OBSERVATIONS ON THE LONG WAR by Conrad Crane

Some very important observations by Conrad Crane, the man behind FM 3-24 whose name you rarely hear associated with it.

Please go to War on the Rocks and read the entire essay: http://warontherocks.com/2014/09/observations-on-the-long-war/

I strongly agree with his conclusion about being "COINfused" - not to be confused but to have a fusion between the COINtras and COINdinistas.

But I have to take some exception to his comments about SOF and FID.  I concur on the critical importance of FID and the FID approach but I disagree with his characterization that SOF has been drawn to much to the dark side (though the role reversal of SOF and conventional forces he describes in Iraq is accurate and interesting to consider - but that should be understood to be a function of those who designed, executed, and led the campaign plan).  I think the Army and the US Army Special Operations Command have well articulated the Yin and Yang of SOF with Special Warfare and Surgical Strike and the vast majority of SOF and in particular US Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations forces are conducting Special Warfare with particular emphasis on FID.  I think that what causes confusion is that there is a dominant narrative both in the press and in the military that revolves around the high payoff immediate effects of surgical strike and there is a major command and control headquarters that is conducting those operations.  Special Warfare does not currently have that type of headquarters to integrate Special Warfare on a global scale.  USSOCOM does not do that though the separate Theater Special Operations Commands at the Geographic Combatant Commands do command and control Special Warfare and FID operations.    But they will never achieve the notoriety of the forces conducting surgical strike and therefore there is a perceived imbalance.  His comment about headquarters and playing the super bowl is especially applicable to the conduct of Special Warfare and FID.  The only super bowl capable headquarters we have is the surgical strike headquarters. I do also agree with his comments about Air Force FID and with the need for the Coast Guard to conduct FID.

But all his observation are very much worth pondering, discussing, debating and using as we move forward.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE LONG WAR

Conrad Crane

September 10, 2014 · in Commentary

http://warontherocks.com/2014/09/observations-on-the-long-war/

For more than a decade, I have been recording reflections about the course of the so-called “Long War” launched after the tragic events of 9/11. These are based on many unique experiences: being the recorder for the 2002 Army After Action Review on Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle, developing prewar Army plans to reconstruct Iraq, serving as lead author for the 2006 version of Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24 on counterinsurgency, visiting Iraq in 2007 for General David Petraeus, working on projects analyzing wartime assessment and war termination for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Army Training and Doctrine Command, and innumerable conversations with insightful civilian and military veterans returned from the field. This commentary has also been shaped by many international travels and my own reading of history. I hope to provoke more critical thought about where the American military has been and where it should be going.

There are two approaches to warfare: asymmetric and stupid. I have been quoted on this topic a few times, and need to expand upon it. All competent belligerents will seek an edge in conflict. Such an edge could be found through new technology, superior numbers, more effective strategy, or innovative tactics. No one has pursued such advantages better than the United States. The American military today is the most asymmetric warfighting machine in the world. All of those so-called “asymmetric warfare” cells and centers scattered throughout DoD are really analyzing how other actors pursue common ways of countering U.S. advantages that are outside our own preferences. These means are often the purview of non-state actors. Perhaps they should be called “uncomfortable warfare” centers, to borrow from Max Manwaring. We are deluding ourselves if we do not recognize the unique ways and means of American warfare, and the fairly commonplace and pervasive application of others’ “asymmetric” approaches to oppose them.

Conflict termination has become even more difficult, and outcomes even more uncertain. I was privileged to be a member of the team called upon by General Dempsey, when he was TRADOC commander, to analyze how the United States ends its wars. The project produced a number of case studies and eventually a book. War aims and desired end states always change over time because wars always take on dynamics of their own, and both sides must agree on final conditions if hostilities are really going to cease. Sometimes vague objectives like “unconditional surrender” are enough to direct military actions, but even in World War II, the final political end states for defeated enemies were not determined until the gunfire stopped. As the United States enters contemporary conflicts with more partners, and against adversaries that that are often loose and shifting coalitions of non-state actors, the number of players who can influence termination has expanded, as has the difficulty of enforcing any sort of agreed upon end state. Mosaic wars require a mosaic peace, which can also vary significantly in character from village to village and region to region. Perhaps the best that can be hoped for in contemporary complex conflicts is to reduce violence to a tolerable level, rather than really conclude them.

Precision targeting is not always the answer. America’s airpower is its greatest asymmetric advantage in major combat operations. The U.S. Air Force has doggedly pursued the ideal of precision bombing since the 1930’s and has achieved truly remarkable levels of accuracy. But when military museums of former enemies develop displays portraying American warfighting, the dominant theme is one of massed airpower (Hanoi even has a separate “Museum to the Victory Over the B-52”). Obviously there are certain propaganda angles that can be exploited from that perspective, but discussions with Chinese, Vietnamese, and Iraqi veterans reveal the persistent power of such images. One of the key motivators that drove so much of the Iraqi Army to go home in 2003 was their memory of B-52s in 1991. Leaflets displaying those aircraft dropping scores of bombs were used to intimidate the Serbs during Operation Allied Force. The deterrent impact of such operations should not be ignored. During the writing of FM 3-24 in 2006, the proposed imperative of “Use the Minimum Level of Force” was finalized as “Use the Appropriate Level of Force,” because of the realization that there are times when one really needs to hammer an enemy to make an impression. And that impact may reverberate for many years, and in the minds of many other potential adversaries.

Who controls the ground controls the message. Despite the strength of American airpower, our real and potential adversaries have developed many ways to counter that asymmetric edge, and not just with expensive anti-access technology. These other approaches include so-called “lawfare” – the push for international legal restrictions on uses of force most commonly employed by the United States – as well as deft information campaigns to cause public backlash against perceived atrocities. As the U.S. military found in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, one of the drawbacks of “long-range precision strike,” whether by Special Operations Forces or a drone, is that whoever controls the ground in the aftermath controls how the media spins the results. America’s enemies have become adept at quickly producing images of destroyed mosques and dead children supposedly from such missions, but often from other, unrelated (or fictional) incidents. The results of investigations that may clear American forces of wrongdoing appear too many news cycles later to change the accepted narrative.

(Continued at the link below)

http://warontherocks.com/2014/09/observations-on-the-long-war/

Read the entire article at Small Wars Journal at the link below.

Reference coindinista and cointra at an NDU panel a week or so ago Conrad Crane, perhaps half in jest, used the term "COINfused."  On the one hand it can be interpreted with some humor as in confused about COIN but upon reflection I thought it could also mean the fusion of both the so-called and mythical coindinistas and cointras fusing the important and valuable ideas from both sides of the debate so that we can capture best practices that can be incorporated into doctrine and training that will support campaign planning and ultimately support good policy and strategy.  

This essay is quite an interpretation But of course the 5 lessons apply to military operations in general and not exclusively COIN.

V/R

Dave

Patton as a Counterinsurgent?: Lessons from an Unlikely COIN-danista

by J. Furman Daniel, III

Journal Article | January 25, 2014 - 9:09am

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/patton-as-a-counterinsurgent-lessons-from-an-unlikely-coin-danista

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Patton as a Counterinsurgent?: Lessons from an Unlikely COIN-danista

J. Furman Daniel, III

Abstract: This essay argues that General George S. Patton Jr. was a surprisingly proficient practitioner of small wars in three different contexts−the 1916-1917 Punitive Expedition to Mexico, the 1942 North Africa campaign, and in 1945 as Pro-Council to occupied Bavaria. While these lesser known campaigns will always be overshadowed by Patton’s other exploits, this essay attempts to accomplish three goals: first, to provide an alternative and more nuanced view of General George Patton; second, to underscore elements from these campaigns which may be of use to modern counterinsurgents; finally, to identify the elements that allowed Patton to succeed as an unlikely counterinsurgent despite his lack of formal training or practical experience. To this end, this essay will first briefly examine Patton’s role in each of these campaigns and will then proceed to an analysis of the factors that made Patton successful and the lessons which can be learned from this unlikely Coin-danista.

Nearly seventy years after his death, General George Patton still evokes many powerful images.[i] Patton is known as a prophet of mechanized warfare, a stubborn adherent to the value of horse cavalry and the sabre, an Olympic athlete, a contradictory mix of prayerful and profane, a mystic believer in atavistic reincarnation, a lifelong student of military history, and one of the most successful and dynamic commanders of the Second World War.[ii] Truly, George Patton is a unique figure in American history and, as such, means many things to many people.[iii]

One thing that Patton is almost never called is a counterinsurgent. Indeed, in many ways, such a label would be misleading. While the US military was heavily engaged in a series of small wars and pacification campaigns during his youth and early career, these experiences were generally denied to Patton. In fact, Patton was never formally trained in counterinsurgency techniques and the closest he came to being educated in these arts was his time as a cavalryman on the Western Plains. Although these deployments were formative experiences that helped Patton develop his leadership style and impressive horsemanship, they were more anachronistic reminders of the battles of the Little Big Horn or Wounded Knee than training for counterinsurgency.[iv] Furthermore, Patton missed opportunities to acquire these skills on the job. Despite a powerful desire to see action, he did not participate in the campaigns in the Philippines, Nicaragua, Panama, Haiti, Russia, or China. These campaigns largely defined the US military during the period and had a profound impact on other future American Generals such as Douglas MacArthur and Dwight Eisenhower.[v]

Given this lack of formal training or practical experience, how can Patton possibly be considered a counterinsurgent? This essay will argue that Patton exhibited these unlikely talents as a counterinsurgent in three distinct campaigns: The 1916-1917 Punitive Expedition to Mexico; the 1942 Campaign in North Africa; and during his brief and controversial tenure as Military Pro-Council to Bavaria in 1945.[vi] While these efforts are less well known than Patton’s Invasion of Sicily, the Cobra breakout, his subsequent attempt to close the Falaise Pocket, or his dramatic relief of Bastone during the Battle of the Bulge, they contain potentially powerful, and overlooked, lessons for students of history and practitioners and the military art.[vii]

By developing this unconventional view of the great general, this essay attempts to accomplish three goals: first, to provide an alternative and more nuanced view of General George Patton; second, to underscore elements from these campaigns which may be of use to modern counterinsurgents; finally, to identify the elements that allowed Patton to succeed as an unlikely counterinsurgent despite his lack of formal training or practical experience.[viii] To this end, this essay will first briefly examine Patton’s role in each of these campaigns and will then proceed to an analysis of the factors that made Patton successful and the lessons which can be learned from this unlikely Coin-danista.

Punitive Expedition to Mexico 1916-17

While the Punitive Expedition in Mexico from 1916-1917 is not one of the more celebrated chapters of US military history, it was an extremely influential episode in the early career of then Lt. George Patton. After initially being tasked to stay behind the expedition at Ft. Bliss, TX, Patton eventually persuaded his friend and mentor General John Pershing to include him as his personal aid during the expedition. In this role, Patton was indispensable to Pershing. Patton was energetic and thirsty for action and he quickly expanded the scope of his duties beyond the typical tasks assigned to a general’s aid.[ix] In addition to delivering messages, clerical work, and personal assistance, Patton served as a scout, an intelligence analyst, an operational planner, an interrogator of prisoners, a forward air observer, a liaison with the local population, and led multiple raids into enemy controlled territory. In essence, Patton was learning the rudiments of low-intensity warfare through an intense inside look at the center of Pershing’s headquarters and by personally leading and directing many of the essential tasks of this unusual mission.

Patton’s most famous exploit of the campaign was on May 14, 1916 when he used three Dodge touring cars to lead a raid on a house which contained rebel leader Julio Cárdenas and two of his men. In a swirling gun fight that recalled scenes of the mythic American West, Patton and his men killed Cárdenas and his two associates as they attempted to first fight and then flee on horseback, strapped their lifeless bodies to the hoods of their cars, and beat a hasty retreat as more of Villa’s fighters arrived on the scene and threatened to overrun their position.

This engagement is notable for more than its dramatic blend of the Army’s horse drawn past and a harbinger of its mechanized future. In addition to being the first mechanized assault in American military history, it was one of the few American successes in an otherwise frustrating and inconclusive campaign. By removing Cárdenas from the insurgent chain of command, this raid greatly curtailed the banditos’ freedom of action in the local area and singled to the local population that the US Army was able to act on local intelligence and mount bold strikes deep into hostile held territory. On a more personal level, this success gained Patton a large amount of favorable press and helped establish his growing reputation as a bright young officer within the US Army. In addition to these laurels, this successful raid was a microcosm of Patton’s early effectiveness at conducting counterinsurgent campaigns.

Patton was successful in this tactical-level counterinsurgency mission for a number of practical and theoretical reasons. First, Patton used his contacts with the local population to gather timely information regarding the whereabouts of the Mexican forces. He then combined this knowledge of the human terrain with his rapid reconnaissance of the geographical landscape. Patton then acted quickly and decisively, traveling as light as possible and making use of the mobility provided to him by his primitive Dodge touring cars. Next, Patton bravely engaged the hostile forces, but was careful to avoid potentially hurting local civilians who were busy cleaning a cow carcass. With a great degree of tactical skill and personal initiative, Patton was then able to fix the enemies’ position and to bring his superior firepower to bear on the insurgents. As the beleaguered bandits attempted a desperate escape on horseback, Patton remembered the old wisdom that he had heard from the Confederate raider John Singleton Mosby to shoot at horse of a fleeing rider and not the man himself. This adage proved accurate, as Patton and his men were able to first drop the horse and then silence the fleeing rider. Once they neutralized their targets, Patton and his forces tied the bandits to the hoods of their vehicles and made a hasty retreat as forces loyal to Cárdenas began to arrive on the scene.

Patton’s first taste of action highlighted his ability to succeed across a wide range of different environments, including a low-intensity counterinsurgency campaign. As will be discussed in greater detail in the Lessons and Conclusions sections of this work, Patton was able to combine his knowledge, cultural skills, leadership, initiative, and his political acumen to achieve tangible tactical results. While this early adventure is often forgotten, it is impressive that as a young and inexperienced officer, Patton could quickly master his tactical situation and harness his impressive array of talents to achieve success in a mission that he was not formally trained to conduct.

(Continued at the link below)

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/patton-as-a-counterinsurgent-lessons-from-an-unlikely-coin-danista

Counter-Insurgency Best Practices: Applicability to Northeast India

An interesting read from the Indian perspective.  Although I am always opposed to new buzzwords to simply rename things when we want to change direction or make an impact, I do like the Indian use of "sub-conventional operations."  Perhaps if we had conceived the 2006 COIN doctrine from the perspective of sub-conventional operations we would not have gone down the road of  the COINdinista versus COINtra with people arguing that COIN is the graduate level of war or not. (my thoughts on this from 2008 are here: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/is-counterinsurgency-the-graduate-level-of-war)

The Indian army also published its first ever Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations[2] in 2006 where the focus was on general features of a successful counter-insurgency campaign from the point of view of the army.

Some interesting excerpts:

To argue for uniqueness however misses an important point; that there are certain common features of counter-insurgency that are valid across time and space as is indicated by the rich literature on counter-insurgency. These practices or features are so commonsensical that one cannot seriously challenge them without appearing spurious. For instance, can one deny the criticality of political primacy in counter-insurgency in a democracy; the significance of people’s support; intelligence; unity of effort; resolute leadership, etc. State agencies that deal with counter-insurgency require a frame of reference in order to have a common map based on which adaptation and learning can take place. Take the case of the Indian army. While the Indian army deals with numerous “unique” insurgencies in the northeast, the doctrine does not offer a recipe that caters to each. Rather, it has a general set of features of what could be optimal counter-insurgency practices, be it intelligence, training, winning hearts and mind, terrain knowledge, leadership

From the conclusion:

In war, of any character, be it conventional or sub conventional, the basic principles are the same: uncertainty, chance, enmity, friction, passion, and violence. But two sides may fight it differently or interpret the principles differently based on capacity and capability. The asymmetry of power plays a major role in counter-insurgency. Insurgencies wage protracted conflicts not only because they want to impose a psychological toll on the counter-insurgency actors but also because they require time to find recruits, generate resources and establish base areas. It must be recognized that the aim of the insurgents is not to kill the counter-insurgency actors but to establish competitive parallel governing structures aimed at controlling the population. The counter-insurgency actors must succeed in breaking the financial, ideological, and intimidation linkages between the population and the insurgents. For the counter-insurgency actors to succeed in this endeavour, popular legitimacy and population influence are the ingredients to success. To achieve this, adaptation and flexibility are the buzz words.

V/R

Dave

Counter-Insurgency Best Practices: Applicability to Northeast India

by Namrata Goswami

Journal Article | December 6, 2012 - 5:30am

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/counter-insurgency-best-practices-applicability-to-northeast-india

In a fight between a fly and a lion, the fly cannot deliver a knockout blow and the lion cannot fly

                                                                                             Lt. Col. David Galula

Abstract

                India has a longstanding counter-insurgency experience in the Northeast; a region that has suffered from multiple insurgencies since the 1950s. This counter-insurgency experience has witnessed its share of successes and failures. This article locates the Indian counter-insurgency experience in the Northeast of India within the conceptual framework of counter-insurgency best practices. The best practices include: Primacy of Political Goals; Centre of Gravity: Population; Counter-Propaganda; Resolute leadership; Intelligence; Unity of Effort; Appropriate Force Structures; Rule of Law; and Operational Clarity. The selected best practices have been identified across the literature as most critical for the successful conduct of counter-insurgency operations. Analyzing the Indian counter-insurgency experience in the Northeast of India within these best practices, the article concludes that ‘popular legitimacy and population support’ are the most critical factors for optimal counter-insurgency outcomes. 

Insurgencies by their very nature are a violent struggle against the state for legitimacy and influence over relevant populations. Therefore, in order to win against any insurgency, the first core insight for any counter-insurgency force is to gain the support of the population. Without this support, it becomes rather difficult, if not impossible, to conduct counter-insurgency operations. Coupled with population support is the criticality of efficient intelligence. However, it is not enough to merely state that population support or intelligence is vital for counter-insurgency; an article on counter-insurgency best practices should ideally provide the path to get there. This article thereby discusses certain counter-insurgency best practices and the means to operationalize these practices on the ground. The best practices selected for focused study in the article are based on a literature survey on counter-insurgency theory, doctrines and manuals of the Indian, British and the US military. This literature, in turn, has been utilized to assess the Indian Army’s counter-insurgency operations in the Northeast of India. This article is meant to be the start of a discussion on counter-insurgency best practices and is not the final word on the subject. There will be many more such exercises with perhaps different lists of best practices for sure. However, every project of this nature must have a well defined scope. Hence, the aim here is to limit the best practices to a manageable number with optimal analysis and debate.

It is often argued that the “most striking single characteristic of insurgencies is their dissimilarity”.[1] 

We are reminded time and again that each insurgency has a unique setting with its own causes, organizational structure, population base, terrain, dynamics of allegiance, etc. Yet despite this caution, societies and their militaries have engaged in rich discussion and published both counter-insurgency theory and field manuals aimed at generalizations across cases. The Indian army also published its first ever Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations[2] in 2006 where the focus was on general features of a successful counter-insurgency campaign from the point of view of the army. I am also deeply aware that each insurgency is unique having conducted fieldwork over the years in conflict affected states in Northeast India. The insurgencies within Assam itself differ from each other, as well as with those in neighbouring states like Manipur and Nagaland. To argue for uniqueness however misses an important point; that there are certain common features of counter-insurgency that are valid across time and space as is indicated by the rich literature on counter-insurgency. These practices or features are so commonsensical that one cannot seriously challenge them without appearing spurious. For instance, can one deny the criticality of political primacy in counter-insurgency in a democracy; the significance of people’s support; intelligence; unity of effort; resolute leadership, etc. State agencies that deal with counter-insurgency require a frame of reference in order to have a common map based on which adaptation and learning can take place. Take the case of the Indian army. While the Indian army deals with numerous “unique” insurgencies in the northeast, the doctrine does not offer a recipe that caters to each. Rather, it has a general set of features of what could be optimal counter-insurgency practices, be it intelligence, training, winning hearts and mind, terrain knowledge, leadership, etc.[3]

There are several extremely rich and detailed documents on counter-insurgency warfare. The most notable amongst them are R W Kromer’s The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort, a 1972 RAND study that detailed the reasons why the British succeeded in Malaya;[4] Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam;[5] David Galula’s Counter-Insurgency Warfare Theory and Practice,[6] which counts as one of the most extensive expositions on the qualities required by counter-insurgency forces to succeed against an insurgency; Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison Taw’s A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency;[7] Frank Kitson’s Low Intensity Operations: Sub-version Insurgency & Peacekeeping;[8] Alastair Horne’s A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962;[9] Roger Trinquier’s Modern Warfare: A French View of Counter-insurgency;[10] C E Callwell’s Small Wars A Tactical Textbook for Imperial Soldiers;[11] Rajesh Rajagopalan’s Fighting Like a Guerrila The Indian Army and Counterinsurgency,[12] David Kilkullen’s influential “Counterinsurgency Redux,[13]etc. Amongst the counter-insurgency doctrines, guides and manuals that have been uitilized for this article are: the Indian Army’s sub-conventional operations doctrine;[14] the United States military’s manual and guides on counter-insurgency;[15] the US Joint doctrine on counter-insurgency operations;[16] the British field manual on counter-insurgency;[17] etc.

(Continued at the link below)

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/counter-insurgency-best-practices-applicability-to-northeast-india