Principle and Prudence in American Foreign Policy

This is quite a critique of US foreign policy.  And this is an interesting statement.

Prudent American realism, as opposed to a more traditional realism, recognizes that the internal character of regimes matters and that foreign policy must reflect the fundamental principles of liberal democracy. And unlike liberal internationalism, which holds that international law and institutions alone are sufficient to achieve peace, prudent American realism understands that there are certain problems that can be addressed only through the prudent exercise of power.  Thus, the strategic objective of prudent American realism is to maintain a liberal world order characterized by freedom and prosperity.

Principle and Prudence in American Foreign Policy

http://www.fpri.org/print/2004

 [3]

Mackubin “Mac” Owens is Editor of Orbis [4], FPRI’s quarterly journal of international affairs, and Senior Fellow at its Program on National Security [5]. In addition, he is a Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. He served as a Marine infantry platoon commander in Vietnam, retiring from the Marine Corps Reserve as a Colonel in 1994. A contributing editor to National Review Online [6], he is co-editor of the textbook Strategy and Force Planning, now in its fourth edition, and he is the author of the FPRI E-book Abraham Lincoln: Leadership and Democratic Statesmanship in Wartime (2009).

Mackubin Thomas Owens [3]

January 2014

U.S. foreign policy is in shambles, characterized by drift and incoherence. It is at best a-strategic at worst anti-strategic, lacking any concept of how to apply limited resources to obtain our foreign policy goals because this administration has articulated no clear goals or objectives to be achieved. The foreign policy failures of the Obama Administration are legion: the Russian “reset” that has enabled Vladimir Putin to strut about as a latter-day czar; the betrayal of allies, especially in Central Europe, not to mention Israel; snatching defeat from the jaws of victory in Iraq by failing to achieve a status of forces agreement (SOFA) that would help to keep Iraq out of the Iranian orbit; the muddled approach to Afghanistan; our feckless policy—or lack of policy—regarding Iranian nuclear weapons, not to mention Libya and Benghazi, as well as Syria. President Obama has said that he was elected to end wars, not to start them, as if wars are fought for their own purpose. Ending wars is no virtue if the chance for success has been thrown away, as it was in Iraq.

Observers disagree about the causes of the Obama failures in foreign policy. Some attribute them to indifference, others to incompetence—although the two are not unrelated. Still others contend that the results we are seeing represent the desired outcomes of more insidious motivations. But no matter the cause of Obama’s dysfunctional foreign policy, the result is the same: weakness that opens the way for those who wish America ill. Winston Churchill’s 1936 characterization of the Stanley Baldwin government as Hitler gained strength on the Continent echoes ominously today: it was, said Churchill, “decided only to be undecided, resolved to irresolute, adamant for drift, solid for fluidity, all-powerful to be impotent.”

To the extent that it has any intellectual foundation, the Obama foreign policy represents a species of “liberal internationalism,” which holds that the actors in the international political system (IPS) tend towards cooperation rather than competition. Liberal internationalists contend that the goals of actors within the IPS transcend power and security; they also see an important role for actors in the IPS other than states, including international institutions such as the United Nations.

It is easy to criticize the foreign policy of the Obama Administration, but what are the alternatives? Some, citing war weariness, have succumbed to the siren call of strategic disengagement offered most consistently by Senator Rand Paul. Others call for a return to traditional realism in foreign policy which emphasizes the international balance of power, the careful coordination of diplomacy and force, and the international (rather than domestic) behavior of other states.  Still others, for instance Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham, reject what they see as the utopianism of liberal internationalism but nonetheless have supported U.S. intervention in Libya and Syria.

The United States has been most successful when it has followed a foreign policy of what might be called “prudent American realism,” which links American principles with Aristotelian prudence. On the one hand, this approach is based on the recognition that American realism differs from the realism taught as part of academic international relations courses: American realism has always fused the features of traditional realism—power and security—with prosperity and the preservation of American principles. George Washington articulated this unique American realism in his Farewell Address:

If we remain one People, under an efficient government, the period is not far off, when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest guided by justice shall Counsel.

On the other hand, Aristotle called prudence the virtue most characteristic of the statesman. Prudence requires the statesman to always maintain a clear vision of what needs to be achieved—the endsof policy—while maintaining flexibility regarding the means. Successful American foreign policy, for example that pursued by Ronald Reagan, fused American power and American principles in order to ensure the survival of those principles.

Prudent American realism, as opposed to a more traditional realism, recognizes that the internal character of regimes matters and that foreign policy must reflect the fundamental principles of liberal democracy. And unlike liberal internationalism, which holds that international law and institutions alone are sufficient to achieve peace, prudent American realism understands that there are certain problems that can be addressed only through the prudent exercise of power.  Thus, the strategic objective of prudent American realism is to maintain a liberal world order characterized by freedom and prosperity.

Prudent American realism represents a species of primacy. Primacy is based on hegemonic stability theory, which holds that a “liberal world order” does not arise spontaneously as the result of some global “invisible hand.”  Instead, such a system requires a “hegemonic power, a state willing and able to provide the world with the collective goods of economic stability and international security.”  The United States, as Great Britain before it, took up the role of hegemon not out of altruism but because it is in its national interest to do so.

Primacy can be caricatured as a “go-it-alone” approach in which the United States intimidates both friends and allies, wields power unilaterally, and ignores international institutions.  But prudent American realism is a “benevolent” primacy, an approach in keeping with the liberal political tradition of the United States but which recognizes the world as a dangerous place in which a just peace is maintained only by the strong. The form of primacy embodied in prudent American realism is based on the idea that U.S. power is good not only for the United States itself but also for the rest of the world. Yet, the desired outcome is not motivated by altruism but by the recognition that the United States can be fully secure, free, and prosperous only in a world where everyone else is also secure, free and prosperous. The mere existence of liberal institutions is not sufficient. A liberal world order is possible only if the United States is willing and able to maintain it.  In the words of the late Sam Huntington,

the maintenance of U.S. primacy matters for the world as well as for the United States....

A world without U.S. primacy will be a world with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world where the United States continues to have more influence than any other country in shaping global affairs. The sustained international primacy of the United States is central to the welfare and security of Americans and to the future of freedom, democracy, open economies, and international order in the world.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.fpri.org/articles/2014/01/principle-and-prudence-american-foreign-policy

I cannot emphasize enough (or beat the horse more dead) that we (the ROK/US Alliance) must focus on preparation in addition to planning:

This is why Kim’s vow to achieve economic prosperity may hasten the regime’s unraveling. One big mistake that the 3^rd generation of the Kim dynasty made was promising to fix the economy. His father, Kim Jong Il never promised a rose garden, only nukes. As North Korea’s system has broken down, over the past two decades, it has by default allowed private markets to sprout up all over the country. As the system from food distribution to economic growth in the provinces broke down, a nascent merchant-class has taken shape that may now number upwards of 500,000 to a million. But more broadly, [7]a study of North Korean defectors by Seoul National University’s Institute for Peace and Unification Studies revealed [7] that more than 74% had experience selling goods in open-air markets, and derived the bulk of their income from unofficial economic activity. Even if such numbers are exaggerated, clearly large portions of North Koreans are using the markets as a coping mechanism.

But it is also possible that the Jang episode may mark the beginning of an unraveling of the Kim dynasty. The dangers of loose nukes, refugees heading North to China and South to the ROK, chaos, possible intervention by China and/or the ROK, or the US seeking to control nukes, and a precipitous reunification by default all hold the prospect of an inflection point approaching in Northeast Asia. Stay Tuned.

North Korea: Expect the Unexpected

http://nationalinterest.org/print/commentary/north-korea-expect-the-unpredictable-9678

January 8, 2014

Robert A. Manning [2]

Where is North Korea headed? When we last heard from the Boy General, Kim Jong-un, he was rationalizing the sudden and brutal execution of Pyongyang’s No.2, [3]Jang Sang Thaek [3], followed by threats to “strike mercilessly without notice [4]” in response to anti-Kim protests in Seoul.

Now Kim has offered us a glimpse of things to come. Pyongyang’s New Year’s statement, which often contain hints of coming attractions, reiterated all the vitriol about Jang’s alleged misdeeds, but contained few indications of anything except more of the same: Songun, it’s “military first” policy was praised as the way forward.

What was missing from Kim Jong-un’s New Year’s statement was any mention of the core problems leading Pyongyang down a steady, if gradual, path to oblivion. The words “nuclear weapons” and “US” were noticeably absent. Indeed, South Korean President Park Geun-Hye emphatically called Kim out on it in her first 2014 Press conference on January 6^th explaining, “a nuclear North Korea is an obstacle to unification and world peace, and can never be allowed.”

The one intriguing element was a hint of possible interest in advancing North-South relations. Kim urged a move away from confrontation and said that, “Respecting and thoroughly implementing the north-south joint declarations is a basic prerequisite to promoting the inter-Korean relations and hastening the country’s reunification.”

Whether Kim is serious, or just seeking more handouts from Seoul remains to be seen. But previous North-South accords, particularly the 1990 North-South Basic Agreement contains – at least on paper – provisions to address all outstanding issues, from denuclearization to North-South reconciliation. Here again, President Park countered Kim in no uncertain terms [5]: “We must prepare for an era of unification. The primary barrier to this is North Korea’s nuclear program.” President Park put Kim to the test, calling for resuming reunions of divided families, after Pyongyang quashed an agreement to do so last year.

If the New Year’s message is any indicator, progress on the nuclear issue and the possibilities of more than marginal improvement in the North Korean economy range from slim to none.

Can’t Have Both

Unfortunately Pyongyang fails to understand the integral linkage between these two fundamental issues. At a Worker’s Party Congress last March, Kim Jong-un adopted the “byungjin” line: simultaneously pursuing nuclear and economic development. The bulk of Kim’s 10 page New Year’s message was focused on the economy, its purported achievements and what needs to be done to advance it. Yet for more than two decades, US-led global efforts to denuclearize North Korea have been based on the premise that the North must choose: it can join the global economy and prosper or it can have nukes. It can’t have both. Pyongyang has chosen self-imposed isolation reinforced by UN sanctions.

Even after several years of modest growth, the North Korean economy is now at roughly the level it was at the end of the Cold War in 1991. Even the Chinese, who account for nearly 90% of the North’s total foreign trade (a miniscule $6.8 billion) have trouble doing business with the North. Indeed, among the alleged sins of the executed Jang was selling resources too cheaply, all but mentioning China by name. Arbitrarily shutting down the Kaesong Industrial Zone operated by South Korea, the one example of opening to outside investment, sent exactly the wrong message: don’t invest here, your investment is subject to our political whims. [6]And holding an 85 year-old American tourist [6](because he fought in the Korean war) is not exactly a PR strategy for promoting tourism, which Kim’s new ski resort and dolphinariums are intended to do.

The reality is that so long as the enormous political risk factor remains, so long as military provocations can occur at any time, and no system of credible commercial arbitration exists, North Korea will have little chance to obtain any foreign investment. Pyongyang’s economic possibilities will remain very limited and it will continue to fall further behind its brethren in the South – not to mention the globalized economy. And the execution of Jang and destruction of his business networks will almost certainly chill China’s economic involvement in North Korea, a rare source of foreign investment.

Rising Expectations?

This is why Kim’s vow to achieve economic prosperity may hasten the regime’s unraveling. One big mistake that the 3^rd generation of the Kim dynasty made was promising to fix the economy. His father, Kim Jong Il never promised a rose garden, only nukes. As North Korea’s system has broken down, over the past two decades, it has by default allowed private markets to sprout up all over the country. As the system from food distribution to economic growth in the provinces broke down, a nascent merchant-class has taken shape that may now number upwards of 500,000 to a million. But more broadly, [7]a study of North Korean defectors by Seoul National University’s Institute for Peace and Unification Studies revealed [7] that more than 74% had experience selling goods in open-air markets, and derived the bulk of their income from unofficial economic activity. Even if such numbers are exaggerated, clearly large portions of North Koreans are using the markets as a coping mechanism.

It can be argued that those benefiting from the current system in North Korea are unlikely to rock the boat. Nonetheless, growing portions of North Koreans are increasingly less economically dependent on the state. Historically, it is less deprivation than rising expectations that drives political change. In the case of North Korea, it is difficult to envision popular uprisings given the tight and ruthlessly enforced control Pyongyang’s terror state routinely exercises. That is precisely why the unprecedented public display of deep factionalism in the case of Uncle Jang and his associates is intriguing. One of the few certainties is that we are in truly uncharted territory. If change occurs in North Korea it is most likely to be a top-down process, with fighting amongst rival elite groups or networks.

(Continued at the link below)

http://nationalinterest.org/print/commentary/north-korea-expect-the-unpredictable-9678

I provided comments in an interview for the article below.
V/R
Dave

U.S. Adding 800 Troops for South Korea Citing Rebalance

http://mobile.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-08/u-s-adding-800-troops-for-south-korea-citing-rebalance.html

By Tony Capaccio and Nicole Gaouette
January 07, 2014 7:52 PM EST

    

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The U.S. is sending 800 additional troops to South Korea with upgraded equipment, the Pentagon said, citing the Obama administration’s rebalance of forces to the Asia-Pacific region.

“There is no greater sign of the United States commitment to regional security than the 28,500 troops stationed in South Korea,” Secretary of State John Kerry said today inWashington in an appearance with South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung Se. “It’s clear the foundations of this relationship are built to endure.”

The small addition to those forces already stationed in South Korea “was long-planned and part of our enduring commitment to security on the Korean peninsula,” Army Colonel Steve Warren, a Defense Department spokesman, told reporters at the Pentagon today. “This gives commanders in Korea an additional capability.”

The U.S. and South Korean governments are watching the actions of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un after he ordered his uncle and second-in-command, Jang Song Thaek, executed on treason charges last month. The purge prompted South Korea to heighten combat readiness along its border with North Korea, and President Park Geun Hye has voiced worries that Kim may seek a provocation to consolidate his support.

North Korea Vote

In March, North Korea will hold its first parliamentary vote since Kim took power in 2011, the official Korean Central News Agency said today. The event, last held in 2009, was previously used to reaffirm his father Kim Jong Il’s power.

The added troops may be a reflection of concern about Kim, said Bruce Klingner, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, a Washington-based policy research group.

“Although he’s continuing the policies of his father and grandfather, he may be doing it in a more brutal and unpredictable level,” Klingner said in an interview. “We saw him willing to take tensions on the Korean peninsula to a dangerous level last year, and so there is concern about what may happen in 2014.’

The 1st Battalion of the 12th Cavalry Regiment, part of the U.S. Army’s 1st Cavalry Division based at Fort Hood, Texas, will be equipped with about 40 new M1A2 Abrams tanks and 40 of the latest model Bradley Fighting Vehicles, Warren said. The vehicles will stay in Korea after the personnel complete their nine-month rotation, he said.

Asia Shift

The regiment has prepared for possible action in Korea at the Army’s National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. Starting Feb. 1, the 1st Battalion will be stationed for the nine months at U.S. Camps Hovey and Stanley, north of Seoul and near the Demilitarized Zone that separates North and South Korea.

The deployment is part of a longer-term effort to change the U.S. military’s posture and presence in Asia, according to David Maxwell, associate director of the Center for Security Studies and the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University in Washington.

By sending the newest tanks, the military ‘‘is trying to undo the continuous decline of U.S. combat capabilities in the last decade,” Maxwell said in an interview.

The U.S. has kept troop levels in Korea at about 28,500 since an April 2008 agreement between the Bush administration and the South Korean government. The number had been been closer to 35,000 for years before that accord. South Korea is also set to take over wartime control of its 640,000 troops from the U.S. in December 2015.

One concern South Korea may have is that U.S. fiscal constraints could at some point prompt an end to troop rotations, Maxwell said. “There has to be a strong commitment to ensure there’s a strong rotational presence so there’s an adequate presence to defend against the North,” Maxwell said.

The U.S. and South Korea can best deter North Korea “by showing strength and resolve and then by deploying the right forces ready for contingencies, from war to collapse to provocation,” Maxwell said.

To contact the reporters on this story: Tony Capaccio in Washington at acapaccio@bloomberg.net; Nicole Gaouette in Washington at ngaouette@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this story: John Walcott at jwalcott9@bloomberg.net

Does Aunt's Absence Weaken Kim Jong-un?

We should remember that the legitimacy of the Kim Family regime rests on the myth of anti-Japanese partisan warfare led by Kim Il-sung.  If Kim Jong-un does not have the support of the descendants of the 1/88th special independent sniper brigade that Kim Il-sung commanded then it does not bode well for the regime's future.

Excerpt:

The Institute for National Security Strategy said in a forecast that North Korea's power elite may have pledged allegiance to Kim for now but will eventually grow critical of his absolute power. The institute warned that "criticism among the elite will intensify" should Kim repeatedly make mistakes. 

Kim Keun-sik, a North Korea expert at Kyungnam University, said, "Over the short term, Kim Jong-un will strengthen his sole grip on power, but over the long term, instability will increase." He added that Kim is not protected by former partisan soldiers like his grandfather, nation founder Kim Il-sung, and has been unable to build up a strong base of supporters like his father, Kim Jong-il, who was groomed for 20 years to assume the throne. 

Does Aunt's Absence Weaken Kim Jong-un?

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2014/01/07/2014010701765.html

Rumors of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's aunt Kim Kyong-hui's death have raised speculation that the regime is weakening. 

Hwang Jang-yop, the highest-ranking North Korean defector who died in 2010, had predicted that Kim's leadership would be supported by his aunt and her husband Jang Song-taek. But with Jang and now Kim Kyong-hui out of the picture, the North Korean leader appears to be on his own.

Without these mentors, the mistakes of the young could become more noticeable, experts say. Officials will probably keep their heads down for now as they reel from Jang’s brutal execution, but any missteps by Kim could in the long run lead to unrest.

The Institute for National Security Strategy said in a forecast that North Korea's power elite may have pledged allegiance to Kim for now but will eventually grow critical of his absolute power. The institute warned that "criticism among the elite will intensify" should Kim repeatedly make mistakes. 

Kim Keun-sik, a North Korea expert at Kyungnam University, said, "Over the short term, Kim Jong-un will strengthen his sole grip on power, but over the long term, instability will increase." He added that Kim is not protected by former partisan soldiers like his grandfather, nation founder Kim Il-sung, and has been unable to build up a strong base of supporters like his father, Kim Jong-il, who was groomed for 20 years to assume the throne. 

The absence of his aunt is also expected to weaken justification for the hereditary succession of the so-called "Baekdu bloodline" to lead the country. The Baekdu bloodline refers to direct descendents of Kim Il-sung.

The biggest weakness of Kim, who marks his third year as leader of the reclusive state, is that he has been unable to rack up any startling achievements that would have justified his position.

Jan. 8 marks Kim's 30th birthday, but that has not been designated a national holiday. However, other experts see no major threats.

Chung Sung-jang at the Sejong Institute said Kim Kyong-hui's absence would not have any effect since every aspect of the lives of elite Workers Party officials is tightly controlled, with Minister for State Security Kim Won-hong responsible for monitoring and controlling the lives of top officials, while military Politburo chief Choe Ryong-hae has a firm grip on the army.

englishnews@chosun.com / Jan. 07, 2014 12:47 KST

U.S. to deploy mechanized infantry battalion to S. Korea

A double edged sword here.  USFK is undoing years of decline of US combat capabilities but the rotational force presence concerns the Koreans.  There is a lot going on with the alliance right now that needs to be worked out from the special measures agreement to the transformation of the CFC (e.g., OPCON transfer) to preparing for regime collapse while maintaining the necessary strong deterrence and defense capabilities.  With US fiscal challenges the Koreans worry about the easy decision to not rotate forces in order to save money.  One of the ways to potentially alleviate those fears and strengthen interoperability might be to return US forces to rotations on the DMZ conducting actual combat patrols integrated with the frontline ROK forces.

V/R

Dave

U.S. to deploy mechanized infantry battalion to S. Korea

http://m.yna.co.kr/mob2/en/contents_en.jsp?cid=AEN20140107001200315&domain=3&ctype=A&site=0100000000

2014-01-07 09:05

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   The U.S. Army will deploy a mechanized infantry battalion made up of advanced battle tanks to South Korea to bolster defense on the peninsula as part of a rotational force, a military source said Tuesday.

   The battalion armed with M1A2 battle tanks and M2A3 armored infantry fighting vehicles will depart their base on Thursday to join the U.S. Army's 2nd Infantry Division stationed in South Korea, the source said, asking for anonymity.

   About 800 American service members will serve in North Gyeonggi Province, just south of the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas, for nine months as part of planned enhancements to American forces in the country, he said.

   The latest deployment shows the U.S. commitment to the military rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region amid rising tensions in the strategically important region.

   It also comes at a time when South Korean and U.S. forces have been beefing up their vigilance against potential political instability in North Korea following the execution of young leader Kim Jong-un's once-powerful uncle, Jang Song-thaek.

   Last September, a U.S. Army attack reconnaissance squadron returned to Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, south of Seoul, after missions in Iraq with 30 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopters.

   In April 2013, a U.S. chemical battalion was also redeployed to Camp Stanley in Euijeongbu, just north of Seoul, nine years after it withdrew from the peninsula in 2003.

   About 28,500 American service members are stationed in South Korea to help deter aggression from North Korea.

   By Kim Eun-jung
   SEOUL, Jan. 7 (Yonhap)
   ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)

REBOOTING COUNTRY STUDIES by Anna Simons

Dr. Simons may indirectly make the case for a revitalized Special Operations Research Office (SORO) as we had at American University back in the 1950's and 1960's.  Not only did it produce the Assessing Revolution and Insurgent Strategies casebook (since updated in 2012 by USASOC and Johns Hopkins) it also produced country studies for the military.  With Dr. Simons advice such an office could provide a valuable capability for DOD and DOS by compiling and updating resources for study and not simply producing the traditional country studies.

I would also add to this as important as country studies and area studies are (especially the way that Dr Simons describes how they should be done) to pre-mission preparation, area assessment conducted by actual personnel on the ground is critically important to deep understanding of the country and the region.  

Please see the entire article on the War on the Rocks web site. http://warontherocks.com/2013/12/rebooting-country-studies/

V/R
Dave

REBOOTING COUNTRY STUDIES

Anna Simons

December 31, 2013 · in Commentary and Analysis

http://warontherocks.com/2013/12/rebooting-country-studies/

For all the talk about “big data,” what about deep understanding?  Surely in the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan—and faced with other conflicts burbling all over the place—some enterprising office in the Department of Defense or Department of State is busy re-conceptualizing the nature of what constitutes a good country study for those deploying abroad in the 21st  century.  And surely that office is being run by individuals with ample experience both in  non-Western countries and with the U.S. military.  Right?

I ask because the field grade officers I know and teach at the Naval Postgraduate School need more than just data (facts), information (assemblages of facts), and knowledge (cumulative information).  Until the pendulum swings back and Congress proves willing to issue declarations of war in circumstances that permit no-holds-barred fighting, the military will continue to be asked to act with finesse.  Yet, one problem with finesse is that it requires more than just being able to populate databases with names, dates, and information about who’s connected to whom.  Data, information, and knowledge certainly matter.  But, what they can’t do—ever—is make what others do make sense.  They can’t explain how others perceive events, conditions, their predicament, or you.

Meanwhile, there are two ways to gain a sense of what makes others tick.  You can either acquire understanding experientially, which is sometimes hard to come by.  Alternatively, you can acquire understanding second-hand.  In a perfect world, both methods should be iterative.  Arguably, great drama—and television series, like The Wire—can help convey a “sense of” and “appreciation for.”  Maybe, too, someone will be able to convince me someday that simulations can likewise build understanding.  But, for now I want to extol books.

The kinds of books I have in mind are narratives, non-fiction accounts that tell a literal story (with a beginning, a middle, and an end)—books that are just long enough that they can’t be read in a single sitting, and books that can’t effectively be skimmed.  The kinds of books I have in mind impel the reader to want to come back to them for more.  They are also books that educate, in the sense that they rearrange their readers’ point(s) of view.

For years, I have contended that the best journalists do a better job than most of the rest of us at evoking the principles that underpin life in foreign places and foreign systems. Twenty years ago, David Remnick (Lenin’s Tomb: The Last Days of the Soviet Empire), Tom Friedman (From Beirut to Jerusalem), and Joseph Lelyveld (Move Your Shadow: South Africa, Black and White) topped my list.  This wasn’t just because these reporters wrote fluidly about complicated situations, but because at some point during the 1970s and 1980s academics started to indulge in truly awful writing.  In fact, to earn tenure you were given little choice, but to learn to write tortured prose.

Consequently, I still prefer to assign journalists’ accounts, since at least then there’s a greater chance students will actually read them.  Current favorites include Andrew Rice’s The Teeth May Smile but the Heart Does Not Forget set in Uganda, Peter Godwin’s When the Crocodile Eats the Sun and The Fear, both set in Zimbabwe, and Douglas Rogers’ The Last Resort (also set in Zimbabwe).  What makes these works resonate is that they zoom in and out from past to present, and from micro to macro levels, which means they educate as well as inform.  They are also written in the first person and each does an excellent job of humanizing the otherwise incomprehensible.

But, I have also discovered that even when I come across what I consider to be the best single overviews of other countries, these books don’t always work for students.  For instance, Richard Cockett’s  Sudan: Darfur and the Failure of an African State  is probably the single most insightful recent book about both Sudans.  But, when I assigned it a couple of years ago, students were overwhelmed.  Despite all of Cockett’s skill as a correspondent, students came away convinced of the complexity, but feeling nothing for the place or the people.  No one in the book grabbed them, which meant they walked away with no “sticky” principles for how either of the two Sudans worked.  Thus, I didn’t dare assign the next single country book I liked, Daniel Branch’s Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2011. I worried that the very thing that most impressed me about Branch’s account would be the very thing to turn the students off; there would be too much that couldn’t be familiar to people who had never been to Kenya.  This brings me to Tamim Ansary.

Unlike Branch (a professor) and Cockett (a correspondent), Tamim Ansary is an author who, until 9/11, specialized in children’s books.  He is also half Afghan and half American and happened to grow up both in Afghanistan (until the age of 16) and in the U.S.  I came across West of Kabul, East of New York, Ansary’s first adult book, in the public library right after it was published in 2002. As soon as I read the first few chapters I knew: here was someone who could do a better job than I could at transmitting the very things I was trying to teach, whether about the strength of extended families or the significance of faith.  Even better, Ansary could do so in such a way that even students who had already served in Afghanistan put down his book wishing they had read it before they deployed.  A significant number also passed it on to their wives, just because.

During the ten years I assigned West of Kabul, it always had this same effect.  It opened eyes.  It gave even the most cynical officers a new appreciation for Afghans and for that country’s rich, but tormented history.  Of course, Ansary is a gifted writer.  But, even more important, he understands what most Americans have such a hard time understanding, which he is perfectly positioned to do since he is one of us.

(Continued at the link below)

http://warontherocks.com/2013/12/rebooting-country-studies/

Writing on Wall for Future of Fearpolitik (north Korea)

Key Excerpt:

If we assess the durability of the North Korean regime through its various stages, we find that there was a 90% likelihood of success under Kim Il Sung’s “total Chollima line;” just 40% under Kim Jong Il’s “military-first line;” and perhaps just 20% under the rule of Kim Jong Eun. There is not a glimmer of hope to be found anywhere. If it were to happen quickly, the Kim regime could be cornered, mired in crisis and rife with internal bickering starting by 2014. This situation could then continue until 2018.

…

The 2015-2018 period will see the disintegration of Kim Jong Eun’s reign. The Byungjin Line of simultaneous nuclear and economic development will fail, and there will be a life-or-death struggle for power and the very existence of military and Party. As a result, various unforeseen incidents and mishaps could occur, indicative of the terminal symptoms of a totalitarian dictatorship. These will include political calamity for Kim Jong Eun, characterized by inconsistent decision-making. Decisions made in the morning could be reversed or overturned by evening. 

Let's think about the active preparations for this possibility.

V/R

Dave

Writing on Wall for Future of Fearpolitik

[Sohn Gwang Joo Column ③]

Sohn Gwang Joo, Director, Daily NK Reunification Strategy Research Institute
2014-01-01 22:50 

http://www.dailynk.com/english/m/read.php?cataId=nk03600&num=11329

The collapse of the Soviet Union occurred in three stages: the first was the death of Stalin, which was followed by the weakening of class and Suryeongist dictatorship and the failure of socialist/communist economic construction in the 1960s; the second was the Helsinki Accords and the human rights investigations of the 1970s; and the last was the President Reagan-led American 1980s strategy of inciting Soviet collapse through economic warfare projects like the Strategic Defense Initiative (aka “Star Wars”).

At the core of all three stages was the fundamental failure of Socialist economics. The result was the collapse of the USSR in the early 1990s.

North Korea’s Chollima Movement of the Kim Il Sung era was also initially successful (in the late 1950s–1960s).  Then, from the mid-1960s, the Byungjin Line of simultaneously focusing on national defense and the economy took over.  Kim Il Sung managed to attain only one of these goals, succeeding in the defense sector but failing in economic construction. Thus, the proper foundation for future economic development was never set. Kim Jong Il succeeded in developing nuclear weapons and managed to prop up the regime via his military-first survival strategy between 1998 and 2011, but it brought about economic devastation.

Kim Jong Eun has opted for a second Byungjin Line (2013-?), this time featuring the simultaneous development of nuclear weapons and the economy. Will he succeed? All the available indicators point to failure.

In the Kim Il Sung era, the East Asian security environment was one of “security amidst the Cold War,” a function of being wedged between the diplomatic blocs of East and West. The charisma of the Suryeong, Kim Il Sung was absolute. In the Kim Jong Il era, Eastern Europe collapsed and North Korea suffered food shortages on a massive scale, but the regime was preserved by nuclear development and aid from China and South Korea. 

In the Kim Jong Eun era, however, the international community is demanding human rights improvements, while South Korea, the United States, Japan and China are now ranged in opposition to Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons programs. Marketization has progressed apace, and information from the outside has mushroomed. Horizontal exchanges of information have become possible thanks to 2.5 million mobile phones, meaning that the people of Chongjin know immediately if something occurs in Pyongyang.  The Stone Age, that time when North Korea relied solely on a single state source for all its information, is long gone.

Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il built up their “Suryeongist charisma” over multiple decades. Kim Jong Eun has no hope of achieving the same in just a few short years.

If we assess the durability of the North Korean regime through its various stages, we find that there was a 90% likelihood of success under Kim Il Sung’s “total Chollima line;” just 40% under Kim Jong Il’s “military-first line;” and perhaps just 20% under the rule of Kim Jong Eun. There is not a glimmer of hope to be found anywhere. If it were to happen quickly, the Kim regime could be cornered, mired in crisis and rife with internal bickering starting by 2014. This situation could then continue until 2018.

Accordingly, here are the things to look out for as North Korean goes into 2014, any or all of which could have a decisive impact on the future of the regime: 1) A fourth nuclear test or long-range missile launch and subsequent pushback from South Korea, the United States, Japan and China, or a military provocation against the South and subsequent pushback from South Korea; 2) A backlash from the persistence of “Fearpolitik” across society; 3) Rising levels of doubt due to Kim Jong Eun’s constant political reshuffling, leading to unexpected elements within the Party and military; 4) The fate of North Korea's existing special economic zones and 13 other areas slated for economic development; and/or 5) Most vitally, the success or failure of South Korean government policy toward the North.

The 2015-2018 period will see the disintegration of Kim Jong Eun’s reign. The Byungjin Line of simultaneous nuclear and economic development will fail, and there will be a life-or-death struggle for power and the very existence of military and Party. As a result, various unforeseen incidents and mishaps could occur, indicative of the terminal symptoms of a totalitarian dictatorship. These will include political calamity for Kim Jong Eun, characterized by inconsistent decision-making. Decisions made in the morning could be reversed or overturned by evening. 

South Korea’s fate for the next 50-100 years will be determined by this three-year period.

And what may occur if the people of South Korea fail to deal appropriately with this issue, thus allowing the Kim Jong Eun regime to muddle through until 2020? What if China provided economic and diplomatic assistance to the Kim Jong Eun regime as part of its America policy, with North Korea playing the “bad guy” role instead of China in the Northeast Asian security sphere, all in the midst of a “new East Asian Cold War” featuring the U.S., Japan, and China?

Should this transpire then the Kim Jong Eun regime could indeed survive as a “nuclear power state.” Needless to say, this would endanger the sustainable development of South Korea. In fact, it may well present a serious challenge to South Korean liberal democracy itself.

In a given historical period, the total strength of a community of nations is the aggregate strength of each individual within each nation.  It is the role of politics to generate this strength. The fate of a nation may be radically different depending on the manner in which this combined “people power” is exhibited during crucial periods of opportunity and crisis.

What can the current generations of South Koreans do to secure the wellbeing and happiness of their children and their children’s children? The answer is the swift overturn of North Korea’s totalitarian Suryeongist dictatorship.  This would be a step in the right direction, portending a new dawn of prosperity for the 75 million people on the Korean Peninsula.

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