Showing posts with label Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies. Show all posts

Tuesday, December 15, 2015

50 Shades of Gray: Why the Gray Wars Concept Lacks Strategic Sense by Adam Elkus

We should remember Colin Gray (whom I do not think was the inspiration for the Gray Zone) and Clausewitz.  And my fear is that we do not heed Clausewitz' wisdom that we must first understand kind of war upon which we are about to embark and instead we focus on simply trying to name the war.

“The American defense community is especially prone to capture by the latest catchphrase, the new-sounding spin on an ancient idea which as jargon separates those who are truly expert from the lesser breeds without the jargon.”  Colin Gray

“Thus it has come about that our theoretical and critical literature, instead of giving plain, straightforward arguments in which the author at least always knows what he is saying and the reader what he is reading, is crammed with jargon, ending at obscure crossroads where the author loses its readers. Sometimes these books are even worse: they are just hollow shells. The author himself no longer knows just what he is thinking and soothes himself with obscure ideas which would not satisfy him if expressed in plain speech.”
Major General Carl von Clausewitz

Yes Adam is correct to note that USSOCOM has lost control of the new term  "Gray Zone" with everyone applying it to everything. (or old term -see below for the chart on the 100 names of "LIC" that I have been carrying around since 1994 - note "Gray Area Phenomena")   The USSOCOM White Paper can be accessed here: http://maxoki161.blogspot.com/2015/10/ussocom-white-paper-gray-zone.html)  And Yes Adam is right that Limited War and Compellence area useful concepts and do not need to be reinvented.

While I was hopeful that the Gray Zone would be a useful construct to describe the space between peace and where (where we have a strategy gap) what is really taking place in that space is what has always been taking place - revolution, resistance, and insurgency (RRI) .  Please take a look at the Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) project at the link below.  I had preferred Political Warfare with a nod to George Kennan (http://maxoki161.blogspot.com/2015/03/sof-support-to-political-warfare-white.html) but USSOCOM adopted the Gray Zone.   But we should be focusing on is revolution, resistance, and insurgency (and of course this is nothing new). This is what we should be focusing on.  And of course our adversaries are fomenting and  exploiting RRI in the space between peace and war and it was good of Congress to recognize that they are conducting their unique forms of unconventional warfare in that space (thus the directive in NDAA 2016 Sec 1097 to DOD to develop a counter-UW strategy: https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1735/text#toc-H57D78DE2C41D4347BF5202B774B80E94)  But now Gray Zone is being used to describe everything from Little Green Men in Ukraine to competition and potential conflict in the South China Sea to north Korean provocations (http://csis.org/publication/issues-insights-vol-15-no-13-struggling-gray-zone) 

Excerpts: 

Gray zone terminology has also been applied to characterize conflict in the South China Sea. Surely Putin’s various operations, Chinese territorial disputations, civil wars in Iraq and Syria, and Boko Haram’s terrorism in Nigeria are not equally gray? The idea that the term somehow meaningfully encompasses all of these conflicts is bizarre. But this is not the biggest flaw with the gray wars concept. It is yet another example of the recurring problem of military strategists and civilian analysts inventing new terminology to replace forgotten, yet perhaps more coherent concepts. Gray zone wars seem to be a composite of two very well known ideas in military strategy and political science: limited wars and compellence.

Gray wars are often defined as wars in which combatants minimize the scope and scale of combat. This is not an exotic new stratagem as much as the realization that, as Carl von Clausewitz noted, absolute war — war unconstrained by any kind of political limitation — is largely if not completely impossible in practice. The political context of war always involves some degree of minimizing the scope and scale of combat.


  • ARIS Logo


    Assessing Revolutionary And Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) Studies

    The Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) project consists of research conducted for the US Army Special Operations Command by the National Security Analysis Department of The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. Its goal is to produce academically rigorous yet operationally relevant research to develop and illustrate a common understanding of insurgency and revolution. Intended to form a bedrock body of knowledge for members of the Special Operations Forces, the ARIS studies allow users to distill vast amounts of material from a wide array of campaigns and extract relevant lessons, enabling the development of future doctrine, professional education, and training. The ARIS project follows in the tradition of research conducted by the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) of American University in the 1950s and 1960s, adding new research to that body of work, republishing original SORO studies, and releasing updated editions of selected SORO studies.


50 Shades of Gray: Why the Gray Wars Concept Lacks Strategic Sense

  • by Adam Elkus 
  •  Dec. 15, 2015 
  •  7 min read 
  •  original
Many men, as they age, start to worry about gray hairs. America’s military men, however, worry about gray wars. Gray wars are, as the former commander of U.S. Special Operations Command noted, wars in which groups or entities “seek to secure their objectives while minimizing the scope and scale of actual combat.” These wars and geopolitical conflicts, ranging from the Russian annexation of Crimea and its continued aggression in Ukraine to Boko Haram’s reign of terror in Nigeria, require allegedly new means of training, organization, and doctrine. There’s only one problem: The “gray wars” concept lacks even the most basic strategic sense. Like the book and movie 50 Shades of Grey, the gray wars concept grossly over-exaggerates its own transgressions from the norm. Beneath the hype is something rather ooh-la-lame rather than ooh-la-la.
First, it should be observed that this definition, which is applied to both wars with Vladimir Putin’s deniable “little green men” and Middle Eastern wars in Iraq and Syria featuring mobile combined arms maneuver, is incoherent. Yes, Putin is keeping it low-key, but can the same really be said of any of the Syrian or Iraqi factions contesting major cities and tweeting beheading pictures at each other? If the latter form of combat is somehow lacking in scope and scale, it is certainly not lacking in ferocity due to the intentions of the combatants (who are all fighting for their survival). And one can also quibble with the idea that these conflicts also are somehow lacking in scope and scale to begin with. Every faction in Syria and Iraq is fighting a war of utmost ferocity, and the expansion of the Islamic State to battlegrounds beyond Iraq and Syria suggests that the conflict may not necessarily be limited to its primary theaters of operation.
Gray zone terminology has also been applied to characterize conflict in the South China Sea. Surely Putin’s various operations, Chinese territorial disputations, civil wars in Iraq and Syria, and Boko Haram’s terrorism in Nigeria are not equally gray? The idea that the term somehow meaningfully encompasses all of these conflicts is bizarre. But this is not the biggest flaw with the gray wars concept. It is yet another example of the recurring problem of military strategists and civilian analysts inventing new terminology to replace forgotten, yet perhaps more coherent concepts. Gray zone wars seem to be a composite of two very well known ideas in military strategy and political science: limited wars and compellence.
(Continued at the link below)

Monday, February 16, 2015

On Resistance: A Philosophy of Defiance by Howard Caygill - review

Bottom line up front line:  I recommend reading the 2013 book review below (in case you want to bypass my commentary).

As most know from my commentary I am a strong proponent of the idea that most threats that we face in the future can be characterized by revolutions, resistance, and insurgency as laid out in the ARIS project (Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies - http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/ARIS.html) with the most important being resistance.  And of course I believe that resistance is not new at all.  It is only new to those of us who do not study it or recognize its history.  Resistance is the essence of unconventional and political warfare and we must know both how to exploit it for our interests as well as to counter it where it opposes our interests and be able to advise and assist our friends, partners, and allies, again, when it is in our interest to do so.

My thoughts can be summarized this way:

Revolutions, resistance, and insurgencies (RRI) are being conducted around the world and will continue to be the norm in the space between peace and war.

We have a strategy gap between diplomacy and war fighting and the US government (USG) requires a capability to achieve its objectives using all means necessary beyond diplomacy but short of war (adapted form George Kennan’s political warfare memo 1948)

Unconventional warfare can provide a strategic capability to operate in this gap.  To be effective, elements of the US military and Intelligence Community must continuously assess potential, nascent, and existing resistance organizations around the world on a day-to-day basis.  Assessments will contribute to understanding when USG interests and resistance objectives can be aligned and provide the intellectual foundation to determine if a UW campaign is warranted or if opponents’ UW campaigns should be countered. 

Interestingly there is no single definition of resistance agreed upon among disciplines.  But here is my stab at it.


An organized group (with leadership, objectives and strategy [a manifesto?]) opposing an organized structure (e.g., government or occupying power) and employs methods and activities (subversion to paramilitary and military) across a spectrum of legality from non-violent political to violent action to achieve (or force?) accommodation of its aims.

Even the DOD dictionary does not define resistance at all, it is only the Joint Doctrine on Special Operations (3-05) that describes a "resistance movement:"

Resistance Movement – A organized effort by some portion  of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability.

I was recently  participant in a workshop studying resistance in which scholars from the disciplines of political science, history, economics, sociology, and the law presented their disciplines' views on resistance and of course each had different perspectives.  The goal of the workshop is to come up with a common typology for resistance that can assist scholars in studying the phenomena of resistance which can then inform practitioners, policy makers, strategists and planners, particularly those in the SOF community but also the greater national security community.  It occurred to me that resistance is one of the most interdisciplinary of fields of study (maybe a blinding flash of the obvious to others) and of course this is why it is rarely the subject of study as no single discipline "owns" it.  However, it was noted that one discipline was not represented in the workshop and that was philosophy and one of the participants recommended this November 2013 book review which I strongly recommend reading.  I have ordered this book and look forward to reading it as well.

Excerpt:

On Resistance opens with Clausewitz, whose famous discourse On War, Caygill suggests, could itself be retitled On Resistance, since what Clausewitz meant by war was the destruction of the enemy's capacity to resist, and the preservation at any cost of your own. Clausewitz also spends much more time on guerrillas and partisans than we might expect from his most famous statement, that "war is the continuation of politics by other means". Resistance is therefore mired in war, which goes some way to explain why, according to a seemingly inexorable logic, it so rarely seems to escape it. When Goya painted his famous series Disasters of War, he matched the image of uniformed figures executing civilians con razón o sin ella (with or without reason) with one of resistant partisans killing a soldierlo mismo (the same). For us to be shocked today by the atrocities that appear to have been committed by the insurgents in the Syrian civil war is therefore a category mistake. Why – a founding question for this book and one that any meaningful resistance has to keep asking itself – should it be any different?


On Resistance: A Philosophy of Defiance by Howard Caygill – review
Jacqueline Rose on the joy and necessity of rebellion, from Rosa Luxemburg to Tahrir Square

 The spirit of resistance … an Occupy protester overlooks the crowds filling Madrid’s Plaza Mayor. Photograph: Action Press / Rex Features Action Press / Rex Features/Action Press / Rex Featureshttp://www.theguardian.com/books/2013/nov/07/resistance-philosophy-defiance-howard-caygill-review
Thursday 7 November 2013 10.00 EST

There could not be a more timely moment for this book, when resistance across the world – the Arab uprisings, the Greek revolt against austerity – seem to be succumbing to the brutality of the army and the law; when the heady protests, which many saw as offering the hope of revolution, seem ineffective against the dead hand of the state and the global rule of capital. Acutely attuned to this context, which was unfolding as he wrote, the philosopher Howard Caygill offers a meditation on the history of resistance as idea and lived experience, a term which, as he states at the outset, is "strangely unanalysed".

On Resistance could be read as a warning against the dangers faced by all forms of resistance: the risk of co-option, of the escalating violence that is the hallmark of modern warfare, of the revolutionary moment allowing itself to be folded back into the ugly imperatives of authority and power. And yet the book is wholly inspired by the spirit of resistance whose often unhappy trajectories it so brilliantly describes. It is therefore asking us to do two things that may at first glance seem incompatible. To step back from the euphoria in order to take the measure of the cruel fate that hovers, always ready to pounce on people's most energised objections to injustice; and, at the same time, to go on believing in resistance as a way, perhaps the only viable way, of living in the modern world.
Caygill's acclaimed studies of Kant, Walter Benjamin and Emmanuel Levinas were already alert to the political ramifications of philosophical thought. Gathering up these thinkers – together with writers and activists ranging from Rosa Luxemburgto Gandhi, from Pier Paolo Pasolini to Stéphane Hessel – Caygill now goes down into the street where, in a sense, he has always belonged. It is his unique mix of caution and enthusiasm, his avoidance of blind utopianism and of defeatism alike, which makes this book so important. At the end of his life, Pasolini, whose work and life is read here as a form of continuous protest, was, we are told, "sombre but not desperate". Caygill could be describing himself. He has written a manifesto in the style of radical melancholia. He is telling us to think again; he is suggesting that, without the ability to tolerate despondent thought, to grant it a place alongside our most passionately held convictions, there is no prospect of making the world a better place. In the words of The Coming Insurrection, issued in France by the protest group The Invisible Committee following the 2007 riots against Nicolas Sarkozy, "From whatever angle you approach it, the present offers no way out. This is not the least of its virtues."

On Resistance opens with Clausewitz, whose famous discourse On War, Caygill suggests, could itself be retitled On Resistance, since what Clausewitz meant by war was the destruction of the enemy's capacity to resist, and the preservation at any cost of your own. Clausewitz also spends much more time on guerrillas and partisans than we might expect from his most famous statement, that "war is the continuation of politics by other means". Resistance is therefore mired in war, which goes some way to explain why, according to a seemingly inexorable logic, it so rarely seems to escape it. When Goya painted his famous series Disasters of War, he matched the image of uniformed figures executing civilians con razón o sin ella (with or without reason) with one of resistant partisans killing a soldierlo mismo (the same). For us to be shocked today by the atrocities that appear to have been committed by the insurgents in the Syrian civil war is therefore a category mistake. Why – a founding question for this book and one that any meaningful resistance has to keep asking itself – should it be any different?

Pitting Gandhi against Mao, Caygill sees Mao's commitment to the primacy of military action and the cathartic role of violence as having devastating consequences for subsequent revolutions across the world; whereas Gandhi'ssatyagraha (firmness to the commitment to truth) and ahimsa (non-violence) entrench protest in unflinching belief, an inner state grounded in the justness of its cause. Such resistance is sustained not by violence, but by legitimacy that in turn creates a type of freedom: if a subject refuses to "obey laws that are unjust," Gandhi wrote, "no man's tyranny will enslave him". This principle led, for example, to mass burning of identity cards, central in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa where Gandhi had lived, and the acceptance of mass imprisonment during the Indian fight for independence. Violence, on the other hand, can lead only to escalation, since it justifies its use by the enemy. It is also illogical. How on earth are we supposed to get our opponent to do by force "what we desire but he does not"?Resistance does not breed good behaviour. It may arise from just protest, but that does not mean it will be ethical, unless it makes the choice to place ethics at the core of its politics. For that reason, the heroes and heroines of this book, which are many, include Jean Genet, the Zapatista liberation movement in Mexico, and, perhaps unexpectedly, the women of Greenham Common whose main imperative and slogan – "resist the military" – was embedded in a non-violent philosophy centring on the affirmation of life and the creation of a community of women. This was resistance as a form of continuing education. Preparing women to bring about the desired political change was part of the ongoing work of the camp. What kind of human being, On Resistance prompts us to ask, does resistance promote? Not only what do we want to achieve, but who do we want to be?

The critique of violence does not however entail a naive refusal of death, nor of its strategic place at the heart of resistance. At such finely drawn distinctions, On Resistance excels. The Zapatistas draw their moral authority from their claim to speak on behalf of what they call "the resistant dead", all those who have resisted in Mexican history: "Everything for everyone says our dead. Until this is true there will be nothing for us." Among other things this brings resistance close to the realm of poetry: "Arming a tender fury. A nameless name. An unjust peace made war. A death that/ is born. An anguish made hope…Everything for everyone. Nothing for us. We the/ nameless, the always dead. We, the Zapatista National Liberation Army."


Similarly, Clausewitz's vision of resistance is read here as a form of creative activity, an "imaginative response to chance" that plays havoc with the deadly mix of force and consciousness that underlies "the military posture of the nation state". Resistance is canny. It has to be. It must mislead, entice and confuse. This is not the vocabulary of rational prediction, but rather a different type of knowledge, outside the remit of state power, which recognises that the world will not wholly submit to man's purpose. We should not, then, be surprised at the lengths to which state authority will go to destroy resistance, such as the modern-day manhunt that cuts the enemy down with no legal process or possible path of escape, reducing its targets from human to prey. Think of the Indian government's explicitly named "Operation Green Hunt" against resistance from Indian tribal peoples, or Obama's drones.


From Tahrir Square to Occupy Wall Street, the call to resistance has today become a "living genre". There is a new "technology of resistance", and a belief that social media can forge the path to revolution. We need, however, to remember that modern technology was perfected as the bureaucratic arm of the capitalist state. The origins of the internet can be traced to the Rand Corporation, a strategic thinktank for the conduct of nuclear war, founded in 1948 with the objective of looking into future weapons technology. And yet the more technology perfects itself the more it makes itself vulnerable, or available for better ideas. 

Proliferation breeds potential loss of control. The denser the archive, the greater the chances that secrets will come to light. Nothing is pre-given. The future will be decided by struggle. On this Caygill is unambiguous. On Resistance is as much an act as a philosophy of defiance. It will be indispensable for anyone thinking about resistance in our times, not least for demonstrating so profoundly that, for all its perils, resistance still possesses its "own necessities, its own affirmations and its own joy".


• Jacqueline Rose's books include The Last Resistance.


Thursday, October 23, 2014

Do We Really Understand Unconventional Warfare?

Do We Really Understand Unconventional Warfare?

by David S. Maxwell

Journal Article | October 23, 2014 - 11:34am
Do We Really Understand Unconventional Warfare?
America May Not Be Interested In Unconventional Warfare
But UW Is Being Practiced Around The World By Those Who Are Interested In It
David S. Maxwell
The United States has the most powerful conventional military force and the strongest nuclear deterrent in the world. It remains the sole superpower because it is well prepared to fight and win in state on state conflict.  Yet the majority of wars, conflicts, and threats in the 21st Century are unlikely to be purely conventional or nuclear.  In the 21st Century we are more likely to experience kinds of warfare for which scholars have been hard pressed to find a name. Scholars have used many names including irregular warfare, hybrid warfare, 4th Generation Warfare, and of course the post 9-11 rediscovery of insurgency and counterinsurgency.  Yet despite all these various names the one overarching form of warfare that encompasses all is unconventional warfare (UW). However, the fundamental question is do we understand unconventional warfare?  And if not, why not?
We know that the Department of Defense (DOD) defines unconventional warfare as “activities to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power through and with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.”[1]  Although this was designed by the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) UW working group in 2009 to be a broad definition and apply generally to this form of warfare and not specifically from a U.S. centric perspective it continues to connote a very narrow description of warfare (e.g., the overthrow of a hostile government) and has often been relegated to the province of Special Operations Forces and more specifically Special Forces.[2]  Furthermore many political leaders either fear the blowback from such operations or, perhaps worse, have unrealistic expectations of the efficacy of UW.  However, as I have argued before, if the United States is going to consider employing unconventional warfare as an option in support of policy and strategy then it is imperative that policy makers, strategists, and theater commanders and staffs have sufficient understanding of and appreciation for unconventional warfare not only if UW is to be conducted by the US government but also for when the US government must develop policies and strategies to conduct operations to counter unconventional warfare executed by opponents of the US or our friends, partners and allies.[3]
Although this definition now resides in the DOD dictionary there is no DOD or joint level doctrinespecifically for unconventional warfare.  There is no national policy for unconventional warfare.  There is Army Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Special Forces doctrine[4] but, as we know, few people in uniform or out really read, study, internalize, and practice the concepts published in our doctrine.  USSOCOM has been working over the past year to remedy the lack of joint and DOD doctrine and will soon publish the first ever joint doctrine for UW; however, that is unlikely to solve the problem of policy makers and strategists not appreciating and understanding unconventional warfare and all that operating in that realm of warfare entails.  There seems to be an insufficient intellectual foundation in unconventional warfare.
Before addressing the lack of intellectual foundation let me state for clarity the essence of UW.  Definitions and doctrine aside, unconventional warfare at its core is about revolution, resistance, and insurgency (RRI) combined with the external support provided to a revolution, resistance, or insurgency by either the US or others (who may or may not have interests aligned with the US and may in fact be opposed to the US and our friends, partners, and allies).  This is a type of warfare that is timeless, timely, and something that we can expect to occur over time in the future.  It is both political in nature and at times violent – even as violent as conventional warfare in some cases.
What makes me say that we do not have an understanding of and appreciation for unconventional warfare?  Two recent articles from the New York Times and the Daily Beast illustrate this.  In the first Mark Mazzetti writes about a classified CIA report that alleges that the US has rarely been successful in training and equipping rebel forces and because of this report the US Administration was reluctant to arm and train Syrian rebels.[5]  Christopher Dickey takes issue with the report and claims there have been some successes despite there often being an “acrid aftertaste” as in the case of the Afghan war in the 1980s.[6]
What the Mazzetti and Dickey articles (as well as simply the emphasis on “train and equip" by government spokespeople and pundits) illustrate is that policy makers really do not understand the nature and conduct of unconventional warfare.  It is neither an abject failure in every case nor is it a war winner in almost any case but it is a viable strategic option if used in the right conditions at the right time by the right organizations.  But most importantly it is both risky and hard and what makes it most difficult for policy makers and the public is that it is time consuming.  It cannot be employed "in extremis" in most cases (in the fall of 2001 post 9-11 being an exception) and really requires long-term preparation, thorough assessments, and relationships with key players to have chance of being successful.  And most importantly it must absolutely be part of and in support of a coherent policy and strategy.
Again to restate the problem there is little intellectual foundation for unconventional warfare.  Yes there are some important books to ready from Max Boot’s Invisible Armies to John Tierney’s Chasing Ghosts,to John McCuen’s The Art of Counter-Revolutionary Warfare as well as works by Hy Rothstein and Thomas K. Adams and one of the most prescient studies by the late Sam Sarkesian from 1993:Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era.  These are all important to read and I would commend them to any policy maker or strategist; however, what the all lack is how to think about the strategic application of unconventional warfare because they do not delve sufficiently into the common “principles” used to conduct unconventional warfare (save perhaps McCuen’s work).  There is only one time in the history of the US military that unconventional warfare was sufficiently studied to provide the necessary knowledge to policy makers and strategists and that was in the 1950-1960’s with the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) and the partnership between the Army and the Academy. 
We have a number of contemporary examples about UW that are worth examining to illustrate both our lack of understanding as well as the continuing importance of UW.  We have only to look at both Libya and Syria from a US perspective and how we either “led from behind” or are now focusing only on train and equip.  We have thoroughly adopted such concepts as “through, by, and with” and “train and equip” and “building partner capacity” as ways in our strategic calculus.  But we do not understand the complexity, the difficulties and the depth of operations and activities necessary for the conduct of effective UW and we expect to simply apply building partner capacity and train and equip to problems that may require an understanding of UW to support a strategy.  This is most prominently illustrated by the public statements of our political leadership and pundits who only focus on training and equipping rebel forces as if this action is enough to succeed and achieve our interests.  The second example we have comes from competitors and opposition.  We are seeing variations of UW conducted by the Russians and their New Generation Warfare,[7] the Chinese and their Three Warfares,[8] and the Iranian Action Network.[9]  And finally groups like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) are conducting variations of UW (though ISIL might be said to have completed its UW campaign and is now functioning like a quasi-state).  Interestingly the roots of these strategies and campaigns can be found in George Kennan’s political warfare that he described in his 1948 memo to the Policy Planning Staff:
Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz's doctrine in time of peace. In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (as ERP--the Marshall Plan), and "white" propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of "friendly" foreign elements, "black" psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.[10]
Kennan describes the realm of revolution, resistance, and insurgency that can contribute to coercing, disrupting or overthrowing a government or occupying power.  These are truly strategic actions and objectives but the question remains: do we understand what it requires to implement strategies with campaigns that either support or counter-revolutions resistance, or insurgency. 
To graphically illustrate our lack of understanding of unconventional warfare we can turn to two charts from the Assessing Revolution and Insurgency Strategy (ARIS) project.[11]  The first depicts the relationship and relative size of the fundamental components of UW: the underground, the auxiliary, and the guerrilla or armed military force as well as the public component.
For some years in Syria we have been focusing on training and equipping the “armed component” (and until recently provided only limited non-lethal assistance).  Yet it is the underground that provides the key to understanding the motivation, objectives, interests, methods, and strategy of the leadership of a revolution, resistance, or insurgency (RRI).  It is through the underground that we can not only vet members but also try to determine one of the most important questions of “what comes next?” after the organization achieves success.  We really need to assess all the organizations of an RRI and not solely the armed component, which seems to always be the focus of our strategy and activities.
Another chart illustrates the scope of activities in an RRI environment and in particular the underground.  We tend to focus only on the “tip of the UW iceberg.”

(Continued at the link below)

Giving Tuesday Recommendations

  Dear Friends,  I do not normally do this (except I did this last year and for the last few years now, too) and I certainly do not mean to ...