Putting Statistics to Work in a Land of Illusions (north Korea)

I have heard Nick Eberstadt at some conferences on Korea.  He has done a lot of analysis of the statistical information that the north provides.  In one example I vividly remember he showed how the data that north Korea provided show that population in north Korea actually increased during the great famine of 1994-1996 when the objective analysis shows that  more than a million likely starved to death.  Furthermore, the north Korean data on infant mortality at one time at least showed that north had a superior infant mortality rate than the US.

And I do not think that this program "risks" that these students will return to the north to be able to manipulate the data for the regime, I guarantee that it will whether by direction or necessity on the part of the newly minted statistician.  Since advancement in the north occurs because of demonstrated loyalty to Kim Jong-un with one of the measure of loyalty being how good you make him and the Kim Family Regime look I believe that the statistics education these students receive will be put to good use for both the regime and their own personal benefit (e.g., survival).  There is no way that these statisticians can ever report bad statistical news so they have to be very good at manipulating the numbers to tell the right story to and for the regime.

But in the long run I concur with Nick Eberstadt that this kind of engagement is good and can have long term positive effects and should be continued. The opportunity to influence some potentially important technocrats (they are all well-vetted and have to be loyal members of the regime) as well as potentially establish relationships that can later be exploited should not be passed up.

V/R

Dave

• THE NUMBERS GUY
• Updated January 18, 2013, 7:50 p.m. ET

Putting Statistics to Work in a Land of Illusions

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324468104578248451947354498.html#printMode

• By CARL BIALIK

Wanted: statisticians to teach their craft in what many experts call the country with the least reliable statistics in the world.

The Pyongyang Summer Institute in Survey Science and Quantitative Methodology last year began teaching students at North Korea's first private university about such topics as probability, correlation and survey methodology. More than 250 students, mostly in their 20s, learned from 13 instructors from the U.S. and Europe. This summer, the institute hopes to have 30 teachers instructing 250 students and 100 government workers.

Since North Korea's establishment in 1948, its authoritarian regimes have made it state policy to conceal many statistics from the outside world, say researchers. Here, North Koreans shown last month leaving the statues of late North Korean leaders Kim Il Sung, left, and Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang.

Several students sought grants to apply the knowledge in year-long projects, such as using statistical techniques to create a plan for an ice-cream business in Pyongyang, or to study college students' television-watching behavior, according to the institute's director, Asaph Young Chun.

In the U.S., these could be the unremarkable activities of an introductory stats course at a college summer program. In North Korea, they are extraordinary events that could have positive effects, but also come with risks, North Korea researchers say. Since the country's establishment in 1948, its authoritarian regimes have made it state policy to conceal many statistics from the outside world, and to falsify some of the numbers they do release, according to researchers.

The Numbers Guy blog

• Statistical Diplomacy in North Korea

"Trying to describe North Korea statistically for a statistician is like [climbing] Mount Everest," said Nicholas Eberstadt, a demographer at the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative Washington, D.C., think tank. "It's the last place on earth where one can't find regular, reliable data on a national scale."

Organizers of the summer statistical institute, known as PSI, say their goal is education and promoting engagement between scientists from different countries, without any political intent. "We are there to serve them, to learn from them," Dr. Chun said of the institute's students, who last summer were drawn from the institute's host school, the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology, which opened in 2010.

Some researchers familiar with North Korea's official statistics worry that training young people in proper statistical techniques won't achieve its goal, or will even backfire. Marcus Noland, director of studies at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, D.C., who has experience in similar training programs in arbitration and economic policy in North Korea, said graduates of the program likely "will never be able to put their new skills to use," because the government isn't equipped or willing to let them do so.

(Continued at the link below)

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324468104578248451947354498.html#printMode

More or less: The debate on U.S. grand strategy

This is a good conversation starter for all thinkers and practitioners.  What is the right way ahead from a grand strategy perspective?

V/R
Dave

More or less: The debate on U.S. grand strategy

Posted By Stephen M. Walt  Wednesday, January 2, 2013 - 5:34 PM   Share

http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/01/02/more_or_less_the_debate_on_us_grand_strategy

If you'd like to start 2013 by sinking your teeth into the debate on U.S. grand strategy, I recommend you start with two pieces in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs. Both are by good friends of mine, and together they nicely limn the contours of a useful debate on America's global role. It's also worth noting that there are realists on both sides of this particular exchange, which reminds us that agreement on fundamental principles doesn't necessarily yield agreement on policy conclusions.

The first piece is Barry Posen's "Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy," and the second is Stephen Brooks, John Ikenberry, and William Wohlforth's "Lean Forward: In Defense of American Engagement." (A longer version of the B, I & W argument can be found in the latest issue of International Security; Posen's argument is outlined at length in a forthcoming book.)

Dedicated readers of this blog know that I am largely in agreement with Posen's position, so I'm going to focus today on what I find lacking in B, I & W. Like all of their work, it's vigorously argued and the longer version is richly documented. But all those footnotes cannot save it from some serious weaknesses.

First, B, I, & W straw-man their target by lumping together a group of strategic thinkers whose differences are at least as significant as their points of agreement. The "proponents of retrenchment" that they criticize range from libertarian isolationists who want to bring virtually all US forces home to "offshore balancers" like Posen who support a robust but less extravagant defense budget and favor not isolationism but merely more limited forms of international engagement. Needless to say, there is a world of difference in these views (even if both are broadly in favor of doing less), and so many of B, I & W's broad-brush charges miss their mark.

Second, there is something deeply puzzling about B, I & W's devotion to what Ikenberry used to called "liberal hegemony," and what he and his co-authors now prefer to call "deep engagement." B, I & W argue that deep engagement has been America's grand strategy since World War II and they believe it was the optimal strategy for the bipolar Cold War, when the United States faced a global threat from a major great-power rival. Not only was the USSR a formidable military power, but it was also an ideological rival whose Marxist-Leninist principles once commanded millions of loyal followers around the world.

Here's the puzzle: the Soviet Union disappeared in 1992, and no rival of equal capacity has yet emerged. Yet somehow "deep engagement" is still the optimal strategy in these radically different geopolitical circumstances. It's possible that U.S. leaders in the late 1940s hit on the ideal grand strategy for any and all structural conditions, but it is surely odd that an event as significant as the Soviet collapse can have so few implications for how America deals with the other 190-plus countries around the globe.

(Continued at the link below)

http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/01/02/more_or_less_the_debate_on_us_grand_strategy