One of the very few credible articles on Chinese SOF (The only other that I can recall was by Dean Cheng in Special Warfare Magazine a couple of years ago. http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/archive/SW2503/SW2503TheChinesePeoplesLiberationArmy.html).  

 In addition to the excerpts highlighted below (and I recommend reading the whole article) I would highlight the section on psychological operations/information warfare and note that these activities, including the "Three Warfares" are not part of SOF but controlled by the General Political Department.  I think this is an illustration of the importance that China places on these activities.  (we should recall the history of how US PSYOP ended up in USSOCOM in 1987 - GEN Lindsay (in addition to recognizing the historical and important linkage of psychological warfare and unconventional warfare) believed that failure to incorporate PSYOP into USSOCOM would have led to all US PSYOP capabilities placed in the Reserve Component and we would have lost important PSYOP capabilities for the nation.)  The Chinese on the other hand place such priority on these activities that they are controlled (and synchronized) at the national level.

Excerpt:

Despite its early history as a guerilla organization, the PLA does not include irregular and unconventional warfare among the types of campaigns the force may be assigned. Special operations are an “important campaign activity” to be integrated into operations along with information warfare, firepower, maneuver, and psychological warfare capabilities. “Campaign special operations” are defined in the textbook The Science of Campaigns as

irregular operational activities conducted by specially formed, trained and equipped crack units (and small units) using special warfare to achieve specific campaign and strategic goals. The main purpose of its objectives are to assault enemy vital targets, paralyze enemy operational systems, reduce enemy operational capabilities, and interfere, delay, and disrupt enemy operational activities to create favorable conditions for main force units.

SOF units concentrate on special reconnaissance, raids, sabotage, and harassment while other non-SOF units conduct most special technical warfare tasks such as computer network attack.

And we should heed the message about mirror imaging SOF. Dennis makes an important contribution by comparing Chinese SOF missions with the US military Title 10 SOF mission

s

.

PLA SOF units and capabilities are not a black box to outside observers as Chinese SOF units frequently interact with foreign counterparts. For example, PLA and PAP SOF personnel and units have participated in numerous training exercises with foreign militaries, special operations competitions, and in-country training at foreign schools. Chinese SOF teams often have had excellent results in international competitions. As a result, Chinese SOF units have demonstrated their capabilities in many types of small unit commando-type direct action and reconnaissance missions, the first two Title X core SOF activities.

Though most analysts assume Chinese SOF would be used in Taiwan contingency operations (including support to and by “Fifth Column” fighters already on the island), there is little open source evidence that SOF units are organized or trained to conduct Title X unconventional warfare activities. Likewise, though the PLA provides training for foreigners in its system of schools in China, it does not appear to have recent experience in overseas foreign internal defense activities. No PLA SOF units are known to be organized and tasked similar to U.S. Army Special Forces (“Green Beret”) units.

The PLA also does not have units equivalent to U.S. Civil Affairs units. Most national-level civil affairs operations conducted by the PLA requiring intergovernmental coordination fall under the purview of the General Staff and General Political Departments and are domestically oriented. PLA headquarters are part of the local government structures from the provincial to the county levels of government and commanders and staffs of these headquarters routinely work with their civilian counterparts. However, when it comes to governance functions, local civilian government and party officials are in control while local PLA officers focus on military matters. SOF units would not be involved in these functions.

CHINESE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES: NOT LIKE “BACK AT BRAGG”

Dennis J. Blasko

January 1, 2015 · in Analysis

http://warontherocks.com/2015/01/chinese-special-operations-forces-not-like-back-at-bragg/?singlepage=1

“The PLA’s special forces: secrets revealed,” promised Want China Times, a Taiwan-based English-language website. The article describes China’s “10 major special operations forces, each with its own unique characteristics and code names” and was based on a translation of an earlier blog posting on the PLA Daily website with photos and descriptions of several People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and People’s Armed Police (PAP) special operations units.

In fact, little in the article was new and no real secrets were revealed. Over the past decade, the official Chinese military media, both in Chinese and English, have paid copious attention to Chinese special operations forces (SOF). Based on this evidence, much more can be said about these units, their missions, and capabilities.

Unsurprisingly, Chinese SOF units are quite different from their U.S. counterparts and demonstrate most often capabilities similar to those of U.S. Army Ranger units. In particular, Chinese SOF units lack many of the dedicated special mission support capabilities found in the U.S. military.

Unfortunately, by the repeated use of the terms “special operations” and “SOF” some foreign readers might assume Chinese SOF units are like ours. In other words, readers might assume Chinese SOF are tasked to perform theten Title X SOF core activities defined by the U.S. Congress (direct action, strategic reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, civil affairs operations, counterterrorism, military information support operations [formerly known as psychological operations], humanitarian assistance, theater search and rescue, and activities specified by the president or secretary of defense). According to publicly available PLA doctrine, many U.S. SOF Core Activities are not included among PLA SOF missions.

This essay outlines the structure and doctrine of the Chinese armed forces involved in special operations and discusses their capabilities in each of the ten core activities based solely on information from Chinese sources. But first it is necessary to put the Chinese armed forces into the context of the entire government security structure.

The Chinese Security Apparatus

(Continued at the link below)

http://warontherocks.com/2015/01/chinese-special-operations-forces-not-like-back-at-bragg/?singlepage=1

Damn right China is unsettled.  What this means is that there is no hope of Chinese style reforms in north Korea.  China's influence is waning now.  If anyone still has hopes of Kim Jong-un being a reformer they should reconsider now.  Kim Jong-un is not only fallowing in his father's and grandfather's footsteps he is taking the the mafia like crime/cult family to the next level.  These very well could be very dangerous times if he is not able to suppress the dissent that Jang may have caused.  And of course his harsh actions are designed to do exactly that. But the difference between Kim Jong-il and Kim Il-sung and Kim Jung-un is that Kim Jong-un does not have the experience and maturity of his father and grandfather and combined with his arrogance this could lead to very bad decision making.

V/R

Dave

Public Ouster in North Korea Unsettles China

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/10/world/asia/a-gamble-for-north-korea-leader-kim-jong-un.html?hpw&rref=world&_r=0&pagewanted=all

Yonhap/Reuters

Jang Song-thaek, uncle to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, was forcibly removed from a meeting of the Political Bureau by uniformed personnel in a photograph released Monday by Yonhap news agency.

By JANE PERLEZ and CHOE SANG-HUN

Published: December 9, 2013 34 Comments

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BEIJING — North Koreans had long known Jang Song-thaek as the No. 2 figure in their country, the revered uncle and mentor of Kim Jong-un, the paramount leader. Then on Monday state-run television showed two green-uniformed guards clutching a glum-looking Mr. Jang by the armpits and pulling him from a meeting of the ruling party after he was denounced for faction-building, womanizing, gambling and other acts as dozens of former comrades watched.

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• North Korea Releases List of Accusations Against Purged Official(December 9, 2013)

• South Korea Announces Expansion of Its Air Defense Zone (December 9, 2013)

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The spectacle of Mr. Jang’s humiliating dismissal and arrest was a highly unusual glimpse of a power struggle unfolding inside the nuclear-armed country. But the major impact may be outside, and nowhere is the downfall more unnerving than in China.

North Korea’s longtime protector and economic lifeline, China has considered strategically close relations with North Korea a pillar of foreign policy and a bulwark against the United States military presence in South Korea. Despite Chinese irritation with North Korea’s nuclear tests and other bellicose behavior, China had built a good relationship with Mr. Jang as the trusted adult who would monitor Mr. Kim, who is less than half his age.

Any shift by China concerning North Korea has the potential to significantly alter the political equilibrium in Asia, where the divided Korean Peninsula has been a fact of life for more than 60 years. While there is no indication that the Chinese intend to change their view, it seemed clear that even Beijing’s top leaders were surprised by Mr. Jang’s abrupt downfall on Sunday, and even more on Monday by the North Korean state television broadcast.

“Jang was a very iconic figure in North Korea, particularly with economic reform and innovation,” said Zhu Feng, professor of international relations at Peking University, and a specialist in North Korea. “He is the man China counted on to move the economy in North Korea. This is a very ominous signal.”

Mr. Jang’s dismissal was a shock not only because he had long been considered a core member of the country’s ruling elite and a regent and confidant of Mr. Kim, who assumed power only two years ago upon the death of his father, Kim Jong-il. The way that Mr. Jang was dismissed also was considered extraordinary, as the North Korea government has almost always maintained secrecy over its inner workings, power struggles and skulduggery during the more than six decades of rule by the Kim family.

“Kim Jong-un was declaring at home and abroad that he is now the truly one and only leader in the North, that he will not tolerate a No. 2,” said Yang Moo-jin, an analyst at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul, South Korea.

Mr. Jang had visited China on a number of occasions and had been considered the most important advocate of the Chinese style of economic overhaul that the government in Beijing has been urging North Korea to embrace.

At 67, Mr. Jang is of the same generation as China’s leaders. Unlike the 30-year-old Mr. Kim — who has not been to China and who remains a mystery despite the lineage to his grandfather Kim Il-sung, North Korea’s revolutionary founder — Mr. Jang was seen by Beijing as a steady hand and a trusted conduit into North Korea’s top leadership. He was one of China’s few high-level North Korean interlocutors.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/10/world/asia/a-gamble-for-north-korea-leader-kim-jong-un.html?hpw&rref=world&_r=0&pagewanted=all

Technological progress gave China confidence to declare ADIZ: analysts

 I was asked earlier today by a journalist for some insight on what may happen in this situation.  Here are my musings.

I am afraid I do not have any real insight on this.  I can only offer you my opinion and say that we have surely entered the ultimate Chinese curse: "may you live in interesting times."  We are sure to see some interesting times ahead.  But I am hesitant to speculate on what may happen or what the real Chinese intentions are.

I would say that although we are going to support our allies (both Japan and the Republic of Korea) I think what most security specialists will say is that the US military will continue to fly through the ADIZ to ensure freedom of navigation and to prevent a de facto ceding to the Chinese the disputed territory and air space.  Some may argue that if they are successful in this gambit that they will establish other ADIZs  throughout the South China Sea and therefore claim other disputed territories which cannot be allowed to take place.  Others may argue that the Chinese have blundered and miscalculated.   Still others may argue that the Chinese actions may justify why it needs to establish its own National Security Council as discussed at the Third Plenum because of past foreign affairs and national security blunders and miscalculations (e.g., the EP-3 incident and the testing of the "stealth" aircraft during Secretary Gates trip to China).  Along these lines others may argue that this is for domestic internal politics in China.  And still others who study the Eastern way of war would argue that the obvious action is not the real action action as all warfare is based on deception.  I think a key question that we should try to understanding (assuming this is not a blunder or miscalculation or just some other attempt to overcome the 100 years of humiliation and make people show respect for China) is what are the Chinese trying to achieve?  How does the ADIZ help the Chinese in some way?  Or is the ADIZ a diversion and what seemingly unrelated objective might the Chinese be trying to achieve?  Some would say that the Chinese are presenting the exact threat that many American security specialists have been saying and that many security specialists want – a perfect bi-polar security threat that would allow for another NSC 68 like grand strategy of containment focused on the new communist threat posed by China rather than the former USSR.  China could very well giving us the threat we want while developing threats we do not see and thus ensuring we build our military capabilities toward the threats we want vice the threats that may be more real.  Unfortunately I do not know what those threats might be.

I mention all of the above just to illustrate some of the unknowns and how hard it is to try to assess the Chinese, US and alliance responses.  My sense is that there will be strong pressure in the US security community along the lines of this ADIZ cannot stand and that we must assert our freedom of navigation rights through international airspace and we cannot allow any country to arbitrarily establish such ADIZs (and of course the counter argument is that the US has established such ADIZs).

I think we will see continued US air activities challenging the ADIZ. I do not see the Chinese having the capability to permanently enforce the ADIZ or deny aircraft from transiting it. They will likely send up aircraft and there will be pilots playing games of chicken much like during the Cold War.  But of course there is a chance for miscalculation.  We should remember that the Chinese pilot who clipped the EP-3 was named Lieutenant Wong Wei (we would say "wrong way" for the joke) and although that is humorous I think it is also illustrative that military operations and war takes place in the realm of chance in Clausewitz' trinity (and of course the other two being passion and reason).  My fear is that chance and passion may dominate in this situation when reason on the part of the governments involved does not restrain or temper the other two.

V/R
Dave 

Technological progress gave China confidence to declare ADIZ: analysts

Thursday, 28 November, 2013, 3:40am

http://www.scmp.com/print/news/china/article/1367389/technological-progress-gave-china-confidence-declare-adiz-analysts

News›China

Minnie Chan minnie.chan@scmp.com

Improvements in the People's Liberation Army's air surveillance and control systems helped give Beijing the confidence to create its air defence identification zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea, military experts said.

China is the last major power in the region to set up such an identification zone, as effectively policing the area requires advanced coastal and airborne radar systems and the capability to track, identify and monitor numerous flying objects simultaneously.

For years, the PLA struggled to obtain such technologies and develop its own airborne early-warning systems. Western countries put an embargo on the sale to Beijing of the necessary equipment after the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989.

Nearly a quarter of a century later, the country finally had the hardware and software to police its own ADIZ, said Xu Guangyu , a retired PLA general.

"The declaration is not only a testament to China's awareness of the need to protect its rights in the air and at sea, it also shows the PLA's capabilities of mastering the technology," Xu said.

"The PLA's air defence systems have undergone some major upgrades over the years, achieving improvements in early-warning equipment, air reconnaissance and surveillance that enable the military to deal with all sorts of foreign flying objects entering into the Chinese air defence identification zone," he added.

The centrepieces of China's new air surveillance system are the airborne early-warning and control systems developed by the PLA. China is one of only four countries - Israel, Russia and the United States being the others - to have mastered such systems.

The military unveiled its KJ-200 and KJ-2000 early-warning aircraft in 2009. Beijing has refused to disclose the exact number of the airplanes in service.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.scmp.com/print/news/china/article/1367389/technological-progress-gave-china-confidence-declare-adiz-analysts

Park, Xi agree on North Korean denuclearization

I was watching the ROK-PRC summit on Korean TV in Seoul today, and I cannot help but notice what appears to be a very high level of ceremony and respect surrounding the visit.  I doubt that Kim Jong-il received this much apparent respect and recognition and certainly Kim Gye-kwan did not on his last visit (though obviously he is not a head of state).  But the televised events have to be a real slap in the face of the Kim Family Regime let along the stated "common view" on denuclearization that was announced.  I certainly hope the north Korean defector organizations (and hopefully ROK and US PSYOP professionals) are capturing all these images and transmitting them to the people in the north as there is a lot of PSYOP value in the images and words coming out of Beijing today..  It sure does not look like President Park is anybody's "puppet" and this visit even more than the US visit  really illustrates the status of the ROK as superior to that of the DPRK. (I do not mean anything negative about the US visit because President Park received protocol respect above the working level visit but because the PRC is a north Korean ally and it is treating President Park with far more public recognition than of its ally even when they were closer than lips and teeth).  As an aside in comparison with President Parks' self taught language skills, I wonder how much Mandarin Kim Jong-il spoke or Kim Jong-un speaks?

V/R

Dave

Park, Xi agree on North Korean denuclearization

Two presidents reach 'common view' on denuclearization, 'peace and stability' and 'resolving issues through dialogue'

http://www.nknews.org/2013/06/park-xi-agree-on-north-korean-denuclearization/

BY SUSAN AHN , JUNE 27, 2013

SEOUL – Park Geun-hye and Chinese President Xi Jiping share a “common view” that North Korea should denuclearize after a day of bilateral talks that were widely believed to have been heavily focused on the North Korean nuclear issue.

Park is in China for a four-day visit and, after meeting the Chinese President, is expected to meet with Premier Li Keqiang and Zhang Dejiang, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Friday.

“The two leaders shared a common view on denuclearizing North Korea, maintaining peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and resolving issues through dialogue and negotiations,” Reuters reported Park Geun-hye’s office as saying.

Beyond the North’s nuclear program, Park’s self-taught Mandarin and interest in Chinese philosophy has dominated Chinese media coverage in anticipation of the summit.

EAST ASIAN DENUCLEARIZATION

Denuclearization should be a “joint-effort”, Park’s senior presidential secretary Ju Chul-ki said in an official statement before the summit

“This visit is an opportunity for our two countries to further cooperation on effective North Korea policies, including the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and the peace and stability of the region,” he added.

Free Trade Agreements and other points to “forge a stronger economic partnership” were also discussed by the two presidents, staff from both sides said.

“I believe it is high time for our two countries to seek a new framework of economic cooperation in line with our economic status within the international community,” Park told the China Daily in a printed interview.

XI’AN THE SIGHTS

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.nknews.org/2013/06/park-xi-agree-on-north-korean-denuclearization/