Showing posts with label GSN. Show all posts
Showing posts with label GSN. Show all posts

Thursday, November 7, 2013

Interagency Planner Special Applications Group (USSOCOM - Global SOF Network)

The job announcement below references the Global SOF Network.

However, I recently learned unofficially that the concept of the Global SOF Network is no longer the USSOCOM narrative.  Rather USSOCOM, at the direction of the Joint Staff has been directed to submit a Global SOF Campaign Plan that is designed to support US National Security objectives by orchestrating global SOF (aligning forces and sustaining the proper level of effort) to support the Geographic Combatant Commands and the Chiefs of Mission and their theater campaign plans and country team mission strategic plans respectively.  This will be done in accordance with the established joint planning system.  I think this is the proper way to move ahead rather than develop a new concept that is resisted by the very people and organizations that it is designed to support.  There is a lot to be said for using existing (and proven) doctrine and processes.

In regards to this job announcement, as usual the personnel guys are probably the last to get the word!



Interagency Planner

Special Applications Group


Posted on: 10/28/13


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Minimum Security Clearance

Top Secret/SCI Clearance

Location

Macdill AFB, Florida  33608

 (map)
Workplace: On-Site/Office
Travel: Occasional travel
KEY ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES:

• Support USSOCOM J3 mission objectives by assisting with the management of the Global SOF Network (GSN) comprised of the USSOCOM staff and its Service Components, Theater SOCs, Special Operations Task Forces and sub-unified commands, and relevant IA and coalition partners.
• Identify and support issue resolution where problems cross seams or boundaries within the GSN or regional Communities of Interest (COI)
• Coordinate and collaborate with GSN, Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC), and IA counterparts to build consensus and produce positive Whole of Government outcomes
• Serve as subject matter expert responsible to facilitate overall information and knowledge management in order to maintain accurate situational awareness, make recommendations in support of requests for support and issue resolution, and ensure relevant information is synchronized across the GSN and issue-specific COI
• Analyze facts, problem issues, and develop alternative solutions or recommendations
• Function as a primary IA focal point and effectively collaborate with military, IA, and functional area subject matter experts
• Support planning and maintain situational awareness within USSOCOM and all other GSN entities as required
• Prepare information papers, non-routine reports, briefings, findings, recommendations, and targeted information briefings for diverse audiences
• Function as a primary SME for JSAW and Afghan Stability Operations, and the Afghan Local Police program in order to effectively collaborate with SOF Components, GPF, Coalition Military Units, the IA, and functional area subject matter experts

REQUIREMENTS:

• Extensive experience working with US SOF and a clear understanding of Counterinsurgency (COIN), specifically in relation to Afghan Village Stability Operations (VSO) and the Afghan Local Police (ALP) Program
• COA development, MDMP, senior-level decision support, and execution experience are required
• Bachelor’s Degree
• Master’s Degree strongly preferred
• Current DoD TS/SCI clearance

Start Date:
9 September 2013
 
The Company
Special Applications Group has an immediate need for an Interagency (IA) Planner. We are a growing and values-based, Service Disabled, Veteran Owned Small Business (SDVOSB) with access, currency, and relevance throughout the Department of Defense and Homeland Security communities. We have an unmatched blend of military, special operations, aviation, homeland security and other specialists who bring responsive, tailored services and products to dynamic organizations.

The Candidate will support USSOCOM J3 mission objectives as an Interagency Planner through a variety of duties and subject matter expertise.

This Full-Time position is located at USSOCOM in Tampa, FL.
Preferences
10+ yrs experience
Employee
Industry Category: Military - Other
Compensation
Unspecified annual salary
Unspecified hourly wage.

Saturday, August 10, 2013

Lawmakers Skeptical of Global Spec Ops Plan

Paul McLeary has performed an important service with this article. We have known about the friction with Congress for some time but I do not think that we have heard specific criticisms on the record from this range of Congressmen.  And with all due respect to the Congressman, I think many of the views illustrate how little many really understand the nature of Special Operations beyond capturing and killing high value targets and the raid on Bin Laden. Of course we have a responsibility to educate politicians, policy makers and strategists so that they understand special operations (and in particular the offensive strategic option of unconventional warfare to be conducted by US military and interagency forces as well as the full range of missions and activities to counter unconventional warfare that is being conducted against us and our friends, partners, and allies).  We do need to pay attention to the criticisms on transparency because what it really means is that we need to help educate them and this takes a lot more than a Capabilities Exercise demonstration or an Ambassadors Orientation brief. 

However, if we do not get Congress back in support of USSOCOM (and as I have mentioned there is some irony in that USSOCOM would not exist if it were not for Congress and now Congress appears to be very suspicious and critical of USSOCOM), my real fear is that Congress and others will cause us to throw the baby out with the bathwater because of the friction over the Global SOF Network.  Traditional Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations missions and activities among others need to be conducted and and for the foreseeable future more than ever.  We do not need a Global SOF Network necessarily to conduct those activities though a comprehensive national strategy for conducting those activities integrated with and in support of the Geographic Combatant Commands and the Chiefs of Mission would be a good start.  There is a lot more to be discussed, debated, and written on this topic and I hope a lot of people weigh in and help shape this in the proper way.
V/R
Dave


Lawmakers Skeptical of Global Spec Ops Plan


Aug. 10, 2013 - 09:35AM   |  
 By PAUL McLEARY   |   Comments
Night Strike: A US Army Ranger squad keeps watch during a nighttime raid in Iraq. A plan to link operators, interagency personnel and allies into a global network is encountering resistance from lawmakers and at least one combatant commander.
Night Strike: A US Army Ranger squad keeps watch during a nighttime raid in Iraq. A plan to link operators, interagency personnel and allies into a global network is encountering resistance from lawmakers and at least one combatant commander. (US Army Special Operations Command)
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WASHINGTON — Sometime next month, the heads of the US military’s global combatant commands will convene at the Tampa, Fla., headquarters of US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to be briefed on an ambitious and controversial plan to revamp the way special operators deploy around the globe.
The concept is the brainchild of Adm. William McRaven, who has been working toward fully unveiling the plan since taking command of SOCOM in 2011. The idea is to establish a formal framework in which US special operations forces (SOF), interagency partners and foreign allies join an alliance that promotes the sharing of intelligence, partner engagement, training and, if necessary, direct action.
McRaven has been on the stump actively promoting the idea for well over a year now while taking great pains to assure skeptical military officials that he isn’t trying to usurp their power by setting up a new global command structure. Despite his efforts, however, lawmakers on Capitol Hill and at least one combatant commander have expressed concern over the proposal, called the “Global SOF Network.”
The move comes at a heady time for a defense bureaucracy stressed by simultaneously wrapping up a war and planning for a new era with smaller budgets. These stressors are particularly acute at SOCOM headquarters, where the moment also represents a rapidly closing window of opportunity to solidify gains in manpower, budget and prestige it has won since 2001.
In explaining the need for more SOF-led coordination across the US military’s regional commands, McRaven told an audience at an SOF convention in May that “there is no such thing as a local problem any more. If you have a problem in Mali, it will manifest itself in Europe. And that problem in Europe will manifest itself in the Far East. Then the problem in the Far East will manifest itself in the Middle East.
“The world is linked, and therefore we need to be linked,” he said. “We have to build a network to defeat the enemy network.”
But what that network would look like, who it would report to, how it would interact with established command structures, how it would be funded and how the 66,000 — soon to be 72,000 — members of SOCOM would fit into it are all questions that have yet to be fully answered.
Officials at SOCOM did not reply to multiple phone and email requests for comment.
According to multiple sources, these issues came to a head this summer, when the chief of US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), Marine Corps Lt. Gen. John Kelly, rejected a key part of the plan after he was briefed on the idea of building a “regional SOF coordination center” in Colombia.
The center is a cornerstone of McRaven’s plan, as it would serve as a place where military and civilian agencies can coordinate efforts while advising host nation forces.
The problem with the site in Colombia was that representatives from SOCOM began discussions with Colombian officials about building the $15 million facility without working through SOUTHCOM first, according to several sources with knowledge of the situation.
“SOUTHCOM is saying no way, and SOUTHCOM has the trump card on that,” one former SOF officer said.
In a statement, Kelly took issue with reports of his opposition, saying that “I am absolutely for this concept and I talk with Bill McRaven all the time. There are things we need to work out with the State Department, but the more for this area of the world, the better.”
“I think there are concerns about redundancy in an era of fiscal austerity and perhaps a lingering sense of SOF going off on its own,” said Linda Robinson, whose book, “One Hundred Victories: Special Ops and the Future of American Warfare,” comes out this fall.
(Continued at this link)

Thursday, July 11, 2013

Optimising the Potential of Special Forces (An Indian Perspective)

The is quite a critique of the Indian military.  Example:

A lackadaisical approach to internal security and failure to coordinate a response has been the bane of the problem in India.

This excerpt is an interesting assessment of US and other Special Forces (or Special Operations Forces in US terminology).  Sounds like an Indian assessment of the US Global SOF Network.

Why the US has managed to secure its mainland post 9/11 is not only because of an efficient Homeland Security organisation but because the US Special Forces (USSF) are operating in 200 countries including India. Significantly, USSF have undeclared tasks such as conducting proactive, sustained ‘man-hunts’ and disrupt operations globally; building partner capacity in relevant ground, air and maritime capabilities in scores of countries on a steady – state basis; helping generate persistent ground, air and maritime surveillance and strike coverage over ‘under-governed’ areas and littoral zones and employing unconventional warfare against state-sponsored terrorism and trans-national terrorist groups globally. Before 26/11, Al-Qaeda had planned similar operations against New York but could not because the USSF had infiltrated Al-Qaeda. One cannot guard the house by simply barricading it. You must patrol the streets and the area outside. 
Growing inter-dependence and interlinking of terrorist groups regionally and internationally should be a matter of serious concern. It is not the US alone that has deployed its Special Forces abroad. This is the case with most advanced countries including UK, Russia, Israel, China and even Pakistan. Pakistan’s SSG was operating with the Taliban in Afghanistan and has been active in Jammu and Kashmir, Nepal and Bangladesh, primarily training anti-India forces. There is a strong possibility of their presence in the Maldives and Sri Lanka as well, aside from presence within India. The Chinese have been smarter. For all the development projects throughout the globe, including in Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan-POK, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Seychelles, contracts underway by PLA-owned/affiliated companies employ serving and veteran PLA soldiers and disguised Special Forces with assigned tasks, including evacuation of Chinese citizens from that country in case of emergencies.
V/R
Dave

Optimising the Potential of Special Forces

 By Lt Gen Prakash Katoch Issue Vol. 28.2 Apr-Jun 2013 | Date : 08 Jul , 2013

In India, the lack of strategic culture, more on account of keeping the military out from strategic military decision making, has led the hierarchy to believe that conventional forces coupled with nuclear clout can deter us from irregular threats. Nothing can be farther from the truth. Pakistan, though conventionally inferior, has been successfully playing her ‘thousand cuts policy’ knowing full well that India has failed to develop the required deterrent. It is our inability to find a cure to this Achilles’ heel, that has led China, which was hitherto using Pakistan as proxy to wage irregular war on India, now directly aids and supports insurgent and terrorist outfits inside India.

A lackadaisical approach to internal security and failure to coordinate a response has been the bane of the problem in India.
The last conventional war was fought between Russia and Georgia in 2005. In the case of India, the last conventional war or rather conflict was in 1999 in the Kargil region though Musharraf wanted the world to believe that so-called freedom fighters were fighting the Indian Army and not Pakistani regulars (Northern Light Infantry and SSG). Over the last two decades, conflict has increased exponentially with regular armies fighting irregulars or between irregulars, latter more so because of sectarian reasons rather than ideology. In India, irregular forces have been confronting the security sector. In a rogue neighbour like Pakistan, the term ‘non-state actors’ is a misnomer. The notorious exploits of the ISI have led the Deputy NSA to call upon the international community to label it a ‘terrorist organisation’.

In India, the lack of strategic culture, more on account of keeping the military out from strategic military decision making, has led the hierarchy to believe that conventional forces coupled with nuclear clout can deter us from irregular threats. Nothing can be farther from the truth. Pakistan, though conventionally inferior, has been successfully playing her ‘thousand cuts policy’ knowing full well that India has failed to develop the required deterrent. It is our inability to find a cure to this Achilles’ heel, that has led China, which was hitherto using Pakistan as proxy to wage irregular war on India, now directly aids and supports insurgent and terrorist outfits inside India.

Battlefield India

A lackadaisical approach to internal security and failure to coordinate a response that includes external factors has been the bane of the problem in India. This is further aggravated by lack of governance, inadequate laws and lack of implementing existing laws on account of vote-bank politics. Mismanagement of social change has increased strife. We continue to retain the label of ‘soft state’ with actions like permitting Hurriyat to meet Pakistani visitors inside the Pakistani embassy, granting visas to Hurriyat to seek blessings of Hafiz Saeed in Pakistan and politicians shunning bureaucratic advice to not invite Rehman Malik and to not entertain Raja Pervaiz Ashraf visiting Ajmer privately. Incidentally, in a book authored by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman prior to the formation of Bangladesh, he wrote, “Because Eastern Pakistan must have sufficient land for expansion Eastern Pakistan must include Assam to be financially and economically strong.”

In a rogue neighbour like Pakistan, the term ‘non-state actors’ is a misnomer.
Ironically, our politicians permitted the take-over of Assam by illegal Bangladeshi migrants (facilitating their Indian citizenship) through the infamous 1983 Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunal) (IMDT) Act till it was struck down by the Supreme Court of India in 2005, but not before Assam was reduced to a Hindu minority state. Today, the MHA has banned no less than 35 terrorist organisations in India, though there are many more that need banning, like the Kerala headquartered Popular Front of India (PFI). Lack of an Internal Security Strategy, governance and aforesaid factors have provided an enormous asymmetric battlefield to our adversaries anchored around the Maoist insurgency, and China and Pakistan would be foolish not to exploit it.

Based on the 1960’s advice of China, Pakistan has raised anti-India jihadi forces and inducted armed modules pan-India that were identified in some ten states including Assam, West Bengal and Kerala in 1992-1993. SIMI started sending cadres to Pakistan for training with the mujahedeen, Taliban and Al-Qaeda and established linkages with radical organisations in Bangladesh for terrorist training. In recent years, Pakistan’s ISI had organised nucleus Maoist training in mines/IEDs/explosives with LTTE that is extracting a heavy price through CRPF cadres being killed and maimed. China backs the Maoist insurgency in India. Not only is China providing sophisticated weapons and communication equipment to the Maoists but over past several months, has provided arms manufacturing facilities to Maoists within India and to Kachen rebels in Myanmar. The Indian Mujahideen (IM) is the creation of Pakistan and the latter’s involvement in various terrorist acts including the recent Hyderabad blasts is unmistakable. The LeT has been hobnobbing with the Maoists and both LeT and Al Qaeda have established roots in Kerala and are deeply linked with the PFI.

India must also focus on the Chinese ‘String of Pearls’ surrounding us being reinforced by radical Islamic terrorism, particularly in Bangladesh and Maldives as it will fuel our internal security situation further. India has been talking of a cold start strategy for many years but Bangladesh too was practicing cold start during the BNP regime headed by Khaleda Zia through annual exercises racing for the Siliguri Corridor. That is the reason why China and Pakistan are trying their level best to integrate and boost insurgencies within India. It is no secret that the BNP-led government in Bangladesh has always been pro China and Pakistan. It is supported by terrorist organisations including Jamat-e-Islami and Ahle Hadith Andolan that are viciously anti-India and are funded by Saudi Arabia in a major way.

China’s newfound interest in Maldives may advertently or inadvertently help spur anti-India sentiments in Maldives.

The cold start by Bangladesh independently is little threat but when viewed in conjunction with China’s designs for Doklam Plateau in Bhutan, the state of Arunachal Pradesh and the strategic footprints already made in Northern Nepal, the threat magnifies. In Maldives, the advent of radicalism and anti-India perceptions have been building since 2005 when the youth started going for training under the LeT in Pakistan, drugs started flowing in and signs of radicalisation became visible on the streets. It did cause alarm bells in the Maldives National Defence Forces (MNDF) but nevertheless radicalism is on the rise. In a country where, as per 2008 estimates, there were 70,000 foreign employees and some 33,000 illegal immigrants, the presence of Al Qaeda and LeT in Maldives cannot be ruled out, as would be their links with their operatives and PFI in Kerala. This poses a major threat to soft targets in South India. Additionally, China’s newfound interest in Maldives may advertently or inadvertently help spur anti-India sentiments there.


Deterrence
(Continued at the link below)

Wednesday, June 26, 2013

Special Forces Can Rescue the U.S. Pivot: A plan to open elite military training centers in Asia could be a rare bright spot in an era of U.S. defense cuts.

Does the Pivot need rescuing?  But note the controversy:
Congress is an equally daunting impediment to Adm. McRaven's dreams of a global special forces network. The core of his plan is to establish partner-led coordination centers in Latin America and Asia that are similar to NATO's in Europe. Congress, however, has rejected SOCOM's request for $14.7 million to begin building a regional center pilot program, despite interest in Asia and Latin America.
 
I have been somewhat critical of this concept not necessarily because of the concepts itself but because it has apparently been difficult to explain in the media and to Congress (as evidenced by the Congressional action above).  I frankly do not think that Michael Auslin helps here because not only does the sensational headline put people off but this unsupported and un-provable concluding assumption does as well:
A global special forces network will not by itself solve the world's security problems, of course. But Adm. McRaven and his strategists believe, with reason, that such a network can materially improve the quality of allied special operations forces around the globe. That, in turn, will serve to protect the U.S. homeland threatened by interlinked, international webs of terrorist financing and drug running.
The hubris in the title and in the concluding statement are unhelpful to SOF.  In some ways this could undercut the legitimacy of SOF because  I think that there are countries that will be put off with the idea that receiving training from US SOF will "in turn, serve to protect the US homeland."  Yes, every military engagement and operation has to be to support US national security interests and objectives first and foremost and we should never hide that fact.  However, there are those that would rather receive training because it is of mutual benefit and would rather not have it advertised in the media that such training is to support the defense of the US homeland.  Furthermore the emphasis only on terrorist financing and drug running as well as counter-proliferation of WMD as stated elsewhere in the OpEd is too narrow a focus for SOF (though in Michael's defense he could not describe the full range of SOF missions and objectives and the editor probably cut most of them out and only went with sexy missions that support the thesis of the OpEd).

But most importantly.  I also think that if you removed the phrases “Global SOF Network” and “Regional SOF Coordination Centers” and just described in plain language the work that is being done by SOF to train, advise, and assist friends, partners, and allies in support of the Geographic Combatant Commanders' theater campaign plans and Country Teams'  mission strategic plans you would be describing the traditional work of Special Forces which most people (in the GCCs, Country teams and in Congress as well as host nations) should understand and for which there might  be little to no controversy.  The so-called "network" would exist "naturally" as SOF provides bridging capabilities that link the Geographic Combatant Commanders and Chiefs of Mission with various indigenous elements (regular, special, irregular  or paramilitary forces) throughout countries and regions as well as assist in providing situational understanding of various conditions, capabilities, potential conflicts, and actual conflicts through their normal engagement activities that can help adjust, adapt, and shape current and future GCC theater campaign plans and the Chiefs of Mission mission strategic plans.  The GSN and RSCC's are nice attempts to codify traditional SOF work but instead they have become lightening rods for controversy as everyone has their own idea of what they mean and intend to do.
V/R
Dave

Special Forces Can Rescue the U.S. Pivot
An plan to open elite military training centers in Asia could be a rare bright spot in an era of U.S. defense cuts.
The disconnect between U.S. defense cuts and President Obama's strategic pivot toward Asia has raised doubts about whether the policy can live up to its billing. Amid this uncertainty, however, one part of the military is eager to expand its footprint in Asia and make the pivot real, at a relatively low cost – if only Congress would loosen its purse strings.

Admiral William McRaven is the commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) here in Tampa, Florida. For the past several years, some of his top officers have been creating a plan to use America's special operations forces to radically transform Asia's security environment. The goal is to help America's elite warriors better train Asian militaries and special forces to counter threats such as narcotrafficking and terrorism. In the process, Adm. McRaven says, such training could bring Asian nations together to reduce the risk of future conflict.

When most people think of U.S. special operations forces, they think of Navy SEALs taking out Osama Bin Laden or the Army Delta Force kicking down doors and rescuing hostages. This is what SOCOM calls "direct action." Yet the bread-and-butter of special operations work is the long-term "indirect action" of training foreign military forces and sharing information. While there will always be a need for special forces' ability to execute high-risk missions, their partnering with foreign militaries often pays a higher dividend over time.

These special forces partnerships are usually planned on a country-by-country basis, with little coordination across missions. The exception—and the model for Adm. McRaven's plans for Asia—is NATO's special operations forces headquarters in Belgium, which began as a coordination center in 2006 and now trains forces from 26 NATO nations. Centralized cooperation there has led to a dramatic increase in the number of European special operations force missions conducted with and without help from U.S. soldiers.


Now Adm. McRaven wants to establish a "Global Special Operations Forces Network" of similar training centers for allies in Asia and elsewhere. By standardizing and expanding U.S. allies' special operations training, Adm. McRaven says that this network could reduce the number of doors American SEALs have to kick down themselves. Instead, better-prepared Philippine or South Korean forces could pick up the slack.
(Continue at the link below)

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