US Military Forces in Asia in Support of US Policy and Strategy

US Military Forces in Asia in Support of US Policy and Strategy

Vision:  The United States is a global power and must operate globally in all regions of the world.  It requires a military force that has a proper mixture of forward basing and stationing combined with an effective rotational structure and deployment capability.  This will allow for the projection of US military power whenever and wherever necessary to support the interests of the United States and to support its friends, partners, and allies. Most important, military capabilities must support the leading instruments of national power: diplomatic, economic, and informational.  The US can lead with these three instruments because they will rest on the rock solid foundation of military power.

The US cannot make its military the centerpiece of strategy in Asia.  Yet it has to be the foundation of US strategy.

The US strategy in the Asia-Pacific and around the world must be built around strategic reassurance and strategic resolve (Steinberg & O’Hanlon 2012)[1] The US will reassure its allies as well friends and partners and will demonstrate strategic resolve to defend its interests, access to the global commons, and to ensure stability and allow for commerce and economic growth.

Problem:  Despite the Asia Rebalance/Pivot shifting a small percentage of military forces to the region over the next decade, an overall diminishing US military structure, combined with unproductive rhetoric, unrealistic priorities, over commitment of US forces (in particular ground forces but air and sea as well) have undermined US strategic reassurance and strategic resolve in the Asia-Pacific. This is combined with a lack of strategy requiring balance and coherency among ends, ways, and means, with an understanding of threats, risks, and opportunities.  This prevents the US from developing effective policies and executing strategies that protect US national interests in the region.  Ultimately this leads to instability in the Asia-Pacific and globally. 

Key Ideas:

China and the US will be strategic competitors throughout the 21^st century, with competition for markets, resources, and influence.  Cooperation is possible but there will always be competition:

Competition does not have to lead to military conflict.

-       The US competes economically - it protects free market principles

-       The US competes for influence - it demonstrates strategic reassurance and strategic resolve

-       The US competes for ideas - self determination, rule of law, international standards, treaties, and organizations

-       The US competes for access - freedom of navigation is the US priority

Competition is not zero-sum.  Winning is defined based on the competitors cultural, political, and economic systems and goals and desires and definitions of winning should not be mirror imaged.

The Asian paradox as described by Korean President Park is present and growing:  Asian nations are increasingly economically interdependent yet they have unresolved political and security issues.  Despite growing economic interdependence there is growing insecurity.[2]

A vital strategic US interest is freedom of navigation.  Territorial disputes cannot impede freedom navigation in the South China Sea, the Asia-Pacific region, and throughout the world.

The US will engage bilaterally, multilaterally and through regional and international organizations and mechanisms.  No two situations are the same and therefore all means of engagement must be at the disposal of the US.

We must maintain forces to not only deter threats and defend our interests; we must have overwhelming force to stop violence wherever we are faced with it.  This especially applies to the Korean peninsula where the ROK/US alliance must have the combined forces of air, land, maritime, and special operations to be able to win the war and end the violence that will occur during either post-conflict or post-regime collapse in North Korea.

The US will not be able to increase the number of bases in the Asia-Pacific for both US fiscal constraints but also host nation domestic political challenges.

Building new permanent bases requires a minimum of a five-year lead time from a Congressional approval and resourcing and an engineering construction perspective and often longer form a political/diplomatic perspective.

Key Concepts: 

The US must lead with the diplomatic and economic instruments of power.  The concept of US leadership in the Asia-Pacific should be based on statesmanship with Statesmen leading the US strategic efforts.  A Statesman is a wise, skillful, and respected political leader and this will describe the type of men and women that will make up leaders on the US national security team both in Washington and those responsible for the US policy in the Asia-Pacific region.

The first priority for the US is to reinforce and strengthen relationships with and commitments to the five treaty allies in the Asia-Pacific: Australia, Japan, The Republic of Korea, The Republic of the Philippines, and The Kingdom of Thailand.   US Strategic Reassurance and Strategic Resolve rests on this alliance structure.

Although the alliance and basing structures evolved over the Cold War it does not mean that they are anachronistic.  As long as the US and our five treaty allies have sufficiently aligned interests we must sustain and strengthen our relationships.  The bases that we have in Japan and Korea, as well as the US territory of Guam and the access we have in Australia, Thailand and the Philippines for rotational forces provide the US with strategic flexibility and agility.  The one law that the US cannot violate is the law of physics that controls time and distance.  Until we can overcome that law we suffer from the tyranny of distance.  To ensure our strategic reassurance and strategic resolve we must have presence and persistence.  Our forces must be present and we must persistently improve the military interoperability of the US and its treaty partners as well as friends and partners with like-minded values and interests.  In terms of maintaining our basing structure we should borrow the adage of the combat infantryman on patrol – “never give up the high ground” because once you do you may not be able to get back to the top.

Forces based and stationed in the region provide a critical capability to support humanitarian assistance when needed and requested.  These capabilities have been demonstrated for decades with recent examples in response to tsunamis in Southeast Asia and Japan, and typhoons and volcanic eruptions in the Philippines and other disasters in other countries.  Providing humanitarian assistance reinforces US strategic reassurance and strategic resolve.

The US will support Korean unification as the only long term and permanent solution to the North Korean nuclear program and human rights atrocities and crimes against humanity being perpetrated by the Kim Family Regime.  The US will develop joint military and interagency plans to support the ROK in achieving the United Republic of Korea (UROK – pronounced “You Rock”)[3]

Lastly, the US cannot be deterred by threats whether they are economic, diplomatic, or military.  The US will protect its interests in the Asia-Pacific, defend it allies, support friends, and partners, and ensure regional and global adherence to international laws and norms.

Key Force Concepts:

The first priority is to maintain the current force structure in Japan and Korea as well as in Guam and Hawaii as the baseline force structure for the Asia-Pacific.  There can be no reduction in US presence in the region. 

An aircraft carrier battle group must always be home ported in Japan.

Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets must be properly deployed throughout the region to provide the US with unparalleled situational awareness, situational understanding, and early warning.

The development of an integrated missile defense system is vital to protect the US, its forces in the region, and US allies.  This system will be land, sea, and space based.

Ground forces in the Pacific will be postured for defense of the ROK/US Alliance and then interoperability throughout the Asia-Pacific region, first with US allies and then with like-minded friends and partners.

David S. Maxwell

Associate Director, Center for Security Studies

Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service

Georgetown University

Phone and email:  202-687-3834; david.maxwell@georgetown.edu 

---

[1] James Steinberg and Michael O’Hanlon, Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: US China Relations in the 21^st Century, (Princeton University Press, 2014) Borrowed and adapted from the title of their book.

[2] Park Geun-Hye, “A Plan for Peace in North Asia,” Wall Street Journal, November 12, 2012 http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323894704578114310294100492?alg=y

[3] Center for New American Security, INFOGRAPHIC: The Geopolitical Implications of Korean Unification, October 16, 2015, http://maxoki161.blogspot.com/2015/10/infographic-geopolitical-implications.html

RE: Kerry's off the cuff proposal and the Russia-Syrian response:

RE:  Kerry's off the cuff proposal and the Russia-Syrian response:

   Peter R. Neumann @PeterRNeumann2h     Obama's gamble may (inadvertently) have paid off. (Credible) military threat enabling diplomacy. Textbook Clausewitz.

I think Peter Neumann's tweet would be an excellent discussion starter for seminars on foreign affairs, policy, and strategy.  Who would have thought tweeting could be so influential and educational.

• Luck (chance):  Kerry's off the cuff remark?
• Was/Is the military threat credible?
• Dithering does not (usually) equal deterrence, but did dithering contribute to leading to a potential solution (though people are still skeptical and rightly so – but is there a diplomatic opportunity?)
• Did reason/rational control (by the Russians?) counter the hate, enmity, and greed of the situation?
• Did a credible military threat enable diplomacy?
• Would Clausewitz approve?  Would Sun Tzu approve?  If so why and if not why not?

The Market Shall Set North Korea Free

Some important insights and commentary.  I wish we could remind all pundits and those who think that we can negotiate with the Kim Family Regime based on international norms and standards to always remember these three key points:

All of us at the United Front Department — also known as “the window into and out of North Korea” — learned three tenets of diplomacy by heart: 1. Pay no attention to South Korea. 2. Exploit Japan’s emotions. 3. Ply the United States with lies, but make sure they are logical ones. 

Kim Jong-il stressed the importance of these three tenets as the framework within which we were required to implement his vision for Pyongyang’s foreign relations. North Korea’s dealings with South Korea, Japan and the United States always hewed closely to these principles.

V/R

Dave

OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR

The Market Shall Set North Korea Free

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/27/opinion/global/The-Market-Shall-Set-North-Korea-Free.html?ref=global&pagewanted=all

Sung Choi

By JANG JIN-SUNG

Published: April 26, 2013

I DEFECTED from North Korea in 2004. I decided to risk my life to leave my home country — where I worked as a psychological warfare officer for the government — when it finally sunk in that there are two North Koreas: one real and the other a fiction created by the regime.

Although in my job I had access to foreign media, books with passages containing criticism of our Dear Leader Kim Jong-il or his revered father, Kim Il-sung, had large sections blacked out. One day, out of deep curiosity, I made up an excuse to stay behind at work to decipher the redacted words of a history book.

I locked the office door and put the pages against a window. Light from outside made the words under the ink perfectly clear. I read voraciously. I stayed late at work again and again to learn my country’s real history — or at least another view of it.

Most shocking was what I discovered about the Korean War. We had been taught all of our lives how an invasion by the South had triggered the conflict. Yet now I was reading that not only South Korea but the rest of the world believed the North had started the war. Who was right?

It was after my harrowing defection — in which I bribed my way to a border crossing and escaped by running across a frozen river to China — that I recognized the existence of a third North Korea: a theoretical one. This is the North Korea constructed by the outside world, a piecemeal analysis of the regime and its propaganda that misses the political and economic realities of the country.

All of us at the United Front Department — also known as “the window into and out of North Korea” — learned three tenets of diplomacy by heart: 1. Pay no attention to South Korea. 2. Exploit Japan’s emotions. 3. Ply the United States with lies, but make sure they are logical ones.

Kim Jong-il stressed the importance of these three tenets as the framework within which we were required to implement his vision for Pyongyang’s foreign relations. North Korea’s dealings with South Korea, Japan and the United States always hewed closely to these principles.

Our department’s mission was to deceive our people and the world, doing what was necessary to keep our leader in power. We openly referred to talks with South Korea as “aid farming,” because while Seoul sought dialogue through its so-called Sunshine Policy, we saw it as an opening not for diplomatic progress but for extracting as much aid as possible. We also successfully bought time for our nuclear program through the endless marathon of the six-party talks.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/27/opinion/global/The-Market-Shall-Set-North-Korea-Free.html?ref=global&pagewanted=all

Cracks seen in US diplomacy towards North Korea

Yes, we need a coherent policy and a strategy.  The two Presidents gave us the vision with the Alliance strategic end state specified in June 2009.  I have yet to see a coherent US, ROK, or more importantly an Alliance strategy developed and executed to achieve that end state.  Without a strategy there are sure to be cracks in the diplomacy because in effect when it comes to dealing with north Korea we are the Little Dutch boy just putting fingers in holes in the dike.

V/R

Dave

Cracks seen in US diplomacy towards North Korea

http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/02/09/288122/cracks-seen-in-us-diplomacy-towards-north-korea/

Sat Feb 9, 2013 4:1PM GMT

Joseph Kim, Press TV, Seoul

Experts in the United States and South Korea agree that Washington’s current policy toward Pyongyang must move in a new direction. North Korea has recently threatened to strengthen its nuclear deterrence against the U-S which some fear may produce a domino effect, creating a nuclear-arms race in Northeast Asia.

A bill banning food aid to North Korea is expected to pass in the United States Congress this year. Washington has already come under fire for using humanitarian assistance to influence negotiations and political decisions last year, when the bill was first introduced. The U.S. and North Korea ceased dialogue back in 2009 following Pyongyang’s attempt to launch a satellite. Tension between the two countries increased after North Korea’s recent satellite launch and indications of a looming third nuclear test. U.S. officials claim North Korea is becoming a nuclear threat. However, U.S.-based scientists say that’s a worst-case scenario.

At a security forum hosted jointly by one of South Korea’s largest news agencies and Stanford University earlier this week, experts criticized Washington’s current approach to Pyongyang; including a former U.S. defense chief. 

Domestic analysts agree, arguing North Korea’s nuclear program has been a method of dialogue historically. 

The analyst added that it is problematic that the United States and South Korea are holding North Korea’s actions solely responsible for the failure of a resumption of dialogue. 

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/02/09/288122/cracks-seen-in-us-diplomacy-towards-north-korea/

2 Americans Are Advised Not to Visit North Korea

I wonder what they think they can really achieve?  Perhaps they will be able to help get Mr. Bae released.  The "ransom" for his release could be the visit in order to provide international and domestic legitimacy as the perception of the visit will be spun but the north Korean propagandists as that of Americans kowtowing and paying tribute to the great Kim Jong-un.  They will be played and used by the regime.  

And they also cause friction for ROK-US policymakers because despite the fact that there are north Koreans who study the west and think they understand US politics and the like, it is very likely that the regime cannot fathom that these two could come without some official behind the scenes sanction by the government because in the mirror image analysis the regime could not imagine such prominent people doing something on their own that would go against the desires of the government.  And statements from State and other officials would only be viewed as disinformation because that is how the regime would operate so they would expect such statements to made as a matter of routine.  So whatever they say (especially Richardson) will be assessed as a message from the Administration.
V/R
Dave

January 3, 2013

2 Americans Are Advised Not to Visit North Korea

By MICHAEL R. GORDON

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/04/world/asia/bill-richardson-and-googles-eric-schmidt-are-advised-not-to-visit-north-korea.html?smid=tw-nytimesworld&seid=auto&_r=0&pagewanted=print

WASHINGTON — The State Department said Thursday that it had advised against a visit to North Korea by the former governor of New Mexico, Bill Richardson, and Google’s executive chairman, Eric E. Schmidt.

Neither Mr. Richardson nor Mr. Schmidt have publicly discussed reports of the possibility of such a trip or its purpose. The two men could not be reached for comment on Thursday.

Victor D. Cha, an expert on North Korea at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said that the visit might aid discussion of a humanitarian issue of concern to the United States: North Korea’s detention last month of a naturalized American citizen born in South Korea.

North Korea identified the man as Bae Jun-ho, and human rights activists as Kenneth Bae, 44. A report by the North’s state-run Korean Central News Agency said, without elaborating, that Mr. Bae had admitted to committing “hostile acts against the republic,” a crime punishable by a year in prison. The human rights activists said Mr. Bae had run a travel company that specialized in taking tourists and prospective investors to North Korea.

His arrest came shortly after North Korea launched a long-range rocket that it insisted was part of a peaceful space program. But the United States asserts that the real purpose is to develop a ballistic missile as part of a military program. “Frankly, we don’t think the timing of this is particularly helpful,” the State Department spokeswoman, Victoria Nuland, said Thursday about talk of a trip by Mr. Richardson and Mr. Schmidt. “They are well aware of our views.”
(Continued at the link below)
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/04/world/asia/bill-richardson-and-googles-eric-schmidt-are-advised-not-to-visit-north-korea.html?smid=tw-nytimesworld&seid=auto&_r=0&pagewanted=print