Continuity of Denial: Kim Jong-un’s Succession and North Korean Human Rights by Robert Collins

This short piece provides more insight into the north Korean regime, the system and nL human rights that you can find in any essay from a think tank or academic institution.  I am of course biased because the author is one of my mentors, particularly on north Korea.

V/R

Dave

Sunday, August 11, 2013

Continuity of Denial: Kim Jong-un’s Succession and North Korean Human Rights

by Robert Collins

http://humanrightsnorthkorea.blogspot.kr/2013/08/continuity-of-denial-kim-jong-uns_6886.html

          Few countries base their self-sustainment on the concept of denying human rights to its populace. That is, if they are not authoritarian dictatorships, which historically see internal enemies in a far more immediate context than foreign ones.  History has seen plenty of these dictatorships in the 20^th Century and before.  But the 21^st Century has its fair share.  And perhaps there is no dictatorship more totalitarian than that of North Korea’s Kim Jong-un Regime. 

          North Korean society is characterized by the values of the collective over the individual, the priorities of a dictatorship, and the denial of human rights to any and all citizens.  Led by a regime that overwhelmingly employs pervasive tools of political terror, North Korean society is designed from the top to focus on collective support to the supreme leader through revolutionary thought and constant political indoctrination.  

Contrary to early predictions of economic reform, Kim Jong-un has sustained and promoted the policies of his father and grandfather.  The human rights plight of the North Korean citizen has worsened as those in Pyongyang continue to gain privileges and opportunity for financial success, so long as they work to promote all current regime policies, while those outside Pyongyang continue to work in a feudal system where daily survival is very difficult at best.  The gap between the haves and have-nots, more accurately described as the gap between the privileged and suppressed, continues to widen. 

          Inheriting a dictatorship is risky business, to be sure.  Threats abound and plenty of challengers would be ready to step into the leadership position if it were not for the political terror network so prevalent in dictatorships.  The inheritor of dictatorial power, whether he or she had reasonable morals in the first place, must put those morals aside to manage the volatile institutions, personnel and policies implementing human rights as they are until succession is secure.  That means a new dictator must grasp control of the current political structure as it is before considering how to institute any kind of reform—economic, human rights or otherwise.  So after securing the Kim Family Regime and after gaining confidence in his ability to control threats to his position as the North’s Supreme Leader, Kim Jong-un basically has three choices regarding the regime’s human rights policies: improve them, leave current human rights practices as they are, or increase denial and suppression of those rights. From the looks of it, Kim Jong-un has chosen the latter course of action.

          Certainly, denying human rights does not happen in a vacuum of security policy.  Indeed, there are many cornerstones to Kim Jong-un’s hold on power, just as there were for his father and grandfather:  political terror, ideological indoctrination of the populace, social classification of each citizen, resource control, border security, and personnel purges on the domestic front, as well as increasing military capabilities for both internal and external defense and to heighten peninsular and regional tensions on the international front.  All of these contribute in some way, directly or indirectly, to Kim Jong-un’s ability to deny human rights to every North Korean. 

            The greatest challenge Kim Jong-un faced in the succession process was securing control of the military.  The casual observer of North Korea would think that the North Korean dictator need not regard the control of the military as a component of change in the North’s human rights policy.  However, without control of the military, there is no guarantee of succession and no anticipation of human rights improvement. 

After Kim Jong-il suffered a stroke in August 2008, he began laying the foundation for Kim Jong-un’s succession to replace him.[1]  For Kim Jong-un’s transition to greater and greater authority, Kim Jong-il did not have the 30 years he was given by Kim Il-sung to secure power. As it turned out, he only had three years.

          After returning from his secondary education in Switzerland, Kim Jong-un attended a three-year artilleryman course at the Kim Il-sung Military Academy and then a two-year graduate course for regimental and division commanders at the same institution.  His first assignment was in General Political Bureau’s (GPB) division of the Korean Workers’ Party Organization and Guidance Department, a position that taught him how to gain control of the Korean People’s Army through the GPB political commissar system.[2] 

          From that point on, Kim Jong-un has used GPB personnel[3] as his means of controlling internal security agencies, the core institutions of human rights denial.  For example, Choi Yong-hae[4]was appointed the new GPB Director in April 2012[5] from one of North Korea’s premier families whose dedication to the Kim Family Regime is total.  After Lee Chin-su died in 1987 as the Director of the State Security Department (SSD), Kim Jong-il did not appoint a new director through the end of his life in 2011. Essentially, that meant Kim Jong-il himself was the SSD Director and lead implementer of human rights denial.  But within a short time after assuming power, Kim Jong-un appointed General Kim Won-hung to be the SSD Director, moving from the position of vice-director of the GPB.  Kim also promoted another GPB senior officer, Colonel General Cho Kyong-chol, to the position of Commander of the Military Security Command, the SSD’s military counterpart, and lead institution of human rights denial within the Korean People’s Army and defense industries.[6]  These actions followed the dismissal of two SSD Deputy Directors in 2011 (Ryu Kyong) and 2012 (U Dong-chuk).  Loyalty to Kim Jong-un is the supreme requirement of the regime’s lead human rights henchman.  There have been plenty of military personnel purges after Kim Jong-un’s assumption of power.  Vice Marshal Ri Yong-ho was purged from his position of Chief of the KPA General Staff; Admiral Kim Chol was purged from his position of Deputy Minister of People’s Armed Forces; and six of nine KPA corps commanders were replaced, the first time in North Korean history that has happened in such a short period of time.  Indeed, since Kim Jong-un was designated successor in 2010, a total of 32 elite personnel have been purged, a solid indicator of no changes in the North’s human rights policies.[7]  To reinforce this approach of loyalty first, Kim Jong-un gave a speech on October 29, 2012, at Kim Il-sung Military Academy where he stated, “We do not need people who are not devoted to the Party and Suryeong (supreme leader), no matter how militaristic their disposition or excellent their tactical ability.”[8]

          As for Kim Jong-un himself, his first military appointment was as the Deputy Chairman of the Party Central Military Committee on September 28, 2010.  Within days after his Kim Jong-il’s death in December 2011, and as an indicator of power priorities, Kim Jong-un was appointed the by Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) Politburo Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army on December 30, 2011. This was based on Kim Jong-il’s wishes dating from October 8, 2011.[9]  Kim Jong-un was then appointed at the 4^th Party Representatives Conference on April 11, 2012 as the Party’s First Secretary[10] and then appointed the Chairman of the National Defense Commission at a meeting of the Supreme People’s Assembly meeting on April 13, 2012.[11]

          Another connection between the military and human rights denial are North Korea’s asymmetric military capabilities development and its impact on resources.  The successful long-range missile test in December 2012[12] and its third nuclear test,[13] along with subsequent threats against President Obama, the United States, and South Korea, were effective in raising military tensions across Northeast Asia to the U.S. homeland.  But these capabilities were and are a major contributor to the denial of the right to food as described in the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[14] The December missile launch was estimated by the South Korean Government to cost US$1.3 Billion, enough to purchase 4.6 million tons of corn to feed its people.[15]  The failed missile test of the previous April cost the Kim Regime US$850 Million, enough to feed 80% of all North Koreans for a year.[16] These expenditures could have easily relieved food security problems in North Korea where, according to the latest quarterly report from the World Food Programme, 81% of all households are at the poor or borderline level in food consumption.[17]  Missiles and nukes before feeding the populace is obviously the priority of the Kim Jong-un Regime, as evidenced by a United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization report that the North only purchased 57% of the grain necessary to feed its population.[18]

(Continued at the link below)

http://humanrightsnorthkorea.blogspot.kr/2013/08/continuity-of-denial-kim-jong-uns_6886.html

More on the possible COCOM reorganization.
V/R
Dave

Defense Department Weighing COCOM Realignment and Rebrand

JAMES JOYNER   ·   SUNDAY, AUGUST 11, 2013   ·   1 COMMENT

HTTP://WWW.OUTSIDETHEBELTWAY.COM/DEFENSE-DEPARTMENT-WEIGHING-COCOM-REALIGNMENT-AND-REBRAND/

The Pentagon is considering doing away with two combatant commands—and no longer calling them combatant commands.

Defense News (“DoD Weighs Major COCOM Realignment“):

The Pentagon is considering a major overhaul of its geographical combatant commands, possibly realigning oversight within hot-button areas of the world and eliminating thousands of military and civilian positions, according to defense sources.

While the plans for combatant command (COCOM) realignment and consolidation are still notional, sources say some options include:

Combining Northern Command and Southern Command to form what some are calling “Americas Command” or “Western Command.”

Dissolving Africa Command and splitting it up among European Command and Central Command.

Expanding Pacific Command to include Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are part of Central Command.

In all, the realignments could shutter two COCOMs and eight service-supporting commands, totaling more than 5,000 people, both uniformed and civilian.

This would be a bold step, although the cost savings would be minor by Pentagon standards. Offhand, all of the proposals listed above seem odd. Southern Command, which oversees Latin America minus Mexico, is arguably our most functional COCOM, characterized by repeat assignments and language and cultural proficiency. AFRICOM is largely useless but the symbolism of shuttering what is already a Potemkin COCOM so soon after standing it up would be horrible.  While AfPak is part of the Asian continent, nobody thinks of it as Asian.

But there’s at least some real thinking behind this.

Combining Northern and Southern commands could lead to greater resources for activities in South and Central America, which experts say has long been DoD’s most neglected region.

Combining the regions could better address cross-border issues — particularly drug trafficking — among Mexico, South America and the United States, said Bob Killebrew, a retired Army colonel and senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security.

Mexico is part of Northern Command, which also includes the contiguous United States, Alaska and Canada.

“[I]t makes … sense not to have a kind of artificial DoD boundary, not only between Mexico and Central America, but between Mexico and the American border as well,” Killebrew said.

It strikes me that the more obvious solution would be to place Mexico into SOUTHCOM, where it belongs linguistically and culturally. For all intents and purposes, NORTHCOM isn’t a fighting command but an administrative creature. So,  combining the two would simultaneously take away SOUTHCOM’s unique culture while lumping it in with the least prestigious of the COCOMs; it’s not at all clear why that would improve focus on Latin America.

(Continued at this ink below)

HTTP://WWW.OUTSIDETHEBELTWAY.COM/DEFENSE-DEPARTMENT-WEIGHING-COCOM-REALIGNMENT-AND-REBRAND/

NK Adds Kim Jong Il to 'Ten Principles'

The 11th principle should be when the going gets tough in north Korea, the answer is to give the people more ideological training.  The second article below from the Daily nK has listed all 10 principles.

It is interesting that Kim Jong-il is being added.  I had speculated that Kim Jong-un would really focus on him being the grandson of Kim Il-sung because the people longed for the "good old days" when the Great Leader was in charge (well of course he still technically is since he retains all the leadership positions he held and Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un have adopted different titles).  I had thought that maybe his plan would be to at a minimum marginalize Kim Jong-il and perhaps even after a suitable amount of time blame him for the ills of north Korea,  But perhaps Kim Jong-un cannot do that because he needs to still deal with Kim Jong-il loyalists within the elite.  Or it could simply be that that Kim Jong-un is banking on the heredity succession process and therefore must idolize his father as well so that he can have complete "legitimacy" (however legitimacy is defined in the north Korean system. 

V/R

Dave

NK Adds Kim Jong Il to 'Ten Principles'

By Kang Mi Jin [2013-08-09 17:15 ] http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk01500&num=10828

The North Korean authorities have revised the “Ten Principles for the Establishment of the One-Ideology System” (hereafter the “Ten Principles”). The phrase “General Kim Jong Il” has been added to the revised version, whose core structure remains in place. The Ten Principles, each of which has a number of sub-sections, reflect the demand that all North Korean citizens be guided by the thoughts and deeds of Kim Il Sung. They were formulated in the 1970s by Kim Jong Il during the process of his anointment as successor, and act as guidelines that both underwrite Kim family rule over North Korea and facilitate the mass repression of the country’s populace. They are memorized by every citizen. (Continued at the link below) http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk01500&num=10828 What Are the 'Ten Principles'? By Daily NK [2013-08-09 17:41 ] http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk02900&num=10829 The “Ten Principles for the Establishment of the One-Ideology System” are regulations that govern the everyday lives of the North Korean people. They were officially announced by Kim Jong Il in 1974. The original Ten Principles, to which the name “General Kim Jong Il” has now been added, are as follows: 1. We must give our all in the struggle to unify the entire society with the revolutionary ideology of Great Leader Kim Il Sung. 2. We must honor Great Leader comrade Kim Il Sung with all our loyalty. 3. We must make absolute the authority of Great Leader comrade Kim Il Sung. 4. We must make Great Leader comrade Kim Il Sung’s revolutionary ideology our faith and make his instructions our creed. 5. We must adhere strictly to the principle of unconditional obedience in carrying out the Great Leader comrade Kim Il Sung's instructions. Continued at the link below) http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk02900&num=10829

DoD Weighs Major COCOM Realignment

From today's Early Bird and will probably be on the Defense News web site tomorrow: http://www.defensenews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/frontpage?odyssey=refresh I had only heard from rumblings about this.  These would be some significant changes - perhaps the largest amount of change at one time since the Unified Command Plan was established.  Putting Africa back into EUCOM, NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM into an Americas or Western Command, and giving PACOM Pakistan and Afghanistan. I agree with Bob Killebrew that Combatant Command is a terrible name  I would go back to the traditional Commanders in Chief (CINCPAC, CINCEUR, CINCCENT - but I wonder about the Americas or Western Command - CINCAM or CINCWEST?). And the Pakistan and Afghanistan additions to PACOM are interesting.  It is good to recognize that those countries are in Asia and also align somewhat with other government bureaucracies but if PACOM is going to be the strategic priority and part of the unstated but somewhat accepted rationale of the Asian Pivot was to shift the focus away from Iraq and Afghanistan, won't PACOM be consumed by those problems?  Or is it because PACOM has always been an "economy of force theater" used to doing less with less and maintaining a conservative, if not somewhat risk averse stance on the use of the military instrument, so perhaps it is thought that PACOM could reduce our commitment in that area and keep the "problems" at arms length (as if that were possible).  Maybe PACOM can keep us out of trouble there. And I could not end without getting on my hobby horse:  Of course there is no mention of Korea because as I recall the only mention of Korea in the Unified Command Plan is that USFK is a subunified command of PACOM and the UNC and CFC are not part of the UCP. Defense News August 12, 2013 Pg. 1 DoD Weighs Major COCOM Realignment By Marcus Weisgerber WASHINGTON -- The Pentagon is considering a major overhaul of its geographical combatant commands, possibly realigning oversight within hot-button areas of the world and eliminating thousands of military and civilian positions, according to defense sources. While the plans for combatant command (COCOM) realignment and consolidation are still notional, sources say some options include: Combining Northern Command and Southern Command to form what some are calling “Americas Command” or “Western Command.” Dissolving Africa Command and splitting it up among European Command and Central Command. Expanding Pacific Command to include Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are part of Central Command. In all, the realignments could shutter two COCOMs and eight service-supporting commands, totaling more than 5,000 people, both uniformed and civilian. US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel for the first time hinted at consolidation of the COCOMs during a July 31 press conference when he announced significant budget-cutting options the Defense Department would have to make should federal spending cuts remain in place across the decade. Defense officials would not comment on specific consolidation plans being considered. The sequester is forcing the Pentagon to look for ways to cut spending quickly. Shuttering a COCOM would impact US relations abroad and underscores the need to eliminate the budget caps, a defense official said. “Combining combatant commands is certainly not something that we want to do but something that we have to consider because all cuts have to be on the table,” the official said. Members of the Joint Staff and other defense officials have been exploring options for COCOM realignment since last year, according to sources. Regional experts agree the Pentagon could reorganize its combatant commands to better align the headquarters with long-term strategic goals. Combining Northern and Southern commands could lead to greater resources for activities in South and Central America, which experts say has long been DoD’s most neglected region. Combining the regions could better address cross-border issues — particularly drug trafficking — among Mexico, South America and the United States, said Bob Killebrew, a retired Army colonel and senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Mexico is part of Northern Command, which also includes the contiguous United States, Alaska and Canada. “[I]t makes ... sense not to have a kind of artificial DoD boundary, not only between Mexico and Central America, but between Mexico and the American border as well,” Killebrew said. Organizing oversight of Africa has been a topic of debate — mostly in the academic community — ever since Africa Command split from European Command and became a stand-alone COCOM in 2008. Before that, European Command oversaw much of the continent, with Central Command overseeing the Horn of Africa. “The [oversight] that was diffused over multiple commands really wasn’t something that was in our best interest nor in the best interest of our partners on the continent,” said Kip Ward, a retired Army general who was the first commander of Africa Command. Major changes to the existing Africa Command construct are not likely during a COCOM reorganization, experts say. US military operations in Africa, ranging from the 2011 overthrow of Moammar Gadhafi in Libya to the recent campaign against terrorists in Mali, underscore the need for a dedicated COCOM, defense officials say. Since its establishment, Africa Command has added value and has been well received on the continent, Ward said. “I think that the focus that AFRICOM is able to bring to that vital, important part of the world is still important,” he said. Meanwhile, experts agree that Afghanistan, Pakistan and India should fall under the same COCOM, regardless of whether it’s Pacific or Central. India falls under Pacific Command while Pakistan and Afghanistan are part of Central Command. Since security, foreign policy, economic and trade issues with India predominantly involve Pakistan and vice versa, placing them under the same COCOM could better streamline US military ties with each country, some experts say. The same is true for security and policy issues involving Afghanistan, since much of the violence in the nation is along the Pakistani border. “It’s better that the people who are dealing with India are the ones that are at least fully aware of, or completely in the picture, of what was discussed between two top dignitaries between the US and Pakistan,” said Hassan Abbas, a former Pakistani government official who served in the administrations of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and President Pervez Musharraf. “If they are the same team, or the same group of people that are in the same institution who are dealing with India, it actually provides more leverage for the United States and more opportunities to go for a coherent policy rather than dealing through two different commands,” said Abbas, a senior adviser and fellow at the Asia Society and a professor at National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs. He stressed that this is his personal view, and he was not speaking for the university or the US government. “I think this makes sense.” Budget-driven Changes Federal budget caps would cut about $500 billion from planned defense spending over the next decade. The caps have already cut $37 billion from the Pentagon’s 2013 budget. With that in mind, Hagel on July 31 announced the findings of the four-month-long Strategic Choices and Management Review, an effort that examined options the Pentagon could take to meet those spending targets, while trying to achieve the goals of its Pacific-focused military strategy. If the caps remain in place across the decade, “additional consolidations and mission reductions,” such as “consolidations of regional combatant commands, defense agency mission cuts and further IT consolidation” might be necessary, Hagel said. “These changes would be far-reaching and require further analysis and consideration,” he said. “Though defense bureaucracies are often derided, the fact is that these offices perform functions needed to manage, administer and support a military of our size, complexity and global reach.” The actual realignments would be laid out in the Unified Command Plan, a document that “establishes the missions, responsibilities and geographic areas of responsibility.” The Unified Command Plan — which originated in the late 1940s — is usually reviewed every two years and was last updated in April 2011. The Pentagon last shuttered a major command in 2010 when it closed US Joint Forces Command, in an attempt to trim overhead. But many of the positions associated with that command remained as the Joint Staff absorbed nearly 3,000 uniformed and civilian workers. The growth in headquarters staff sizes at the COCOMs and across the entire military has been a major issue of late. Between 2010 and 2012, staff sizes at the six geographical COCOMs have increased more than 7 percent, adding nearly 1,000 civilian and military positions. In addition to those numbers, each service operates its own subordinate commands to the individual COCOMs. Many positions at the service commands are redundant to positions at the COCOMs, according to the Government Accountability Office. “If they were to streamline or combine [COCOMs], you certainly won’t have as many components,” said Arnold Punaro, a retired Marine Corps major general and former Senate staffer who chairs the Reserve Forces Policy Board. “It depends on how they do it.” Hagel announced this summer a plan to cut COCOM headquarters and Pentagon staffs by 20 percent and reduce duplication. Pentagon officials overseeing the reorganization should also consider changing the title from combatant commanders to something less invasive, Killebrew said. “It’s a horrible [title] because what most of these commanders do is military assistance and military cooperation with other countries,” Killebrew said. “When you say you’re a combatant commander the first thing somebody in a small country says is, ‘But I don’t want to go to war. I just want to talk.’” Paul McLeary contributed to this report.

Lawmakers Skeptical of Global Spec Ops Plan

Paul McLeary has performed an important service with this article. We have known about the friction with Congress for some time but I do not think that we have heard specific criticisms on the record from this range of Congressmen.  And with all due respect to the Congressman, I think many of the views illustrate how little many really understand the nature of Special Operations beyond capturing and killing high value targets and the raid on Bin Laden. Of course we have a responsibility to educate politicians, policy makers and strategists so that they understand special operations (and in particular the offensive strategic option of unconventional warfare to be conducted by US military and interagency forces as well as the full range of missions and activities to counter unconventional warfare that is being conducted against us and our friends, partners, and allies).  We do need to pay attention to the criticisms on transparency because what it really means is that we need to help educate them and this takes a lot more than a Capabilities Exercise demonstration or an Ambassadors Orientation brief. 

However, if we do not get Congress back in support of USSOCOM (and as I have mentioned there is some irony in that USSOCOM would not exist if it were not for Congress and now Congress appears to be very suspicious and critical of USSOCOM), my real fear is that Congress and others will cause us to throw the baby out with the bathwater because of the friction over the Global SOF Network.  Traditional Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations missions and activities among others need to be conducted and and for the foreseeable future more than ever.  We do not need a Global SOF Network necessarily to conduct those activities though a comprehensive national strategy for conducting those activities integrated with and in support of the Geographic Combatant Commands and the Chiefs of Mission would be a good start.  There is a lot more to be discussed, debated, and written on this topic and I hope a lot of people weigh in and help shape this in the proper way.

V/R

Dave

Lawmakers Skeptical of Global Spec Ops Plan

http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130810/DEFREG02/308100007/Lawmakers-Skeptical-Global-Spec-Ops-Plan

Aug. 10, 2013 - 09:35AM   |  

 By PAUL McLEARY   |   Comments

• A
• A

Night Strike: A US Army Ranger squad keeps watch during a nighttime raid in Iraq. A plan to link operators, interagency personnel and allies into a global network is encountering resistance from lawmakers and at least one combatant commander. (US Army Special Operations Command)

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WASHINGTON — Sometime next month, the heads of the US military’s global combatant commands will convene at the Tampa, Fla., headquarters of US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to be briefed on an ambitious and controversial plan to revamp the way special operators deploy around the globe.

The concept is the brainchild of Adm. William McRaven, who has been working toward fully unveiling the plan since taking command of SOCOM in 2011. The idea is to establish a formal framework in which US special operations forces (SOF), interagency partners and foreign allies join an alliance that promotes the sharing of intelligence, partner engagement, training and, if necessary, direct action.

McRaven has been on the stump actively promoting the idea for well over a year now while taking great pains to assure skeptical military officials that he isn’t trying to usurp their power by setting up a new global command structure. Despite his efforts, however, lawmakers on Capitol Hill and at least one combatant commander have expressed concern over the proposal, called the “Global SOF Network.”

The move comes at a heady time for a defense bureaucracy stressed by simultaneously wrapping up a war and planning for a new era with smaller budgets. These stressors are particularly acute at SOCOM headquarters, where the moment also represents a rapidly closing window of opportunity to solidify gains in manpower, budget and prestige it has won since 2001.

In explaining the need for more SOF-led coordination across the US military’s regional commands, McRaven told an audience at an SOF convention in May that “there is no such thing as a local problem any more. If you have a problem in Mali, it will manifest itself in Europe. And that problem in Europe will manifest itself in the Far East. Then the problem in the Far East will manifest itself in the Middle East.

“The world is linked, and therefore we need to be linked,” he said. “We have to build a network to defeat the enemy network.”

But what that network would look like, who it would report to, how it would interact with established command structures, how it would be funded and how the 66,000 — soon to be 72,000 — members of SOCOM would fit into it are all questions that have yet to be fully answered.

Officials at SOCOM did not reply to multiple phone and email requests for comment.

According to multiple sources, these issues came to a head this summer, when the chief of US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), Marine Corps Lt. Gen. John Kelly, rejected a key part of the plan after he was briefed on the idea of building a “regional SOF coordination center” in Colombia.

The center is a cornerstone of McRaven’s plan, as it would serve as a place where military and civilian agencies can coordinate efforts while advising host nation forces.

The problem with the site in Colombia was that representatives from SOCOM began discussions with Colombian officials about building the $15 million facility without working through SOUTHCOM first, according to several sources with knowledge of the situation.

“SOUTHCOM is saying no way, and SOUTHCOM has the trump card on that,” one former SOF officer said.

In a statement, Kelly took issue with reports of his opposition, saying that “I am absolutely for this concept and I talk with Bill McRaven all the time. There are things we need to work out with the State Department, but the more for this area of the world, the better.”

“I think there are concerns about redundancy in an era of fiscal austerity and perhaps a lingering sense of SOF going off on its own,” said Linda Robinson, whose book, “One Hundred Victories: Special Ops and the Future of American Warfare,” comes out this fall.

(Continued at this link)

http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130810/DEFREG02/308100007/Lawmakers-Skeptical-Global-Spec-Ops-Plan

More of my thoughts on OPCON Transfer.
V/R
Dave

OPCON TRANSFER AND THE AMERICAN-ROK ALLIANCE

August 8, 2013 · by David Maxwell · in Hasty Ambush

On Tuesday the Wall Street Journal published an op-ed titled “A Test of Responsibility in Korea: Seoul now wants the U.S. to retain military command on the peninsula.”

The alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) is at a critical juncture. Koreans see an alliance at-risk due to ongoing US fiscal challenges and their impact on the defense budget.  Koreans, and others in the region, fear that this lead to American retrenchment.  Senior ROK leaders may fear this so much that they are willing to risk their own domestic political backlash as well as international derision by requesting that the United States remain in command of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command, thus postponing the so-called OPCON Transfer scheduled for 2015.

(read the rest at War on the Rocks: http://warontherocks.com/2013/08/opcon-transfer-and-the-american-rok-alliance/)

Must Read - Adjusting mindsets on future of alliance command (Korea)

This is a must read editorial.  It makes the point on the dreaded "OPCON Transfer" better than I have been able.  

His view reminds me of an anecdote.  When we were writing the initial CONPLAN 5029 it what was called the "super-combined working group which consisted of ROK and US officers front he Combined Forces Command and ROK officers from the JCS, the working group got off to a rocky start because the first question ROK and US officers wanted to address was "who is in charge?"  It was Marine Lt Gen Ray Ayres who was the CJ5 at the time who finally broke the log jam and said look who is in charge and command relationships can be described on one page.  Let's work on the other 99 pages (the "How") and then we will sort out command relationships at the end.  And that is what we did and that is how we wrote 5029 rather quickly.  Park Jin-ho is advocating a similar course of actin, let's drop the terminology of "OPCON Transfer" and determine what the proper military structure is for the Alliance that will achieve our mutual strategic objectives.

V/R
Dave

2013-08-06 16:54 Adjusting mindsets on future of alliance command http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2013/08/197_140596.html By Park Jin-ho Seoul’s Ministry of Defense has requested a review of the conditions for a successful transition of wartime operational control (OPCON), with some going as far to say that the ministry requested another delay in OPCON transition. From a view of achieving the best strategic interests of the Republic of Korea and the U.S., delaying OPCON transition does not seem to be the best strategic approach because related political controversy between the two nations would distract our strategic focus from discussing the fundamental issue ― sustaining an effective alliance command and control structure capable of addressing the North Korean threat and other security challenges. A combined wartime command and control structure is a “center of gravity’’ for constituting and sustaining a ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), or installing a new alliance command and control structure. Changing the wartime command and control relationships significantly impacts “how to fight and win a war.’’ Between Seoul and Washington, however, discussion over “who will lead’’ takes priority over “how to structure’’ a combined defense of the Republic of Korea. These characteristics of bilateral discussion go against a ROK-U.S. combined war fighting spirit of “Let’s go together.” Military force is the measure of last resort for political leaders in the pursuit of vital national interests. So, it is natural that the issue of military command and control is politically charged. However, the issues involved are complex and have two key components ― military and political. In the military realm, things are more straightforward than in the political arena. Militarily, we can focus on capabilities and readiness, though as already stated in Korea, we tend to focus more on the “who” instead of the “how” in designing the future structure of combined command and control structure. The decision of OPCON transition is ultimately a political call, but the ROK and the U.S. need to change a strategic mindset. What is key in both the military and political realm is to sustain or enhance our bilateral combined military partnership. Former President Roh Moo-hyun approached wartime OPCON transfer as a matter of regaining sovereignty, which stimulated a massive political controversy. Now we should transcend this mindset and discard the term “OPCON transfer” because the term reflects and instigates a nationalistic response to a critical national security issue. The use of inappropriate terminology often makes an issue much more vulnerable to domestic politicization. In the case of OPCON transfer, such politicization obscures and complicates a strategic discussion for making a sound decision. We have to examine an appropriate and less politically loaded term to facilitate sound decision-making about the future alliance command and control structure. The best alternative term is “Future Alliance Command and Control.” The strategic agenda for bilateral discussion of alliance command and control should be focused on “how to defend Korea,’’ not on the question of “who is in the lead.’’ As wartime OPCON is at the zenith of planning and executing a war, the result of a war would be dependent on how to manage the control rather than who manages the control. Our basic ability to fight and win wars should not be tied to whether the ultimate commander wears a ROK or a U.S. uniform. (Continued at the link below) http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2013/08/197_140596.html