Showing posts with label CIA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label CIA. Show all posts

Tuesday, April 4, 2017

Hacking 4 Defense: The Future of Innovation in National Security

A great event last night led by Chris Taylor and Matt Zais who teach Hacking for Defense for our Security Studies Program.  I wish the Cipher Brief had captured GEN Selva's key closing comments on cyber and lethal targeting and the requirements for ethical leadership among those who will make life and death decisions executed through cyber attacks.  (My comments  - cyber is not simply a video game - it will result in real casualties).

The 90 minute video can be viewed here at this link on our Center for Security Studies You Tube page.  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TXZkClEyK9E  It is worth 90 minutes of your time to watch.

If you only watch part of this please see GEN Selva's comments toward the end at 1:34:30.  His comments about those who must inflict violence on our enemies are very important to keep in mind.

Hacking 4 Defense: The Future of Innovation in National Security

In a world where globalization makes it possible for adversaries to compete with American technologies, the United States must consistently innovate and adopt new tools and methods to stay ahead in the national security space. 
That was the message at a special panel held at Georgetown University on Monday, called “The Future of Innovation in National Security.” It featured five panelists across the security space from the Pentagon, the Intelligence Community, and the private sector.
The panel discussion was an extension of a course at Georgetown University called “Hacking 4 Defense” – for which The Cipher Brief is a media sponsor – which aims to use new methodology to find solutions to real national security challenges identified by U.S. government agencies.
The key question of this endeavor was: “how we do gain advantage by not playing the same game that has been played before” and “force [the enemy] to engage with a different set of rules,” said Milo Medin, Vice President of Access Services at Google and a member of the Defense Innovation Board, an initiative set up by former Defense Secretary Ash Carter in 2016.
General Paul Selva, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, took it a step further, saying “innovation is about ideas that answer a problem that scales into the culture or the organization.”
“It’s not enough to have bright ideas; you have to be able to operationalize,” he added.
In order to do that, all sectors of society will have to be tapped, said Andrew Hallman, CIA Deputy Director For Digital Innovation, a Directorate launched in 2015, and tasked with reinventing the CIA for the big data era.
“We have to be able to be embrace whole-of-nation approaches…the commercial sector, the private industry, startups and innovation hubs, to dominate our adversaries” and “mobilizing that grassroots, local innovation.”
Part of that is developing a culture that allows for innovation, said Soraya Correa, Chief Procurement Officer at the Department of Homeland Security.
“We are constantly talking about how do we improve, how do we protect the Homeland, what are the technologies out there that [we] can bring in to enable us to do our mission much better? Because we do have to stay ahead of the threat that’s out there,” she said. “So everyone is talking about innovation and we’re trying to find ways to integrate that into our culture.”
That would involve leaders with “an appetite for failure” because “we can learn a lot from those mistakes,” she added.
Medin, however, argued that “we all make mistakes, the question is, are we making new mistakes? We shouldn’t be making the same old mistakes. There are things that are known not to work, and we should just not do those, right?”
Panelists also discussed recruiting the best talent into innovation offices, with competition between the private and public sectors. Medin acknowledged that the private sector can generally pay much more than government. But, he said, “government has all kinds of of interesting sets of problems and systems that industry does not. The challenge is how do you get people to go into [the] security space in the government for permanent careers? That is something we really should think about.”
Effective Inter-Department Information Sharing
With multiple innovation offices across government agencies and departments – from from In-Q-Tel to DARPA, for instance – panelists were asked whether there was enough done on sharing information and coordinating innovation.
Erin Simpson, CEO for Archer Avenue Consulting, a company that develops data strategies for clients in the security space, said it was a challenge because “unless you make it your business to spend a fair amount of time talking to people on the government side, on the vendor side, on the academic side, you have no idea what’s going on,” she said. “It’s a fantastic challenge but not one that the government seems particularly interested in.”
But Hallman differed in his view. “We have room to grow, we have to align more in that space, but I don’t think it’s quite that bleak.”
Correa agreed. “I’m not saying we’re perfect, but we are reaching out,” she said.
“One of the things DHS has done is that we do reach to the other agencies, we do talk to the Intelligence Community, the Department of Defense, and we try to understand what they’re working on and share ideas,” said Correa. “The other thing we’ve been doing – especially over the past two years – is talking to industry more.”
Gen. Selva added that not all innovation was meant to be shared across agencies. “There’s a whole stream of research and development inside the defense department on things that are unique to defense. We have to subdivide why we do that research because nobody else will do it.”
Given the billions of dollars spent on Research and Development (R&D), panelists were asked when they believed the investments paid off - to which Selva responded bluntly “the place we get the return is combat effectiveness - the survival of our forces in the modern battle space - if that’s an adequate return for that investment. I would argue it is.”
Artificial Intelligence
With Secretary of the Treasury Steve Mnuchin recently commenting that Artificial Intelligence (AI) and other technologies purported to displace humans were 50-100 years away – even as a core pillar of the Third Offset strategy – panelists were asked when it was appropriate to discuss AI.
Medin said it was important to define what type of AI was being discussed. “General purpose AI is not just around the corner. On the other hand, in his view, machine learning AI is already available - “and should be used in the operational context today.”
General Selva agreed, defining AI into two categories: “narrow AI” as in “teaching machines to do tasks” and “general AI” where machines are “self-aware.”
“What we can do is employ narrow AI to empower humans to make decisions faster in an ever increasingly complex battlespace.” That, in turn, would “change the dynamic in a battle space.”
Asked if foreign technology could be leveraged to add to U.S. security purposes, Hallman said “the reality is that with the globalization of technology, even if you look for U.S.-only solutions, you’re probably not getting U.S.-only solutions.”
He said it was important to think more broadly about the concerns and make a “risk-based decision.”
“How do we do this in a way - with counter-intelligence concerns, dependency concerns - that doesn’t leave us so far behind technologically that we miss the boat entirely?”
Leone Lakhani is an executive producer and reporter at The Cipher Brief. Follow her on Twitter @LeoneLakhani.
Callie Wang contributed to this report.

Monday, September 12, 2016

Interrogation, Intelligence Gathering, and Public Policy

This dialogue between Dr. Elizabeth Grimm Arsenault and Former Deputy Director of the CIA, John McLaughlin, is well worth watching for anyone interested in post 9-11 interrogation and intelligence operations.  Both of their views will make you think regardless of which side of the issue you come down on.

Interrogation, Intelligence Gathering, and Public Policy

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CUmlaVLTPxU
Georgetown University Center for Security Studies
The Center for Security Studies Lunch Series: "Interrogation, Intelligence Gathering, and Public Policy" - A Conversation with John McLaughlin and Dr. Elizabeth Arsenault

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the intelligence community faced significant pressure to capture, detain, and interrogate suspected terrorists. However, the question remained: once they were found, how should the US handle captured fighters in U.S. custody? What measures were legal, moral, and effective to acquire actionable intelligence in the war on terror?

John McLaughlin, who served as the CIA's deputy director from 2000 to 2004, and Elizabeth Grimm Arsenault, who teaches in the Security Studies Program, examined these questions as well as the implications of these decisions.

Sunday, March 8, 2015

Sunday Night Reading

Special Operations Command Central Multi-Method Assessment of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

March 8, 2015



US security strategy and its implications for the PH

[CIRSS Commentaries] 'It is within the Philippines’ interest that the United States continue to play a leadership role in the world stage'

Interesting tactical combat arms analogy for strategic thinking.

Conclusion:

Which brings me back to headspace and timing. To echo General Mattis, we need a renewed global strategy, not unlike that with which we countered the Soviet Union. Maybe we didn’t always make the best decisions (oh hey, Southeast Asia, didn’t see ya there), but it was a strategy and everyone knew where we stood on it. We need to align our strategy with realistic and achievable goals for the military. Once our headspace and timing is correct, we can hear the words, “Enemy troops in the open, 400 meters” and engage, without the fear of it all blowing up in our faces.



Inline image 1





From John Schindler at his XX Committee Blog.  An interesting perspective and some common sense advice:  Think strategically, Take intelligence seriously, Fight corruption hard, Quantity has a quality all its own, But quality counts too.

Conclusion:

To sum up, the Russo-Ukrainian War is Kyiv’s to win, if it approaches the future wisely. The last year has been one of defeat after defeat for Ukraine, sometimes needlessly. Vladimir Putin has opted for war against Russia’s vast neighbor, the second biggest country in Europe, and this is now a conflict that Russia cannot win without a massive invasion and mobilization that would be politically and economically toxic to average Russians. Therefore the initiative has passed to Kyiv, if it has the strength and honor to use it. That will require thinking strategically, turning the espionage tables on Moscow, and building the right military machine for the war at hand. All this can be done, but every day that Kyiv does not change course is a further indication that the Poroshenko government does not really want to win.

How Ukraine Can Win


March 8, 2015

Imagine if someone proposed a modern day Morale Operations branch. We have many adversaries who are well versed in such operations and conducting them quite effectively )just look at the controversy over the contracting of the Lincoln Group or the Transregional Web Initiative and just the employment of Propaganda, Psychological Warfare, and Psychological Operations in general - we are so afraid of these concepts we had to change the name of PSYOP to MISO - we do not have the political stomach to conduct these kinds of operations).   Perhaps since it would be such a political lightning rod (and likely an impossibility) to re-create such an organization that maybe we should create an "Anti-Morale Operations branch" and have it focus on exposing those operations and explaining exactly what the adversaries are doing in this area.  Excerpt:

Betty was one of the few women assigned to OSS Morale Operations (MO). “Eventually I was introduced to the MO group in Washington and then I was informed what my duties were.”
The MO branch was in the business of creating rumors that our foreign adversaries would believe. In other words, black propaganda. Betty worked for the Far East division, while the other MO branch serviced Europe. “They taught us how to utilize material tailored for specific targets in the Far East. We had to learn to disseminate the material, a mix of truth and fantasy; we were taught how to get rumors started, for example.” It was at this point that Betty learned basic tradecraft, the same time-honored skills taught to intelligence officers today, skills that served her well in a post-war career at the CIA.
“The group was mostly made up of newspaper men, radio people, artists, cartoonists, and some writers,” said Betty. “Mainly it was the media. That was what the OSS wanted for a quick production start.” Betty’s team included several artists from China, as well as captured Japanese soldiers who were artists in civilian life and willingly offered their talents to the Allied cause.

“Spy Girl” Betty McIntosh Turns 100 Years Old




Excerpt:

America is bitterly divided over the threat of Islamic extremism partly because we are now bitterly divided over almost everything. But the impasse also reflects disappointment with the initial responses by presidents from each party.
George W. Bush's domestic antiterrorism architecture has largely survived, with some reassessments by Obama. But the disillusioning results in Afghanistan and Iraq discredited Bush's vision of a "global war on terror" powered by U.S. military force. Obama understandably recoiled from those failures. But even some Democratic thinkers believe he has overcorrected, both by downplaying the depth of the radical threat and by overly limiting America's role in responding to it.

THE LONG WAR

Sustainability should guide America’s strategy against Islamic extremism.








Saturday, November 22, 2014

From the CIA Book reviews: Moles, Defectors, and Deceptions: James Angleton and His Influence on US Counterintelligence

Excerpt:

This is the best assessment of James Angleton and his career ever produced.

You can watch the entire conference at this link:http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/moles-defectors-and-deceptions-james-angleton-and-his-influence-us-counterintelligence
 (I moderated the third panel :-))


We also have hard copies of the book at the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown since we sponsored this conference and co-hosted it with the Wilson Center.

Moles, Defectors, and Deceptions: James Angleton and His Influence on US Counterintelligence, edited by Bruce Hoffman and Christian Ostermann (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2014), 116 pp., photos, no index.

https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-58-no-3/intelligence-officer2019s-bookshelf.html
On 29 March 2012, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars sponsored a seminar on James Angleton, his legacy, and his influence on counterintelligence. It was cochaired by the editors of this volume, which is a transcript of the proceedings. The 12 contributors were Tennent Bagley (CIA retired); Barry Royden (CIA retired); Carl Colby 
(Producer/Director and William Colby’s son); journalist/authors Edward Epstein, Ronald Kessler, David Martin and David Wise; historians Christopher Andrew (Cambridge), Loch Johnson (University of Georgia), John Prados (National Security Archive), and David Robarge (CIA); and Oleg Kalugin (KGB retired).

Each contributor made a presentation, and the overall result was an unusual summary view of Angleton and his CIA career. Only Bagley had had prolonged professional contact with Angleton. Johnson had interviewed him several times while on the Church Committee staff, and Epstein had interviewed him for 85 hours; both of these encounters occurred after Angleton had retired. The other journalists, authors, and historians had written books or articles about Angleton based on documents and interviews.

The varied views presented reflect the origins and functions of CIA counterintelligence as well as Angleton’s molehunt and other controversial elements of his career. There were brisk exchanges among the presenters and the audience. (36–37) Questions from the audience and the panelists’ answers are also included. This is the best assessment of James Angleton and his career ever produced.

Saturday, November 15, 2014

U.S. weighs expanded CIA training, arming of Syrian allies struggling against Assad


I certainly hope the CIA will take a comprehensive UW approach to the problem.  I hope they will focus on the underground and auxiliary and not just on training and equipping fighters.  It is only through a comprehensive UW approach can we gain and sustain access and influence, the important task being the ability to have sustained influence over the leadership whom we are supporting.  But of course I would not expect the press to understand this and ask the right questions.

And of  course the question should be asked why are their separate CIA and DOD efforts? (if what is implied in the article is accurate).

The proposed CIA buildup would expand a clandestine mission that has grown substantially over the past year, U.S. officials said. The agency now vets and trains about 400 fighters each month — as many as are expected to be trained by the Pentagon when its program reaches full strength late next year.


Why is there not a single integrated strategy?  Why are their separate "programs?"

U.S. weighs expanded CIA  training, arming 

of Syrian allies struggling against Assad


A rebel fighter readies a mortar during clashes with regime forces in the northern Syrian city of Aleppo on October 31, 2014. Syria accused Turkey on October 30, of a "flagrant violation" of its sovereignty, as Ankara allowed Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga fighters and opposition rebels to cross its border to battle jihadists. AFP PHOTO/KARAM AL-MASRIKARAM AL-MASRI/AFP/Getty Images (Karam Al-Masri/AFP/Getty Images)
By Greg Miller and Karen DeYoung November 14 at 7:45 PM   
The Obama administration has been weighing plans to escalate the CIA’s role in arming and training fighters in Syria, a move aimed at accelerating covert U.S. support to moderate rebel factions while the Pentagon is preparing to establish its own training bases, U.S. officials said.
The proposed CIA buildup would expand a clandestine mission that has grown substantially over the past year, U.S. officials said. The agency now vets and trains about 400 fighters each month — as many as are expected to be trained by the Pentagon when its program reaches full strength late next year.
The prospect of expanding the CIA program was on the agenda of a meeting of senior national security officials at the White House last week. A White House spokesman declined to comment on the meeting or to address whether officials had reached a decision on the matter.
Others said the proposal reflects concern about the pace of the Pentagon’s program to bolster moderate militias, which so far have proved no match for al-Qaeda offshoots including the Islamic State.
“We need a little more urgency in helping the moderates, and the agency was viewed as the best way to get that going fast,” said a senior U.S. official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, citing the sensitivity of the Syria debate.
A decision to expand the CIA program would deepen U.S. involvement in Syria, where the United Nations says 200,000 people have been killed during more than three years of civil war. The agency’s mission is a central but secret component of a broader U.S. effort that also involves airstrikes and an influx of U.S. military advisers into Iraq.
(Continued at the link below)

Sunday, October 19, 2014

The CIA's Wrong: Arming Rebels Works

Some interesting excerpts:

Criticism keeps pouring in and the Obama administration is hard pressed to prove it made the right decision back then, on the one hand, but has good reason to change its mind now as it tries to train new cadre to fight, not Assad, but ISIS. “This makes no sense,” says the same CIA veteran.
But from Obama’s point of view, actually, it does. The basic principles by which this administration operates are clear for anyone to see, even if the once-eloquent POTUS now finds it impossible to articulate simple ideas:
Obama does not believe in overthrowing foreign governments.
Obama does not intend to occupy foreign countries.
Obama does not think American troops—overt or covert—provide very good answers to the world’s crises.
Indeed, Obama sees very clearly what most average Americans see: U.S. efforts to overthrow bad guys abroad usually wind up making things worse, and the only reason to move against them is if they pose, as Tom Clancy would say, a “clear and present danger” to the United States.
...
Back in January, Obama told David Remnick of The New Yorker that when he was thinking about arming Syrian rebels a couple of years ago, he “actually asked the CIA to analyze examples of America financing and supplying arms to an insurgency in a country that actually worked out well. And they couldn’t come up with much.”
The New York Times ran a story last week that suggested CIA covert operations failed again and again to achieve the policy objectives set for them.
Just about everyone I talked to afterward in the U.S. intelligence community saw this as a story put out by the administration. One retired high-ranking intelligence officer said the article “seems founded on the kind of leaks that are permissible when beneficial to folks in high places but prosecutable when done by others.”

What the NY Times article and Christopher Dickey's article here (as well as the emphasis on 'train and equip") illustrate is that policy makers really do not understand the nature and conduct of unconventional warfare.  It is neither an abject failure in every case nor is it a war winner in any almost any case but it is a viable strategic option if used in the right conditions at the right time by the right organizations.  But most importantly it is both risky and hard and what makes it most difficult for policy makers and the public is that it is time consuming.  It cannot be employed "in extremis" in most cases (in the fall of 2001 post 9-11 being an exception) and really requires long term preparation, thorough assessments, and relationships with key players to have  chance of being successful.  And most importantly in must absolutely be part of and in support of  a coherent policy and strategy.
Christopher Dickey

DIRTY BUSINESS

10.19.14

The CIA's Wrong: Arming Rebels Works

President Obama has weighed the options and concluded America does more harm than good when it sets out to topple regimes. OK. But don’t pretend that’s the CIA’s fault.
PARIS, France—What could be more cynical than a covert operation? Sure, there’s always a lot of talk about fighting for freedom, defeating tyranny. What was it Ronald Reagan called the Contras and the Afghan mujahedin? “They are the moral equivalent of the Founding Fathers.”
Actually some of the Contras whom I knew were the moral equivalent of pathological killers. They were so out of control that the CIA, which had armed them and trained them, finally had two of their commanders hunted down and executed.
As I say, covert ops: cynical business.
But recent reporting on the subject has been profoundly and, indeed, dangerously misleading about both the truth and the consequences surrounding such operations.
All sorts of politicians—left, right and center; former administration insiders and confirmed outliers—have been talking about arming and training Syrian rebels as if that could have been the salvation of the uprising against Bashar al-Assad’s dictatorship in Damascus in 2012, and would have preempted, somehow, the rise of the horrific organization that calls itself the Islamic State, but which we’ll call by the acronyms it despises: ISIS or ISIL.
Certainly there was bitter infighting inside the administration back then. As one agency insider told me, “three years ago the Syria program was headed by a man who was competent but not senior enough to run such a high-profile account.” So Langley decided to cut short the tour of the then-CIA station chief in Bangkok and bring him in to head up the show. But “he was so shocked by the disorganization and lack of seriousness that he submitted his papers to retire.”
Criticism keeps pouring in and the Obama administration is hard pressed to prove it made the right decision back then, on the one hand, but has good reason to change its mind now as it tries to train new cadre to fight, not Assad, but ISIS. “This makes no sense,” says the same CIA veteran.
But from Obama’s point of view, actually, it does. The basic principles by which this administration operates are clear for anyone to see, even if the once-eloquent POTUS now finds it impossible to articulate simple ideas:
(Continued at the link below)

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