decade’s farcical anti-mad cow demonstrations.

But the nonsense of all of this is revealed when America acts outside the stereotype portrayed by Korea’s make-believe leftists. When in 2006 former President Roh Moo-Hyun demanded that wartime OpCon be handed over by 2012, then U.S. Secretary of Donald Rumsfeld responded affirmatively - in fact, Rumsfeld offered the handover as early as 2009. Furthermore, Rumsfeld proposed to Roh that South Koreans should increase their share of costs for U.S. Forces Korea from 40 percent to a “more equitable 50 percent.”

While it would be disingenuous to suggest the United States is in Korea for purely altruistic reasons, there are calls in America for U.S. Forces in Korea to be scaled back given the costs to the American taxpayer and the robust growth of South Korea.

Anyway, President Roh’s demand and Rumfeld’s counteroffer led to street demonstrations by several retired Korean generals and officers, as well as conservative groups, calling on Roh to behave responsibly.

All of which, from a foreigner’s perspective, was quite peculiar. After all, what Korean conservatives and progressives have in common is a strong sense of nationalism. One would naturally think Koreans of all political persuasions would be eager to have this command transfer to take place, the sooner the better.

To see why this is not necessarily so, we need to understand that since 1978, the Combined Forces Command has been accountable to a joint military committee that gets its authority from both U.S. and South Korean national command authorities.

The Korean units assigned to the CFC are designated by the Korean side and can be withdrawn at any time upon notification. The American CFC commander cannot refuse such notification. All he can do is point out the impact it may have on the performance of his overall mission.

In light of Chun Doo Hwan’s coup d’etat and suppression of the Gwangju uprising, these points have not been well understood by most Koreans or most Americans. Neither has it been well explained. When U.S. officials tried to state their position publicly in 1980, they were stymied by South Korean martial law and censorship. Subsequently, there was little effort to set the record straight because of the priority and sensitivity accorded to political stability.

In other words, despite a military technological gap, the relationship between the two sides has been much more equal than is publicly imagined.

As of today, the U.S. maintains at CFC a four-star general and two-star general - C3 (operations and training, the primary war-fighting team) and C5 (plans, policy and strategy) - to head up the most important staff sections, with a Korean four-star deputy and one-star Korean deputy, respectively, to offset them on behalf of the Korean side.

Surprisingly, perhaps, most Korean officers seem quite comfortable with the current arrangement in regard to how U.S. forces are stationed in Korea. Korean officers realize that given their hierarchical system and relatively rigid training, they are not prepared to react within the CFC with the required swiftness and flexibly in the face of major hostilities.

Even with recent changes in orders of the day that permit South Korean forces to fire back at North Korean troops or targets without prior authorization when attacked, ROK officers remain hesitant to order a major response out of fear of overreacting and, thereby, truncating what otherwise could have been successful military careers.

We should note, however, the U.S. Army continuously maintains the lead over its Korean counterparts in cutting-edge military technology, sophisticated command and control procedures, and air power. And, thanks to Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. officers arrive here “battle hardened.”

All of which makes the perception of the South Korean Army operating under the U.S. Army very much a necessity, despite legal technicalities and nationalist passions. According to a credible rumor, when the wartime OpCon handover was agreed to during the Roh administration, Korean leaders learned of the high costs of the technologies they would have to master, which has since diminished their eagerness to be in charge. 

(Continued at the link below)

http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2975274

S. Korea asks US to reconsider transfer of wartime troop control

I think we should keep in mind that we remain committed to the ROK/US Alliance and the defense of the ROK because it is in our strategic interest to do so.  I think it is even more in our interests now that at any time in the history of the Alliance given the ROK's place in the world and global economic importance and the geo-political situation in Northeast Asia.  The defense of the ROK is not some charitable act on the part of the US.  The ROK has always contributed more in blood to its defense both during the war and since, it has also spilled blood outside the ROK in support of mutual ROK and US interests: Vietnam and Central and Southwest Asia.  I think we have to get past the statements of the former Secretary of Defense:

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said during an October 2006 visit that it was “time for the Republic of Korea to assume a larger role and responsibility” for its defense.

The ROK also spends significant treasure on its defense both through its own military forces (which will always form the bulk of the ground forces that will defend the ROK and ensure victory in a war with the north) and through burden sharing which provides a  share of stationing costs for US forces.

But we should not be approaching this issue from the position of relative contributions or the operational control issue (as I have said the ROK has operational control of ROK and US ground forces, special operations forces, and psychological operations forces in wartime).  

The OPCON transfer or transition issue really is only accomplished one way:  the dissolution of the Combined Forces Command.  Dissolve that and we end up with two independent national warfighting commands.  But we need to ask what is the best way to organize and employ the ROK/US Alliance military instrument of power?  I would submit that it is ensuring a combined warfighting command and as I have said I fully support a Korean General being in command of a Combined Theater Command (CTC)  that has been proposed.  If we could more effectively explain the command structure (which I too have a hard time doing in sound bites or an elevator speech) in times of the dual command exercised by both National Command and Military Authorities through the Military Committee we would be able to recognize that there is no OPCON issue with a combined command for either the ROK or US whether there is a US or Korean General in command.  We really need to look at the Alliance from the perspective that at this point in history we have a mature partnership and no longer the big brother, little brother relationship. We should not through away the hard work we have done to develop an effective combined command (especially since its establishment in 1978).  We need to continue to evolve without throwing away the foundation that has been established and we can do that  through a Combined Theater Command with a Korean Commander and a US deputy.

I am not sure what is going on with the negotiations or why the ROKG and Minister of Defense are apparently making statements about delay of OPCON transition/transfer.  I am slightly optimistic that OPCON transfer has just become the shorthand way to discuss the issue and that they are still considering the CTC concept.  If the ROKG is really proposing a delay in OPCON transfer (meaning maintaining the status quo with the Combined Forces Command) I wonder if it is an indication of a possible subtle or unspoken suspicion if the two independent warfighting commands are established in accordance with the current 2015 timeline that beyond 2015 the US might further reduce its military commitment to the Alliance.  This fear could cause the strategic decision making rationale to be that to ensure the strength of the Alliance the ROKG would rather have the status quo and deal with the potential domestic political problems with charges of the ROK forfeiting its sovereignty (which is in fact a myth).  

If that is the case then the Alliance is not as strong as I believe and that the ROK harbors concerns about the long term commitment by the US and it must believe the only way to ensure such commitment is to maintain the CFC with a US General in command.  

It is really too bad if that is the case.  The US has an opportunity to demonstrate to the countries of the region (and the world) that it can be a true partner in an Alliance and not have to dominate it in every way if it goes forward with a CTC with a Korean General in charge and continues to commit US forces for the Alliance.  I think the benefits of such an evolution in the Alliance can impact the Asian Pivot/Rebalance and help to reinsure countries of our commitment as well as our respect for our Alliance partners.

The bottom line is we need to move to the next level in the ROK/US Alliance and that is to establish a Combined Theater Command with a Korean General in command.
V/R
Dave

S. Korea asks US to reconsider transfer of wartime troop control
http://www.stripes.com/news/s-korea-asks-us-to-reconsider-transfer-of-wartime-troop-control-1.231124


By Erik Slavin
Stars and Stripes

Published: July 18, 2013
RELATED

Obama: Plans on track to give South Korea operational control of militaries on peninsula
Former USFK commander speaks out against giving S. Korea operational control
U.S., S. Korea delay OPCON transfer until 2015
South Korea has asked the United States to re-examine an already-delayed plan to give Seoul wartime control of its military forces by 2015, South Korean defense ministry officials said.

While South Korea retains peacetime control of its approximately 639,000 servicemembers, control in the event of war currently transfers to a U.S. four-star general under the Combined Forces Command.

The transfer was originally planned for 2012 but was delayed three years ago.

The two sides will discuss the transfer date at an October meeting in Seoul, said a defense ministry spokesman who requested anonymity, which is common practice in South Korea.

“The significance of variables in North Korea’s nuclear program has changed,” the ministry spokesman said.

The spokesman said South Korea isn’t 100 percent committed to a delay but wants the U.S. to consider it as the regional security situation develops during the rest of the year.

Another defense ministry official confirmed that the proposal had been made and said that if control transfer is postponed, no backup date has been agreed upon.

South Korean media outlets have reported that the delay proposal was made during a June multinational meeting of defense chiefs in Singapore.

At a May joint news conference in Seoul with South Korean President Park Geun-hye, U.S. President Barack Obama said the 2015 operational control transfer date remained on course.

South Korea will continue to plan for a 2015 transfer date for the time being, ministry officials said.

Earlier this year, Gen. B.B. Bell, who retired in 2008 as commander of U.S. Forces Korea, called on the United States to let South Korea “permanently postpone” the transfer.

Bell, who strongly advocated the transfer as commander, said North Korea’s nuclear development put the South at a “significant disadvantage on any future battlefield, or in any future negotiations.”

Operational control became a prominent issue in 2006 under President Roh Moo-hyun, who framed the transfer as a national sovereignty issue. However, when the Pentagon responded that they would go along with a transfer as soon as 2009, opposition conservatives opposed the move and government officials balked.

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said during an October 2006 visit that it was “time for the Republic of Korea to assume a larger role and responsibility” for its defense.
(Continued at the link below)
http://www.stripes.com/news/s-korea-asks-us-to-reconsider-transfer-of-wartime-troop-control-1.231124

Report says S. Korea wants to delay military deal with U.S.

With all due respect to Mr. Harlan but we really need some journalists who understand the command relationships in Korea.  I know they are complex and not easily explained.  But this perpetuation of the myth of "OPCON transfer" is unhelpful.

First, the ROK did not push for the transfer seven years ago.  This goes back to January of 2003 when Rumsfeld offered it up to the delegation from the incoming Roh administration when they came to DC  because Rumsfeld wanted to use the troops that he (and Wolfowitz)thought were "wasted" in Korea because they could not be used int he war on terrorism.  

But the reality is that this is not about the US command of ROK troops or the ROK command of US troops (though the ROK does has had operational control of many US troops under the operational plans).  This is also not technically a legacy of the Korean War and the command arrangements then when ROK forces were put under the operational control of the United Nations Command.  In 1978 the Combined Forces Command was established which is a true combined command with a nearly  one for one counterpart relationship throughout the entire command structure with the only real visible focus on the senior commander who is a US general with a ROK general as deputy commander.  But that commander answers to the MiliTray Committee which is made up of representatives of both nation's National Command and Military Authorities.  Although it is fashionable to say that ROK troops are under US command or operational control in reality ROK and US forces remain under their national commands and the Combined Forces Command exercises operational control of both ROK and US forces when each government decides to CHOP (change of operational control) its forces to the Combined Forces Command.  What was to happen in 2012 and then delayed to 2015 was not really the return of ROK OPCON but the dissolution of the Combined Warfighting Command and (and as noted in the article below) the establishment two separate commands, a ROK Command that would be the lead war fighting command (the "supported command") and the US Korea Command (KORCOM) in support of the ROK Command (the "supporting command").  

This is not a conservative or progressive/liberal issue, this is an issue for how the ROK/US Military Alliance should organize its forces for the defense of the Republic of Korea.  Should there be two separate commands with the huge investment required by both nations to develop independent war fighting capabilities or should there be a combined command that builds on the decades of interoperability training and capabilities and burden sharing of costs?  Certainly political considerations and domestic politics must play a role in the decision on how to organize the military forces (as should the threat consideration as well) but in the end both countries must answer the question of how to best organize their military forces to achieve their desired strategic objectives.  

My recommendation is the new proposed Combined Theater Command (CTC), commanded by a ROK General with a US General as the deputy that has been in the news recently.  This would maintain the effective combined capabilities and allow for equitable sharing of costs.  It would ensure unity of command and unity of effort during war or nL regime collapse.  

While some will say that we have to invoke the Pershing Rule and not put US forces under a foreign commander we must look at reality.  Just as the current Combined Forces Command answers to the Military Committee the Commander of the CTC would as well.  We should also note that there are many instances in the previous war plans (I cannot speak to the current ones) in which the ROK Army Commanders (Third ROK Army [TROKA} and First ROK Army [FROKA]) have operational control of US ground combat forces, at various times the I, III, and XVIII US Corps.  ROK and US Special Operations Forces fall under the Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force (CUWTF) which is commanded by a ROK three star general.  The ROK and US Psychological Operations and MISO forces fall under the operational control of the Combined Psychological Operations Task Force (CPOTF) which is commanded by a ROK one star general.  We really need to get past the controversy of "OPCON transfer" which is really a distraction from the critical analysis that is needed to how best organize the combined forces to achieve the ROK/US Alliance strategic objectives.

V/R

Dave

Report says S. Korea wants to delay military deal with U.S.

By Chico Harlan, Wednesday, July 17, 5:45 AM

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/report-says-s-korea-wants-to-delay-military-deal-with-us/2013/07/17/cff6c33a-eec2-11e2-bb32-725c8351a69e_print.html

SEOUL — South Korea has requested to postpone a plan with the United States that would give Seoul control of its own troops during a war, South Korea’s semi-official Yonhap news agency said Wednesday, citing a top U.S. government official.

The reported request, coming on the heels of earlier delays, underscores South Korea’s ambivalence about how it would handle a potential war with the rival North, and whether its own military is capable of operating independently of Washington.

Under the current arrangement — a legacy of the Korean War — the U.S. would command not only its own troops amid fighting on the Korean peninsula, but also those of the South.

The transfer of operational wartime control from Washington to Seoul would mark the greatest power shift in a six-decade alliance. When the South first pushed for the transfer seven years ago, government officials here described it as an affirmation of the South’s sovereignty — and of its rapid modernization.

But the transfer — originally planned for 2012 and then pushed to December 2015 — has since drawn occasional criticism from conservative analysts in both Seoul and Washington, who say deterrence against the North will suffer if the militarily superior U.S. takes a back seat. Earlier this year, a former U.S. military commander in Korea, retired Gen. B.B. Bell, said the U.S. should “permanently postpone” the deal in light of North Korea’s nuclear capability.

The Yonhap report, attributed to a top U.S. government official and confirmed by a senior South Korean official, did not indicate how the U.S. would handle the request.

South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense did not confirm the Yonhap report in a statement, but said that Seoul had proposed that Washington take into account “North Korea’s heightened nuclear problem” as the two sides discuss the OpCon handoff. The ministry’s statement added that transfer will be “continuously discussed” by the two governments.

The U.S. Forces Korea, in its own statement, said “no formal proposal” has been made to adjust the current OpCon plan.

When the transfer does occur, the 28,500 U.S. troops here will not fall under the command of the South during war. Rather, the U.S. and South Korea will have separate commands that communicate with one another.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/report-says-s-korea-wants-to-delay-military-deal-with-us/2013/07/17/cff6c33a-eec2-11e2-bb32-725c8351a69e_print.html