A thought provoking article.

• LAND, STRATEGY & POLICY

’10 Years Of Abject Failure’: Army, SOCOM, Marine Leaders Focus On ‘Strategic Landpower’

By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR. on August 27, 2013 at 11:04 AM

http://breakingdefense.com/2013/08/27/10-years-of-abject-failure-army-socom-marine-leaders-focus-on-strategic-landpower/

FORT BELVOIR: Under the shadow of sequestration and a Navy/Air Force-dominated “Pacific Pivot,” representatives of the Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Command met to discuss the future of what they’re calling “strategic landpower.”

Before I sat in on the first session of the conference, I’d thought “strategic landpower” boiled down to the conventional “Big Army” trying to yoke the politically more popular Special Operations Command and Marine Corps into a common argument for the continued relevance of ground forces, even in a post-Afghanistan era many see as dominated by high-tech air, sea, space, and cyber power. I was half-right.

I was right about the Marine Corps: There were remarkably few Marines in the meeting room at the Fort Belvoir Officers’ Club, and they were on the whole remarkably silent. If you’re familiar with mid-grade Marine officers, who tend to be outspoken warrior-humanists, the idea of them not leaping feet-first into a discussion of the military art is unsettling.

But while Marine leaders want to do right by the Army, with whom they’ve fought shoulder-to-shoulder for the last 12 years, at least some Marines are uneasy that embracing “strategic landpower” may hobble their longed-for return to seaborne operations. They are also uneasy that “strategic landpower” is often seen as an counterargument to “Air-Sea Battle,” the favorite concept of their parent service, the Navy. (“This had nothing to do with Air-Sea Battle, just to be clear,” said one Army officer wearily after I raised the subject. “Air-Sea Battle is a good idea.”) So everything I saw today reinforced my sense that the Marine Corps, collectively, is conflicted about Gen. Odierno’s effort.

Not so SOCOM. Officers from the Army slice of Special Operations Command were a numerous and outspoken lot on Monday afternoon — so outspoken, in fact, that when conference administrators warned there was a reporter in the room (me) and reminded everyone that all comments were not for attribution, the ranking special operator spoke up at once:

“I don’t believe in non-attribution,” said Maj. Gen. Bennet Sacolick, the director of force management and development at SOCOM and a co-host of the conference. “Anything I say I stand behind,” he said. “You can quote me.”

The veteran special operator was well worth quoting. For example, when one participant said the strategic landpower effort was created in large part to institutionalize a decade of improvements since 9/11, such as better interservice cooperation and new skills in working with local populations, Sacolick — who was present at the creation of the concept — bluntly said, that’s wrong.

“It wasn’t built on 10 years of kumbayah on the battlefield; it was built on 10 years of frustration [and] not working together properly,” Sacolick said. “It wasn’t 10 years of wonderful success. It was 10 years of abject failure that we don’t want to repeat.”

“There is too much self-congratulatory talk,” agreed RAND scholar Linda Robinson, who also gave me permission to quote her by name. “Looking at everything that has happened over the last decade until now, we are not good enough at ‘shape and influence’” — the military terms for getting people, groups, and governments to do what we wantwithout having to shoot at them first.

In Afghanistan and Iraq, said Sacolick, “most of our successes on both those fronts came not from shooting people but from talking to them…. living with people and talking to them in their native language.” That said, he added bluntly, soft-speaking won’t be taken seriously unless you have the proverbial big stick to back it up. “What makes my guys effective in Afghanistan is not their diplomatic skills, quite frankly,” he said. “It’s the threat of force.”

Historically, the conventional “big Army” has been all about the big stick, while the Special Forces were about speaking softly in the local language (and still shooting people when they had to). Having become deeply interdependent in Afghanistan and Iraq, the special and conventional soldiers are now converging on a concept called, tentatively, “the human domain.”

It’s the idea that long-term strategic success comes, not from blowing stuff up until the enemy surrenders, but from figuring out how other people think so we can influence their actions. The means of influence range from building schools to giving bribes to, yes, blowing things up — but only carefully chosen things.

“We went into Iraq with a target list and an order of battle [and] zero appreciation for the complexities of the human domain, the environment, that we were about to step into,” said one Army participant. “Others did, and it was dismissed.” The conventional military was wildly successful at destroying its list of targets and routing Iraqi units, he went on, but that turned out not to be enough. As a result, he said, the story of 2003 was “statue falls, high five, we’re done — oh, not so much.”

“We didn’t understand,” he repeated.

(Continued at the link below)

http://breakingdefense.com/2013/08/27/10-years-of-abject-failure-army-socom-marine-leaders-focus-on-strategic-landpower/

N. Korea tried to export gas masks to Syria: media

Should be no surprise here.  But I wonder if actions like these are affecting the north's decision making calculus regarding Kaesong, Family Reunions, and Kumgangsan.  If the regime is not able to get hard currency through its weapons proliferation and military equipment sales, then perhaps that is contributing to the charm offensive with the ROK.  I think we should keep in mind that the effects of an aggressive international campaign against the regime's Department or Office 39 could be far reaching on a number of levels in both the short and long term.

V/R

Dave

N. Korea tried to export gas masks to Syria: media

http://news.yahoo.com/n-korea-tried-export-gas-masks-syria-media-044646212.html

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4 hours agoForeign PolicyPoliticsSyriaTurkey

North Korea tried to export gas masks to Syria but they were seized in Turkey along with arms and ammunition, a Japanese daily said Tuesday, as the US threatened action over an alleged chemical weapons attack.

A Libyan-registered vessel, identified as Al En Ti Sar, left North Korea for Syria earlier this year with the consignment, the Sankei Shimbun said, quoting unnamed sources from the US military, Japanese and South Korean intelligence.

The US military, which obtained the information, was tracking the ship in coordination with other countries, the daily -- which is known for its North Korea coverage -- said in a detailed report.

The vessel sailed through Dardanelles in Turkey on April 3 and was searched shortly after by Turkish authorities, who had been tipped off by the US.

Turkish officials seized 1,400 rifles and pistols and some 30,000 bullets as well as gas masks apparently for chemical protection, the daily said.

View gallery."

Graphic on a shipment of gas masks, arms and ammunition bound for Syria from North Korea and seized  …

US authorities believe that the ship was intending to unload its cargo in Turkey and send it overland to President Bashar al-Assad's regime, the Sankei said.

(Continued at the link below)

http://news.yahoo.com/n-korea-tried-export-gas-masks-syria-media-044646212.html

10 Brutal North Korean Secrets

Good reminder on the brutality of the Kim Family Regime.

V/R

Dave

10 Brutal North Korean Secrets

ANDREW HANDLEY AUGUST 26, 2013

HTTP://LISTVERSE.COM/2013/08/26/10-BRUTAL-NORTH-KOREAN-SECRETS/

If the Kim family had their way, the entire world would think North Korea was a beautiful paradise and that every one of its leaders was a blessing sent straight from heaven. Needless to say, North Korea’s media has a slight penchant for bias, and thanks to their strict tourism policy (anyone can visit as long as they’re already in the country), it’s difficult to get a firm grasp on what actually goes on inside the borders of this closed, totalitarian state. But thanks to a few daring undercover journalists who snuck in, along with gruesome reports from defected North Koreans who snuck out, we’re getting a better picture of how the cogs turn behind the veil of this great propaganda machine. And it’s not pretty.

10Labor Camps

North Korea currently operates about 16 labor camps—massive compounds scattered across the mountainous terrain and enclosed by electrified barbed wire fences. It’s estimated that somewhere around 200,000 prisoners are held in these camps at any given time.

The prison cities are often compared to the Gulag camps of Soviet Russia—forced labor camps in which prisoners are held in brutal working conditions and executed for crimes as petty as stealing a few kernels of corn. Prisoners are usually a mix of defectors, traitors, and ex-politicians who ran afoul of the government—a fairly easy thing to do.

9Three Generations Of Punishment

North Korean law dictates a “three generations of punishment” policy: If you commit a crime, your children and grandchildren will carry the stains of your sin and be punished accordingly. That means that if your grandfather committed a crime, you get to bear the full brunt of his punishment. As mentioned above, this usually leads to entire lives spent inside prison camps. One of the worst offenses that a North Korean can commit is attempting to leave North Korea, which can justify either immediate execution or an extended sentence in one of their labor camps.

Criticizing the government, no matter how slightly, is also considered a treasonous offense. Simply learning about other cultures warrants a death sentence. Recent smuggling between the border of North Korea and China has allowed some people to get DVDs of Western movies—which are illegal. The North Korean National Security Agency has begun raiding villages in the north of the country by shutting off the electricity to a whole village then storming into houses and checking which DVDs are stuck in the DVD player.

8Insurance Fraud

The North Korean economy is, in all measurable aspects, completely failing. Exports are virtually nonexistent due to their reluctance to interact with foreign markets, as well as the fact that they struggle to feed everyone living within their own borders. The current population of North Korea is about 25 million, and the average GDP per person is about $500 (for comparison, in the US it hovers around $50,000).

To supplement their ailing economy and bring in more money, North Korea has been known to turn to international crime. One of these crimes is global insurance fraud: They’ve conned Western insurance companies out ofhundreds of millions of dollars. Brought to light in 2009, it turns out that the North Korean government had been taking out huge insurance policies on property and equipment, then claiming that it had been destroyed.

In 2005, several of the world’s largest insurance companies, including Lloyd’s of London, took North Korea to court over an alleged helicopter crash with a $58 million insurance policy. When North Korea’s state-run courts “reviewed” the case, they announced that it was a legitimate claim. The insurance companies settled because their contract was subject to North Korean law, which is a bit like playing “I win” with a toddler.

7Arms Dealing

Insurance fraud aside, the United Nations has also accused North Korea of selling illegal weapons and nuclear technology to the highest bidder, which usually means countries in Africa and the Middle East. For example, in 2012, the UN seized a North Korean shipment heading to Syria which contained nearly 450 graphite cylinders meant for use in ballistic missiles. In 2009, shipments to both Iran and the Republic of Congo were caught in transit—one had 35 tons of missile components, and the other contained Soviet-era tanks.

According to UN sanctions, North Korea has been banned from trading or selling missile technology, but North Korea came right back out and said that it’s actually the sanctions that are illegal, and they can do whatever they want. It’s hardly a surprise then that North Korea’s arms trade isn’t slowing down at all. Like the insurance fraud, it’s a much needed source of revenue for the government—although according to Blaine Harden at the Washington Post, the majority of that money goes into Kim Jong Un’s personal stash rather than toward food for his people.

(Continued at the link below)

HTTP://LISTVERSE.COM/2013/08/26/10-BRUTAL-NORTH-KOREAN-SECRETS/

A bright spell in the Korean Peninsula By Joseph R DeTrani

A slight quibble:  the 1953 Armistice did end the Korean War, it only temporarily suspended the fighting. The war is not yet over.

Only time will tell if the Ambassador's thesis is correct: e.g., that this summer's charm offensive is actually an attempt at de-escalation of tension by the Kim Family Regime.

I am one of the doubters but as always I hope to be proven wrong.

V/R
Dave

A bright spell in the Korean Peninsula By Joseph R DeTrani http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/KOR-01-260813.html On the 60th anniversary of the end of the Korean War, there is reason for guarded optimism that a peaceful resolution of tension with North Korea is achievable. The last 20 years have conditioned us to believer that North Korea will persist, despite periods of apparent reconciliation, with its nuclear weapons and missile programs, despite United Nations sanctions and international condemnation. It's possible that North Korea's new leadership recently assessed the benefits that would accrue from denuclearization, in terms of security assurances, economic assistance, foreign investment and ultimately normal relations and international legitimacy, and  concluded that a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue is in North Korea's interest. Relations with North Korea during the last six months have been tense. After North Korea's February 2013 nuclear test and the subsequent imposition of United Nations sanctions, North Korea assumed an aggressive posture: Threatening the US with a pre-emptive nuclear strike and to make Seoul "a sea of flames", unilaterally closing the Kaesong Industrial Complex and pledging to build more nuclear weapons, to include uranium enriched nuclear weapons. These threats, from a Kim Jong-eun, a leader who initially removed some of the hardline supporters of his father and spoke of economic reforms, were unexpected and resulted in a display of US and South Korean military might that showed the two forces could effectively deal with any military threat from North Korea. This, indeed, was a tense and unfortunate period. Any miscalculation from either side could have sparked military conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Fortunately, this did not happen. For the past six weeks, tensions on the Korean Peninsula have eased. The initial visit of North Korea Vice Marshal Choe Ryong-hae to Beijing, who met with President Xi Jinping and others in the Chinese leadership, no doubt was North Korea's attempt to maintain a good relationship with a China that was critical of North Korea's brinksmanship, as evidenced by Beijing's support for intensified UN sanctions in March 2013 and their decision to cease banking relations with North Korea's Foreign Trade Bank. I view the visit of Vice Marshal Choe, a close confidant of Kim, as the beginning of North Korea's de-escalation of tension, in an apparent effort to maintain good relations with a China they depend upon for food and energy assistance. On August 14, South Korea and North Korea agreed to re-open the Kaesong Industrial Complex, pledging "not to shut it down again under any circumstances" and to "internationalize" Kaesong to foreign investors. This is an important agreement. For North Korea, it means about 50,000 workers from the North have jobs, in addition to an annual revenue of more than US$30 million for North Korea. Immediately following this agreement, the South's President Park Geun-hye said that the two Koreas should resume arranging reunions of families separated by the Korean War and she renewed her proposal to build an "international peace park" inside the demilitarized zone. In response, North Korea agreed to the South's proposal to resume the reunion of families separated in the Korean War. These reunions should take place on September 19, 2013, during the Chuseok Harvest Festival. North Korea also will call for the resumption of tours from the South to Mount Kumgang, which will remain problematic until the North complies with Park's request that the North apologize for the death of a South Korean tourist to Mount Kumgang a few years ago. This significant easing of tension between the two Koreas is encouraging and appears to be a policy approach now being pursued by the leadership in Pyongyang. (Continued at the link below) http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/KOR-01-260813.html

Foreign Policy by Whisper and Nudge By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

Unfortunately this is true:

But what we’ve learned in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, Egypt and Syria is that it is very hard to change another country’s internal behavior — especially at a cost and in a time frame that the American public will tolerate — because it requires changing a country’s political culture and getting age-old adversaries to reconcile.

But I fear we are going to get sucked into another rathole in Syria if we execute the first part of the statement below and then think (and hope – despite there being no hope) that we can accomplish the second part.

For instance, if it is proved that Syria has used chemical weapons, American officials are rightly considering using cruise missiles to punish Syria. But we have no hope of making Syria united, democratic and inclusive without a much bigger involvement and without the will of a majority of Syrians.

V/R
Dave 

August 24, 2013

Foreign Policy by Whisper and Nudge

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/25/opinion/sunday/friedman-foreign-policy-by-whisper-and-nudge.html?emc=eta1&_r=0&pagewanted=print

IF you follow the commentary on American foreign policy toward Egypt and the broader Middle East today, several themes stand out: People in the region argue: “Whatever went wrong, the United States is to blame.” Foreign policy experts argue: “Whatever President Obama did, he got it wrong.” And the American public is saying: “We’re totally fed up with that part of the world and can’t wait for the start of the N.F.L. season. How do you like those 49ers?”

There is actually a logic to all three positions.

It starts with the huge difference between cold-war and post-cold-war foreign policy. During the cold war, American foreign policy “was all about how we affect the external behavior of states,” said Michael Mandelbaum, the Johns Hopkins University foreign affairs expert. We were ready to overlook the internal behavior of states, both because we needed them as allies in the cold war and because, with the Russians poised on the other side, any intervention could escalate into a superpower confrontation.

Post-cold-war foreign policy today is largely about “affecting the internal composition and governance of states,” added Mandelbaum, many of which in the Middle East are failing and threaten us more by their collapse into ungoverned regions — not by their strength or ability to project power.

But what we’ve learned in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, Egypt and Syria is that it is very hard to change another country’s internal behavior — especially at a cost and in a time frame that the American public will tolerate — because it requires changing a country’s political culture and getting age-old adversaries to reconcile.

The primary foreign policy tools that served us so well in the cold war, said Mandelbaum, “guns, money, and rhetoric — simply don’t work for these new tasks. It is like trying to open a can with a sponge.”

To help another country change internally requires a mix of refereeing, policing, coaching, incentivizing, arm-twisting and modeling — but even all of that cannot accomplish the task and make a country’s transformation self-sustaining, unless the people themselves want to take charge of the process.

In Iraq, George W. Bush removed Saddam Hussein, who had been governing that country vertically, from the top-down, with an iron fist. Bush tried to create the conditions through which Iraqis could govern themselves horizontally, by having the different communities write their own social contract on how to live together. It worked, albeit imperfectly, as long as U.S. troops were there to referee. But once we left, no coterie of Iraqi leaders emerged to assume ownership of that process in an inclusive manner and thereby make it self-sustaining.

(Continued at the link below)

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/25/opinion/sunday/friedman-foreign-policy-by-whisper-and-nudge.html?emc=eta1&_r=0&pagewanted=print

N. Korea appears to struggle to woo Chinese investors

This may be helping to drive regime back to Kaesong.  Perhaps China is deliberately keeping its investors away (then again maybe they do not need to be kept away and they are making these decisions on their own since they have been burned by the Kim Family Regime so many times).

V/R
Dave

(Yonhap Feature) N. Korea appears to struggle to woo Chinese investors

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/08/23/33/0301000000AEN20130823004100315F.html

2013/08/23 14:26

BEIJING, Aug. 23 (Yonhap) -- The only sign of activity at the North Korean trade promotion agency here in Beijing is the faintly lit banner in front, and it is hard to tell whether the office is open for business.

No one is seen at the reception desk of North Korea's Investment and Development Group building, located in a northern Beijing suburb, and its front door, though appears to be open, remains stationary for most of a weekday.

"North Koreans are still working there," said a Chinese cleaner near the building, who only gave his surname Wu.

The Beijing branch of North Korea's Investment and Development Group was believed to have launched operations early last year, but it appears certain to be a dead duck as the North's unpredictability continues to keep Chinese investors away.

Its website has not posted any statement since Jan. 23 this year, and there was no response to a phone call made on Aug. 16.

A South Korean diplomatic source in Beijing, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said the North Korean branch has been dormant since the North's defiant launch of a long-range rocket last December.

Tensions on the Korean Peninsula soared early this year, with North Korea conducting its third nuclear test and its near-daily war threats during an annual joint military drill between South Korea and the United States.

(Continued at the link below)

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/08/23/33/0301000000AEN20130823004100315F.html

Double-Crossing on the Border (north Korea)

More indications of problems.  The additional incentives for guards to double cross smugglers and defectors likely indicates the regime's fear of losing control on the border.  I think it is also interesting that Soldiers might still be obsessed with getting Party membership.  I think we should recall that the military and security services are made up of mostly those from the wavering classes of society (see Robert Collins' work on Songbun at the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea).  But the final paragraph should give us some hope (however slight) because it illustrates some resistance potential and it is this mindset that will ultimately create the resistance necessary for change and if properly supported people with this attitude will be important during the unification process.

However, the source pointed out that the current policy will have an effect on people who trade in smuggled goods, but that ultimately people will find a way to circumvent the problem. “They think we cannot compete with the soldier who is obsessed with party membership,” the source explained, “but we say ‘if this is how you decided to treat us, we will find our own way to stand up to it.’”

Double-Crossing on the Border

By Kang Mi Jin [2013-08-23 12:56 ] http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk01500&num=10878

Although there is still plenty of smuggling taking place in North Korea with the active collusion of border guards, there have recently been a number of cases in which border guards double-crossed their links, reporting on them in order to obtain alternative benefits. A source from North Hamkyung Province told Daily NK about one case yesterday, “Earlier this month a group of people tried to defect across the Tumen River near Hyesan. The moment they tried to cross the river they were arrested by border guards.” “A guard who had promised to help them didn’t show up; indeed, I heard it was him who reported them,” she explained. The source then went on, “The soldier who was suspected of reporting them received a vacation from his unit and went home. People are very resentful. They wonder how someone could do that, no matter how obsessed with getting Party membership he may have been.” (Continued at the link below) http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk01500&num=10878