Wednesday, July 16, 2014

Interesting tweet from the IDF spokesman

This seems like an example of good strategic communications.  A calm response to a potentially tragic event (if as reported).  Obviously it will not sooth Hamas or Israeli opponents but it seems to me that this is a good example of how to communicate bad news to the public.  It is not defensive, it acknowledges the possibility of the tragedy but it implies the need for patience while an investigation is conducted and it says that Israel is taking the incident seriously.  There is a lot of information packed into this little tweet.

 Retweeted by Blogs of War
The #IDF has commenced an investigation on the beach incident. The reported civilian causalities from this strike are a tragic outcome.

Obama's New CT Program Meets Bipartisan Resistance on Capitol Hill

The fundamental problem is in the name.  "Counterterrorism partnership."  First we need a strategy and second such as strategy has to look beyond terrorism.  Counterterrorism partnership is no substitute for strategy nor the intellectual rigor required to develop strategy.

The irony is that counterterrorism has become like communism in the Cold War.  The perception is anything to do with counterterrorism is going to be funded as we have seen since 9-11. Not only our friends, partners, and allies (and lesser developed countries in particular) have learned that all they have to do is play the counterterrorism card and they will receive funds, resources, and training; but also US state and local law enforcement and other agencies can play the counterterrorism card and will likely receive funding (and often massive amounts that provide dubious capabilities to really defend the homeland).

I think we need to put CT back in the box and make it the discreet operation that it should be (the other issue that many of us lament is how often our national mission forces are exposed in the media).  We would better protect and allow for more effective operations of our national mission forces if we reduced the emphasis and visibility on counterterrorism.   Our national leaders call attention to their every operation as they try to scare congress into providing resources. It is interesting to see Congress standing up and saying perhaps "No Mas."

Please do not misunderstand me.  Counterterrorism is critically important and not going away.  However, I believe it is a mistake to make it the "focal point" of our strategy.  (pun perhaps intended here)   But what we really need to focus on are effective policies and strategies that are broader than counterterrorism and that take a holistic, comprehensive (and dare I say grand) approach to our national security.  Sometimes I think our national focus on resourcing counterterrorism is an example violating the principle of doing the hard right over the easy wrong.  The hard right is getting our national security strategy right.  But we put everything in the counterterrorism box from Afghanistan to Iraq to Africa to developing our SOF partners around the world to fight terrorism for us (another dubious concept perhaps).  There is more to national security than counterterrorism.  We need to think bigger than counterterrorism because our adversaries are exploiting terrorism and our focus on it while they pursue much larger strategies through variations on unconventional and political warfare.

Obama's New CT Program Meets Bipartisan Resistance on Capitol Hill

Jul. 16, 2014 - 01:39PM   |  
By JOHN T. BENNETT   |   Comments

Sgt. 1st Class Grady Hyatt, with US Army Africa, leads an after-action review with soldiers of the Ghana Army.
Sgt. 1st Class Grady Hyatt, with US Army Africa, leads an after-action review with soldiers of the Ghana Army. (US Army)
  • FILED UNDER
WASHINGTON — US House Armed Services Committee leaders struck a skeptical — and bipartisan — tone about a $5 billion counterterrorism program proposed by President Barack Obama.
Obama first proposed the CT program, designed to help train and equip US allies to fight violent extremist groups, during a major foreign policy speech at West Point in May. Since, Republicans have criticized him for providing scant details of what he envisions with the CT program and another proposal aimed at “reassuring” European allies.
The new program was codified in a $58.6 billion overseas contingency operations (OCO) request the White House recently sent to Capitol Hill. On Tuesday, the first panel dug into the request in a public setting.
“We understand that these initiatives were levied on the [Defense] Department by the White House without coordination, and you’re now working to develop spending plans,” House Armed Services Committee Chairman Rep. Buck McKeon, R-Calif., told a panel of senior Pentagon officials.
“But while counterterrorism partnerships and reassuring our European allies are important and necessary, the president’s approach lacks detail and is too broad in scope,” McKeon said.
The panel’s top Democrat, Rep. Adam Smith of Washington, joined McKeon, as did numerous members of Obama’s own party.
“Most members of Congress are broadly supportive of building the capacity of our international partners and understand the necessity of providing a fair amount of flexibility to the department to carry out these activities,” Smith said.
“Nonetheless, the legislative proposal for the [CT program] the department submitted to the Congress can fairly be described as unconstrained — it is written so that it could be used for almost anything the department does,” Smith said, “up to and including refueling an aircraft carrier while circumventing all the normal reprogramming and transfer rules.”
HASC Vice Chairman Rep. Mac Thornberry, R-Texas, viewed as the frontrunner to replace McKeon, also criticized the proposed CT fund.
Rep. Mike Turner, R-Ohio, considered another contender for HASC chairman, said, “The reason people are concerned this a slush fund” is, in part, because “the detail is lacking.”
Moments earlier, Rep. Tammy Duckworth, D-Ill., questioned the Pentagon witnesses on how they could prevent the account from becoming a slush fund.
Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Work told the panel he sees a number of “checks and balances,” including a need to get White House Office of Management and Budget approval for any spending plans, which would prevent the Pentagon from “going willy-nilly” with the OCO monies.
Rep. Tulsi Gabbard, D-Hawaii, raised concerns that some of the requested OCO funds might go toward new initiatives that would be “duplicative” with existing programs.
Another Democrat, Rick Larsen of Washington, told Work “you’re not doing a very good job of explaining it.”
Work responded by saying the proposed CT fund would give the Pentagon greater flexibility to spend monies when crises happen around the world.
Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Adm. Sandy Winnefeld said the department “is running out of” funds allocated for CT operations under existing programs.
Larsen said lawmakers spent the last decade ensuring a number of post-9/11 CT programs function as the executive branch wanted and in a way that suited Congress.
The new proposed program, he said, “seems backward.”
Work described the aims of the proposed CT program this way: “The overall goal of the CTPF is to increase the ability of partner countries to conduct counterterrorism operations, prevent the proliferation of terrorist threats from neighboring states, and participate in multinational counterterrorism operations.” ■

Monday, July 14, 2014

U.S. Wants to Keep Combined Forces Command in Seoul

This should not be unexpected.  If the ROK/US Combined Forces Command is going to remain in tact there are only two options.  One it remains where it is.  Two, all the  Korean officers assigned to ROK/US CFC would have to move to Pyongtaek and would out of Camp Humphreys (though as I understand it there is no facility there for the ROK/US CFC because with the mythical OPCON transfer there would be no ROK/US CFC.

Yes there will potentially be domestic political fallout in Korea.  My recommendation is when USFK and 8th Army move out of Yongsan to Camp Humphreys that Yongsan Army Garrison be returned to Korean military control.  Since only the ROK/US Combined Forces Command would remain the US personnel and the US supporting units assigned to the ROK/US CFC could remain as tenants on the ROK military installation. A formal turnover ceremony would mark the end of US foreign occupation of Yongsan (which has been previously occupied throughout history by the Japanese, Chinese and even Mongol militaries back in the 13th Century I believe - of course we should keep in mind that Yongsan was/is outside of Seoul proper but the growth of Seoul after the Korean War has subsumed it thus making it appear that the US is occupying the real estate in the city of Seoul)

Of course this is not a US military decision as the land of Yongsan is controlled by the US Embassy (and there are embassy facilities on Yongsan to include embassy housing); however, it would be wise for the US to consider such a move. Because after all one of the main reasons for moving US forces out of Yongsan is due to the growth of anti-American sentiment in 2002.  See one of Secretary Rumsfeld's "snowflakes" pasted below this article.  He recognized the need to move US forces out of Yongsan (i.e., Yongsan is a red flag and he wanted to change the US footprint in Korea).  Approximately 3 weeks after this snowflake the emissaries from President -Elect Roh Moo-hyun met with Secretary Rumsfeld and with no US interagency coordination nor coordination with the US commander in Korea or the Pacific, he informed them that he was going to move all US forces (to include 2d Infantry Division south of the Han River and out of north Korean artillery range).  This event was the beginning of the wartime OPCON transfer process (or debacle) which makes no military sense given the threats and which wasted countless man hours of ROK and US Staff officers over the past 12 years.   When the command could have been focusing on evolving the ROK/US CFC to the next level of readiness and proficiency a large part of the command was wasting time building plans and briefings for no good strategic or operational reasons because they actually weakened the military capabilities of the alliance.

This link should take you to the snowflake at the Rumsfeld Papers web site (http://papers.rumsfeld.com/)



U.S. Wants to Keep Combined Forces Command in Seoul


After an agreement between Seoul and Washington to push back the handover of wartime operational control from December 2015, the U.S. military has reportedly asked the government here to keep the Combined Forces Command in Seoul. 

The CFC is currently based inside the U.S. Army garrison in Yongsan in central Seoul. But the U.S. Forces Korea headquarters is scheduled to be relocated to Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province by 2016. 

"The U.S. recently brought up the possibility of keeping the CFC in Seoul," a government source said Sunday. "They believe that having the CFC in Seoul would be advantageous in terms of cooperation with our Defense Ministry and Joint Chiefs of Staff in responding to emergency situations." 

Government and military officials here seem inclined to accept the request given the military necessity and symbolic importance of keeping the CFC in the capital. But they are concerned about public outcry since that would make the relocation plan incomplete. 

The CFC is to be dismantled when the U.S. transfers wartime operational control of Korean troops to Seoul. The transfer was originally scheduled for April 17, 2012 under an agreement with the U.S. by the Roh Moo-hyun administration. It was then postponed until Dec. 1, 2015 by the Lee Myung-bak government. In April this year, the two sides agreed to delay it again during a meeting with President Park Geun-hye and her counterpart Barack Obama. 

Korea and the U.S. will decide on the new date and conditions of the transfer when their defense ministers meet in October.
englishnews@chosun.com / Jul. 14, 2014 12:06 KST


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Friday, July 11, 2014

(Linda Robinson Interview) Beyond Hollywood, 'Call Of Duty': Why Special Forces Are The Future Of The U.S. Military

I do have to take issue with these excerpts:

But, I want to get to this issue of the actual Special Operations themselves; you're most recent book talks about how Special Ops are the future of American warfare. And, we've been hearing this for some time that this really is the way in which we're going to be fighting our wars in the future. 

I think it is fair to say that Special Operations will make an important contribution to national security strategy but the fighting of US wars will always be done by the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines and conventional and special operations forces.  Special operations as a way of war and special operations are certainly not war winners by themselves.  Special operations can play a role in helping others to help themselves in their wars but to say that special operations is the way of future American warfare does a disservice to both conventional and special operations forces and also imprints in the public mindset unrealistic, unsupportable, and unattainable expectations.  Small footprint with special operations working with indigenous and host nation forces is a nice concept and very useful in many cases but it and special operations are not a panacea or silver bullet and we need to be careful about implying it as such.  I know that is not what Linda Robinson means but it is obvious by the reporter's questions and the questions and comments of the press and pundits that they are implying that small footprint special operations are the answer to everything.  It should not be touted as the future of American warfare.  We do not need that kind of cheerleading for special operations.


And it pains me to read this:

So what I viewed, what was happening in Afghanistan was they were kind of recovering their roots, and going back to working with populations and also working with indigenous military forces.

This is actually counter to the discussions in this very article about Colombia, The Philippines, and East Africa where Special Forces continued since 9-11 and continue to this to operate in accordance with their "roots."


Beyond Hollywood, 'Call Of Duty': Why Special Forces Are The Future Of The U.S. Military


By  &  & TREVOR FORD
  • Soldiers from the U.S. Special Forces review map data while conducting an operation in Panjawi district, Kandahar province July 10, 2010.
    Sgt. David Russell U.S. Army
The so-called “light footprint strategy” has been a hallmark of President Obama’s military engagement strategy as he pulled U.S. troops out of Iraq and winds down the U.S. presence in Afghanistan. That drawdown of massive units of soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and civilian support staff means a stronger reliance on smaller, more elite military groups.
RAND Corporation senior international policy analyst Linda Robinson focuses on national security strategy and these types of units in her latest book One Hundred Victories: Special Ops and the Future of American Warfare. It covers the two years she spent embedded in Afghanistan.
14:41
Listen to Suzette Grillot's conversation with Linda Robinson.
Before the Middle East, she started her career focusing on insurgencies in Latin America. She studied and wrote about the role of U.S. Special Forces in a counter narcotics effort that eventually evolved into a true counterinsurgency against FARC rebels in Colombia.
“One officer had said, ‘Nothing has been written about us since Vietnam. Much of what was written in that era wasn’t good, so let’s take a chance on this reporter and see if she’s willing to give some in-depth research on us.’,” Robinson says.
According to Robinson, U.S. special operations have doubled in size since the September 11, 2001 attacks and the subsequent October invasion of Afghanistan. But they still operate in small numbers, and Robinson calls that the model of the future.
“About 12,000 people can be deployed around the world at any one time as a sustainable number,” Robinson says. “And some people may say, ‘Oh my gosh, that’s a lot.’ Well, if you consider it compared to 100,000-plus [the 2006 counterinsurgency] in Iraq, it’s not.”
In Afghanistan, these small units worked among indigenous populations by going into villages and seeing if residents wanted to form self-defense groups and a local government.
“They had done this in the Vietnam era, but they had gotten away from that in the years after 9/11,” Robinson says. “And that is a more long-term solution while recognizing they still do the direct action raids, but that is more of a temporary piece of the puzzle.”
FULL TRANSCRIPT
SUZETTE GRILLOT, HOST: Linda Robinson, welcome to World Views.
LINDA ROBINSON: Thank you Suzette, I'm delighted to be here.
GRILLOT: I have to start by asking what drew you to that topic, why focus on Special Forces and Special Operations?
ROBINSON: Well I did get that question a lot and I actually started my career focused on insurgencies down in Latin America. First in Central America but also in Peru, Colombia, Mexico, and elsewhere. And also the democratization issue was something I covered heavily there. But the insurgency, or small wars, issue led kind of naturally to the flip side which is counterinsurgency, what the people do when they're trying to combat an insurgency. Since that is one of the main missions for the Special Forces, I gained some entree, really first in Colombia, down in Latin America, where the Special Forces were ramping up a counterinsurgency support effort. So, the Colombians were in the lead, but US Special Forces were helping them and training them what had originally been a counter narcotics effort, morphed into a counterinsurgency effort because there were two very strong insurgencies. 40 years the FARC was the larger of the two groups in Colombia that had really grown in strength to control half of the country. So it was a good, real, first lesson for me in what Special Forces could do to help a country. And, right now, flash forward a decade or so later, Colombia is engaged in very serious peace talks with the remnants of the FARC and there is quite a strong expectation that they will be able to wrap up their war, with the negotiated accord. So, of course the Special Forces weren't solely responsible for that progress but it gave me a window into the various things that they do and I had to go through a lot of hoops to gain that access. So I spend a lot of time on doing research and attending exercises and briefings. They had really not let anyone inside to see what they do, and one officer had said, "Nothing has been written about us since Vietnam, much of what was written in that era wasn't good, so let's take a chance on this reporter and see if she's willing to really give some in depth research on us." 
GRILLOT: Well I want to get back to that issue of your access, and specifically what it is you did on the ground, you know, what that was like, spending time with the Special Forces. But, I want to get to this issue of the actual Special Operations themselves; you're most recent book talks about how Special Ops are the future of American warfare. And, we've been hearing this for some time that this really is the way in which we're going to be fighting our wars in the future. But you begin your story in this most recent book, at a time when you say that Special Forces were at a crossroads, that they were very unclear about their goals that they were unsure of their procedures and the effectiveness of those procedures. So, when was it, that it became more clear that Special Forces were going to be the way that we were going to fight wars, and what's the reason for that?
(Continued at the link below)

ISIS threat to Philippine security

With the focus on China, the terrorist threat in the Philippines has been put on the back burner.

ISIS threat to Philippine security

Videos showing a few Muslims in the Philippines expressing allegiance to ISIS with the use of the Black Flag demonstrate that ISIS threat to Philippine security is real rather than imagined
Rommel C. Banlaoi
Published 3:30 PM, Jul 11, 2014
Updated 4:35 PM, Jul 11, 2014
After Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is posing a serious threat to Philippine security.
Otherwise known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, now recently called by its followers as Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham, ISIS, thus far, is the most violent extremist jihadist armed group operating predominantly in Iraq and Syria. But ISIS has a delusion to expand its operations in the Muslim world not only in the Middle East and North Africa but also in Muslim areas stretching from Europe to Asia.
The Philippines is not spared the ISIS threat because it has self-proclaimed followers among Muslim Filipinos or Moros who just performed a Bay-ah or pledge of allegiance to ISIS founder, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. (READ: Australian ISIS supporter nabbed in Cebu)
On June 29, 2014, Baghdadi proclaimed himself as the overall leader or a Caliph of a so-called independent ISIS Caliphate. ISIS followers call this Caliphate as Al-Dawlah Al-Islamiyah Fi Al-Iraq Wa-Al Sham.
In May 2014, Muslims in the Philippines, who called themselves part of the Ansar Dawlah Fi Filibbin, posted a video showing a few men in white dress performing a Bay-ah to Baghdadi.
In Islamic parlance, a Bay-ah is an oath of allegiance to a Muslim leader. It is practiced in the Muslim world to recognize the establishment of a new caliphate or Islamic monarchy. In some places, Muslims performed the Bay-ah to “sell” themselves to a spiritual leader as a quid pro quo for physical protection, financial support, or spiritual assistance.
The May 2014 video was filmed a month before Baghdadi proclaimed an independent ISIS Caliphate. Titled “Filipina Support for ISIS and Bay-at to Shaikh Abu Bakar Al Baghdady (Hafidzahullah),” the video displayed a few men speaking in Arabic to express their support for and loyalty to ISIS and its leader Baghdadi. In the latter part of the video, these men spoke in Filipino, reiterating their allegiance to ISIS and submission to Baghdadi.
(Continued at the link below)

China Plays the South Korea Card

Excellent point:

China will continue to support North Korea for the same reason it does Russia, Iran and Syria. It chooses to align itself with rogue regimes, revisionist powers and disruptive actors. It sees its interests aligning more with those who try to destabilize global stability rather than those who try to maintain peace. When Beijing no longer supports dangerous actors around the globe, it will no longer support North Korea. That day, however, is far from coming.
But I have to take strong issue with this: 

In light of Mr. Xi's visit to South Korea, it is incumbent on Washington and Tokyo to deepen their own relations with Seoul. That has been particularly difficult for Japan of late. But both President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe should be stressing the future of relations, not just the past.

Is Michael implying that relations between the US and Japan are"deeper" than between the US and the ROK?  Is he implying that the US-Japan alliance is somehow superior to the ROK-US alliance?  I am hopeful that this is not what Michael means but it certainly can be interpreted that way and we should consider it incorrect.  I think more correctly stated might be that the US should work hard to foster deeper relations between its two allies in Northeast Asia.  Implying subordination of one alliance to the other is unhelpful but I fear that that is how many inside the beltway view things because Japan appears to be much more compliant with US desires than the ROK.

China Plays the South Korea Card
President Xi's trip to Seoul was undoubtedly an attempt to isolate Japan. It won't work.
By 
MICHAEL AUSLIN
Updated July 10, 2014 7:19 p.m. ET
After Chinese President Xi Jinping's trip to South Korea last week, "Beijingology" is in full swing. Analysts are trying to interpret the tea leaves of his visit. Is he showing anger toward North Korea? Driving a wedge between Japan and South Korea? Is he responding to U.S. pressure?
Such speculation is as unhelpful as it was during the dark days of the Cold War, when Americans studied Soviet leaders' every move in an attempt to understand their motives and goals, a strategy known as "Kremlinology." As with the Soviet Union, today's China is often a blank palimpsest to its readers, who impose whatever interpretation of Beijing's motives and goals suits them.
The very existence of Beijingology is a healthy reminder that even as China has become the world's second largest economy, the Chinese Communist Party continues to control information and limits its cooperative relations with outside states. Still, analysts should refrain from reading too much into President Xi's trip to Seoul last week.
They are undoubtedly right that Mr. Xi wants to use his relationship with South Korean President Park Geun-hye to further pressure and isolate Japan. Yet there is very likely a limit to how far Ms. Park will go in her outreach to China. Seoul remains committed to the U.S. alliance, in no small part because Washington is the only realistic counterweight to Beijing's growing strength.
A recent poll indicated that 70% of South Koreans consider China's rise and power a threat to their country. And, despite deep historical anger and hatred toward Japan, South Korean officials know that democratic (and aging) Japan poses less of a threat than a revisionist China.
On top of all that, Seoul realizes it must to some degree work with Japan, since both are key allies of the United States. Any U.S. action to protect South Korea from the North would also involve U.S. bases in Japan.
As for North Korea, Mr. Xi is hardly sending a message to Kim Jong Un by visiting Seoul before Pyongyang. It is no secret that China has long found North Korea's behavior as infuriating and unpredictable as the rest of Asia.
(Continued at the link below)

Obama’s counterterrorism blueprint looks good, on paper

Conclusion:

Obama has the right concept in creating a global network of Special Operations forces and intelligence services that can combat the frightening evolution of al-Qaeda into new and potentially more toxic offshoots. But someone at the White House needs to drive this policy every day and make sure it’s happening on the ground, in Syria and Iraq and all the other potential ungoverned places on Obama’s new map.
We can take issue with the policy and strategy (and the proposed ways and means as some have done).  But I think Ignatius is exactly right.  Someone has to "do strategy" and do it every day, managing the process and making sure the efforts of the government are well orchestrated to to achieve the strategic end state and support the policies.

And I would also argue that there are other challenges to the US besides terrorism and that we have to have our strategy fully integrated and not stove piped dealing separate problem sets in isolation.
David Ignatius
By David Ignatius Opinion writer July 10 at 7:53 PM 
In President Obama’s sometimes maddeningly cautious foreign policy, you can see him struggling to answer what may be the hardest question of his presidency: How should the United States project power in a disorderly world without making the same mistakes it did in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Obama, whose deliberative approach often resembles that of a Supreme Court justice rather than a politician, has developed a conceptual framework for combating terrorism and instability. It looks good on paper. But the problem is that he hasn’t yet applied this framework successfully in dealing with the challenges that arose on his watch: civil wars in Libya, Yemen and Syria, and the emergence in Iraq of the Islamic State.
David Ignatius writes a twice-a-week foreign affairs column and contributes to the PostPartisan blog. View Archive
Obama is emphatic about what he doesn’t want to do. He wants to avoid “boots on the ground” with U.S. troops; he wants to avoid unilateral actions that isolate the United States; he prefers quiet partnerships that shield America and its allies from domestic political criticism. He is willing to use what amounts to targeted killing.
Instead of significant U.S. military intervention, Obama seeks a network of partnerships stretching from Morocco to South Asia. The United States would provide training and other support for the security services and militaries of nations across this belt. Where governance has vanished and terrorism reigns — as is the case now in parts of Syria and Iraq — the United States would fill the gaps, using surveillance drones, armed drones and Special Operations forces.
It’s a strategy in which Obama, despite his legalistic temperament, plays a role I’ve described as “covert commander in chief.” He relies on the two instruments of national power he most trusts: the CIA and its armed drones and “special activities,” overseen by Director John Brennan, one of his closest aides; and Special Operations Command’s “Global SOF Network,” developed by Adm. William McRaven, the architect of the Osama bin Laden raid and perhaps Obama’s favorite military adviser.
(Continued at the link below)

Giving Tuesday Recommendations

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