China Wouldn't Mind a Unified Korea—Just Not Yet

This conclusion has it about right.

China's historical ties to North Korea still have some meaning, but it would be a mistake to assume that these ties are what drives Beijing's approach to its neighbor. The Chinese government does not love the Kim family and will not shed a tear once it goes. But the timing has to be right. Ultimately, like the last remaining friend of unpopular bullies worldwide, Beijing knows that it'll have to pick up the pieces if anything goes wrong.

V/R

Dave

MATT SCHIAVENZA - Matt Schiavenza is an associate editor at The Atlantic.

China Wouldn't Mind a Unified Korea—Just Not Yet

JAN 25 2013, 8:53 AM ET 57

How far will China to go to protect an increasingly belligerent North Korea?

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/01/china-wouldnt-mind-a-unified-korea-just-not-yet/272492/

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un delivers a New Years address in Pyongyang (KCNA KCNA/Reuters)

In considering the security situation in Northeast Asia, it's sometimes useful to imagine the region's players as schoolboys playing in a courtyard. North Korea, bellicose and unpredictable, misbehaves and threatens the others. An outraged Japan, South Korea, and the United States then turn to China and say, "Well? He'syour friend!"

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, China has had the dubious distinction of being North Korea's only ally and friend on the world stage, a relationship that has occasionally caused a great deal of discomfort. In essence, Beijing's support consists of both economic assistance -- in the form of both direct aid and trade -- and diplomatic protection. To continue our schoolyard analogy, China not only shields its ally from the others -- it also pays for North Korea's lunch.

To the United States and its allies in the region, this arrangement is less than satisfactory. It's no secret that Washington would like to see the eventual reunification of Korea under a pro-Western government in Seoul, and views Beijing as the primary obstacle to realizing this goal. A recent report by U.S. Senate Republican staff members -- mentioned in an article by The Guardian on Tuesday -- went so far as to say that China may block the reunification of North and South Korea should it appear to be imminent.

The rationale for this position is simple and purely strategic: China does not wish to have a unified, dynamic Korea with tens of thousands of American troops sitting right on its northeastern border. For all of its hassles, North Korea is a valuable buffer, one that Beijing would be loath to see fall apart. Americans might think of China's support for a divided Korea as anachronistic, immoral, and wrong. But in the great game of Northeast Asia power politics, this position makes perfect sense. 

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/01/china-wouldnt-mind-a-unified-korea-just-not-yet/272492/

Image First Politics in north Korea

Commentary on the photo below is from one of our foremost Korea Hands.  Although there is speculation on Jang Song-taek's absence, I think the members that were present is significant and I think the fact that this meeting is made public is important as noted in the comments below.

V/R

Dave

Clockwise from Supreme Commander Kim Jong-un is Kim Kye-kwan, First Vice-Foreign Minister; Kim Yong-il, Director of the Party’s International Department; Kim Won-hong, Director of the State Security Department; Choe Yong-hae, Director of the General Political Bureau (political officers within the KPA); Hyon Yong-chol, Chief of the KPA General Staff (NK version of the US JCS Chairman); Hong Sung-mu, a Party vice-director (which the ROK Govt assesses to be Vice-Director of the Munitions Industry Department which controls nuke and missile programs); and Pak To-chun, Party Secretary for Military Munitions (the man who got much of the credit for the recent missile launch).

Although KIS did some of this (not in a timely fashion), I do not recall Kim Jong-il ever staging this type of "national security" meeting and reporting it through KCNA so the whole world could see.  KJI's ego would not have permitted this to be public.  He always showed his national security concerns through "management by walking around" at base or exercise visits.  This is an apparent message to back up its recent threats to the US and the ROK...and to make KJU look tough.  The Bolshoi Ballet could not have choreographed this better.

Absence of N.K. leader's uncle sparks speculation over internal power game

Yes, this could be signifcant.  Or it could be deliberate to stir up speculation among Korea watchers.  Or he could be ill with the flu and just could not make this meeting.  This certainly bears watching but we should not jump to conclusions.

V/R

Dave  

2013/01/28 08:23 KST

Absence of N.K. leader's uncle sparks speculation over internal power game

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/01/27/80/0301000000AEN20130127006000315F.HTML

By Lee Chi-dong

WASHINGTON, Jan. 27 (Yonhap) -- The absence of Jang Song-thaek, uncle of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, at a key national security meeting may be a sign of a renewed power game inside the reclusive communist nation's leadership, a U.S. expert said Sunday.

   Jang, vice chairman of the National Defense Commission, did not attend the meeting of top North Korean officials handling security and foreign affairs, in which Kim ordered "substantial and high-profile important state measures," according to Pyongyang's official media.

   Kim recently convened the meeting, viewed as North Korea's equivalent of the U.S. National Security Council, to discuss the impact of new U.N. sanctions imposed on his regime for the Dec. 12 rocket launch and Pyongyang's response. The North's media stopped short of specifying the date and venue for the meeting.

   "In my judgment, Jang's glaring absence was significant, signaling the emergence of a possible crack in the senior leadership, especially in the relationship between Kim Jong-un and his all-powerful uncle," Alexandre Mansourov, a specialist on North Korea told Yonhap News Agency. He has monitored North Korea issues for decades.

   He raised the possibility of divergent approaches between Kim and Jang to the North's international strategy, especially in regard to the issue of a nuclear test and ways to cope with international sanctions.

   "As the perceived 'China man in Pyongyang,' Jang may be deliberately staying out of Kim Jong-un's decisions on such a controversial issue as nuclear testing, which is objected by China, in order to preserve 'clean hands' and his good standing in Beijing," he added.

(Continued at the link below)

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/01/27/80/0301000000AEN20130127006000315F.HTML

Kim Jong-un Mutters Dark Threats

I think he is doing a little more than muttering.  I think the regime propaganda machine is in full swing.  This except though should help us realize that the regime will not give up its nuclear program as it does truly believe it is key to regime survival.

Kim also echoed more irate statements last week from various arms of the regime, saying the North "must defend its sovereignty by itself" while there "can be no denuclearization of the Korean peninsula before the world has been denuclearized," KCNA reported.

But perhaps instead of the 6 party talks maybe the north would be amendable to working on Global Zero.

V/R

Dave

Kim Jong-un Mutters Dark Threats

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/01/28/2013012800643.html

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in a meeting with a new panel of top security officials and diplomats pledged "substantial and high-profile state measures," apparently in response to fresh UN sanctions.

The official KCNA news agency on Sunday quoted Kim as uttering the obscure threat "in view of the prevailing situation," which is being read as a reference to the latest UN Security Resolution condemning the North's rocket launch and intensifying sanctions.

Kim also echoed more irate statements last week from various arms of the regime, saying the North "must defend its sovereignty by itself" while there "can be no denuclearization of the Korean peninsula before the world has been denuclearized," KCNA reported.

Immediately after the UN resolution, the North's Foreign Ministry vowed to boost its arsenal, while the National Defense Commission threatened a "high-level" nuclear test.

The committee of security officials and diplomats seems to be a new setup and has sparked some speculation among pundits here. KCNA only said the meeting took place "recently."

"It looks like North Korea formed a taskforce of sorts copying the U.S.' National Security Council," said a Unification Ministry official here. "Perhaps the plan is to demonstrate how serious the situation has become due to the UN Security Council sanctions." North Korea watchers also note that the KCNA report came out at the unusual time of 2 a.m., which is noon in the U.S.

The committee is a mixed bag, including top military brass like new army chief Hyon Yong-chol and the army's top ideologue Choe Ryong-hae, Minister for State Security Kim Won-hong, Pak To-chun, the man overseeing nuclear arms development, party bigwigs Kim Yong-il and Hong Sung-mu who deal with foreign policy, and Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan, a comparative moderate and long the point man in negotiations with the U.S.

The hardline officials in charge of propaganda and surveillance against the South were absent, suggesting to some pundits that the regime is not yet willing to burn its bridges with South Korea's incoming Park Geun-hye administration.

Meanwhile, a Chinese North Korea expert reflected Beijing's growing impatience with North Korea's grandstanding and predicted that Beijing could use its growing diplomatic clout to "widen its strategic sphere" and meet that challenge. Ding Gang, writing in the English-language Global Times, warned that anyone who tries to put China in a tight spot will live to regret it.

Ding said a nuclear arsenal would not only fail to bring security to North Korea but go directly against China's national interests. He added North Korea faces no threat from outside its borders and the best way to ensuring its security is economic development.

(Continued at the link below)

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/01/28/2013012800643.html

North Korean Leader Vows ‘High-Profile’ Retaliation

Continued evidence that Kim Jong-un is following the Kim Family Regime playbook that has been in effect for 6 decades.

Mr. Kim threw his weight behind his government’s escalating standoff with Washington when he called a meeting of top security and foreign affairs officials and gave an instruction in his name. He inherited the posts of supreme party and military leaders from his father, Kim Jong-il, who died in December 2011.

Actually he has assumed new posts with new names because Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il retain their posts even in mortal death. That is why we can say that north Korea is not only ruled by a mafia-like crime family and cult but also by a "necrotocracy" – the only country rulled by dead people.

V.R

Dave

January 27, 2013

North Korean Leader Vows ‘High-Profile’ Retaliation

By CHOE SANG-HUN

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/28/world/asia/north-korea.html?ref=global-home&pagewanted=print

SEOUL, South Korea — Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader, has ordered his top military and party officials to take “substantial and high-profile important state measures” to retaliate against American-led United Nations sanctions on the country, the North’s official media reported Sunday.

North Korea did not clarify what those measures might be, but it referred to a series of earlier statements in which Mr. Kim’s government has threatened to launch more long-range rockets and conduct a third nuclear test to build an ability to “target” the United States.

Mr. Kim threw his weight behind his government’s escalating standoff with Washington when he called a meeting of top security and foreign affairs officials and gave an instruction in his name. He inherited the posts of supreme party and military leaders from his father, Kim Jong-il, who died in December 2011.

By calling such a meeting and having it reported in state news media, Mr. Kim appeared to be asserting his leadership in what his country called an “all-out action” against the United States, unlike his father, who tended to remain reclusive during similar confrontations.

“At the consultative meeting, Kim Jong-un expressed the firm resolution to take substantial and high-profile important state measures in view of the prevailing situation,” said the North’s Korean Central News Agency, or K.C.N.A. “He advanced specific tasks to the officials concerned.”

The K.C.N.A. dispatch, which was distributed on Sunday, was dated Saturday, indicating that the meeting in Pyongyang, the capital, took place then. That was the same day on which the North’s main party newspaper, Rodong Sinmun, said that the United Nations Security Council’s resolution last Tuesday calling for tightening sanctions against the North left it with “no other option” but a nuclear test.

“A nuclear test is what the people demand,” it said in a commentary.

The resolution was adopted unanimously — with the support of the North’s traditional protector, China — as punishment for its Dec. 12 rocket launching. The Security Council determined that the launching was a cover for testing intercontinental ballistic missile technology and a violation of its earlier resolutions banning North Korea from conducting such tests.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/28/world/asia/north-korea.html?ref=global-home&pagewanted=print

The secret lives of North Korea

This is why an active and aggressive influence campaign must be conducted in north Korea by the ROK/US Alliance.  The people that Mr. Everard is talking to might be considered those who are potential 2d tier leaders and often members of what the regime considers the "wavering classes" i.e., those in the middle of  Songbun social system of 51 classes.  Increasing information to these people will help better prepare a key element of the population for a post-Kim Family Regime Korea as they are potential leaders and technocrats who could make a difference.  We need to conduct aggressive psychological operations (or MISO) and a comprehensive influence campaign – standard – e.g., Radio Free Asia and "non-standard" – infiltrating more DVDs or penetrating the closed cell phone and computer infrastructure of the regime as just a couple of examples. 

V/R
Dave

The secret lives of North Korea

What is life like for the non-elite in this closed land? Do citizens really believe that mountains dance when a leader is born? Britain's former ambassador describes the people he knew there

John Everard

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/the-secret-lives-of-north-korea-8468421.html#

Sunday, 27 January 2013

I had the rare privilege of serving as the UK's ambassador to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (usually referred to simply as North Korea) from February 2006 to July 2008, a tumultuous period that included missile launches and the country's first nuclear test.

In between wrestling with these issues, and despite the efforts of the North Korean regime to block contacts between its citizens and foreigners, I managed to get to know some North Koreans reasonably well – at least to the extent that they were prepared to discuss with me their lives and how they saw the world. In particular, I realised that while many, even some experts, viewed North Koreans as identical automatons who obeyed unquestioningly every order of their leaders, this was simply wrong.

North Korea is not like that at all. It is a real country with real people, whose everyday concerns are often not so very different from our own: their friends, how their children are doing at school, their jobs, and making enough money to get by. Above all, North Koreans are sharply differentiated human beings, with a good sense of humour and are often fun to be with.

The North Koreans whom I got to know were from the outer elite of Pyongyang. These were not the inner elite of the regime, who live in some luxury and rarely if ever interact with foreigners. But neither were they from the impoverished countryside. None of my social contacts was a key decision maker, but many were involved in implementing decisions by the senior leadership. They were executives rather than leaders.

By and large, these people did not eat well, but at least they ate regularly. Their clothing was not smart, but adequate (although all of them had one special outfit for obligatory appearances at parades and other official events). And they lived not in the villas of the elite nor the hovels of the poor, but in cramped flats in respectable, if unprestigious, parts of Pyongyang. Above all, they talked among themselves – North Koreans always seem to have time to chatter, and to share the fragments of information they can gather about their country and the outside world.

Their lives would seem very dull to most Westerners. They revolved around daily rituals of carefully phased breakfasts in overcrowded flats, tedious journeys to work (often prolonged because Pyongyang's rickety public transport so often broke down), and generally tedious work days. I had the impression that they worked at a relaxed pace. They all seemed to have a great deal of time to sit around talking with their colleagues – it was important to them to keep good relations with their workmates, both to create a pleasant working environment but also to make sure they had as many friends as possible if they got into trouble.

After work, they might have to attend a political meeting. When I asked my contacts what these meetings were about they told me that they did not remember. At first, I thought they were politely saying that they were not going to tell me, but I once came across an open-air political meeting at which the audience all appeared to have glazed eyes, despite the best efforts of the speaker. Perhaps my contacts were telling the truth – that they effectively entered a kind of catatonic state in these meetings, simply switching off, and genuinely could not remember what they were about.

Then they would face the commute home. Some told me that whenever possible they would walk – a longer journey but much less frustrating. Some of my contacts refused to use the Pyongyang metro because of the risk of a power cut while they were in a tunnel.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/the-secret-lives-of-north-korea-8468421.html#

Why sticks don't work with North Korea (TWO)

In response to Mr. Armstrong's article and my comments below I received this message reminding us of some important north Korean history with some very good recommendations which many of us have supported over the years to include the emphasis on combined Psychological Operations (now MISO), ending the "transformation" and move of US forces to Camp Humphreys (in reality the dissolution of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command) and reinstitution of Team Spirit.  But he makes the important analysis that we have very, very rarely responded to the north with any "sticks."  (and even then in 1976 and Operational Paul Bunyan following the axe murders and 2010 following Cheonan and Y-P Do our responses were merely shows of force).  So this is a good counter to Mr. Armstrong because while the UN has implemented sanctions we have not used any significant sticks over the the past 6 decades and in fact from the north Korean/Kim Family Regime perspective the list below indicates a pattern of success or at least that the north can get away with murder.

V/R

Dave

Sir,
The problem is the world has never tried the stick with north Korea since 27 July 1953.  We have only tried diplomacy under all its names - working groups, exchanges, talks, inspections, sanctions, UN recognition, and the list goes on.  What the world has never done to north Korea is punch the bully back in nose when he punches, terrorizes, or threatens to punch the other kids on the block.  north Korea has done so many things over the years that would have gotten any other nation on the planet the opportunity to feel the full might of the United States military might.  And I am not referring to the skirmishes over the years along the DMZ.  Perhaps Mr. Armstrong needs a little perspective on the real history of nK? 

Who else in the world has taken a US naval vessel in international water and turned it into a museum?  Military Response - None. 

Who else has held the crew of a US naval vessel for a year?   nK!  Military Response - None. 

Who else has shot down a US recon plane in international airspace?   nK!  Military Response - None. 

Who else has sent a military hit squad to kill the President of our treaty ally?   nK!  Military Response - None. 

Who shot down a US military helicopter?   nK!  Military Response - None. 

Who chased US recon planes in international airspace?   nK!  Military Response - None. 

Who was repeatedly found to be training terrorist such as the PLO in the 1970's?  nK.  Military Response - None. 

Who murdered two American officers in the JSA?   nK!  Military Response - Operation Paul Bunyan - tree cam down, north Korea fails to live up to their threats to prevent tree coming down.  (lesson here?) 

Who orders civilian aircraft to be bombed?  nK!  Military Response - None. 

Who ordered a terrorist bombing in Burma trying to kill President of Korea and his cabinet?   nK.  Military Response - None.  

Who starved two million members of his people while spending his money on booze and weapons program?   nK!  Military Response - None.  No Aide like Bosnia, Somalia, Lybia, or Syria. 

Who launched an ICBM over a Japan another treaty ally?   nK!  Military Response - None.  Unless you count ceasing PSYOP in 2000 and removal of US BCT in 2003. 

Who held a ICBM and Ballistic Missile 4 July Party?   nK!  Military Response - None.   Unless you count the removal of numerous US units from peninsula and the announced reductions in ROK military size. 

Who tested Nuclear Weapons?  Military Response - None.  Sanctions not even to level of India and Pakistan's from their nuclear tests and we carried on with the 6PT. nK!  Military Response - None.  Unless you count more US units leaving. 

Who makes fake US currency and weakens the dollar world wide and disrupts currency exchange throughout asia?  nK.  Military Response - None. 

Who sank a allied military vessel of a MDT partner?   nK!  Military Response - None! 

Who shelled an island killing military and civilians?  nK!  Military Response - None 

It seems in reviewing history, one should reach the conclusion is that diplomacy has been the problem because the north believes that the military option doesn't exist for the United States or our allies because we are too scared of the risks of war.  We are too scared that nK can shell Seoul and kill millions in a few hours.  Thus they believe all we can do is negotiate and talk to them.  We have nothing backing up our diplomacy. 

In their eyes, we have no stick at all.  And that is the problem.  You can negotiate when you have no leverage.  A nation and regime that has already demonstrated they will starve millions of their own people to maintain power will not be scared by a few more sanctions.  When your economy is as dismal as their there is no real effect.  They can smuggle what they need to remain in control and keep the loyal class fat, dumb, and happy 

Maybe the time has come to dicard the failed diplomacy path and stand up to the north.
Here are a few easy things we can due to show we are prepared to conduct military operations if needed: 

1) In response to their inference to the renouncing the 1992 accord, announce that the U.S. is returning nuclear weapons to Korea and will assist Japan and the ROK in developing their own nuclear weapons programs.  Furthermore, announce that the US nuclear policy is being revised and we will return to our pre-1992 positions that we reserve the right to conduct a pre-emptive nuclear strike on nations that threaten the U.S., especially those that are self-proclaimed nuclear and chemical capable states. 

2) Announces the need for the Alliance to completely re-look its stance and military posture including opening all previous agreements up to revision to include - OPCON transfer, Yongsan Relocation, the Land Partnership Plan, the move to Humphreys, and treaties on weapons limitations such as missile range 

3) Demonstrate that the US is fully committed to the Alliance recommending the US return its force structure to 1992 levels to include the reintroduction of US brigades that left the peninsula since 1990 and that the Alliance will resume the conduct of the TEAM SPIRIT exercise suspended since the 1994 nuclear agreement 

4) Resume full scale combined PSYOP, an act not taken since prior to 1972.
Then, watch nK's reaction and only then, consider asking nK and the PRC if they would like to resume diplomatic discussions on denuclearizing the peninsula.

Original Comments:

For diplomacy to work, the north has to participate.  Mr. Armstrong's  conclusion is completely logical from the point of view of the ROK, China, Japan, Russia and the US.  Unfortunately the Kim Family Regime does not have a similar view and since it has never conducted diplomacy in accordance with any acceptable international standard for the last 60 years I am not optimistic it will at any time in the future.  Certainly the actions of Kim Jong-un and the regime over the past year have reinforced that.  Actions speak louder than words (although north Korean propaganda is pretty loud too). But it is better to jaw jaw than war war.

So, where do we go from here?  The United States and the United Nations have little choice but to impose sanctions in response to North Korea’s actions, which clearly violate earlier sanction conditions. But it is hard to see how such sanctions can deter a determined and defiant North Korea, especially if the sanctions are not rigorously enforced. The best we can hope for is that the latest confrontation will finally bring all sides together – including both Koreas, the United States, China, Russia, and Japan – to solve this issue. 

Diplomacy, not threats or sanctions – and certainly not military action – is the only viable path to resolution.

January 25th, 2013

11:59 AM ET

Why sticks don't work with North Korea

By Charles Armstrong, Special to CNN

http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/01/25/why-sticks-dont-work-with-north-korea/