We should remember that north Korea considers the ROK/US Combined Forces Command exercises a provocation while north Korea conducts provocations that includes shelling civilian and military personnel on islands and murdering 46 South Korean sailors when it sank the Cheonan.

north Korean propaganda has pundits, progressives (in the ROK) and the press (and those who sympathize with north Korea) calling for another postponement or even cancellation or a at least a reduction or scaling back of the upcoming exercises.  But we should ask ourselves objectively what do we think we will get from north Korea if we postpone, cancel, or scale back the exercises?  What do these people think the north will do in return?

• Will the north end its provocations to gain political and economic concessions?
• Will it end its winter and summer training cycles?
• Will it withdraw the thousands of artillery and rocket systems along the DMZ?
• Will it cease its infiltration of spies and SOF into the South?
• Will it cease its unification campaign using subversion, coercion, and if necessary force?
• Will it end seeking to split the ROK/US Alliance?
• Will it ends its global illicit activities (counterfeiting, drug trafficking, use of slave labor)?
• Will it end its proliferation activities around the world?
• Will it end its WMD cooperation with Syria and Iran?
• Will it end its human rights violations and crimes against humanity?
• Will it come to the negotiating table?
• Will it pledge to denuclearize?
• Will it denuclearize?

Does anyone think that postponement, cancellation or scaling back of the exercises will result in a reduction in tensions?

The only thing we will see happen if we postpone, cancel, scale back the exercises is that the regime will shift fires to new propaganda targets and continue all of the above.  The only thing we will get in return for postponing the exercises are:

• A reduction in ROK/US military readiness.
• A reduction in ROK/US deterrent capabilities.
• More emboldened north Korean propaganda as it will deem cancellation a success (and it will still focus on the exercises even if we scale it back to a one platoon, one aircraft, and one ship exercise)
• More demands on the ROK/US alliance that will not be reciprocated by the regime.

And of course all of the above is not all inclusive, the north will think of many more ways to benefit from our decision to cancel the exercises.

We should remember that the reason for the exercises is due to the stated and demonstrated threat to the very existence of our blood ally the Republic of Korea.

The bottom line is that we will get nothing in return for postponement or cancellation of the exercises. Some might feel good about doing it in the misguided idea that it will somehow change north Korean behavior and reduce tensions but I believe that they could not be more wrong.

N. Korea issues warning over U.S. military provocations

• english.yonhapnews.co.kr
• View Original
• March 3rd, 2018

SEOUL, March 3 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's representative told the United Nations-sponsored Conference on Disarmament in Geneva last month that Pyongyang stands ready to fight back against any military provocation from the United States, the North's official media reported Saturday.

The Korean Central News Agency quoted the North's representative to the U.N. office in Geneva as telling the plenary meeting of the U.N. disarmament conference on Tuesday that it is a legitimate right of a sovereign state to take measures to increase its national defense capability for coping with outside threats.

"(North Korea) was compelled to possess a nuclear deterrent in order to protect its sovereignty and the security of its nation from the harsh hostile policy and nuclear threat of the U.S. that have persisted for years," the unidentified representative was quoted as saying in English.

"However, the hostile forces led by the U.S. labeled the exercise of this legitimate right as a 'threat to global peace' and misused the voting mechanism of the U.N. Security Council to cook up several 'sanctions resolutions' in an attempt to deprive the DPRK of its self-defensive right." The DPRK stands for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the North's official name.

The North's representative then accused the U.S. of "amassing huge strategic assets in and around the Korean Peninsula, and mulling staging joint military exercises aimed at a pre-emptive nuclear attack on North Korea."

"In order to defend itself from such threats, the DPRK had access to nuclear weapons, treasured sword of justice. As we have stated on numerous occasions, we will consider any type of blockade as an act of war against us, and if the U.S. has indeed the guts to confront us in any 'rough' manner, we will not (hesitate) to respond to it," the representative said.

A Reuters photo taken Feb. 27, 2018, shows Han Tae-song, North Korea's ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, speaking at the U.N.-sponsored Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.Photo by: Yonhap

(END)

Koreas to resume high-level talks Sunday to work out differences

Ten hours of talks at Panmunjom.  Sounds like a page out of Admiral C. Turner Joy's book How Communists Negotiate and his experience negotiating with the north Koreans as the senior UN delegate in 1951-1952.  Or we could read Chuck Down's Over the Line: North Korea's Negotiating Strategy to gain a sense of what the north is doing.  The ROK negotiators need patience and big bladders.

It is better to jaw-jaw than war-war so long talks should be a good thing.  

Here is one scenario of how this will play out.  Marathon talks will continue.  Eventually the north will give the ROK negotiators a private verbal apology in return for the ROK agreeing to shut down the loud speaker broadcasts.  There will be a brief joint verbal statement from the heads of each delegation that will be somewhat vague and will not include a specific apology.  The ROK will cease the loudspeaker broadcasts and inform the public that the north offered its apologies during the negotiations.  In response the north will deny that an apology was made and will instead say that their superior negotiating tactics combined with the strength of its military (and the fear that it brings to the South and the world) that forced the ROK to cease the loudspeaker operations (and we should remember that it was the north that sent a message to the South asking for talks). Then we will return to "normalcy"  (e.g., armistice)  during which we should keep in mind north Korea's four "principles" of provocation outlined by Dr. Bruce Bechtol in his latest book that I have sent out before.

 "North Korea and Regional Security in the Kim Jong-un Era,"

"Most North Korean provocations have had four things in common: 

1) they are intentionally initiated at moments when they have the likelihood of garnering the greatest attention on the regional and perhaps even the

world stage; 

2) they initially appear to be incidents that are relatively small, easily contained, and quickly ‘resolved;’

3) they involve continuously changing tactics and techniques; and 

4) North Korea denies responsibility for the event."

english.yonhapnews.co.kr

(LEAD) Koreas to resume high-level talks Sunday to work out differences

• Aug. 23, 2015 
•  1 min read 
•  original

(ATTN: UPDATES with quote; ADDS background)

SEOUL, Aug. 23 (Yonhap) -- South and North Korea will resume high-level talks later Sunday to work out differences on how to defuse tensions on the Korean Peninsula, Cheong Wa Dae said.

The talks between South Korean National Security Adviser Kim Kwan-jin and Hwang Pyong-so, the North Korean military's top political officer, were adjourned at 4:15 a.m., presidential spokesman Min Kyung-wook told reporters.

The marathon talks -- which lasted for nearly 10 hours at the border village of Panmunjom -- were joined by South Korean Unification Minister Hong Yong-pyo and his North Korean counterpart, Kim Yang-gon.

"The two sides held in-depth consultations on how to resolve the situation that was recently created, and how to improve inter-Korean relations," Min said.

South and North Korea will review each other's positions before resuming the talks at 3 p.m., Min said, without elaborating.

The talks, which were first proposed by North Korea on Friday, came an hour after the Pyongyang-set deadline for defusing the crisis passed.

On Thursday, North Korea gave a 48-hour ultimatum for South Korea to end propaganda broadcasts along the heavily fortified border and dismantle all loudspeakers, saying it otherwise will launch "a strong military action."

   North Korea also warned Friday that it is prepared to engage in "all-out war."

   Propaganda broadcasts have become a bone of contention between the two Koreas after South Korea resumed them earlier this month for the first time in 11 years.

South Korea took the measure in retaliation against North Korea for a recent land mine attack that maimed two South Korean soldiers. South Korea accused the North of planting the mines inside the demilitarized zone that separates the two Koreas, a charge denied by North Korea.

North Korea views the psychological warfare critical of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un as an insult to its dignity. The isolated country is also concerned that an influx of outside information could pose a threat to Kim.

Still, South Korea has vowed to continue the psychological warfare.

Tensions between the Koreas have risen dramatically since Thursday's exchange of artillery fire.

The North fired one artillery shell across the border Thursday afternoon before firing several more rounds later in apparent anger over South Korea's resumption of propaganda broadcasts. South Korea fired back dozens of shells.

The North later claimed that it never started Thursday's exchange of fire with the South and accused Seoul of fabricating the allegations that the communist nation fired first.

(END)

Conclusion:

Albright and Wit said the administration should come up with terms for a resumption of dialogue that the North Koreans and the U.S. can both accept. U.S. officials have said repeatedly they are open to talks, but they are demanding several preconditions that Pyongyang has repeatedly rejected.

“The North Koreans are more than happy to make concessions to start things up again, but the U.S. has shown no flexibility in addressing North Korea’s position to arrive at a starting point that both sides can be happy with,” said Albright.

“We have this reactive approach and it’s ad hoc,” Wit added. “The North Koreans aren’t taking us seriously. They feel they are in the driver’s seat here. It’s wrong to assume they are taking these steps like this Sony hack out of weakness. They are taking these steps because they feel there’s nothing we can do to them.”

And this raises an uncomfortable question for the White House. Why does a targeted cyber-hack draw a tougher response from Obama than the amassing of a small nuclear arsenal? The message it sends to Pyongyang is that they can threaten their entire region with nuclear weapons, just so long as they don’t touch Hollywood.

Unreciprocated removal of US nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula in 1992, The north-South Agreement of Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Exchanges (ARNE) (1992) (never implemented by the north), the Agreed Framework 1994, heavy fuel oil and food aid through the Arduous March 1994-1996 and beyond, the Perry Policy review and proposal 1999, the Albright visit in 2000, the Sunshine Policy, visits to the north by Kim Dae-jung (Nobel Peace Prize at the cost of millions of dollars) and Roh Moo-hyun, Four party Talks in late 1990's Six Party talks in the 2000's, removal from the state sponsored terrorism list and more are examples of efforts to engage and deal with the north Korea.  But to what end?  What good has become of any of this? Continued north Korean provocations to gain political and economic concessions and blackmail diplomacy, development of nuclear weapons, missile delivery systems, increase in asymmetric offensive military capabilities (to include not on SOF and cyber but allso Chemical weapons), while sustaining and even increasing capabilities (e.g., 300mm MRL)  of  the world's fourth largest conventional military force?  yes let's find common ground but would someone please tell me what that common ground is because what is non-negotiable for the Kim Family Regime are its vital national interests and its long term strategic aims and objectives:

Vital Interest: Survival of the Kim Family Regime at all costs (therefore it can do nothing that will undercut the legitimacy of the regime domestically which includes real economic reforms that will counter its ideology)

Strategic Aim:  reunification under Kim Family Regime control to ensure regime survival.

Strategic Objective: Split the ROK/US alliance and get US forces off the peninsula to ensure attainment of the strategic aim and vital national interest.

How does it achieve the above? - nuclear program for blackmail diplomacy and deterrence, proliferation of weapons and global illicit activities to obtain hard currency to ensure the loyalty of the elite members of the Kim Family Regime, provocations (primarily against the South) to gain political and economic concessions and as Dr. Bruce Bechtol has emphasized to us time and again:

"Provocations have had four things in common: 1) they are intentionally initiated at moments when they have the likelihood of garnering the greatest attention on the regional and perhaps even the world stage; 2) they initially appear to be incidents that are relatively small, easily contained, and quickly “resolved;” 3) they involve continuously changing tactics and techniques; and 4) North Korea denies responsibility for the event."

And Bruce has this to say about the Sony hacking incident 

With two key differences:

1.        It is carried out against an entity in the USA, NOT South Korea.

2.       It is using a new, offensive capability – thinking out of the box if you will – that North Korea’s military and intelligence services are likely to utilize on a larger scale in the future

If the north Koreans did the Sony hack then we should consider it a "confidence target" to test its capabilities and gauge the reaction of the US and international community.  From the reactions I think north Korea and other state and non-state actors see great potential in hacking US businesses (even if they are owned by a foreign company, i.e., Sony).  And other targets probably loom large especially as tensions rise or conflict erupts.

These strategies, concepts, and tactics are the foundation for everything that north Korea does and it is unlikely to deviate from its interests, aims, objectives, and tactics (though as we are seeing it will adapt the tactics).  So yes, I am all for finding common ground and would rather "jaw jaw than war war" but we had better try to understand the position of the Kim Family Regime.

As an aside one of the best deterrents of the north is this (change Kim Jong-il to the Kim Family Regime):

 Given the dangers of regime collapse and the potential for war the first imperative of the

strategy is to sustain the illusion for Kim Jong Il that his regime can survive.30 As

long as Kim Jong Il believes he will survive and have the possibility at some time

in the future to achieve reunification under his terms he will in effect be deterred

from attacking. 

30 Credit for coining the phrase “sustaining the illusion that Kim Jong Il will survive” goes

to COL Rick Gribling, Chief of UNC/CFC/USFK CJ3 Plans Division during crisis action planning

session in June 1997.

The entire paper on a long term strategy for the Korean Peninsula can be downloaded here: http://bit.ly/1CWA5vm

The key to the future of the peninsula lies among the people in north Korea.  Can they change their own regime and have a leadership emerge that will seek peaceful unification with the South?  While sustaining the illusion that the regime will survive in order to deter its attacks perhaps we can try to engage the north while at the same time providing support to the nascent but emerging resistance potential among the population and 2d tier leadership in the north.  But that would require a coherent ROK/US alliance strategy and a classified one at that.

COMMENTARY / WORLD

North Korea’s nukes are much scarier than its hacks

BY JOSH ROGIN AND ELI LAKE

BLOOMBERG

DEC 26, 2014

HTTP://WWW.JAPANTIMES.CO.JP/OPINION/2014/12/26/COMMENTARY/WORLD-COMMENTARY/NORTH-KOREAS-NUKES-

ARE-MUCH-SCARIER-THAN-ITS-HACKS/#.VJ1A8WAB

• 
  

NEW YORK – While the world’s attention focuses on North Korea’s cyberwar with Sony Pictures, the Hermit Kingdom is rapidly increasing its stockpile of nuclear weapons material, with real little pushback from the United States.

A new analysis of North Korea’s nuclear program by a group of top U.S. experts, led by David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, estimates that North Korea could have enough material for 79 nuclear weapons by 2020.

The analysis, part of a larger project called “North Korea’s Nuclear Futures” being run by the U.S.-Korea Institute at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced and International Studies, has not been previously published.

Albright said the North Korean government is ramping up its production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, speeding toward an amount that would allow it to build enough nuclear weapons to rival other nuclear states including India, Pakistan and Israel.

“North Korea is on the verge of being able to scale up its nuclear weapons program to the level of the other major players, so it’s critical to head this off,” Albright said in an interview.

He added, “It is on the verge of deploying a nuclear arsenal that would pose not only a threat to the United States and its allies but also to China.”

According to the analysis, which included the input of a team of former government officials, nuclear experts and North Korea-watchers, the regime now has as many as four separate facilities churning out nuclear weapons material or preparing to do so.

The best-known one, at Yongbyon, has a functioning 5-megawatt plutonium reactor, a uranium enrichment grid with thousands of centrifuges and a light-water reactor that could be used for either military or civilian purposes.

The U.S. intelligence community also believes the North Koreans have a second centrifuge facility they have never acknowledged. Even if that second uranium facility is taken out of the equation, Albright’s team projects that North Korea will have enough material for 67 bombs in five years time.

The light-water reactor at Yongyon is not online yet, but it should be soon. Even if that reactor is never turned on or limited to civilian purposes, North Korea could still have 45 bombs by the time the next U.S. president is finishing up his (or her) first term.

North Korea is estimated to have 30 to 34 kg of weapons-grade plutonium now, enough for around nine nuclear weapons, depending on the size of each bomb. Last year it conducted its third nuclear weapons test.

Albright acknowledged that the secrecy of the North Korean program makes exact projections impossible and therefore his estimates all have a range to account for known unknowns, such as secret facilities. According to the detailed intelligence community budget leaked to the Washington Post in 2013 by former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden, North Korea’s nuclear program remains one of the hardest targets for U.S. spies as well.

But there’s no doubt about the North Korean government’s intentions, Albright said, to produce as much nuclear-weapons material as possible before it is forced to stop either by coercion or the resumption of a diplomatic negotiations with the West.

(Continued at the link below)

HTTP://WWW.JAPANTIMES.CO.JP/OPINION/2014/12/26/COMMENTARY/WORLD-COMMENTARY/NORTH-KOREAS-NUKES-ARE-MUCH-SCARIER-THAN-ITS-HACKS/#.VJ1A8WAB

North practiced a raid on Incheon airport: Source

Nice description of a north Korean SOF attack.  If they were really training for this it would obviously be on a scale larger than the 1968 attempted raid on the Blue House or the attempted assassination of President Park Chung Hee that killed his wife and the mother of the current President Park.

Of course this statement makes some of the analysis suspect (which is probably a result of the journalist's and editor's interpretation or just a bad translation from Korean to English) because an AN-2 Colt is not a fighter jet but as the article describes it is a canvas skinned (leather?) bi-plane used to infiltrate SOF.  The South Korean military certainly knows the AN -2 COLT

The South Korean military is particularly worried about the use of AN-2 fighter jets in the drills on Jan. 19. 

Here is a photo.

 

North practiced a raid on Incheon airport: Source

JoongAng Ilbo’s gov’t source said night drill was held on Jan. 19

http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2984031

Jan 24,2014

Rodong Sinmun, the mouthpiece of the North Korea’s Workers’ Party, reported Jan. 23 that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un also inspected the tactical training of Unit 323, separate from the airport drill. [Rodong Simun]

North Korea secretly carried out military exercises simulating an attack on a civilian airport in South Korea, mobilizing special jet fighters designed to infiltrate Southern territory, a source told the JoongAng Ilbo.

A South Korean government official who is engaged in North Korean affairs said Wednesday that North Korea conducted simulated military drills targeting Incheon International Airport in South Korea, the biggest civilian airport in the country, while making conciliatory proposals to Seoul at the same time.

“The South Korean government performed an in-depth analysis on the nighttime military exercises by North Korea’s special airborne unit on Jan. 19,” the official said, “and we found the drills targeted our civilian airport.”

“Currently, we have raised the military alert for a possible attack from a North Korean base in Taetan County, North Pyongan Province, and strengthened security at Incheon International Airport,” the official said.

According to the official, the South Korean military found that about 150 special agents of a special North Korean infiltration unit participated in the Jan. 19 drills. They are suspected of practicing sneaking into South Korean territory by parachute, staging a terrorist attack and occupying airplanes and facilities at the airport.

North Korea’s state media reported Jan. 20 that leader Kim Jong-un attended a military exercise held by an airborne unit but did not mention the location of the drills.

“It is extremely rare for North Korea to have conducted such a military exercise against a civilian airport [in South Korea],” the official added.

Following the JoongAng Ilbo’s report, the South Korean government held a top defense meeting hosted by Kim Jang-soo, head security chief, yesterday at the Blue House, which a number of cabinet ministers attended.

“We are closely watching North Korean military activities, including the one that mobilized the AN-2 planes,” Kim Min-seok, spokesman of the Ministry of National Defense, said at a briefing yesterday. “The unit that Kim Jong-un visited is assumed to be air-infiltration, attacking forces.”

The South Korean military is wary of North Korea’s latest proposal that both countries stop “all slander and insults against each other starting Jan. 30,” the first day of the Lunar New Year holiday.

To induce South Korea to accept those conciliatory suggestions, North Korea could possibly make some peaceful moves such as the withdrawal of some forces near the five frontline islands in the Yellow Sea, the South Korean military said.

“Possibly, North Korea could make a show of a surprise bargaining chip, which we would never expect, to maximize the effect of their anti-South propaganda,” a South Korean military official said.

But that could be a prelude to an attack. Some South Korean military officials said they should prepare for a scenario in which North Korea might occupy the five forefront islands.

“We have a tip-off that North Korea has set up a scheme to occupy the five islands in the Yellow Sea first and then ask the United Nations for a resolution of the tense situation,” an official of the South Korean Marine Corps said.

The South Korean military is particularly worried about the use of AN-2 fighter jets in the drills on Jan. 19.

According to the military, the bodies of those planes are made of wood and leather, materials that are hard to detect by radar.

They are capable of landing and taking off on highways or golf courses and are therefore useful in sudden attacks or a guerilla war.

“If the aircraft carry 13 special agents and swiftly land in several places in Seoul or the Gyeonggi region, our core facilities could be destroyed and chaotic disorder could happen,” another South Korean military official warned.


BY LEE YOUNG-JONG, YOO SUNG-WOON [heejin@joongang.co.kr]

US prevented South Korea air strike on North, says Robert Gates

I received Gates' book yesterday (thanks, Amazon) so of course just like all the pundits and reviewers I cherry picked certain topics and I spent some time reading excerpts on Korea and Special Operations (as an aside Gates generally calls all SOF "Special Forces" except for the SEALs,  e.g., McChrystal "led U.S. Special Forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan" [p. 254] - probably the fault of his editors because I think he must have a better understanding of SOF than the book seems to reveal, but I digress).

This article is based on a a couple excerpts from his book. The comments about Roh Moo-hyun are from page 416.  But the specific response to the Y-P Do artillery firing is based on a paragraph on page 497.  His description of the incident below and in the book is somewhat misleading (I have pasted the timeline of the incident below the article).  The ROK military responded to the north's firing as part of the incident (though it was likely to little effect despite some reports because the South Korean artillery was out of position conducting a live fire exercise facing southwest and this of course was the north's rationale for firing in the first place as they were justifying their action based on the south's committing a hostile act)..  The description makes it appear there were rapid and extensive consultations and the US restrained the ROK from conducting air and artillery strikes and ended up "simply" returned fire on the north's artillery.  We actually responded with no employment of force following the incident and this is the real issue to consider.

We were fearful of a decisive ROK military response to this deadly north Korean provocation and we restrained the ROK military as we have generally done for the past 60 years which of course has provided the north with success in its playbook with the expected response (or response) to its provocations.  But this fear to respond with decisive military force has obviously emboldened the north and specifically now Kim Jong-un.  It is impossible to prove this but if the ROK or the Alliance had responded with more decisive force in 2010 when Kim Jong-il was still in power it might have had a moderating effect on Kim Jong-un's subsequent provocative actions.  We have contributed to the cycle of provocations by allowing the north to believe it is successful in gaining political and economic concessions and that there is no cost to the north for conducting provocations.  I think we have to think through the next north Korean provocation that will require a decision ROK military response at the time and place of the provocation.  Unfortunately that is the only way to stop the cycle of provocations.  But of course given Kim Jong-un's inexperience and internal situation there is a level of uncertainty about his reaction. But if we do nothing, provocations will continue.

US prevented South Korea air strike on North, says Robert Gates

(AFP) – 7 hours ago  

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hlcsfHtFpc7Lfpuwhh2VopN3lUiA?docId=17a3863a-78e2-40c1-bde6-a6e6f7d9f0e2&hl=en

Seoul — South Korea declined to comment Wednesday on revelations that the United States talked it down from launching a retaliatory air strike on North Korea in 2010.

The claims were made in the newly published memoir of former US defense secretary Robert Gates, in which he also describes former South Korean president Roh Moo-Hyun as "probably a little bit crazy".

The 2010 incident followed the North's surprise shelling of a South Korean border island in November of that year.

The attack triggered what Gates labelled a "very dangerous crisis", with the South Korean government of then-president Lee Myung-Bak initially insisting on a robust military response.

"South Korea's original plans for retaliation were, we thought, disproportionately aggressive, involving both aircraft and artillery," Gates wrote in his memoir.

"We were worried the exchanges could escalate dangerously," he added.

Over the next few days, Gates said he, US President Barack Obama and then secretary of state Hillary Clinton had numerous telephone calls with their South Korean counterparts in an effort to calm things down.

"Ultimately, South Korea simply returned artillery fire on the location of the North Koreans' batteries that had started the whole affair," he said.

The South Korean government declined to confirm Gates's version of events.

"We have no comment," a defence ministry spokesman told AFP.

There are currently more than 28,000 US troops stationed in South Korea and under the terms of their mutual defence pact, the United States would assume overall military command of their joint forces in the event of a full-scale conflict.

Because the 1950-53 Korean War concluded with a ceasefire rather than a peace treaty, South and North Korea technically remain at war.

The risk of escalation after the shelling of Yeonpyeong island was especially high, with South Korea's patience at breaking point following the recent sinking of one of its warships by what it said was a North Korean submarine.

According to Gates, the North's only major ally China had helped ease tensions by simultaneously "weighing in with the North's leaders to wind down the situation".

In his memoir, Gates spoke of his admiration for Lee Myung-Bak, saying the conservative president was "tough-minded, realistic and very pro-American".

This assessment contrasted sharply with his view of Lee's predecessor, the liberal Roh Moo-Hyun, who Gates described as "anti-American and probably a little crazy".

Gates professed astonishment at Roh telling him that the two biggest security threats in Asia were the United States and Japan.

Roh served as president from 2003-2008. In 2009, he jumped to his death from a cliff behind his retirement home after being questioned by prosecutors about suspected corruption scandals involving his family.

Copyright © 2014 AFP. All rights reserved. More »

(All times in Korea Standard Time: UTC+9.)

08:20: North sends a telex message requesting a halt to the South's artillery training exercise.

10:00: South starts the artillery training exercise.

14:30: North deploys five MiG-23ML fighters from the 60th Regiment at Pukchang.

14:34: North starts firing shells (around 150^{[dubious – discuss]}, of which about 60 land on Yeonpyeong)

14:38: South conducts emergency sorties with two KF-16 fighters.

14:40: South deploys four F-15K fighters.

14:46: South conducts additional emergency sorties with two KF-16 fighters.

14:47: South fires back with the first round of K-9 howitzers (50 shells).

14:50: South issues a 'Jindogae Hana (Jindo Dog 1)' alert (equivalent to US DEFCON 1), the highest military alert given for a local provocation.^[46]

14:55: North stops firing temporarily.

15:12: North starts firing for the second time (20 shells, all of which landed on the island).

15:25: South resumes firing back with K-9 howitzers (30 shells).

15:30: South telexes the North's military general level talk representative requesting an immediate halt to artillery shelling.

15:40 – 16:00: The South's Joint Chiefs of Staff Han Min-gu and USFK Commander Walter L. Sharp have a video conference (a review of cooperative crisis management).

15:41: North stops firing.

16:30: First military casualty reported.

16:35 – 21:50: Foreign and National Security representatives have a meeting.

16:42: South stops firing.

18:40: Lee Hong-gi, the South's Joint Chief of Staff Director of Operations, holds a press briefing.

20:35 – 21:10: South Korean President Lee Myung-bak meets with his Joint Chief of Staff.^[41][47]

South Korea: Responding to the North Korean threat

Probably the single most concise but comprehensive article on the military situation in South Korea and in particular ROK military develops and the OPCON transfer issue.  As a side note, MG Lee (in the photo below) and I were planners together on the CFC staff back in the 1990's.  The PDF of this article can be downloaded from the web site. This is an important read.

V/R
Dave

South Korea: Responding to the North Korean threat

Bruce E. Bechtol | American Enterprise Institute

http://www.aei.org/outlook/foreign-and-defense-policy/defense/south-korea-responding-to-the-north-korean-threat/

November 05, 2013

DefenseImagery.mil

Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, left, exchanges greetings with South Korean army Maj. Gen. Lee Seo-young, a South Korean defense attaché, during a gala hosted by South Korean President Park Geun-hye commemorating the 60th anniversary of the US-South Korean alliance May 7, 2013, at the National Portrait Gallery in Washington, DC.

Article Highlights

• S. Korean defense is unevenly prepared for the N. Korean threat.
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• Combined ROK-US wartime operating force must continue to exist to ensure readiness.
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• All other issues will be ancillary for Seoul as long as there is a DPRK.
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South Korea is in a unique position. It is an economic powerhouse and a thriving democracy that faces the most ­ominous and imminent threat on its borders of any democracy in the world. Moreover, this is a threat that continues to evolve, with increasing missile, cyber, special operations, and nuclear capabilities and a new leader who shows no signs that he will be any less ruthless or belligerent than his father. To meet this threat, Seoul has undertaken a number of efforts to better deter and defend against North Korean capabilities and provocations, including increasing the defense budget, upping training with US forces, creating new command elements, and establishing plans for preemptive strikes against imminent North Korean missile launches. However, in part because of administration changes in Seoul, the South Korean effort has been uneven. And decisions remain to be made in the areas of missile defense, tactical fighter aircraft, and command-and-control arrangements that will be significant for not only South Korea but all states that have an interest in Northeast Asia’s peace and stability.

Key points in this Outlook:

• South Korea faces a clear, present, and evolving threat from North Korea, with Kim Jong-un showing no indication of moving away from his father’s violent and corrupt policies.
• South Korea’s response to the North Korean threat has been uneven, with increased capabilities in some areas but less than what is needed in others.
• A key issue facing the ROK-US alliance is command and control of allied forces during wartime on the Korean Peninsula. A combined operating force must continue to exist to ensure full readiness and capability.

This is the seventh National Security Outlook in a series about the defense capabilities of America’s allies and security partners.[1] 

When analyzing the readiness, capabilities, and future initiatives of the Republic of Korea’s (ROK’s) military, one must take into account the unique geopolitical position that the ROK government finds itself in. There is no ambiguous set of threats for South Korea. Rather, the largest and most dangerous threat to the stability and security of the Korean Peninsula is obvious: the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK).

It is for this threat that policymakers in Seoul must ensure their military is ready. Providing an adequate defense against this threat is the cornerstone of the ROK–US alliance and the most important foreign policy issue between these two allies. As survival of the nation-state is the number-one priority for any national leader, all other issues for Seoul will be ancillary as long as there is a DPRK.

Recognizing that the threatening behavior of its belligerent neighbor to the north is the key military issue for the ROK, it is important to analyze that threat to determine what the priorities of the South Korean military will be and how the threat will influence planning for the ROK–US alliance. Since 2010, North Korea has conducted two violent military provocations: one with a submarine that sank a ROK naval ship and one that involved an artillery barrage against a South Korean island that killed both military and civilian personnel.[2] North Korea also conducted yet another nuclear test this past February.[3] 

In addition, the DPRK has shown with a test launch conducted in mid-December last year that it is now capable (or close to it) of building a missile that can hit Alaska, Hawaii, or perhaps even the west coast of the United States.[4] Pyongyang also has the capability of targeting all of South Korea and most of Japan with its ballistic missiles.[5] 

"All other issues for Seoul will be ancillary as long as there is a DPRK."North Korea has also continued to advance the capabilities and numbers of its armored forces, long-range artillery forces, and special operations forces.[6] And, finally, Kim Jong-un has shown no indication that he has any intentions except to carry on the violent and corrupt policies of his father Kim Jong-il. This means, of course, that South Korea and the ROK–US alliance must continue to prepare for the multifaceted North Korean threat for the foreseeable future.

Initiatives against the North Korean Threat

Despite calls by the Roh Moo-hyun administration (2003–08) for a “balancer policy”—a policy that moved South Korea away from its traditional security ties with the United States to a more neutral or balancing role between the United States, Japan, and the old communist bloc of China, Russia, and North Korea—the fact remains that the primary issue for which Seoul must build its military capabilities and plan its contingencies is North Korea.[7] This process has been exacerbated by the fact that the threat the DPRK presents has evolved and become even more complicated in recent years.

Following the two violent provocations in 2010 already described, it became obvious that the South Korean government and military needed to take steps to counter future provocations from North Korea. As noted North Korean specialist Robert M. Collins has stated, “Since the end of the Korean Conflict in 1953, the ROK–US alliance has done a very good job of deterring against a war initiated by North Korea. The alliance has not done a good job of deterring North Korean provocations.”[8] Thus, the planning, policies, and procedures South Koreans initiated (and coordinated with their key ally in Washington) are very timely and needed now more than ever.

During April 2013, it was reported that the United States and South Korea had finalized a plan to respond more forcefully and appropriately to North Korean provocations.[9] This new “counterprovocation” plan will ensure that there is a speedy “response in kind” that still prevents escalation to all-out war. The existence of the plan was also made public in part, it seems, because Seoul and Washington wanted to both warn the North Koreans and reassure the South Korean populace.

In an earlier and equally important move, the South Korean military established a separate Northwest Islands Command. The establishment of the new command and the appointment of a commander with the autonomy to respond with necessary force in a timely manner under more liberal rules of engagement empower the South Korean military to respond more effectively to violent provocations the North initiates in the Northern Limit Line (NLL) area.[10]

Formally established in June 2011, the command was first headed by Lt. Gen. Yoo Nak-jun, the commandant of the ROK Marine Corps, with a Marine major general as deputy commander and a staff that includes colonels from each of the ROK military services. Built around a division-sized joint unit, with the key contingents being the ROK Marine Sixth Brigade and the Yeonpyeong Defense battalion, the new command now has the ability to respond to North Korean attacks more effectively and rapidly. As such, ROK forces are now better positioned to deter and defend against North Korean provocations.[11]

The attacks in 2010 and the rhetoric from North Korea since have had the opposite effect of what Pyongyang likely wanted. If anything, DPRK behavior has strengthened South Korea’s resolve to strike back against North Korean aggression.[12] The South Korean Navy is now on a heightened state of readiness in the NLL area—the demarcation line in the West (Yellow) Sea between the DPRK and ROK—and has been equipped with the best maritime equipment that the government can provide.[13]

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.aei.org/outlook/foreign-and-defense-policy/defense/south-korea-responding-to-the-north-korean-threat/