A Test of Responsibility in Korea: Seoul now wants the U.S. to retain military command on the peninsula.

We may be at a key turning point in the Alliance.  I do not think we are really grasping the issue in these two paragraphs.

There is also concern in Seoul that if the U.S. hands off operational control of South Korean troops, it may be tempted to dial back its overall security commitment. This is one reason many South Koreans (including 16 former defense ministers) have opposed OpCon transfer from the moment then-President Roh Moo Hyun proposed it in 2006.

This concern has become more acute as current U.S. foreign policy projects weakness around the world. Washington boasts of a "pivot" to Asia yet has cut the defense budget, shrunk the Navy and Air Force, and abandoned its strategy of being able to fight two wars simultaneously. America promises "extended deterrence" to South Korea, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella and missile defenses. Yet in April, as North Korea threatened to test more missiles, Secretary of State John Kerry offered to cut U.S. missile defenses in the region if China reined in Pyongyang.

We should remember that in all the alliance strategic planning documents we have recognized that the alliance is the friendly center of gravity.  This is more than rhetoric to our ROK allies.  They truly believe it (as do I).

While some Americans will belittle the ROK and say its time for them to stand on their own two feet or they have now have the economic power to be independent in defense I think we need to really pay attention to what the ROK is saying.  I actually think that some senior Korean officials may actually be doing some very mature risk analysis and weighing their national security interests.  I think they are willing to field the criticism that they are "afraid" to let go of the hand of the American big brother in the face of the bully from the north.  I do not think they are afraid at all and I think they know they could stand on their own two feet and fight and win.  But they are calculating their own long term strategic interests and they know that they are better served with the US as an ally and they are willing to eat humble pie to ensure the strength of the Alliance because they do fear that if we (the US) continue down this fiscal path combined with US domestic politics that the US military commitment to the ROK continue to decline.   The ROK knows that it has since 1978 when President Carter wanted to remove all US forces and every President, Republican or Democrat, since has either removed or altered some forces (even if for sound military or strategic reasons), removed nuclear weapons, removed US forces from patrolling the DMZ, and now is willing to dissolve the Combined Forces Command.  Taken as a whole over time the picture that is painted is one of declining commitment and now the ROK may have decided that it cannot allow for any further erosion of the alliance.  It may have calculated that the only way to ensure commitment from the US is to leave the Combined Forces Command (CFC) intact with an American commander.

There is an opportunity here at this turning point and with this alliance friction.  We do have the opportunity to move beyond the big brother-little brother relationship (and such US rhetoric as the only way we are going to make the ROK be fully responsible is by forcing the ROK to do more for themselves and to dissolve the Combined Forces Command so that the ROK will no longer be dependent on the US).  What we really have the opportunity to do is to assess the alliance interests and determine our mutual interests and the best way to organize the military instrument of power to support achieving those interests.  The proposal for a Combined Theater Command (CTC) with a Korean General in charge has been floated and may be the best way for the alliance to evolve.  However, the question is while the ROK is maturely looking at its strategic interested and is willing to be chastised as immature for wanting CFC to remain with a US general in charge, is the US mature enough to allow a transition to a CTC with a Korean general in command?  (we need to keep in mind the true command relationships exercised through the Military Committee – we also remember the well written and wise words of article II of the ROK/US Mutual Defense Treaty as well.  Now is the time for the most effective mutual consultation and agreement in 60 years on how best to organize the military forces of both nations to deter armed attack and to further the purposes of the Treaty.

“The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack. Separately and jointly, by self help and mutual aid, the Parties will maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable measures in consultation and agreement to implement this Treaty and to further its purposes.”

V/R

Dave

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• REVIEW & OUTLOOK ASIA
• Updated August 5, 2013, 6:35 p.m. ET

A Test of Responsibility in Korea

Seoul now wants the U.S. to retain military command on the peninsula.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324635904578640981437025750.html#printMode

Add South Korea to the list of countries where the tide of war is not receding. Citing growing threats from the North, nervous officials in Seoul have asked Washington to delay a planned transfer of wartime military command from U.S. to South Korean forces. Seoul's request is another reminder that the world is dangerous and America is the main check against global rogues.

The U.S. and South Korean militaries have been intertwined since the Korean War, when America commanded a coalition under the United Nations flag. South Korea's military remained under U.S. command after the war but became more independent as the country grew into a prosperous democracy.

In 1994 Seoul regained command of its own troops in peacetime, and in 2006 South Korea and the U.S. agreed that Seoul would also assume command of its own troops in a war. This transfer of so-called operational control is set for December 2015, but Seoul has now asked Washington for an indefinite delay.

U.S. and South Korean Marines run out from the South Korea LVT-7 during the joint military exercises between South Korea and the United States called Ssangyong 2013 as a part of annual Foal Eagle military exercises in Pohang, south of Seoul, South Korea, Friday, April 26, 2013.

The two sides have already delayed "OpCon" transfer once before, in 2010, after North Korea torpedoed a South Korean ship, killing 46 sailors. The North has since shelled a South Korean island, launched long-range missiles, tested a third nuclear device, and repeatedly threatened war against South Korea and the U.S. homeland. Amid these threats, it is little surprise that Seoul would rather not shake up the long-time military command.

There is also concern in Seoul that if the U.S. hands off operational control of South Korean troops, it may be tempted to dial back its overall security commitment. This is one reason many South Koreans (including 16 former defense ministers) have opposed OpCon transfer from the moment then-President Roh Moo Hyun proposed it in 2006.

This concern has become more acute as current U.S. foreign policy projects weakness around the world. Washington boasts of a "pivot" to Asia yet has cut the defense budget, shrunk the Navy and Air Force, and abandoned its strategy of being able to fight two wars simultaneously. America promises "extended deterrence" to South Korea, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella and missile defenses. Yet in April, as North Korea threatened to test more missiles, Secretary of State John Kerry offered to cut U.S. missile defenses in the region if China reined in Pyongyang.

Such behavior doesn't reassure American friends in Seoul, Tokyo and other capitals. Already some South Korean lawmakers are calling for Seoul to develop nuclear weapons, a move supported by 66% of the public in a recent poll. Nuclear proliferation is less likely if Washington agrees to delay or shelve OpCon transfer.

(Continued at the link below)

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324635904578640981437025750.html#printMode

It may be 1978 coming true after all this time.  Former President Carter (and Secretary Rumsfeld) may finally get his wish.

And it is not just the South Koreans who "argue" this (I certainly agree with the idea):

Nonetheless, the South Koreans argued that disbanding the CFC and turning over operational control (OPCON in military lingo) might be misread by North Korean leaders and tempt them into assaulting the south. The continued presence of U.S. forces, they asserted, was needed to deter North Korea from miscalculating.

This whole OPCON transfer charade has been playing into the hands of the Kim Family Regime's strategy of splitting the ROK/US Alliance.  We really need to conduct some strategic analysis and keep in mind the strategic direction that both Presidents have given to the alliance, namely unification of the peninsula as the end state.  We should first understand the full range of the threat (from provocation to conventional war, nuclear threat to regime instability and collapse and the potential for irregular warfare) and then determine how to optimally organize the combined military forces to achieve the alliance end state across the spectrum of potential conflict.  I would submit that the optimal way is not to disband the Combined Forces Command but may in fact be the establishment of a new Combined Theater Command with a Korean General Officer in command.

V/R
Dave

The Rising East: Are U.S. Forces Ready To Come Home from South Korea?

By Richard Halloran08/05/2013

http://www.civilbeat.com/posts/2013/08/05/19627-the-rising-east-are-us-forces-ready-to-come-home-from-south-korea/

Flickr: U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys, South Korea

In a meeting between South Korea and U.S. defense officials in Seoul last week, the Koreans urged the Americans: “Please, Yankee, don’t go home.”

The Americans in effect responded: “Sorry, we’re outta here.”

At issue in the Korea-US Integrated Defense Dialogue was the fate of the Combined Forces Command (CFC), the joint Korean and American staff that controls both Korean troops and U.S. forces posted in Korea. It is commanded by an American general with a Korean general as deputy.

During the discussion in the forum with the unfortunate acronym KIDD, the Americans contended that the CFC should be dismantled, with Koreans taking full responsibility for their own defense. The Koreans argued that they are not ready to take over and thus the CFC should remain intact. No decision was made public

Behind this debate was an intrinsically different assessment of the need for American troops to the defense of South Korea against the threat from North Korea.

The Americans point out that the Korean War, which brought legions of U.S. troops to Korea fight the North Koreans and Chinese, ended 60 years ago. Today, those U.S. forces are needed elsewhere in a time of economic difficulty at home and heavy constraints on military spending.

Moreover, in those 60 years South Korea has generated an economic great leap forward, established itself politically as a stable democracy, and forged a first-class military force. It needs very little outside help.

In contrast, North Korea is an economic basket case in which the gap between the capital in Pyongyang and the rest of the country is widening. Corruption is pervasive, millions of people suffer from chronic food shortages, and the inexperienced regime of Kim Jong Un has an uncertain grip on power.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.civilbeat.com/posts/2013/08/05/19627-the-rising-east-are-us-forces-ready-to-come-home-from-south-korea/

U.S.-ROK transfer delay inevitable

It is interesting that the ROK press is not talking at all about the proposed Combined Theater Command with a Korean general in charge that was put forth this past spring.  I think it is also interesting that no one is talking about the other potential reason that many ROK officers and senior government officials are willing to request the postponement.  I think given the US fiscal constraints and the proposal to rotate ground forces there could be a very real fear that the US commitment to the alliance may be reduced over time if the US does not remain in command of CFC.  And of course we should always, always keep in mind that a key part of north Korean strategy has been to split the alliance and we have been contributing to that since 1978 with the continuous decline in US commitment under nearly every US administration both Republican and Democrat.  Perhaps the senior ROK officials are trying to save us from ourselves.

But finally there is a press article that recognizes the Military Committee and at least somewhat explains its important role:

To see why this is not necessarily so, we need to understand that since 1978, the Combined Forces Command has been accountable to a joint military committee that gets its authority from both U.S. and South Korean national command authorities. 

The Korean units assigned to the CFC are designated by the Korean side and can be withdrawn at any time upon notification. The American CFC commander cannot refuse such notification. All he can do is point out the impact it may have on the performance of his overall mission.

This is why there is no real soverignty issue and that OPCON trasnfer is a myth.  What happens in 2015 is the dissolution of the combined warfighting command the loss of unity of command.

And of course this is a very signifcant issue.  The costs to both nations goes up if we have to maintain two independent warfighting commands.

 

  But the ROK has been unable to get sufficient public and government support to invest in all the necessary capabilities.

According to a credible rumor, when the wartime OpCon handover was agreed to during the Roh administration, Korean leaders learned of the high costs of the technologies they would have to master, which has since diminished their eagerness to be in charge. 

 

V/R
Dave 

U.S.-ROK transfer delay inevitable

http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2975274

Surprisingly, perhaps, most Korean officers seem quite comfortable with the current arrangement.

July 30,2013

This latest request from South Korea to the United States to postpone once again the transfer of wartime operational control of combined forces to South Korea reminds me of some of the peculiar characteristics of Korean politics. For example, one may wonder if some South Korean politicians find it advantageous to allow the public to remain ignorant of the evolving complexities of the U.S.-ROK relationship. It seems advantageous for politicians to tacitly give the impression to their constituents that they have less power than they actually do. After all, being “under the thumb of Big Brother” gives politicians a plausible rationale to suggest they have no other choice but to do what might be unpopular.

Of course, this potential misleading of the public brings with it the possibility that Koreans at times will jump to the wrong conclusion, sometimes leading to populist movements - such as last decade’s farcical anti-mad cow demonstrations.

But the nonsense of all of this is revealed when America acts outside the stereotype portrayed by Korea’s make-believe leftists. When in 2006 former President Roh Moo-Hyun demanded that wartime OpCon be handed over by 2012, then U.S. Secretary of Donald Rumsfeld responded affirmatively - in fact, Rumsfeld offered the handover as early as 2009. Furthermore, Rumsfeld proposed to Roh that South Koreans should increase their share of costs for U.S. Forces Korea from 40 percent to a “more equitable 50 percent.”

While it would be disingenuous to suggest the United States is in Korea for purely altruistic reasons, there are calls in America for U.S. Forces in Korea to be scaled back given the costs to the American taxpayer and the robust growth of South Korea.

Anyway, President Roh’s demand and Rumfeld’s counteroffer led to street demonstrations by several retired Korean generals and officers, as well as conservative groups, calling on Roh to behave responsibly.

All of which, from a foreigner’s perspective, was quite peculiar. After all, what Korean conservatives and progressives have in common is a strong sense of nationalism. One would naturally think Koreans of all political persuasions would be eager to have this command transfer to take place, the sooner the better.

To see why this is not necessarily so, we need to understand that since 1978, the Combined Forces Command has been accountable to a joint military committee that gets its authority from both U.S. and South Korean national command authorities.

The Korean units assigned to the CFC are designated by the Korean side and can be withdrawn at any time upon notification. The American CFC commander cannot refuse such notification. All he can do is point out the impact it may have on the performance of his overall mission.

In light of Chun Doo Hwan’s coup d’etat and suppression of the Gwangju uprising, these points have not been well understood by most Koreans or most Americans. Neither has it been well explained. When U.S. officials tried to state their position publicly in 1980, they were stymied by South Korean martial law and censorship. Subsequently, there was little effort to set the record straight because of the priority and sensitivity accorded to political stability.

In other words, despite a military technological gap, the relationship between the two sides has been much more equal than is publicly imagined.

As of today, the U.S. maintains at CFC a four-star general and two-star general - C3 (operations and training, the primary war-fighting team) and C5 (plans, policy and strategy) - to head up the most important staff sections, with a Korean four-star deputy and one-star Korean deputy, respectively, to offset them on behalf of the Korean side.

Surprisingly, perhaps, most Korean officers seem quite comfortable with the current arrangement in regard to how U.S. forces are stationed in Korea. Korean officers realize that given their hierarchical system and relatively rigid training, they are not prepared to react within the CFC with the required swiftness and flexibly in the face of major hostilities.

Even with recent changes in orders of the day that permit South Korean forces to fire back at North Korean troops or targets without prior authorization when attacked, ROK officers remain hesitant to order a major response out of fear of overreacting and, thereby, truncating what otherwise could have been successful military careers.

We should note, however, the U.S. Army continuously maintains the lead over its Korean counterparts in cutting-edge military technology, sophisticated command and control procedures, and air power. And, thanks to Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. officers arrive here “battle hardened.”

All of which makes the perception of the South Korean Army operating under the U.S. Army very much a necessity, despite legal technicalities and nationalist passions. According to a credible rumor, when the wartime OpCon handover was agreed to during the Roh administration, Korean leaders learned of the high costs of the technologies they would have to master, which has since diminished their eagerness to be in charge. 

(Continued at the link below)

http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2975274

So was this written in collaboration with the AP's Pyongyang bureau?  Some of the statements in this seems like rhetoric of which Pyongyang would approve, and as an example the article about war is nicely juxtaposed with the photo of the "peaceful celebration" that implies a threat to no one. (As an aside, while I really do think it is important for foreign news organizations to try to report from north Korea I worry that the establishment of the aP's Pyongyang bureau may have compromised reporting even when done outside north Korea as in the case of the subtly pro-north Korean article).

But I do tire of the mythical OPCON transfer argument.  The issue is how do we best organize the Alliance military forces to achieve our strategic objectives?  

And as far as the US trying to wean the ROK from dependence on the US let's understand the genesis of the mythical OPCON Transfer. It resulted from a combination of the Secretary of Defense's frustration with anti-American sentiment during the progressive governments of the ROK and that same Secretary's desire to get US forces off the Peninsula since they were being wasted and could not be employed in OIF and OEF.  It is really about reducing the US military commitment to the Alliance and this is what I think might now be spooking the ROK.  It is made worse by the US fiscal situation and the impact on the defense budget and the ROK may also be concerned that the proposal for rotational forces will result in a reduced commitment because DoD may not be able to sustain the costs for rotation.

The ROK/US military alliance has evolved in six decades.  The Combined Forces Command has developed to optimize the employment of the strengths of both nation's military forces while mitigating the weaknesses.  Rather than splitting the proverbial Siamese twins we should consider the proposal for the next step in the evolution which was the recent proposal not to delay OPCON transfer but to establish a new Combined Theater Command that is commanded by a ROK General.  Again, the first military consider is how to effectively organize the military forces.  I would submit that a Combined Theater Command might also satisfy some of the domestic political considerations as well.

But the primary question that policymakers, strategists, and planners should be asking is whether this or that policy, strategy, campaign plan, organization, activity, action, etc contributes to directly or indirectly to the accomplishment of the strategic end state established by our two nation's Presidents in the 2009 Joint Vision Statement and reaffirmed in the May 2013 joint declaration which is of course the (peaceful) reunification of Korea.  If the actions are not focused on and contributing to that then we should reconsider them. The dissolution of a combined warfighting command is one action the does not contribute to the end state.

V/R

Dave

6 decades on, U.S. stuck in war role in Korea

http://triblive.com/usworld/nation/4429504-74/korea-north-south#axzz2aCu0srs2

AP

North Korean children perform at the May Day stadium during the 'Arirang' mass games song-and-dance ensemble on the eve of the 60th anniversary of the Korean War armistice in Pyongyang, North Korea, Friday, July 26, 2013. (AP Photo/Wong Maye-E)

By The Associated Press 

Published: Friday, July 26, 2013, 7:18 p.m.Updated 33 minutes ago 

WASHINGTON — Sixty years after it finished fighting in Korea, the United States is struggling with two legacies that are reminders of the costs — political, military and human — that war can impose on the generations that follow.

The first is the leading role that America is committed to playing in defending South Korea should the 1950-53 Korean War reignite.

Washington has tried for years to wean its ally, Seoul, off its dependence on the U.S. military by setting a target date for switching from American to Korean control of the forces that would defend the country in the event the North attacked the South. That target date has slipped from 2012 to 2015 and, this past week, American officials said the Koreans are informally expressing interest in pushing it back further.

Bruce Bennett, a Korea expert at the RAND Corp., a federally funded think tank, says he believes the argument for giving Seoul wartime command of its own troops loses ground as North Korea's nuclear ambitions grow bolder. The North has tested nuclear devices and may be capable of mounting one on a ballistic missile — a worry not only for South Korea, Japan and others in the region but also for the United States.

“From the South Korean perspective — and I believe there is a lot of truth to their argument — having the U.S. in (the lead) is a strong deterrent of North Korea, and it means North Korea can't split the alliance,” he said.

The second is the seemingly endless challenge of accounting for U.S. servicemen who remain listed as missing in action.

(Continued at the link below)

http://triblive.com/usworld/nation/4429504-74/korea-north-south#axzz2aCu0srs2

Korean OPCON transfer backfires and The S. Korean military’s failure to develop

Two articles below.

This is going to be a lesson in failed strategic communications. I am really at a loss as to what the the ROK government officials who are behind this are really thinking. I think the ROK Ministry of Defense made a strategic miscalculation by releasing this information now or someone made a huge mistake if the information was inadvertently released.  As I understood there are ongoing discussion in preparation for the fall Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) where the future security arrangements will be discussed and the decision on the proposed Combined Theater Command should be announced.  There does not seem to me to be any logical reason to publicize this now.  If someone thinks that this could result in an increase in resources for the ROK military I think he is sadly mistaken and this incident has opened the ROK military  to enormous criticism as evidenced by the two editorials below, one from the Korea Times and the Hangyoreh  (not the scathing comparisons to both the Israeli and French militaries.

 I hate to say I told you so, but this probably is made worse for two reasons.  One has been a failure to properly explain the command relationship and inform people about the real nature of the command relationships and the fact that the ROK already does have "wartime OPCON" through the Military Committee equal to the US "wartime OPCON."   As I have said over and over again, the myth of OPCON transfer really means the dissolution of the Combined Forces Command and the establishment of separate warfighting commands.  Second, the situation is made worse by those who are saying that the reason for this is because of the north Korean threat which gives the appearance that the ROK military is afraid of the north (which could not be further from the truth). Again, the question that should be asked is how to best organize the Alliance military forces to accomplish the Alliance strategic objectives and support ROK and US government policies.  We should be transforming the Alliance from a position of strength rather than viewing it from the perspective only of the north Korean threat.   But this is an example of the problem that GEN Mattis gust warned about this weekend in his comments about US generals in this quote:

Mattis also warned that Admirals and Generals need to "stop sucking their thumbs and whining about sequestration, telling the world we're weak" because it sends a signal to nations such as Iran and North Korea, and they may start to believe it.

Unfortunately there are ROK leaders who need to heed this advice.  The fact is the ROK military is not weak, it is very capable, and it will defeat the north. The ROK actions have left it vulnerable to criticism that says otherwise.   And together the ROK/US forces that make up the Alliance are an incredible fighting organization that will be able to continue to deter war, and if necessary defeat the north, deal with regime collapse and support the ultimate strategic objective of the Alliance: unifications of the Korean Peninsula.  And since that is the ultimate end state, the policymakers, strategists, and planners should be using this as the guiding question: Does this policy, strategy, campaign plan, or military action or activity contribute to the ultimate end state of unification?  I think there are those who are dealing with the OPCON issue who are not keeping that in mind.

V/R

Dave

2013-07-19 17:52 OPCON transfer backfires By Kim Tae-gyu Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, appears before the Senate Armed Services Committee for a hearing to consider his reappointment to the military’s highest post on Capitol Hill, Thursday. / AP-Yonhap South Korea’s request for another delay in the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) of its forces from the United States doesn’t fit its improved status, critics say. The way it is being handled raised eyebrows after a senior U.S. official confirmed there will be no change to the agreed transfer scheduled for December 2015 after the Ministry of National Defense (MND) inadvertently disclosed that it had requested a delay. Chang Yong-seok, a researcher at the Institute of Peace and Unification Studies affiliated with Seoul National University, said that a delay of the transition is against national interests. “There is no free lunch. I think that Washington will ask something from Seoul in return for putting off the transfer,” said Chang. “I don’t know why we have to defer the transition without a clear reason.” Another said that the delay was like turning the clock back. “It took 63 years after we surrendered the wartime OPCON to the U.S. in the midst of the Korean War. Back then, it was understandable because our military capacity was meager,” Peace Network chief Cheong Wook-sik said. “Now, our national defense budgets are twice North Korea’s national output. Why do you think that we cannot still regain our sovereign rights to control our forces in time of war?” (Continued at the link below) http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2013/07/116_139583.html [Column] The S. Korean military’s failure to develop Posted on : Jul.20,2013 13:46 KST Transfer of wartime operational control again being delayed because the S. Korean army still isn’t able to defend  By Kim Jong-dae, chief editor of Defense 21+ Though its defense budget is only about half the size of South Korea’s, Israel has done an effective job of defending itself against the 300 million Arabs in the Middle East. Israel’s independent defense strategy is not solely based on the fact that it has nuclear weapons. Rather, Israel relies on its ability to innovate. It has taken a small army and upgraded it into a contemporary force that is run effectively. These strengths of the Israeli army are nowhere to be found in the South Korean military. Napoleon once said, “One must change one’s tactics every 10 years.” A military that fails to bring its weaponry in line with the times and accept change is doomed to fight losing wars, no matter how much money it spends. Because of this lesson, most countries are developing modern military strategies and dedicating themselves to building innovative militaries. When the French military ignored this lesson, it collapsed before the advance of the German military in the Second World War. This was despite the fact that the two countries had invested almost the same amount of money in their militaries. The ROK army is just as anachronistic as the French military was before World War II. The Korean peninsula is a small battlefield. It would only take five minutes for a fighter taking off from Seoul to reach Pyongyang. Nevertheless, the ROK military still clings to an unrealistic operational plan based on a 120-day war. The ROK military squanders the precious resources of the defense budget through all kinds of redundancy, a proliferation of inefficient organizations, and a complicated chain of command. About 30% of the lieutenant colonels and colonels in the entire military are not doing any work since they have already missed their chance for promotion. In 1990, the military announced its 818 Plan, which was supposed to be an effort to “improve the structure of the army, making it more nimble and uncluttered.” But today, 23 years later, the plan has still not been implemented. If anything, the military has become even more bloated and undisciplined. There is something strange about even calling this an military that can win wars. Troubling signs began to appear during the sinking of the Cheonan warship and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010. That’s the ROK military for you. Even after it takes a beating, it still refuses to reform. Any suggestions that the military should get its act together are met with hostility. We can’t do it, military officers say, because we don’t have the budget for it. This is the same mentality that produced the idea to once again delay the transfer of wartime operational control. The main reasons given for proposing the delay are so embarrassing that one wishes they hadn’t even been made public. “The defense budget was inadequate, so we weren’t able to strengthen our military capability as planned,” they say. “The ROK military still doesn’t have the ability to command in battle.” “North Korea has increased its nuclear and long-range missile threat.” If the ROK military is in such a poor condition that it can’t even give orders to its own soldiers, what was the South Korean Ministry of Defense doing when it talked about “preemptive strikes against North Korean nuclear weapons and missiles as a defensive measure,” “an attack on the North Korean command structure,” and “aggressive suppression”? (Continued at the link below) http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_editorial/596460.html

S. Korea asks US to reconsider transfer of wartime troop control

I think we should keep in mind that we remain committed to the ROK/US Alliance and the defense of the ROK because it is in our strategic interest to do so.  I think it is even more in our interests now that at any time in the history of the Alliance given the ROK's place in the world and global economic importance and the geo-political situation in Northeast Asia.  The defense of the ROK is not some charitable act on the part of the US.  The ROK has always contributed more in blood to its defense both during the war and since, it has also spilled blood outside the ROK in support of mutual ROK and US interests: Vietnam and Central and Southwest Asia.  I think we have to get past the statements of the former Secretary of Defense:

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said during an October 2006 visit that it was “time for the Republic of Korea to assume a larger role and responsibility” for its defense.

The ROK also spends significant treasure on its defense both through its own military forces (which will always form the bulk of the ground forces that will defend the ROK and ensure victory in a war with the north) and through burden sharing which provides a  share of stationing costs for US forces.

But we should not be approaching this issue from the position of relative contributions or the operational control issue (as I have said the ROK has operational control of ROK and US ground forces, special operations forces, and psychological operations forces in wartime).  

The OPCON transfer or transition issue really is only accomplished one way:  the dissolution of the Combined Forces Command.  Dissolve that and we end up with two independent national warfighting commands.  But we need to ask what is the best way to organize and employ the ROK/US Alliance military instrument of power?  I would submit that it is ensuring a combined warfighting command and as I have said I fully support a Korean General being in command of a Combined Theater Command (CTC)  that has been proposed.  If we could more effectively explain the command structure (which I too have a hard time doing in sound bites or an elevator speech) in times of the dual command exercised by both National Command and Military Authorities through the Military Committee we would be able to recognize that there is no OPCON issue with a combined command for either the ROK or US whether there is a US or Korean General in command.  We really need to look at the Alliance from the perspective that at this point in history we have a mature partnership and no longer the big brother, little brother relationship. We should not through away the hard work we have done to develop an effective combined command (especially since its establishment in 1978).  We need to continue to evolve without throwing away the foundation that has been established and we can do that  through a Combined Theater Command with a Korean Commander and a US deputy.

I am not sure what is going on with the negotiations or why the ROKG and Minister of Defense are apparently making statements about delay of OPCON transition/transfer.  I am slightly optimistic that OPCON transfer has just become the shorthand way to discuss the issue and that they are still considering the CTC concept.  If the ROKG is really proposing a delay in OPCON transfer (meaning maintaining the status quo with the Combined Forces Command) I wonder if it is an indication of a possible subtle or unspoken suspicion if the two independent warfighting commands are established in accordance with the current 2015 timeline that beyond 2015 the US might further reduce its military commitment to the Alliance.  This fear could cause the strategic decision making rationale to be that to ensure the strength of the Alliance the ROKG would rather have the status quo and deal with the potential domestic political problems with charges of the ROK forfeiting its sovereignty (which is in fact a myth).  

If that is the case then the Alliance is not as strong as I believe and that the ROK harbors concerns about the long term commitment by the US and it must believe the only way to ensure such commitment is to maintain the CFC with a US General in command.  

It is really too bad if that is the case.  The US has an opportunity to demonstrate to the countries of the region (and the world) that it can be a true partner in an Alliance and not have to dominate it in every way if it goes forward with a CTC with a Korean General in charge and continues to commit US forces for the Alliance.  I think the benefits of such an evolution in the Alliance can impact the Asian Pivot/Rebalance and help to reinsure countries of our commitment as well as our respect for our Alliance partners.

The bottom line is we need to move to the next level in the ROK/US Alliance and that is to establish a Combined Theater Command with a Korean General in command.
V/R
Dave

S. Korea asks US to reconsider transfer of wartime troop control
http://www.stripes.com/news/s-korea-asks-us-to-reconsider-transfer-of-wartime-troop-control-1.231124


By Erik Slavin
Stars and Stripes

Published: July 18, 2013
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U.S., S. Korea delay OPCON transfer until 2015
South Korea has asked the United States to re-examine an already-delayed plan to give Seoul wartime control of its military forces by 2015, South Korean defense ministry officials said.

While South Korea retains peacetime control of its approximately 639,000 servicemembers, control in the event of war currently transfers to a U.S. four-star general under the Combined Forces Command.

The transfer was originally planned for 2012 but was delayed three years ago.

The two sides will discuss the transfer date at an October meeting in Seoul, said a defense ministry spokesman who requested anonymity, which is common practice in South Korea.

“The significance of variables in North Korea’s nuclear program has changed,” the ministry spokesman said.

The spokesman said South Korea isn’t 100 percent committed to a delay but wants the U.S. to consider it as the regional security situation develops during the rest of the year.

Another defense ministry official confirmed that the proposal had been made and said that if control transfer is postponed, no backup date has been agreed upon.

South Korean media outlets have reported that the delay proposal was made during a June multinational meeting of defense chiefs in Singapore.

At a May joint news conference in Seoul with South Korean President Park Geun-hye, U.S. President Barack Obama said the 2015 operational control transfer date remained on course.

South Korea will continue to plan for a 2015 transfer date for the time being, ministry officials said.

Earlier this year, Gen. B.B. Bell, who retired in 2008 as commander of U.S. Forces Korea, called on the United States to let South Korea “permanently postpone” the transfer.

Bell, who strongly advocated the transfer as commander, said North Korea’s nuclear development put the South at a “significant disadvantage on any future battlefield, or in any future negotiations.”

Operational control became a prominent issue in 2006 under President Roh Moo-hyun, who framed the transfer as a national sovereignty issue. However, when the Pentagon responded that they would go along with a transfer as soon as 2009, opposition conservatives opposed the move and government officials balked.

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said during an October 2006 visit that it was “time for the Republic of Korea to assume a larger role and responsibility” for its defense.
(Continued at the link below)
http://www.stripes.com/news/s-korea-asks-us-to-reconsider-transfer-of-wartime-troop-control-1.231124