Excerpt:

It is the church (and any other organized group that will step up to the challenge) that poses a great threat to topple the government and disseminate anti-government messages. There is no way to know exactly how many Christians there are but I have heard whisperings of an underground community of 100,000 strong. They have the capability of quickly organizing and just as they can disseminate religious teachings, they can swiftly influence thoughts and actions through word of mouth and handwritten letters.]

Mike is a civilian UW practitioner (whether he knows it or not).

 

Mike Kim Become a fan 

Managing Director at Ferrazzi Greenlight & Author of Escaping North Korea

What is North Korea So Afraid Of?

Posted: 03/14/2014 9:35 am EDT Updated: 03/14/2014 9:59 am EDT

Print ArticleIn one year, three missionaries were detained in North Korea from America, South Korea and Australia.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mike-kim/north-korea-missionaries_b_4961321.html?view=print&comm_ref=false

The Australian, John Short, was detained in North Korea for passing out religious pamphlets at a Buddhist temple and in a crowded train in North Korea's capital, Pyongyang. The worst he would have been charged with in most of the world is littering.

Short said in a statement released to the Australian Associated Press after his release that he was harshly interrogated every day for his actions. "There were two-hour sessions each morning, which were repeated again in the afternoons," he said.

Despite his troubles, John Short was luckier than others. American missionary Kenneth Bae has been imprisoned for about a year and from videos the North Korean state media released of him, he looks to be sick and have lost a considerable amount of weight.

And last week, there were reports that said North Korea would be executing of 33 North Korean citizens for their links to Korean missionary, Kim Jung-wook, who is currently detained.

Missionary Robert Park was imprisoned for illegally entering the country in 2009. He recently recounted the severity of torture he experienced.

"Several North Korean women surrounded me and did the worst thing to me to try to make me commit suicide," he said in an interview with South Korean wire service, Yonhap News. In that interview, he also said that he was placed in a bright room where his genitals were clubbed.

These string of events beg the question, "What is North Korea so afraid of?" And more specifically, "Why is North Korea so afraid of Christianity?"

Many people have asked me these questions and the answer is simple: the North Korean government sees Christianity as a threat to their power. All of these stories point to this fact.

I have interviewed several North Korean refugees who were caught in China, sent back to North Korean prison camps and tortured. In these interviews, I learned that there are sections of the gulags that are dedicated to Christians, reportedly in the tens of thousands. All of them have said that among the first questions they are asked upon repatriation is "Did you convert to Christianity?" and "Did you come into contact with any foreign missionaries?" These are odd questions to greet returning North Koreans with and point to an obsession the regime has with Christianity.

Through Crossing Borders, the non-profit I founded, we know that the North Korean regime has been experiencing a loosening stranglehold on controlling the hearts and minds of their people. Until recently the regime enjoyed the luxury of near-total information control but this trend is changing. Each day DVDs and thumb drives are being smuggled into the country. Radios are being hacked to receive signals from the outside. And cell phones connected to the Chinese network are being used to keep contact with relatives and friends who have escaped.

With no known civil society organizations in operation, the biggest threat to the government is organized religion (the focus of the regime's attack seems to be Christianity but the regime sees any organized religion opposing the government as a threat). They understand that they have not squashed the church despite their efforts to do so. Even after decades of trying to crush the church, there is still an underground community of Christians who gather secretly at night and read their Bibles using a flashlight under blankets.

It is the church (and any other organized group that will step up to the challenge) that poses a great threat to topple the government and disseminate anti-government messages. There is no way to know exactly how many Christians there are but I have heard whisperings of an underground community of 100,000 strong. They have the capability of quickly organizing and just as they can disseminate religious teachings, they can swiftly influence thoughts and actions through word of mouth and handwritten letters.

If organized groups are successful in toppling the government, the ruling elite knows they will be prosecuted in international courts for crimes against humanity. The UN panel that released February's damning report on North Korea suggested that the findings be given to the International Criminal Court for possible prosecution.

North Korea's ruling elite has painted themselves into a corner. They know that opening up to the outside world will lead to new ideas and an eventual threat to their power. They are terrified and distrusting as illustrated by the current ruler Kim Jung Un, who ordered the execution of his very own uncle Jang Song Thaek among other high-level leaders. This is why the regime takes such draconian measures to protect themselves from foreign influence.

Though the situation seems bleak, there is a glimmer of hope. There is a thriving underground market for foreign media. Many experts say that North Koreans no longer believe their country is paradise on earth. The government has stopped claiming this. The foundation of information control that the government once had has corroded and today the world looks on and wonders what will happen next.

One of the most important things Crossing Borders does is to make sure each refugee has a television. I sat with many as they saw the peace and prosperity of the outside world for the first time. They saw the shining lights of Times Square and Seoul and knew they had been duped. In a moment they realized that their fundamental view of the world was a lie. Some of them return to North Korea to aid starving or sick family members and they share the information they gleaned. Then the information spreads. It makes sense for the world to help those who have escaped. These people are an important conduit of information flow back into their country. As information seeps in, the whispers will begin to grow into shouts for freedom and reform.

The truth shall indeed set you free.

Follow Mike Kim on Twitter: www.twitter.com/mikekimnk

For my friends (mentors) who are veterans of operations in Laos.  We should recall the lesson on abandonment when considering future operations with indigenous forces.

The UConn Daily Campus

Presentation recalls ‘secret’ CIA war in Laos

By Zach Lederman

Staff Writer

http://www.dailycampus.com/presentation-recalls-secret-cia-war-in-laos-1.3150989#.UyM_f2RDupc

Published: Friday, March 14, 2014

Updated: Friday, March 14, 2014 02:03

SANTIAGO PELAEZ/The Daily Campus

Major Sar Phouthasack of the Royal Lao Army and Special Guerilla Unit attached to the U.S. Special Forces was the keynote speaker at a ceremony in Konover on Thursday evening.

The atmosphere of Konover Hall in the Dodd Centre on Thursday night was a solemn one during the Vietnamese Student Association’s presentation, “The Vietnam War and the Secret War in Laos.”

The evening began with an introduction by Kimberly Thai, the VSA’s President, and Garret Grothe, who honored U.S. troops with a moment of silence, as well as a playing of the national anthem.

Once the anthem concluded, the opening ceremony began with two cultural acts: one Vietnamese, and the other Laotian. The first act featured five female members of the Vietnamese Student Association who performed a traditional Vietnamese dance representing the cultural view of the Vietnamese people as having descended from dragons. The second performance was also a dance, featuring Mina Phomphakdy, who performed a traditional Laotian dance used to grant good luck to the audience. Following the ceremonies, the keynote speaker was introduced: Major Sar Phouthasack of the Royal Lao Army and Special Guerilla Unit attached to the U.S. Special Forces.

He began his talk with a request for everyone in the audience: “Defend your nation. Support your troops and protect your fellow citizens. I have seen no greater country in my life than the United States.”

Phouthasack is a veteran of the Vietnam War but he identifies as a veteran of what many refer to as the “Secret War” in Laos. This war, which is not typically taught in school, refers to the CIA’s recruitment operation in the Hmong villages of Laos. The CIA recruited Hmong soldiers from these villages, and it was said that over the course of the war, many Hmong lost their lives in order to save even greater amounts of American troops.

Phouthasack was described as one of the greatest assets that the American army had. During the presentation, it was estimated that he had saved potentially upwards of thousands of American lives during his time on the front. He was trained by various groups, including the Green Berets and the CIA, and performed various covert intelligence operations.

Unfortunately, when the Americans left Vietnam, Phouthasack and his fellow troops were abandoned, leaving them to face the wrath of the Communist survivors who enacted ethnic cleanses all across Laos, raping and killing entire Hmong villages suspected of having supported the Americans. Though many were not so lucky, Phouthasack used his skills to successfully find refuge in Thailand before finally making his way to the United States.

At times, the stories were difficult to listen to. Phouthasack spoke of the friends he lost and the atrocities he witnessed, and as Grothe stated towards the beginning of the night, “This is part of all our history. Tonight isn’t about whether you identify as Laotian or American. Tonight is about remembering what happened to our fellow human beings, and doing what we can to see that it does not happen again.”

Following the speech, Phouthasack hosted a brief question and answer session before moving to the Asian American Cultural Center for a reception. The show was coordinated by the Vietnamese Students Association, hosted by the Asian American Cultural Center, and co-sponsored by the Cambodian Student Association, the Laotian and Thai Student Association and the CT Asian Pacific American Affairs Commission.

FINAL UN REPORT ON N. KOREA SANCTION VIOLATIONS

This is a very comprehensive report detailing everything from the north's nuclear and missile program to its illicit activities and how it gets around sanctions.

If I were planning a comprehensive global campaign against north Korea's global illicit activities network, this document would contribute to the targeting process (my apologies to the UN who would probably not be pleased to read that).

The entire report can be downloaded here:  http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/147&referer=/english/&Lang=E

Summary 

 There have been no signs that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 

intends to respond to the Security Council’s calls to abandon its nuclear, ballistic 

missile and other weapons of mass destruction programmes. On the contrary, it is 

persisting with its arms trade and other prohibited activities in defiance of Security 

Council resolutions, while activities related to its nuclear and ballistic missile 

programmes continue. 

 At the present time, the Panel does not see new measures as necessary in order 

to further slow the prohibited programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of 

Korea, to dissuade it from engaging in proliferation activities or to halt its trade in 

arms and related materiel. Rather, the Panel believes that Member States already 

have at their disposal adequate tools. 

 The example of Panama with the Chong Chon Gang shows that determined 

action can thwart prohibited activities on the basis of existing measures. 

Nonetheless, the Panel strongly believes that overall implementation of existing 

sanctions should be significantly improved. In the present and prior reports to the 

Security Council, the Panel has made recommendations to help address identified 

shortcomings. 

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea presents a stiff challenge to 

Member States. It is experienced in actions it takes to evade sanctions. From the 

incidents analysed in the period under review, the Panel has found that it makes 

increasing use of multiple and tiered circumvention techniques. Access to the Chong 

Chon Gang provided the Panel with an unrivalled insight into some of the ways used 

to circumvent sanctions. This incident is also a reminder to Member States that, 

besides trade in arms and related materiel, the Democratic People’s Republic of 

Korea is forbidden to provide services or assistance on the manufacture, maintenance 

or use of arms. 

 Other incidents show that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea remains 

dependent on foreign procurement for certain items, especially some that figure in 

nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. In particular, it lacks sufficient domestic 

precision machine tool manufacturing capability and it purchases off-the-shelf items 

for its ballistic missile-related programmes. The Panel also assesses that it will likely 

seek out foreign suppliers for components it will need to fabricate fuel rods for its 

reactors. 

 A study commissioned by the Panel provided valuable insights into its overseas 

commercial presence, part of which is utilized to find alternative and willing 

suppliers and acquire technology and products it needs for prohibited programmes. 

The study also shows that individuals and entities operating abroad, particularly 

those it identified as working in the shipping industry, could be viewed as belonging 

to interconnected networks, useful in the conduct of legitimate and illicit trade. 

Demand for Delta Force troops, Green Berets, Navy SEALs ‘outpacing capacity’

We need to be very careful here.  The knee jerk reaction to the "stress on the force" will be to cut back deployments.  While that is necessary and fine for some special operations forces (and we should keep in mind that jointness does not equal sameness even within special operations - Delta, Special Forces, SEALs, Rangers, Civil Affairs and PSYOP forces are not interchangeable despite the bean counters who want to count "SOF Teams" ) for those forces that conduct special warfare there is a need to sustain their deployment tempo not only to support persistent engagement but also to sustain regional expertise.  Furthermore, most soldiers who came into Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and PSYOP did so because they want to deploy and work in foreign countries with indigenous forces.  While the force may be tired form Afghanistan and Iraq, that does not mean that forces conducting special warfare do not want to deploy.  While perhaps counterintuitive to some I think we will face a real morale problem among certain forces if their deployments are scaled back too much in response to the cries of the "stress on the force."

V/R
Dave

Demand for Delta Force troops, Green Berets, Navy SEALs ‘outpacing capacity’

Global demand drains readiness even as U.S. wars wind down

http://m.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/mar/11/special-ops-forces-wearing-thin-from-high-demand/?page=all#pagebreak

Firing away: Marines have special operations forces in Afghanistan to train and mentor Afghan National Security Forces. A Pentagon budget review notes significant stress on teams of commandos with multiple tough deployments. (U.S. Marine Corps)

By Rowan Scarborough

-

The Washington Times

Tuesday, March 11, 2014

America’s in-demand global force against terrorists is showing signs of stress and appears to be gliding toward a decline in readiness, says a Pentagon budget overview on special operations forces.

With the end of U.S. military operations in the Iraq War, the thought was that fewer deployments would give some relief to special operations forces after a dozen years of overseas fighting.

But the 2015 budget overview says demand for special operations forces is up, not down.

It talks of “significant stress on the force” and notes that the demand for Delta Force troops, Green Berets, Navy SEALs and other commandos is “outpacing capacity” and has “initiated a downward trend in SOF readiness” this year.

Retired Rear Adm. George Worthington, once the Navy’s top SEAL, said the wear and tear on mind and body, much less equipment, is becoming apparent.

“With guys doing multiple deployments, they’re getting a tough nine to 10 deployments over a 12-year period, the impact on families is going to be noticeable,” Adm. Worthington said. “Anything that can cut down and make the deployments less vigorous in terms of operation tempo is going to be a better thing.

“The stress is, at home, you’ve got to get ready to deploy for another nine months,” he said, adding that the war on terrorism has been the SEALs’ busiest era since the Vietnam War.

“This is Vietnam on steroids,” he said. “If there is any fraying, it’s on replaceable operational equipment. But more than that, it’s the operational tempo on the guys. They’re over there for eight or nine months, and then they come back and then they’ve got to go back.”

The Pentagon says special operations units plan to “reduce select capacity to preserve readiness,” but the Defense Department does not spell out which missions will be scaled back.

Adm. William McRaven, a SEAL by training who is chief of U.S. Special Operations Command, told Congress recently that “the force has continued to fray” and “our suicide rate, unfortunately, has grown here over the past three or four years.”

On Tuesday, Adm. McRaven told a Senate Armed Services subcommittee that demand is so heavy he cannot always say yes to global combatant commanders.

“My job as the supporting commander is to provide them forces,” he testified. “Now, there does come a time when I kind of run out of forces and so I’ve got to work with the [geographic combatant commands] and the services to do the best we can.”

The total number of special operations forces was once planned to reach 72,000, but budget constraints have capped the number at 69,700. The Special Operations Command budget for the next year is $7.7 billion, a 10 percent increase.

The command is taking steps to head off a severe readiness dip in its far-flung troops, who over the past dozen years have conducted counterterrorism training and operations in North and East Africa, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and Asia. They fought a long war against al Qaeda-sponsored insurgents in Iraq, where commandos perfected the fusion of intelligence collection and direct action to kill scores of terrorist leaders.

Special operations forces killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan and tracked down his chief henchman in Iraq, Abu Musab Zarqawi. In October, Delta Force soldiers in Tripoli, Libya, nabbed Abu Anas al Libi, the reputed mastermind of the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa.

“This state of readiness is critical to ensure SOF remains the United States on-call and ready force for global engagements,” the Pentagon assessment says. “The SOF continues to experience and project an increase in global demand outpacing capacity.”

One example: SoCom is facing an explosion in the number of countries that want American commandos to train their forces in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. Last year, 63 countries received training from 3,500 personnel. In 2015, the numbers will balloon to 103 countries and 4,500 personnel.

In the secretive world of special operations, the Pentagon offers no details on reduced training or flying hours. But one infamous example of special operations forces being pulled beyond capacity occurred in 2012 in Benghazi, Libya.

(Continued at the link below)

http://m.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/mar/11/special-ops-forces-wearing-thin-from-high-demand/?page=all#pagebreak

DoD Releases Report on North Korea's Military and Security Developments

The 27 page report can be downloaded at this link:  http://www.defense.gov/pubs/North_Korea_Military_Power_Report_2013-2014.pdf

There is no discussion of Songun, Songbun, Byungjin, or instability and collapse.  This is purely focused on military capabilities (though I would have hoped for an assessment of military capabilities during regime collapse).  The Table of contents and Exsum are pasted below.

News Release

http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=16569

Press Operations

E-MAIL A COPY | PRINTER FRIENDLY | LATEST NEWS RELEASES

NEWS RELEASE

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Release No: NR-113-14
March 05, 2014

DoD Releases Report on North Korea's Military and Security Developments

The Defense Department published a congressionally mandated,

unclassified report on the Military and Security Developments involving the

Democratic People's Republic of Korea today.  

 

The report is posted at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/North_Korea_Military_Power_Report_2013-2014.pdf.

Table of Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1
CHAPTER ONE: ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY SITUATION 3
KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH KOREAN AND PENINSULAR SECURITY 3 
NORTH KOREAN SECURITY PERCEPTIONS 4 
CHAPTER TWO: UNDERSTANDING NORTH KOREA’S STRATEGY 6
STRATEGIC GOALS 6 
NATIONAL STRATEGY 6 
REGIONAL OBJECTIVES AND BEHAVIOR 6 
CHAPTER THREE: FORCE MODERNIZATION GOALS AND TRENDS 8
OVERVIEW 8 
MAINTAINING THE THREAT 8 
AN AGING FORCE... 9 
...WITH EMERGING CAPABILITIES 9 
CHAPTER FOUR: SIZE, LOCATION, AND CAPABILITIES OF NORTH KOREAN MILITARY FORCES 12
CHAPTER FIVE: PROLIFERATION 20
OVERVIEW 20 
CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND MISSILE SALES 20 
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 20 
NORTH KOREA’S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) PROGRAMS 20 
INTERDICTED TRANSFERS 21

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) remains one of the United States’ most critical security challenges for many reasons. These include North Korea’s willingness to undertake provocative and destabilizing behavior, including attacks on the Republic of Korea (ROK), its pursuit of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, and its willingness to proliferate weapons in contravention of United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

Under Kim Jong Il, DPRK strategy focused on internal security; coercive diplomacy to compel acceptance of its diplomatic, economic, and security interests; development of strategic military capabilities to deter external attack; and challenging the ROK and the U.S.-ROK Alliance. We anticipate these strategic goals will be consistent under North Korea’s current leader, Kim Jong Un.

North Korea fields a large, forward-deployed military that retains the capability to inflict serious damage on the ROK, despite significant resource shortfalls and aging hardware. The DPRK continues to be deterred from conducting large-scale attacks on the ROK primarily due to the strength of the U.S.-ROK Alliance. On a smaller scale, however, the DPRK has demonstrated its willingness to use military provocation to achieve national goals. In 2010, it sank the ROK naval vessel CHEONAN, killing 46 ROK Navy sailors, and shelled Yeonpyeong Island, killing two ROK Marines and two civilians.

North Korea’s continued pursuit of nuclear technology and capabilities and development of intermediate- and long-range ballistic missile programs, as reflected in the December 2012 Taepo Dong-2 missile launch and February 2013 nuclear test, underscore the threat to regional stability and U.S. national security posed by North Korea. These programs, and North Korea’s expressed hostility toward the ROK and proliferation of items prohibited under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718, 1874, 2087,and 2094, make the DPRK a continued security challenge for the United States and its Allies and partners.

North Korea’s third nuclear test in February 2013 and subsequent announcement of plans to restart and refurbish nuclear facilities at Yongbyon highlight the continued challenge posed by its nuclear programs. The September 19, 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, and United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718, 1874, 2087, and 2094 call for the complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea. Given North Korea’s unwillingness to abide by these commitments, the U.S. Department of Defense Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 2
will continue to manage the North Korean security challenge through close coordination and consultation with the international community, particularly with our ROK and Japanese Allies.


The United States remains vigilant in the face of North Korea’s continued provocations and steadfast in its commitments to Allies in the region, including the security provided by extended deterrence commitments through the nuclear umbrella and conventional forces. 

Excerpt:

After arriving in South Korea, North Korean defectors find themselves witnessing demonstrations opposing government policies and become aware of severe media criticism of the government. Many defectors believe that such criticism is unneeded and even dangerous.

As people who were taught that solidarity is the only path to a strong country, they find it difficult to understand that controversy and heated discussions in the public sphere are necessary elements of democratic politics.

Dr. Lankov also offers a good reminder of the importance of democratic processes for all of us in the last section.  I am reminded of John Stuart Mill and On Liberty and wonder if north Koreans could ever grasp his thesis after sixty plus years of indoctrination:

"The object of this essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action if any of their number, is self-protection.  That is the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.  His own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant.  Ge cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right.  There are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise.  To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him, must be calculated to produce evil to someone else. The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others.  In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute.  Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign." (On Liberty p. 14)

The question is can north Koreans learn, grasp and embrace the concept of liberty and individual freedom

?  Or will only future generations after reunification be able to do so?  

North Korean Defectors Admire Democracy But Are Confused By Its Freedoms

http://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/defectors-03042014103418.html

A commentary by Andrei Lankov
2014-03-04

• Print
• Share
• Comment
• Email

North Korean defectors release a balloon carrying anti-North Korea leaflets at a park in the border town of Paju, north of Seoul, Jan. 15, 2014.

 AFP

I frequently meet with North Koreans, many of whom are defectors and some of whom are North Koreans living in a third country. When I ask them about South Korean politics they give various answers, but many of them agree on one thing: Most North Koreans who listen to South Korean radio and read South Korean newspapers think that the South Korean president is a great person.

The reason for this is that they are amazed the South Korean president can rule over the country while being sharply criticized by South Koreans.

Most defectors who settle in South Korea are happy with their life there. South Korean life for them is not without its problems, but they have little to complain about materially. Defectors think highly of the individual freedoms enjoyed by South Koreans.

They like it that no one forces them to live regimented lives and that they are able to enjoy whatever books and movies they want.

That being said, though, many defectors have trouble understanding the political freedoms guaranteed under South Korean law.

After arriving in South Korea, North Korean defectors find themselves witnessing demonstrations opposing government policies and become aware of severe media criticism of the government. Many defectors believe that such criticism is unneeded and even dangerous.

As people who were taught that solidarity is the only path to a strong country, they find it difficult to understand that controversy and heated discussions in the public sphere are necessary elements of democratic politics.

No one above criticism

The freedom of different opinions and ideologies to coexist and compete is a fundamental principle of democratic society. And in such a society, no one is immune from criticism. South Koreans believe that criticism by liberals of a conservative-led government is natural, just as is criticism by conservatives of a government led by liberals.

This criticism does not weaken, but strengthens, the country. Politicians, including the president, are only human. And despite their claims that they are free from corruption, they are  just as prone as anyone else to make mistakes.

In reality, they may not be as free from corruption as they may claim. Democracy aims to prevent such mistakes or abuses of power from occurring.

Democratic leaders live in fear that they may lose their hold on power. If they make a mistake, they may be able to hide it for a short time, but this will not be easy. And if their mistakes are revealed, they may have to resign their office or sometimes even go to jail.

Faced with  consequences like these, they are less likely to commit crimes.

North Korean cadres also live in fear. Their fear is not of the people, though, but of the leader, his family, and close associates. As a result, cadres avoid committing acts that would upset the leader, but do not fear upsetting the people.

Thus, the criticism directed toward South Korean politicians that defectors find strange is a very important political tool—a tool that has allowed modern countries like South Korea to develop successfully.

Translated by Robert Lauler.

Andrei Lankov, a professor at Kookmin University in Seoul, is a Russian historian, North Korea expert, and regular RFA contributor.

As a card carrying "collapsist" I still hope for peaceful unification and a soft landing and will be glad to have my warnings ridiculed as chicken little and the boy who cried wolf..  But I also believe we should plan and prepare for the worst case.

This is a dangerous combination indeed. This does not mean that North Korean collapse is imminent – with some luck the North Korean regime can hold on for a couple of decades (if not longer). Nonetheless, this might all mean that regime collapse from within is now more likely to happen than ever. So the long-discredited collapsist school might be proven right at last.

We should prepare for this likely eventuality and we should also ask if collapse from within is more likely to happen now more than ever, what should we be doing about that?  There is a strategy and campaign plan to be written here somewhere.

When North Korea may collapse

Pyongyang's belated economic reforms make 'middle-run' scenarios more likely

http://www.nknews.org/2014/03/when-north-korea-may-collapse/

March 4th, 2014

Andrei Lankov

0

     

   

When it comes to predicting North Korea’s future, a recurring theme is their impending collapse. The collapsist school of scholars, who have repeatedly predicted North Korea’s disintegration since the 1990s, were brought into being by the collapse of the Soviet Union – obviously, no one was talking about such things before 1989-90. The composition of this school has changed over time, but at any given period there are people to be found expressing such views.

Thus far such predictions have proven false: North Korea has survived against the odds, with little change in its ideology or political structure. Non-collapsist analysts might have admitted that in the long run North Korea’s collapse is a likely outcome, but emphasized that this “long run” might be very long indeed.

Being a believer in an imminent collapse now attracts some stigma, but the present author is willing to take the risk and say that recent developments make the chances of regime disintegration in the North far more likely in the mid-term. Of course, this does not mean that North Korea’s collapse is inevitable; rather it means that some changes in North Korea increase the possibility of this outcome and that we should therefore take it more seriously. It appears that the combination of three factors might become destabilizing for the regime. These factors are as follows.

“Recent developments make the chances of regime disintegration in the North far more likely in the mid-term”

First, attempted economic reforms. Second, an increasingly restive population (and especially the lower elite). Third, a growing sense of insecurity among members of the top elite.

CHANGING ECONOMY, SOCIETY

It appears that Kim Jong Un’s government is seriously considering social and economic reforms, somewhat similar to reforms undertaken by China in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Last year, a large scale (and obviously successful) experiment may have heralded the start of a switch to family-based agriculture, i.e. the crawling de-collectivization of agriculture. There have also been attempts to increase the independence of state-owned enterprises, as well as efforts to attract large numbers of foreign tourists.

“The decision to initiate reform-like changes is, in itself, very dangerous in a country like North Korea”

All such efforts are limited in their scope, but the decision to initiate reform-like changes is, in itself, very dangerous in a country like North Korea. Reforms will make people less dependent on the government and more exposed to new ideas, as well as more capable of organizing themselves. Last but not least, these changes will make North Koreans much more aware of life overseas, especially in South Korea. This is exactly why the late Kim Jong Il chose not to follow the Chinese reformist path. His son seemingly has chosen a different path. The risks associated with such a path might be calculated, but they are risks nonetheless.

Secondly, the North Korean people, and especially low-ranking officials and intellectuals, seem to be becoming more restive. The present author has dealt with North Korea for 30 years and it has always been a common-sense observation that North Koreans almost never express opinions on political subjects if such opinions are different from what was written in the Rodong Sinmun. In some rare cases, foreigners have managed to develop a level of trust that allowed their North Korean contacts to express mildly critical opinions about their government. However, such things were very rare, such relationships were difficult to develop and most North Koreans either bought the official line more or less wholesale, or at least did not dare express any doubt about the official line.

However, things have changed in the last few years. Such changes have been quite dramatic and noticeable. For obvious reasons one cannot be too specific on such issues, but a number of foreigners coming from different countries (including Russia and China) have begun to report on hitherto unthinkable encounters with North Koreans, including officials of various kinds. From such reports it seems that North Koreans are far more willing than ever to talk politics, and express their alienation or even open hostility to the regime. It is significant that we are not talking about a small number of defectors or aspiring defectors, but rather about normal North Koreans, who are not aiming to leave their country (or if on an officially sanctioned trip, have every intention of returning home). Reports about such encounters are too numerous to discard as mere isolated incidents.

“North Koreans are far more willing than ever to talk politics, and express their alienation or even open hostility to the regime”

Most critically minded people are not dissidents, and they are not willing to challenge the government yet. However, they talk about the country’s economic destitution, as well as the growing (and already yawning) gulf between North Korea and its neighbors. It is important to note that while in the past it was the American economic blockade that was blamed, it is now the government that is seen as responsible for the country’s economic misfortunes. Corruption and lawlessness are also criticized, even as it is the critics who engage in corruption themselves.

ELITE DISSATISFACTION

To the present author this picture is reminiscent of the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s. At the time, only a tiny fraction of the population were clear-cut dissenters, but pretty much everybody, including a majority of party apparatchiks, shared the feeling that things in the country were not going in the right direction.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.nknews.org/2014/03/when-north-korea-may-collapse/