MUMFORD AND GUNS (Proxy Wars) by Michael Noonan

Michael- Thanks for the shout out on unconventional warfare and countering unconventional warfare.
V/R
Dave

MUMFORD AND GUNS

http://warontherocks.com/2013/07/mumford-and-guns/

July 24, 2013 · by Michael Noonan · in Book Reviews

Writing in the RUSI Journal back in 1981, Philip Towle of the University of Cambridge used the wonderfully British turn-of-phrase “vicarious belligerency” to describe the age old phenomenon of waging war by proxy.  Placing the concept firmly in the Cold War context of the time, Towle noted  “There is a spectrum of aid to Third World states from financial assistance, through arm supplies and the attachment of advisers to the employment of pseudo-volunteers in combat and finally to the formal commitment of ground troops.” On this spectrum, everything to the left of the formal commitment of ground troops could be used to carry out these types of indirect interventions.

Flash forward to today:the phenomenon of “vicarious belligerency” has not gone away. If anything, the use of warfare by proxy has accelerated. The absolute scale and scope of such proxy wars may be smaller than during the geopolitical struggle of the Cold War, but powers large and small (but particularly large ) view such conflict as a useful tool of statecraft. The current situation in Syria illustrates this perfectly: Iranian advisors, Hezbollah forces, and Shi’a Iraqi militias fight for the Alawite regime against foreign fighter volunteers from 50-odd nations, with indirect military and non-military assistance from the Gulf States, Turkey, and the United States among others. Motivations for such support range from the sectarian to the strategic.

There are no indicators that such conflicts will go away. If anything there are warnings and indicators that such uses of “vicarious belligerency” may expand in the future.

The University of Nottingham’s Andrew Mumford has given much thought to the ways that proxy warfare has been used and will be used in the future. In a recent RUSI Journal article (subscription required) and book (Proxy Warfare) he lays out an interesting typology for how to think about this indirect way of war.

Mumford defines proxy wars as

…the product of a relationship between a benefactor, who is a state or non-state actor external to the dynamic of an existing conflict, and the chosen proxies who are the conduit for the benefactor’s weapons, training and funding. In short, proxy wars are the logical replacement for states seeking to further their own strategic goals yet at the same time avoid engaging in direct, costly and bloody warfare.

The introduction of non-state actors to the equation, whether they be terrorist groups or private security companies, is important. He sees state and non-state actors interacting through four types of relationships that help to shape the dynamics of these conflicts:

(1) “a state uses another state (as a surrogate force);”

(2) “a state uses a non-state actor;”

(3) “a non-state actor uses a state;” and

(4) “a non-state actor uses another non-state actor (as a surrogate force)”

For Mumford, state and non-state actors implement? their strategies of proxy war, much in the same ways as Towle described: through the provision of manpower (via surrogates), the delivery of materiel (weapons, ammunition, equipment, etc.), financial assistance, and non-military means.

Why is this strategy attractive? In the main, the attraction lies in the fact that this strategy can reduce the political and financial costs of full-born?? interventions. As Mumford argues,

The appeal of proxy strategies to policymakers, both then and now, comes couched in the perceived benefits of lower risk (no combat deaths, thus reduced political backlash) and plausible deniability (the symbolism of no direct intervention ensures no overt military defeat if the war is lost, but continued influence and enhanced interest if the war is won).

Still, the proxy approach is hardly a panacea. Mumford further contends that proxy wars can create “…dependence in the long run between the benefactor and the proxy (politically and financially); an elongation and/or intensification of the original war in which intervention was sought; and the creation of either conflict overspill beyond the initial boundaries of the war or unintended ‘blowback’ for the participants once the war has ended.” A perfect illustration, even if drawn from fiction, of the dangers of dependence between benefactor and proxy is this exchange between the mercenary Bane and the business man John Dagget in The Dark Knight Rises:*

Daggett: What. The hell. Is going on?

Bane: Our plan is proceeding as expected.

Daggett: Oh really? Do I look like I’m running Wayne Enterprises right now? Your hit, on the stock exchange, it didn’t work, my friend! And now you have my construction crews going around the city at 24 hours a day! How exactly is that supposed to help my company absorb Wayne’s?

Bane: [to Stryver] Leave us!

Daggett: No! You stay here, I’m in charge!

Bane: [puts his hand on Daggett's shoulder] Do you feel in charge?

[Stryver leaves]

Daggett: I paid you a small fortune.

Bane: And this gives you power over me?

Daggett: What is this?

Bane: Your money and infrastructure have been important… ’til now!

(Continued at the link below)

http://warontherocks.com/2013/07/mumford-and-guns/

TRUSTPOLITIK VS. DISTRUSTPOLITIK: DOWN AND OUT ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

An important essay by one of our very best analysts and scholars on north Korea (and a mentor of mine) from the new blog "War on the Rocks."  This is probably one of the most succinct and understandable explanations of the nature of the Kim Family Regime.

V/R
Dave

TRUSTPOLITIK VS. DISTRUSTPOLITIK: DOWN AND OUT ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

July 23, 2013 · by Robert Collins · in Commentary and Analysis

http://warontherocks.com/2013/07/trustpolitik-vs-distrustpolitik-down-and-out-on-the-korean-peninsula/

After decades of tensions and stalemate, Trustpolitik, a  fresh approach by South Korean President Park Geun-hye towards North Korea, indicates why it is so difficult to build anything resembling a stable relationship between these troubled neighbors. Through Trustpolitik, Park has sought to avoid the excesses and naïveté of Kim Dae-jung’s “Sunshine Policy” – which aimed to induce the Kim family’s Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to the table through almost unconditional economic cooperation and aid.

But even President Park’s approach imagines too much sunshine in North Korea.  The distrust between North and South Korea, rooted in their antithetical political systems, cannot be erased.  This distrust has produced one war that has resulted in the death of millions, mostly Koreans, but also troops from the People’s Republic of China, the United States and member nations of the United Nations Command.  It has also produced an armistice that has served as the setting for a 60-year military standoff for, countless provocations, North Korea’s development into a de facto nuclear state, and countless failed attempts at reconciliation.

North Korea remains a family cult-centered dictatorship with the world’s fourth largest military, a poorly-fed populace isolated from the rest of the world, a failed economy, and the ignominious title of the world’s 23rd most failed state, The Republic of Korea in the South, has become an ultra-modern, full-fledged democracy with the world’s 15th largest economyand the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) ranking as the world’s 6th most-wired country.

In the 41 years since the first inter-Korean talks of July 4, 1972, there have been 606 meetings between the North and the South.  These meetings have produced small results and great disappointments.  The July 4th 1972 Joint Declaration, supported by the leadership of the North’s Kim Il-sung and the South’s Pak Chong-hui, was significant in that it was the first official negotiations between the North and South. . In 1991, the North and South held several meetings to produce the “Basic Agreement,” signed in 1992, but never implemented the agreement due to the North’s pursuit of nuclear technology. The agreement would have established a security “holding pattern” while the North figured out how to deal with its security and economic problems in the context of the fall of the Soviet Union.

Perhaps the most significant development of these meetings was more meetings: two summits between the North’s Kim Jong-il  and two South Korean heads-of-state –  Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. The first summit, in 2000, produced the June 15 Declaration that stated the two Koreas’ determination to solve Korean reunification without outside interference.

(Continued at the link below)

http://warontherocks.com/2013/07/trustpolitik-vs-distrustpolitik-down-and-out-on-the-korean-peninsula/

U.S. Urged to Adopt Policy Justifying Intervention

Secretary Albright's report is at this link: http://www.ushmm.org/genocide/pdf/The-United-States-and-R2P.pdf.  For discussions of R2P my question is what do R2P advocates propose to do about the 23 million people suffering some of the most horrific human rights violations (or crimes against humanity) in the history of mankind in north Korea.  Unfortunately (as in almost every discussion of R2P I have heard or read) that question is not addressed in zSecretary Albright's report.

But the report provides some good background on R2P;  the concept, background and evolution.

V/R

Dave

July 23, 2013

U.S. Urged to Adopt Policy Justifying Intervention

By MARK LANDLER

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/24/us/politics/us-urged-to-adopt-policy-justifying-intervention.html?ref=world&_r=2&&pagewanted=print

WASHINGTON — When Samantha Power, President Obama’s nominee to be ambassador to the United Nations, faced senators at her confirmation hearing last week, the first question from Senator Bob Corker of Tennessee, the ranking Republican, was how she defined an idealistic, if somewhat obscure, foreign policy principle known as “responsibility to protect.”

It was a politically loaded question to a woman who made her name as an academic by arguing that nations have a moral obligation to act against genocide and other mass atrocities.

Ms. Power answered gingerly, saying that when civilians were murdered by their governments, “it’s incumbent on us to look” for ways to halt the bloodshed. But, she was quick to add, the principle is “less important, I think, than U.S. practice and U.S. policy.”

The exchange before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee captured the awkward place that “responsibility to protect” occupies in the Obama administration. A 2005 United Nations initiative that calls on countries to intervene to prevent genocide and other mass atrocities, R2P, as it is known, has been endorsed by the United States and many other countries.

Some administration officials cited R2P to justify Mr. Obama’s backing of NATO-led airstrikes in Libya in 2011, which headed off a potential massacre of rebels by Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi.

Yet the administration has said nothing about R2P during two and a half years of bloody civil war in Syria, in which Mr. Obama has resolutely refused to become entangled. In that case, the strategic complexities of the conflict have outweighed any moral imperative to intervene militarily on behalf of Syria’s embattled rebels.

Now, a new report written by Madeleine K. Albright, the former secretary of state, and Richard S. Williamson, a former special envoy to Sudan and foreign-policy adviser to Mitt Romney, argues that the administration should wholeheartedly embrace “responsibility to protect” and explain its importance to the American public.

“R2P sounds like some chemical formula,” Dr. Albright said in an interview. “It’s in many ways a misunderstood concept; it’s up to us to clarify what ‘responsibility to protect’ means.”

Mr. Williamson is blunter. “R2P is still struggling,” he said, in part because of the administration’s unwillingness to do more about Syria, which he criticized as an adviser to Mr. Romney during the 2012 presidential campaign.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/24/us/politics/us-urged-to-adopt-policy-justifying-intervention.html?ref=world&_r=2&&pagewanted=print

What We Learned From the Korean War

A short, good overview of the "highlights" of the Korean War but also contains an assessment of the pattern of American War that began with the Korean War.  Something we should keep in mind as we think about the summer 63 years ago:

On September 29, MacArthur accompanied Republic of Korea (South Korea) President Syngman Rhee back into the National Assembly Hall in Seoul. By the end of September, UN forces were moving into North Korea. Country singer Jimmie Osborne wrote and recorded a song on October 2, "Thank God for Victory in Korea." 

Despite all of the euphoria of an objective reached, this had not been an easy victory. In three months 8,182 American troops were killed in Korea. To underline the magnitude of this sacrifice, that number is nearly 1,400 more than have been killed in Iraq and Afghanistan in the last 12 years.

V/R

Dave

JAMES WRIGHT is president-emeritus and professor of history at Dartmouth College. He is a former Marine and the author of Those Who Have Borne the Battle: A History of America's Wars and Those Who Fought Them.

What We Learned From the Korean War

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/07/what-we-learned-from-the-korean-war/278016/

By James Wright

The demilitarized zone dividing the two Koreas, in Paju, about 55 km (34 miles) north of Seoul (Lee Jae Won/Reuters)

This week marks an important anniversary. Sixty years ago, on July 27, 1953, representatives of the United Nations, led by U.S. Army Lt. Gen William Harrison, met their North Korean counterparts in Panmunjom, Korea, to sign an armistice agreement ending the 37-month-long war. Negotiators had been discussing the agreement for nearly 25 of those months in 158 separate meetings.

The document was not a peace treaty. It provided for a truce. The historic occasion had no mark of formality and no sense of finality. The representatives signed the agreement without speaking a single word to each other, and no one offered handshakes. The South Korean representatives refused to sign and did not join in the meeting. There surely was no ceremony comparable to the one on the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay in September 1945. The New York Times reported from the treaty site, "Outside the thin wooden walls there was the mutter of artillery fire - a grim reminder that even as the truce was being signed men were still dying on near-by hills and the fight would continue for twelve more hours."

Americans at home were similarly restrained. There were no celebrations in Times Square--or anywhere else. The Washington Post noted, "Washington greeted news of the Korean truce yesterday with a matter-of-fact attitude--quietly, without evident jubilation...." It was peace without a clear victory.

Is Korea still, as it was called then, the Forgotten War? Unfortunately it is. But it shouldn't be. The objectives, the conduct, and the conclusion of that war are significant in too many ways. This anniversary provides an occasion to remember them, and to honor those who served in that war.

Those who fought there have said that, at a heavy cost, they accomplished their objective. This had been described by the United Nations declaration of June 1950 and President Harry Truman's statements at the time when he authorized American troops to participate in the action: securing "a withdrawal of the invading forces to positions north of the 38th parallel."

The 1953 agreement provided that Korea would be divided along that line and specified that there should be a follow-up conference within three months to conclude a comprehensive peace treaty. That conference never convened. Even if permanent peace remains a work in progress, the strong democratic government in South Korea today affirms to those who fought that they did their job.

We have much to learn from the Korean War--and this is relevant as we face decisions about the pending drawdown from Afghanistan. History is not a blueprint or a lesson plan, but it surely does provide a real-life insight into the problems we face. There are stunning examples of the consequences of wars with shifting military goals -- and absent realistic public discussion about the likely means and the costs of achieving these goals. Without these shared commitments and understandings, we should not send men and women to die.

The Korean War veterans who claim that they accomplished what they were sent to do are absolutely correct. This assessment requires a sharply defined assignment focusing on the original goal. In fact the Korean command had accomplished that objective by late September 1950. Those who fought in Korea demonstrated courage and sacrifice that is the equal of any American forces in any war. They did not have a victory parade--at least not until New York City belatedly held one in 1991. In fact their "police action" was not congressionally recognized as a "war" until 1998. Nearly 1.8 million Americans served in Korea from 1950 to 1953, and 36,574 died there.

The UN forces--largely from the U.S.--had some extremely difficult early months in the summer of 1950 with heavy casualties. By August they were defending a last enclave around Pusan, with some even fearing the need for a full withdrawal. Finally sufficient forces arrived that enabled General Douglas MacArthur to order a landing at Inchon on September 1950. This fractured the already-stretched North Korean supply line. Within days the North Korean invaders were routed and UN troops had recaptured Seoul.

On September 29, MacArthur accompanied Republic of Korea (South Korea) President Syngman Rhee back into the National Assembly Hall in Seoul. By the end of September, UN forces were moving into North Korea. Country singer Jimmie Osborne wrote and recorded a song on October 2, "Thank God for Victory in Korea."

Despite all of the euphoria of an objective reached, this had not been an easy victory. In three months 8,182 American troops were killed in Korea. To underline the magnitude of this sacrifice, that number is nearly 1,400 more than have been killed in Iraq and Afghanistan in the last 12 years.

This costly victory in three months only previewed the compounded tragedy that followed. General MacArthur insisted that the total defeat of North Korea was certain and the peninsula could be reunified, as the WWII Russian-United States agreement for a "temporary" division had promised. 

Confident of an easy victory, the American Joint Chiefs and the Truman administration urged the United Nations to expand the war goal to accomplish the reunification of Korea. The UN did.

(Continued at the link below)

South Koreans Ask U.S. to Reconsider Timing of Military Handoff

Just when I thought the Alliance was at the pinnacle of strength we have this situation with which to deal.  We very well could do what the Kim Family Regime has been trying to do for some 60 years and that is to split the ROK/US Alliance.

I am now very worried that we are going to talk past each other and make some hasty decisions that both sides will later regret.  I am slightly optimistic based on the spokesman's statements below:

The colonel cautioned that South Korea was not publicly insisting on another postponement; rather, it was requesting that the Pentagon review plans for the hand-off, including its target date, given “North Korea’s worsening nuclear program.”
Such cautious language reflected Seoul’s desire to find a quiet solution and avoid a possible public dispute with Washington. 

The solution to this situation lies in the already proposed establishment of the Combined Theater Command to enlace the Combined Forces Command with a Korean General in charge.  Even this may not allay South Korean fears about a reduction in the US commitment.  With the recent announcement of rotational US ground forces I think the ROK military sees the writing on the wall and that with the high cost of transportation that eventually the rotations will cease and the US commitment will wane.

I really am beginning to think that this is not as much about the ROK military not being confident and ready to operate independently or out of fear of the north but is more about their strategic calculation that the US may eventually not honor its Alliance commitments if it is not in control and that the ROK military would rather suffer the wrath of domestic criticism that lose its military alliance partner in the US.  The ROK military would rather keep the US in charge and be criticized as weak than risk the Alliance being split by Alliance actions and not by the north.

I think we really need to recognize and understand the nature of the ROK military's concerns and then get on with organizing the combined forces in the optimal way to meet the alliance strategic objectives.  Again I think the optimal way is to evolve to a combined  Theater Command commanded by a Korean General with both countries maintaining its commitment of blood and treasure to the Alliance. And if we are to rotate forces then we need to include a tour on the DMZ integrated into the ROK DMZ structure to ensure that we sustain our commitment and provide US forces with mission focus by standing toe to toe and eye to eye with the north Koreans.

But I am beginning to worry about how this issue is being played out in the press when there is a really of work for those in the working groups preparing for this fall's Security Consultative Meeting. We really need to get these issues worked out by the working group behind clothes doors and not air our dirty laundry so that it can be observed by the north.

V/R

Dave

July 22, 2013

South Koreans Ask U.S. to Reconsider Timing of Military Handoff

By CHOE SANG-HUN and THOM SHANKER

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/23/world/asia/south-koreans-ask-us-to-reconsider-timing-of-military-hand-off.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print

SEOUL, South Korea — South Korea, reluctant to weaken its strong relationship with the American military, has asked the United States to reconsider the timing of a plan to cede to Seoul the responsibility for control of the South Korean military in case of war, a Defense Ministry spokesman said Monday.

The Pentagon assumed operational control of South Korea’s military in 1950, during the Korean War. It returned peacetime control to Seoul in 1994, but is still obliged to command South Korea’s 640,000-member military in the event of war. In 2007, the United States agreed to return that power to the South by 2012. But the date was pushed to 2015 a few years ago, as high tensions on the Korean Peninsula increased the South’s fear of appearing militarily weakened.

This spring, after the North began a new wave of nuclear-related threats, South Korean officials delivered another request to “re-examine” the planned transfer through various channels, including in their May meeting with Gen. James D. Thurman, the commander of American forces on the peninsula, said the Defense Ministry spokesman, Col. Wi Yong-seob.

South Korea’s defense minister, Kim Kwan-jin, also discussed the request briefly with his American counterpart, Chuck Hagel, when they met on the sidelines of multilateral security talks in Singapore on June 1, Colonel Wi said.

The colonel cautioned that South Korea was not publicly insisting on another postponement; rather, it was requesting that the Pentagon review plans for the hand-off, including its target date, given “North Korea’s worsening nuclear program.”

Such cautious language reflected Seoul’s desire to find a quiet solution and avoid a possible public dispute with Washington.

Since North Korea conducted its third nuclear test in February and responded to new international sanctions by repeatedly threatening to attack the South, conservative politicians affiliated with President Park Geun-hye’s governing Saenuri Party have argued that South Korea was not ready to take wartime command of its military by 2015.

At the Pentagon, senior officials confirmed that the issue was under discussion. But one senior official said there had been "no formal proposal to adjust plans."

“Both sides have reaffirmed, and continue to work to meet, the conditions” for transfer by 2015, said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss private talks between the two nations.

Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the Senate last week that the South Korean military “is a very capable force, but it has had some setbacks in funding to achieve" some of the steps the two allies have set for transfer of control, including the purchase of weapons, the stockpiling of munitions and the mastering of certain surveillance platforms.

General Dempsey stated his support for the existing timetable, and noted that General Thurman and his team were working with their South Korean counterparts to help them "meet the certification and capability requirements."

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/23/world/asia/south-koreans-ask-us-to-reconsider-timing-of-military-hand-off.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print

Korea-U.S. Talks on Troop Handover to Start This Month

Excerpt:

Discussions will focus on the latest threats posed by North Korea and the capability of the South Korea's military to handle full operational control of its forces in wartime. 

But I would add that they really need to focus on answering the questions:  How to best organize Alliance military forces to achieve the strategic objectives?  Are the military actions and organizations of the Alliance contributing to the ROK ability to achieve unification (the long term strategic objective per the 2009 Joint Vision statement and the May 2013 joint declaration by our two Presidents).

But I think this excerpt below gives an indiction of the possible real reason for the pre-mature leaks.  I think there are elements in the ROKG and in particular the ROK military that are concerned that the US will further reduce its commitment to the Alliance and that they would rather take the heat and even loss of face by calling for a delay and leaving the US General in Command of the Combined Forces Command in order to ensure that US remains committed to the Alliance with sufficient military forces.

U.S. military officials are apparently opposed to another delay because it could clash with planned budget cuts. Under the new plan, Washington would hand over troop control and provide naval and air support in the event of a war. But if the U.S. maintains wartime control of South Korea's military beyond 2015, Washington could demand Seoul shoulder a larger portion of the upkeep of American troops here. 

I am afraid that this could be a real indication of the confidence in the US commitment.  Ironically, I think the ROK might be willing to pay more of US stationing costs in order to ensure US presence even at the expense of ROK military modernization.  Perhaps this should give us some pause in regards to the Asian Pivot.  If one of our closest allies potentially has low confidence in our commitment and is willing to take such drastic actions as to undercut its own legitimacy and suffer the domestic political wrath that it will suffer for some time to come, then we should consider how other friends, partners, and allies view US commitments.  They are all reading the tea leave regarding sequestration and US domestic politics.   I think GEN Mattis' words are very prescient and may apply as much to our friends, partners, and allies as to enemies.

Mattis also warned that Admirals and Generals need to "stop sucking their thumbs and whining about sequestration, telling the world we're weak" because it sends a signal to nations such as Iran and North Korea, and they may start to believe it.

V/R
Dave 

Korea-U.S. Talks on Troop Handover to Start This Month

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/07/22/2013072201122.html

Seoul and Washington plan to start discussions at the end of this month on whether once again to postpone the transfer of full operational control of Korean troops to Seoul.

A government source here on Friday said discussions about delaying the handover will take place during the two-day Integrated Defense Dialogue in Seoul starting July 30.

The handover, already once postponed from 2012, is scheduled for 2015 and spells the end for Combined Forces Command under U.S. leadership.

Discussions will focus on the latest threats posed by North Korea and the capability of the South Korea's military to handle full operational control of its forces in wartime.

Representing Seoul will be Deputy Defense Minister Lim Kwan-bin, while the U.S. side will be represented by Pentagon officials David Helvey and Brad Roberts.

Seoul and Washington agreed in February 2007 to hand back full troop control to Seoul by April 17, 2012, but former president Lee Myung-bak and U.S. President Barack Obama agreed in 2010 to postpone the handover to Dec. 1, 2015.

Seoul officials are optimistic that Washington will accept the request for another postponement, but the process nevertheless will not be easy.

Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a recent response to the Senate Armed Services Committee said he supports the handover of troop control as scheduled and deemed the timeframe "appropriate."

(Continued at the link below)

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/07/22/2013072201122.html

Changing The Korean Tour: Unit deployments would replace individual duty

This is probably the reason the ROK Military has leaked information about the delay in OPCON transfer  They are worried about the long term US commitment of forces on the Peninsula.

As I have proposed before, this could work if these rotational forces conducted a tour patrolling the DMZ integrated with ROK forces during their rotation.  The amount of training required to conduct DMZ patrols would sustain small unit combat readiness and the deployment on the DMZ would demonstrate sustained commitment to the alliance, enhance ROK-US interoperability, provide mission focus for the rotational units, and send a powerful message of the strength of the ROK-US Alliance to the north.  If we go to a rotational scheme we really need to put US forces back on the DMZ (and not simply in a US sector but as I said integrated with ROK forces throughout the entire DMZ - and I would also recommend rotating US Marines with the 6th ROK Marine Brigade in the Northwest Island as well.)

V/R

Dave

Army Times

July 29, 2013
Pg. 20

Cover story

Changing The Korean Tour

Unit deployments would replace individual duty

By Michelle Tan and Lance M. Bacon

One-year individual tours to South Korea may soon be replaced by deployments of trained and equipped combat units that will go for upwards of nine months at a time.

The Army is studying a plan that would rotate units in and out of South Korea — a plan that had the full support of Lt. Gen. Frank Wiercinski, who relinquished command of U.S. Army Pacific on July 2.

The idea of moving to rotational forces, as opposed to individual replacements, has been in the works for at least two years. No official decision has been announced and talks with the Korean government are ongoing, but many defense analysts say the writing is on the wall.

“Think about the increase in the level of preparedness and the training state those units are in,” Wiercinski said. “It’s amazingly higher [and] now that makes them even more of a potent force on the ground.

“It’s a game-changer,” he added. “It makes great sense. Tank crews, aircrews, machine-gun crews, squads, platoons — if you’re constantly rotating key people in and out, you’re never fully trained to the best you can possibly be.”

The June 25 announcement of a massive brigade combat team reorganization by Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ray Odierno would appear to support this idea. He named 10 BCTs that will be inactivated and said one more would be cut. His speech left out one critical word found in his prepared statement: “overseas.”

To cut an overseas BCT significantly narrows the field.

Two are based in Europe: The 2nd Cavalry Regiment in Vilseck, Germany, and the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team out of Vicenza, Italy. The other is the 2nd Infantry Division’s 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team in South Korea.

The Army has cut two BCTs from Europe in recent years as it continues to beef up its Pacific presence. Odierno has long hinted that a honed rotational force on the Korea Peninsula would exponentially increase combat capabilities in the region.

Such a commitment would mark a significant change to the way the Army has done business for years, and the practice would increase the readiness of units stationed in one of the most volatile parts of the world.

The Army has about 19,000 soldiers stationed in South Korea, including the 2nd Infantry Division headquarters and the division’s 1st BCT. Other major units include the 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command, the 1st Signal Brigade, the 35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, the 65th Medical Brigade, the 501st Military Intelligence Brigade and Eighth Army.

The Army has been consolidating its forces in South Korea with a huge project to build up facilities at Camp Humphreys. U.S. Forces Korea broke ground July18 on a $324 million operations command center at the installation, according to Stars and Stripes.

Wiercinski said the volatility on the Korean Peninsula has kept him up at night.

“This is a 29-year-old five-star general without a lot of diplomatic or international experience but with potentially dangerous weapons,” he said of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. “We need to be prepared for that. We need to be absolutely focused.”

That’s why officials at U.S. Army Pacific “fully support” moving to a rotational model, something the Army couldn’t do while it was committed in Iraq and Afghanistan, Wiercinski said.

“We certainly couldn’t do it during the last 11 years, but we’re out of Iraq and we’re pulling back from Afghanistan, and now the forces are available for us to consider this possibility,” he said. “[This] has the potential to be incredibly powerful. Now your force on the peninsula is truly ready to fight tonight.”

Who might go

The Hawaii-based 25th Infantry Division will be responsible for the Pacific theater for the foreseeable future. The Army has dedicated 79,000 troops there and has raised the commanding general’s profile by changing the billet to a four-star one; it had been a three-star billet for many years. Roughly 7,300 soldiers are scheduled to conduct 230 activities in 20 countries in fiscal 2014 — most with a close eye on North Korea.

And while the 25th Infantry Division does not have armored BCTs — the type of BCT now in South Korea — the Army’s BCT reorganization plan announced in June will leave the service with 12 armored BCTs in places such as Fort Hood and Fort Bliss in Texas, Fort Riley, Kan., and Fort Carson, Colo.

The rotational model has strong support in the rank and file because it will enhance readiness. Most soldiers take three months to get in the groove after reporting to the peninsula, and many get a short-timer’s attitude when they are three months from leaving. That leaves six good months of service.

The constant ebb and flow of soldiers makes consistency hard to find.

“Because of the sheer number of first-termers [assigned to South Korea], every three months you’re qualifying tank crews,” said one officer with extensive experience on the peninsula. “There is constant turmoil trying to keep crews together on different weapons systems.”

In the rotational model, a fully trained and equipped unit is ready and able to provide defense, humanitarian assistance and participate in multinational exercises from start to finish. And such deployments are nothing new to Pacific soldiers. More than 150,000 deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001.

But now the spotlight is on their backyard.

And the BCT reorganization optimizes the Army’s power projection. New and improved BCTs will have about 4,500 soldiers, an increase of about 1,000. This will enable a third maneuver battalion, as well as additional engineer and fires capabilities.

Specifically, engineer battalions will have gap-crossing and breaching capabilities while fires capability will go from a 2-by-8-gun fires battalion to a 3-by-6.

The changes follow “extensive modeling and analysis” that used 34 separate vignettes and 6,500 simulated battles that ranged from seven to 72 hours in length, said Col. Karl Konzelman of Army Operations and Plans’ Force Management Division. Extensive interviews were conducted with every division commander, dozens of combat BCT commanders and numerous battalion commanders and senior enlisted leaders.

The final result is more tooth and less tail. The Army will lose three battalions while greatly enhancing the 95 that remain.

It will also cut 12 headquarters. The reorganization puts more combat power at the tip of the spear, and then sharpens the tip, he said.

But that is not true of the BCTs stationed outside the continental U.S. They will stay at two maneuver battalions for now, mostly as a way to save on military construction costs, officials said.

That means a less capable BCT will take point in the world’s most dangerous place unless something changes.

Konzelman was quick to point out that a decision on the final BCT cut has not been made.

And while it seems the logical approach for many defense leaders and analysts, there are a couple of wild cards that could come into play.

One idea that has been floated in congressional and defense circles would keep the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team in South Korea while rotating other units throughout the theater.

After all, the Army has invested a ton of money modernizing that BCT in recent years:

*It has M1A2 SEP Abrams tanks and M2/M3A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicles.

*The 2nd Combat Aviation Brigade has transitioned to UH-60L Black Hawks.

*The division took possession of 70 mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicles. The 35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade is completing the Patriot Recapitalization Program.

“The Army Equipping Guidance 2013 Through 2016,” published June 20, seems to allude to such a scenario.

“Given recurring tensions in Korea, it is critical we keep units there ready to fight, prepare units for rotation to Korea, and balance new fieldings with training schedules,” it reads.

And it is not the first to make such allusions.

New defense strategy

Senior defense leaders on Jan. 26, 2012, unveiled a new defense strategy in light of pending budget cuts.

Then-Defense Secretary Leon Panetta assured “an adaptable and battle-tested Army” would remain the nation’s force for decisive action, capable of defeating any adversary on land.

“We will have a significant land force presence in places like Korea and in the Middle East … and we will also emphasize a rotational presence” to establish partnerships and training in other countries, he said.

But this “best of both worlds” scenario begs the question: Where would you put the deployed force? The Land Partnership Plan is relocating forces from north of Seoul to Camp Humphreys, which is busting at the seams.

It is not clear what would happen to the 3,400 South Korean Army augmentees assigned to U.S. units.

And there always is the question of cost.

Money would be saved by cutting the Korean BCT. While precise estimates aren’t available, an Army analysis of the reduction of two European BCTs estimated a savings of $2 billion over 10 years.

Not everyone will be happy with such savings — especially the 6,659 soldiers who receive a $300 monthly bonus for extending their Korean tours. Some are accompanied tours, which would continue, but many are unaccompanied soldiers who volunteered for a second year.

“People talk about the cost of basing a BCT in Korea, but rotating forces there would not be cheap either,” said one congressional staffer. “And you would have to ask where those units would be and what they would be doing. There are a number of U.S. military forces from all branches positioned throughout the region. But that place is a hot spot. If something goes down, you need to have a force that is ready to respond at a moment’s notice.”

South Korea by the numbers

19,000 -- U.S. Army soldiers in South Korea

79,000 -- U.S. Army soldiers in Pacific theater

1 -- U.S. Army brigade combat team now in South Korea

4 -- Stars worn by the general who leads the U.S. force in the Pacific.